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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The central question of the Chinese revolution is also the central 
question of the changing world; how can men liberate themselves from 
all kinds of alienation in the existing systems? How can they break 
the network of the ties of oppression, obedience and fear? How can they 
build new social and political organisation based on communication and 
responsibility? 
A revolutionary transformation means not only a replacement of a 
group in supreme power with another group within a short period of time, 
but also a replacement of the whole system of government and socioeconomic 
organisation and, above all, the whole social value system with new 
egalitarian one in the daily life of the people. In this sense, the 
Chinese Communist revolution is the first and the 1nost profound revolu-
tion in this century. Moreover, the all existing values have been 
challenged by the new value system of the Chinese Communists, which 
they have attempted to put into practice. It is so different from any 
existing value system in human history that it is little understood by 
the 'China experts' outside the country. 
The whole process of the Chinese Communist revolution was directed 
to free the whole Chines.e population from alienation, in its broader 
sense, whd.ch is now the primary challenge of Marxism to both highly 
industrialised and 'underdeveloped' societies. It suggests to the third 
world a way to 'modernise' itself by its own efforts, as Dr. Mark Selden 
has maintained throughout his fascinating book, The Yenan Way in Revolu-
tionary China, that is, how can the people be capable and industrious 
when they are ev1~n partly freed from alienation. It is, of course, not 
only the problems of alienation that is presented by the Chinese revolu-
tion, but also the problems of political and economic organisation. 
-
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These organisations, however, are designed to minimise social alienation 
of their components. As suggested in the CCP's·concern with the elimina-
tion of the 'three great differentials' in the Cultural Revolution, the 
problem of alienation is a focal point in the Communist revolution. This 
is also the question of the Chinese way to corrununist society. 
Mass mobilisation by the CCP in the Yenan: period included all these 
questions, and moreover, the 'Yenan way' seems now to be considered by 
the CCP a possible shortcut to communist society. Mobilisation of every 
individual in the Communist territory was necessitated by the war 
circumstances in the Yenan period, but its achievement went beyond its 
minimul goal, survival. In the process of mass mobilisation in the Yenan 
period, the CCP challenged almost all the existing values, customs 
and habits in rural China which had tied up energy and activism of the 
peasants. It was difficult work, but the Party succeeded to an impressive 
extent in a drastic transformation of social values, in addition to the 
changes in political and economic systems. The experience of Yenan 
mass mobilisation formed the basis of the Party's challenge1to the 
existing ways in the 'modernisation' of China after 1949. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
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1. Abbreviations 
CCP 
CFJP 
Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu 
Chin-Sui 
KMT 
Mao, I, II, III, or IV 
SKN 
SMR 
2. Measurement units 
J. catty 
loo· catties 
l Chinese dollar (yuan) 
1 hsiang (shang) 
l mou 
l pic:ul 
l tcm 
3. Names 
NOTES 
Chinese Communist Party 
Chieh-fang jih-pao 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei 
Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan 
Shantung-Sui yuan 
viii 
Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) 
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tunq, Volume 1, 
2, 3 or 4 
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia 
South Manchurian Railway Company 
= 'l.3 lb. or 0.6 kilograms 
= l picul or 0.6 quintal 
= •US$0.33 (1936) 
= ,3 mou or 0.45 acre 
= •0.15 acre 
=·133.3 lb. 
= l peck or 10 catties 
For Chinese and Japanese names, surnames are put first, and for 
western names, surnames are put last. 
4. Books by Mark Selden and Richard Solomon 
The two books, Yenan Way i.n Revolutionary China),i.i Ma.rk Sel.,len wri.d. 
Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture by Richard 
Solomon were published after the first draft of this thesis had 
been completed. Similar conclusions of this thesis to that of 
these i:wo books, therefore, have been reached independently. 
,.ot ... 
CHAPTER l 
INTRODUCTION 
The Yenan period of Chinese Communist history is attracting 
renewed attention from students of contemporary China, partly as a 
result of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, some aspects of 
which have been interpreted as an attempt to revive ·the Yenan spirit. 
The reinvocation of the Yenan spirit has been a recurring feature of 
Chinese politics since 1949; examples are the Socialist High Tide and 
the Great Leap Forward, when the slogans of the Yenan mass movements 
were revived and the 'glorious tradition' of Yenan was stressed. In 
the Cultural Revolution, it :Ls clearly identified in the line represented 
by the policies of Mao Tse-tung, whatever interpretation one places on 
the line pursued by Mao's oppon~nts, Liu Shao-ch'i and his supporters. 
There are, of course, significant differences between 'Yenan-type' 
policies after 1949 and the policies of the Yenan period itself. In 
the Yenan period, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to depend almost 
entirely on the peasant masses, to emancipate through basic social and 
political reforms the mass energy which had been contained by the exist-
ing authoritarian social system in order to sustain the resistance and 
survive through the struggles with Japan and the Kuomintang (KMT). Since 
1949 the Yenan strategy has not been so much a matter of survival as a 
political and economic policy to which Mao has resorted to meet new 
challenges or to resolve developing crises. This practice, and partic-
ularly the experience of the Cu]. tural Revolution, make it important 
that the Yenan period itself should be subjected to further scrutiny i~ 
the contemporary policies and strategies of the Chinese leadership are 
to be more fully understood. 
2 
1. Some Comments on the Existing Literature 
on the Yenan Period 
In the early years after the Chinese Cornmt·.nist Party came ·to 
power, most western commentators doubted that the Communist government· 
enjoyed genuine mass support, partly because Communist strength during 
the war against Japan was generally un5erestimated by foreign observers, 
and.to many, the Communist victory over the KMT in ~he Civil War came 
as a complete surprise. In the first decade of the People's Republic, 
mutual hostility between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, and 
the impact of the Cold War and the Korean War, had a profound influence 
on studies of Chinese Communist politics and society in the western 
world. Although there were exceptions, a great deal of writing on China 
in this period presented a simple 'polemical' image of 'totalitarian' 
misery; the people were oppressed and forced to do the bidding ·of the 
CCP, which was that they should have no pursuit other than to work hard. 
They had an extremely low standard of living, and were onLy waiting for 
a leader to overthrow the Communist regime. Even during the Cultural 
Revolution this image was revived anu the Communist government in China 
was hopefully thought to be on the verge of collapse by a number of 
observers in the western world. 
rt seems unnecessary now to argue that the alleged vulnerability 
of Communist power in China was only an illusion o= the anti-communist 
world. In the process of·the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, 
China has shown that Communist rule is firmly rooted in the support of 
the people and that it is unlikely to collapse in the foreseeable 
future. 
Insufficient attention has been given, ·~owever; to the important 
quE'>stion of why and how the Ch~nese c?mn;unists. succeeded .in winning 
active support from the people, especially'·ai;. the basic .level. ·It is,: 
.. 
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of course, impossible to analyse what happened in the minds of the 
illiterate Chinese masses, because of the complei:e lack of source mate-
rials. Virtually, all the material available is written by intellectuals,. 
not by the 'masses' themselves, and there is a question of how far the 
intellectuals were in a position to understand exactly what happened to 
the masses. The CCP has been conducting oral history projects on the 
process of the revolution at the basic level of society, and while the 
results do provide some sources which represent the viewpoint of the 
masses, t: ;y are still few in number and the presentation of material is 
possibly modified by the peasant's experiences after 1949. 
Of the western studies which have been made so far, two important 
articles by Richard Solomon concentrate on the question of how the masses 
turned from traditional to new patterns of behaviour, and the significance 
of this transformation in the establishment of the CCP's authority and 
l power. Analysing the traditional pattern of human relations and the 
psychology of the basic people in Chinese society, he points out that 
the CCP tried to mobilise personal resentment and hostility and channel 
the resulting emotions towards political ends. 2 From his study of Mao's 
Selected Works Solomon argues that Mao completed his conceptualisation of 
mass mobilisation techniques in the early 1940s. subsequently, the 
successful implementation of the tactics of mass mobilisation, which are 
still applied in the stage of socialist construction. were established 
l Richard H. Solomon, "Communication Patterns and the Chinese Revolu-
tion," China Quarterly, No.32 (October-December 1967), pp.88-110; "On 
Activism and Activists," ibici., No.39, pp.76-114. He also deals with the 
same topic as that which provides the subject of the first of these two 
articles, in "Mao's Effort tc Reintegrate the Chinese Polity: Problems 
of Authority and Conflict in Chinese Social Processes," in A. Doak Bar-
·~ett,' ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action, (Seattle: 1967), pp. 
:271-361. These arti~les are included in Solomon's recently published 
book, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, (Berkeley: 1971). 
: 2 
"On Activism and Activists," p.86. 
. ... 
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.·in. a series of mass movements launched from 1942 onwards. 
The Yenan period is divided into two distinct phases, by the point 
·Of,. commencement of the Party rectification (cheng·-feng) campaign in 
E!ar.ly 1.94 2" The first phase was characterised by emphasis on the 
:'united. front with the KMT, and the second by the ::oncentration of the 
.· .· 
CCP 's e'nergies on a series of mass movements. In the last three chap-
ters of his recently published book, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary 
China, 1 which is the first comprehensive study of socioeconomic trans-
formation in the Shensi-Kansu-Nighsia (SKN) Border Region under Commun-
ist con~rol, Mark Selden has examined the evolution of mass mobilisation 
techniques by the CCP. He stresses that in terms of mass mobilisation, 
the period after the rectification campaign was almost entirely differ-
ent from the preceding period, and that the CCP's mass line techniques 
were developed in action in the process of the series of mass movements 
launched in the second period. Both Solomon and Selden make the point 
that the mass movements were important in producing the political 
activists who were essential to the success of the CCP, in that they 
provided the new local leaders and Party members. 
The present study is concerned with the general problems discussed 
by these two writers but with a different focus and in an attempt to 
answer somewhat different questions. Solomon's interest is in the psy-
chological transformation of the individual peasants; Selden is concern-
ed with the evolution of the CCP's socioeconomic transformation policies 
and techniques in the SKN Border Region. This study deals with the 
1 Published by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., in 1971. 
The first two chapterB of this book were published in the China Quarter-
ly, Nos. 28 & 29 (October-December 1966 & January-March 1967), under 
the title of "The Guerrilla Mavemerit in Northwest China: The Origins 
of .the Shensi-Kansu-Nirighsia Bo)'.'der. Region;" and the last two chapters 
are included in Barnett, ed: ;· op.,cit.,.;. )inder. the,-.title".of "The Yenan 
Legacy: The Mass Linei'.,.PJ?-.99-1,51'..: .... ·:.·:" '.·:., .. 
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. · qrg.;nis·a~·i,;n!!.l;-. J<P:si s ·of;· a·na poli t"ical ·:~xplanations for, mass mobilisa-
.' ' ·: ·' . . . . . ' ·. .· . " ~. . . : . . . . ·. : : . 
:. · ..... · ·· tio~·. ··-.°.on ··th~ .. q~~stion of ~oi:it.icai· expla~ations, it is concerned 
· · :.·' . . · ·• .:.:.~~~·0i:~.~~~~·l;.·:·~i·~~:-;° f~~: .. ~fv~i ·~~~~~P~~t~~{ons ... of revolution or class 
. .· ' ·:.- .. : .. :' . .. ·-.:· .... ··.··::::. \ ·:-.: ... ·:·:·.: ; .. ·;·;·,. : ..... · .. ·. . 1 
» struggl<c,· ~nd· n?.t.i,on;l.J):sjn;. ?.S"·t!)e ·princi1>al.political factor. Debate 
·. ' .. 
.,. ·~bout: ~a tiona.lis.~ ·:~~d:: .. :~~~l·u~i~-~,°· -~~ t.he <XP' s ·rise to power leads in-
evitably to the pioneering work of Chalmers Johnson. 
Johnson has studi.ed the period mainly from Japanese militar~· 
sources, and he concludes that nationalism was the primary factor in 
the mobilisation of the peasants and that this was .the basis for the 
establishment of Communist power. 2 It is, perhaps, not surprising that 
he.was led to this conclusion through Japanese sources, since the Japan-
ese did not pay close attention to the peasants' response to Communist 
l . . d . 3 po icies an campaigns. 
Johnson's work, the only published full-length study before Selden's 
to concentrate on Chinese Communist activities in the Yenan period, 
provides a clear insight into. Japanese pacification efforts and the 
emergence of Chinese resistance to the Japanese in the early years of 
the war. It does not 1 however, extend to the fundamental question of 
what happened to the peasants at the basic level in the resistance 
l This is not an entirely new argument. Donald Gillin has argued, 
against Chalmers Johnson, that socioeconomic as well as political 
factors were cri t.Lcal for the CCJ?' s winning of mass support, on the 
basis of his detailed study of the peasants' response to the three 
armies in Shansi in the early period of the war. See his review article, 
"'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," Journal 
of Asian Studies, Vol.23, No.2 (February 1964), pp.269-289. 
2 Chalmers 
l 962) . 
Johnson,. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, (Stanford: 
3 The Japanese military· leaders and staff officers, who were the dis-
ciples of the successful leaders· of Japan's 'moderni.sation from above' 
in the Meiji Era, nev.:r did recognise the strength of the mobilised 
masses. Right up to the time of the surrender in 1945, they continued 
to view the situation as one in which 'ignorant and obedient masses' 
were made to work for the Communists, having been manipulated by 
elaborate CCP techniques. 
.. · 
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machine. Johnson argues that the Japanese invasion destroyed t~e old 
·authority and the old social system in China, and that this, together 
with the masses' hostile reaction to the brutality of the invaders, 
made it easier for the Communists to mobilise the masses for the resist-
ance and thus to lay the foundation ::or a new authority and a new social 
system. 
This study does not take issue with Johnson on this point. But 
there is a further dimension to the problem which Johnson does not 
explore. It is doubtful that the Chinese, who were historically con-
tained within a village life which was politically 'static' arid who 
were def!ply suspicious of the outside world, who lived close to starva-
tion and who feared involvement because of the trouble it might bring, 1 
could have been mobilised by the Communists solely in the nationalist 
cause, despite the ruthless Japanese 'three all' (sanko) policy and the 
attractive economic policies of the CCP. 
The point is not that Johnson is mistaken in giving close attention 
to the element of nationalism in Communist mass organisation, but that 
his focus is selective; his interest is in how the peasants helped 
the Communists in their rise to power, rather than in at what point the 
peasants were mobilised by the CCP and precisely how this occurred at 
the basic level. 
In the lo:-ig term, the question of the techniques by which the CCP 
mobilised the peasants at the basic level is far more important than 
how the mobilised peasantry assist~d the Communists in the war, for the 
CCP continued to depend on the 'Yenan, technique' of mass mobilisation 
.both in the Civil ·war ·and after 1949, and·still regards this technique 
as of use in t~e period of socialist·~onstrµ~tion and communist trans-
formation. 
1 The 
in the 
politi<;:al 
following 
and .. economic ·"s·:l tua ti on 
chaptet .. . ,. 
of ·the peasants is discussed 
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or. the question ·0f mass mobilisation at the basic level, Franz 
··· .. 
Schurmann' s discussion of .Communist. penetration in the basic villages 
by collectivisation of agricultural labour, and James Townsend's 
analysis of the Yenan poiitical system are both suggestive for this 
study. Schurmann argues that the CCP in the '.ienan period was the first 
government in China's history to be aware of the signifi9ance of. the 
.- ,. 
'natural village' and to be successful in integrating it into the polit-
1 ical system. Townsend's investigation of mass participation in the 
basic administration concludes thc>.t this was of critical importance in 
2 
assuring the legitimacy of the Communist government. 
Few people now dispute that the Chinese Communists succeeded in 
mobilising the people, the overwhelming majority of whom were peasants, 
during the anti-Japanese war. By examining their political system and 
the mass movements in North China which served to link the CCP to the 
general population, we can hope to elucidate the reasons for their 
success, and that is the purpose of this study. 
2. Source Materials 
There are two main sources of material on the Communist movement 
in China in this period, Japanese and Chinese Communist. Japanese 
sources are valuable on such matters as the size and location of the 
CCP and its military organisations, and for their observations of Commu-
nist mass work. The main concern of the Japanese military was with the 
military and political strength of the CCP, and the Communist 'infiltra-
tion' in the areas under Japane<;e control. Japanese sources are 
1 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, 
(Berkeley: 1968), pp.405-431.. · 
2 James Townsend, Political Participation 
1967), especially.Chapter 3, pp.36-·64, 
in Communist China, (Ber·keley: 
· .. ·· .. ·. 
" ... 
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·.·concerned also with the CCP' s tactics and manoeuvres in winni~g'. ~v~r · .. ·: .·: .;· ·.· ;·: ·~:>.:·/./': 
.·the peasants. These the Japanese admitted to.be ingenious becau~e they<:..-:, .-:.c"\' .. :., 
. . . . : .·:··· ... ' 
'· 
also were keen to win over the peasants in order to make their puppet 
governments more stable, and to destroy the effects of Communist mass 
work. Japanese observations of Communist military and political activ-
ities often reveal details of what the Communists did to mobilise the 
masses. The special value of Japanese sources lies in the fact that 
they were prepared by the enemy of the CCP, and naturally tend not to 
overstate Communist successes, as CCP sources sometimes do. 
The main shortcoming of the Japanese sources for this study is that 
they are not primarily concerned with the active movements of the people 
at the basic level. Since most Japanese who were reporti1J on the sit-
uation in China believed that the people were ignorant and passive, and 
could be dealt with easily by skilful manoeuvres from outside, Japanese 
sources do not have much to offer on the question of active response 
from the basic peasants to the 'tactics and manoeuvres' of the Communists. 
The Japanese puppet administrations were established from above down to 
the hsien (county) level and no further, although puppet hsien govern-
ments did try to gain control of village administrations. But the 
Japanese could not penetrate to the bottom of the administration system 
because they did not have the manpower; and in any case, they believed 
that they could control the administration and the people at the basic 
level simply by control from the top. 
Another problem of the Japanese sources is that they are concentrat-
ed in the early years of the war. Investigation in the villages became 
increasingly difficult after 1942; from late in 1942, Japanese garrisons 
in the villages could no longer be maintained because most of the best 
·troops were transferred to the Pacific theatre and were replaced by 
aged soldiers who were poorly trained, le.ss experi.e_nced and worse-
.. · .,:- . : .. ····.. . 
····. ·. ·· . 
. ·.. .. 
.. .:· .. 
. ..... 
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-equippi=d. _- ·_J~p~·ri.' -~ · 1:~~s_ pf_. coron;alfd · ov"er. the East China sea also ~;de it 
.. . : ... 
0diffi°c~l:t to ·~·~~~-:~~~u-li'·~·;r~p~;~-S:.::~<;i .. ~oky(J. '.l'he years after 1942 were, 
. in'_ ~ac_t, the- most ~~p~~~~;i~-.··~~:_·-;~~·-'.~:~-~~~: p-~~Io·~·- i;.. terms of mass mobil-
- - . 
isation.· 
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The CCP sources on the other ·hand are devoted to the policies and 
propaganda of the Party, and it is not always easy to juage how far they 
can be relied on as research materials. They are, however, valuable to 
the extent that they reveal the Party's intentions, its observations and 
conclusions, and the matters which it sought to propagate, particularly 
in its own territories. Since the CCP was intent on mobilising the 
basic masses, Party sources, especially the newspapers, devote consider-
able attention to mass movements. Although it cannot be denied that the 
Party newspapers tend to report success rather more than failure, they 
do not completely avoid pointing out problems and failures, even in 
successful cases, as lessons by negative example. From the widely 
acknowledged fact that the CCP came to power because of its success in 
mass mobilisation during the war, it can be assumed that its successes 
in mass work outnumbered its failures. Even if it could not be assumed 
that most cases were as successful as those reported in CCP sources, 
these reports do reveal what sort of mass mobilisation methods the CCP 
considered desirable and how these were supposed to be applied to con-
crete situations. 
Unfortunately, local Communist newspapers ctre available only in 
fragments, and this study relies mainly on the Chieh-fang jih-pao 
(Liberation Daily), the central organ of the CCP, published in Yenan 
from May 1941. The paper does deal quite often with news and other 
items on other Communist ))ases, but the greater part of its content is 
occupied with reports and articles on the SKN Border Region, where the 
Central committee was located. Because of communication difficulties, 
~~~"'"'"''-"=''·""~'-""""'.;;._;,_,_,,,.,...,.5£,::.:;;r;~y:;~:r:tt:·:L>,;;;:~I;1.;'SY.i.;,~,1:::.~:;{J!IZ'.:;:::;:~:-;:·::~::=.:.::3i.'C:~'7~~7~~'~:'··.:=::_:::·· , ..... 
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. . . the Cliieh.:.f~n_g j_ih:_pao rarely report~ on the bases 0in south and Central 
.: Chi1:1a; and· the. freq\:iency of r.eports' on Shangtung, Honan, and. southern 
Hop~i-_ is lowei;. thari· for. _the· _Shansi .bases, which were closer to Yenan. 
·Even though the w~r:s~tu~tion in these provinces, which were behind the 
Japanese lines, was different from that in the SKN Border Region, which 
the Japanese ha.a not invaded, the CCP de<;ided its policies in Yenan· and 
called for their implementation in all its base areas in China. More-
over, because of the relatively stable conditions in SKN and the 
location there of the Central Committee, the CCP used this region as a 
laboratory for policy implementation; it was the most advanced base and 
1 
model for the others. 
The CCP tended to implement new policies in the base areas after it 
had confirmed their effects in SKN. One reason for this was the relative 
polit~cal advancement of SKN as a long-established Communist base, which 
made it well-suited fur experimenting with new methods of organisation and 
mobilisation. The other base areas followed the SKN policies and tech-
niques, usually from three to six months later. 2 Consequently, in spite 
of different circumstances, mass mobilisation in SKN was basically the 
same as in the other bases. 
Despite the relative paucity of information on the other bases, the 
experimental role of SKN makes it possible to discuss this region as 
an example of the general practice of the CCP and the general experience 
of the peasantry, although in the present study every effort has been 
1 Mark Selden's book, cited above, is devoted to the revolutionary his-
tory of the SKN Border Region, which includes the immense mass campaigns 
launched from 1942 onwards. Although he is fully aware of the Border 
Region's model and experimental role in revolutionary transformation among 
the base areas, he does not deal with developments in the other areas. 
2 The role of the SKN Border Region as the model base (mo-fan ken-chU-ti) 
declined towards the end of the war, as the bases behind the J'apanese 
lines increased in e::perience and significance. In the civil war, SKN, or 
Yenan, was no longer important in policy-making or policy-implementation._ 
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. ... :·· ... :.··.;:Because. of its propagandist ch~racter, the contemporary Communist 
. 'ii;edia· may be regarded as of dubious, or perhaps rather singular, 
reliability. The problem is not one of facts but of interpretation; 
there may be cases in which the facts are not as. reported, but as 
numerous studies based on CCP sources have shown, there is always a 
basis of truth in what the Party has to say. It is in such matters as 
the attribution of cause, or of popular response, that questions may 
arise. Precisely because all CCP sources are 'controlled', however, 
the truth can often be deciphered to an extent that is not always 
possible with many other open sources. Even if they do not report 
events exactly as they happened, they still present typified or composite 
examples, or a summation of evidence drawn from a wide range of samples. 
Used with care, CCP sources are rich, informative, and in a sense, 
reliable. 
Mao Tse-tung's writings are of great significance because of his 
position as the supreme leader of the Party. Although it is now well-
known that he has repeatedly revised them for current practical purposes, 
this study relies on the English translation of his Selected Works 
published in Peking in 1965, but only where later revisions do not affect 
the original meanings. Since most of Mao's works were written to be 
presented to the CCP in the course of the Chinese Revolution, they are 
important for this study in understanding how Mao regarded the situation 
of the war and the revolution, and what he thought were the urgent 
tasks for the Communists. Accordingly, in cases where revisions or 
elimination of some parts of the original have changed the meaning 
of the original, I have provided my own translations from the Chin-Ch'a-
Chi edition, Mao Tse-tung hsUan-chi (Selected Works of Mao .Tse-tung), 
.... · ... 12 
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latter, which is the most comprehensive collection to have been published :···i·. ,;··.·~.·, ... 
so far, contains most of Mao's known writings, 1 in their original form, 
with notation of the differences between the originals and'post-1949 
editions of the Selected Works. The former was compiled and published 
by the Party Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei (Chin-Ch' a-Chi) Border 
Region in 1944 in five volumes, as a set.of 'working' documents for 
2 practical use. It excludes most of Mao's pre-1937 works. 
Substantial parts of Mao's Yenan-period writings have been 
eliminated from the post-1949 Selected Works, partly because they were 
too specific and detailed on the peculiar problems of the Yenan period 
to be utilised by the CCP after 1949. These detailed writings of Mao, 
however, are important for the present study, since they often reveal 
difficulties experienced by the CCP in policy implementation, and suggest 
ways to overcome these difficulties. A good example is Mao's report, 
"Economic and Financial Problems," to the Senior Cadres Conference 'in 
the SKN Border Region at the end of 1942. About nine-tenths of the 
original report is deleted from the post-1949 Selected Works. Chapter 1 
of this report, the only chapter included in the present Selected Works, 
discusses rather general problems, whereas the other chapters deal with 
the concrete situation of the SKN economy, the policies implemented up 
to 1942, and policy proposals for 1943 onwards . 
. . .. 
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.. Like 'other c6mmuni·st sources, "·Mao's writings should be handled 
careful.ly, ."because 'they were written for contemporary practical purposes. 
-His writings ·i.ntended strictly for Party members are also clearly dis-
tinct from those for non-Party readers. Apart from their usefulness in 
providing information on what Mao and his Politburo colleagues thought 
about particular problems, Mao's writings also reveal the CCP's percep-
tion of the problems of special importance at particular periods of time. 
In the authorised four-volume Selected Works, Volumes 2 and 3 of 
which are devoted to his Yenan-period works, there is a marked shift of 
emphasis in 1941. In the period up to 1941 his main concern seems to 
have been with the united front with the KMT and with military questions, 
whereas in the. period after 1941 he concentrated more on political and 
economic problems within the Party and the areas it controlled. In other 
words, he became concerned with political and economic construction, 
and consolidation of Communist territory, rather more than with the 
war against Japan. This does not mean that he lost interest in the 
broader perspective of the war, or that he was not concerned with pol-
itical and economic construction within the Communist areas before 1941, 
but that he and his colleagues became .more ·sceptical about their KMT 
and foreign allies and realised more clearly that they could only rely 
on their own power, based on the people in their territory. 
J, Concepts of Mass Mobilisation and Nationalism 
It was here that 'mobilisation'.became the central problem for the 
CCP, as the only basis on which it could survive the war, and in the 
process of 'mobilisation' the revolution would go deeply into the basic 
level of society. 'Mobilisation' in the Chinese Communist sense, that 
is; fa-tung rather than tung-yUan, carries a slightly more active 
meaning than Karl.Deutsch's well-known definition of social mobilisation. 
Deutsch defines socia.1 mobilisation as 
./ 
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the process in which major clusters of old social·, economic ·· 
arid psychological commitments are eroded or broken and ·· 
people becrue available fo~ new patterns of socialization and. 
behaviour. 
He states that this process includes two stages: 
(1) the stage of uprooting or breaking away from old settings·, 
habits and commitments; and 
(2) the induction of the mobilized persons into some relatively 
stable new ~atterns of group membership, organization and 
commitment. 
In the Communist base areas in Ch,ina, the first stage of the above 
'process' was developed by the Party, with the help of the Japanese 
invasion, within a relatively short period. The second stage, however, 
was a more active, more far-reaching and more ambitious process than 
is implied by the word 'induction'. The first stage took place in the 
period between 1937 and 1942 in rural North China, and 'people became 
available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour'. But their 
new social, economic and psychological commitments to the Communist 
system, which are included in the Communist sense of 'mobilisation', 
were achieved after 1943. 
Applying Deutsch's definition to the case of the CCP in the Yenan 
period, 'mobilisation' is also virtually synonymous with politicisation. 
That is to say, the 'old settings, habits and commitments' of the Chinese 
rural population were generally politically quiescent, whereas the new 
patterns, which extended into every aspect of daily life, were politi-
cally highly active and involved. In its mass mobilisation offensive, 
the CCP sought from the people a psychological as well as a practical 
involvement in o:t: commitment to the political process. 
1 
·Karl w. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No.3 (September 1961), 
p.494. 
2 Ibid. 
: 
·. ·'· 
.... 
... '. 
~r ilE 
< 
·.' 
. . . 
.... 
,• 
"': "< ':: ,::_'. .·· :;_·::. ,.:._-.~·:.'. >.~·· .... . . 
. •' . 
... 
. . -· ·: " ... sig!lif-i~'ant .e:Lem~nt · ~;~.:~t~~i~r·~·ti~~ · · 
. . . . . . . : Undoubtedly, nationalism was a 
this 'politicisation; process. As Chalmers Johnson has .emphasised, 
the credit for spreading nationalism am)ng the peasan_ts must be attri-
buted to the CCP. Even though it was assisted by ruthless Japanese 
behaviour towards the civilian population, the CCP's success in arousing 
nationalist feelings among the general populace is amazing if one 
remembers the failure of almost all the nationalist crusades to awaken 
the peasantry carried out by Chinese students after 1919. 1 Nationalism 
had long been of an urban and intellectual nature in China, and the CCP 
became the first nationalist force to succeed in winning over the gen-
eral rural populatio.-, to the nationalist cause. Foreign observers as 
well as the Japanese regarded the Communists as the most uncompromising 
fighters among all anti-Japanese nationalist groups in China, and as 
concerned nationalists who desired to put an end to China's position of 
international humiliation. 2 
In spite of its significance in recent world history, 'nationalism' 
is a most difficult concept to define, although great efforts have been 
made by political scientists and historians. Nationalism in Asia is a 
somewhat different phenomenon from that experienced in Europe, because 
of different historical backgrounds and political environments. 3 Anti-
colonial and anti-European elements in Asian nationalism made it almost 
1 John Israel desc>.ibes one of these unseccessful student crusades 
after the nationalist upsurge of the December Ninth movement in 1935. 
See Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937, (Stanford: 1966), 
pp.134-138. 
2 See, for example, Stuart Schram's 
nuclei of Mao Tse-tung's thought has 
of the Hans'. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 
argument that one of the two 
always been nationalism, 'glory 
(Pelican, 1966), pp.15-17 in sum. 
3 See Munif al-Razzaz, The Evolution of the Meaning of Nationalism, 
(New York: 1963), as an example of works which emphasise the difference 
between 'old European' and 'new Afro-Asian' nationalism. 
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inevitable that this nationalism acquired a socioeconomic component, 
typified in Communist nationalism ~n China. For purposes of this study, 
. 
however, it has seemed prefereable to avoid a general theoretical exam-
ination of nationalism, which would requir•= a book-length study, and to 
accept a general working definition. Chalmers Johnson's functional 
definition seems both applicable and adequate for this study; it is 
"one which identifies specific physical pressures that by acting upon 
given political environments give rise to nationalist movements." 1 In 
other words, nationalism here means not only an 'idea' or 'state of mind', 
but also a dynamic force which acts to maintain and develop the individ-
uality of a nation and realise its values and objectives. 
Nationalism was an awkward question for communist parties which 
based their world view· on the Marxist theory of class struggle and 
proletarian internationalism. In Asia, where revolutionary party members 
were stubbornly anti-colonial, the question of the class struggle was 
often forced to take second place to that of nationalism. National 
revolution or national liberation was generally regarded as the stage 
preceding socialist revolution. The presence of foreign economic and 
military power complicated the domestic politics and the economy of 
colonial Asian countries. Foreign interference was deeply interlocked 
with the existing socioeconomic structure. Asian nationalism, if it 
aimed at economic all well as political independence from foreign control, 
could not be merely a political or ideologicaL movement; it had to be 
concerned with restructuring the domestic socioeconomic and political 
system, that is, with revolution. Mao's approach to the Chinese revol~-
tion and class analysis, particularly his introduction of the concept of 
'the people' who partici.pate in the revolution, illustrates the peculiar 
l Johnson, op.cit., p.xi. 
. .. 
. • . 
. .··· 
17 
: 
... 
····character of revolution in an ·unindustrialised. and semi-colonial Asian· 
. ·1 . 
country·. Mao defined the Chinese revolution in the 1930s and the 1940s 
as an·anti-imperialist and anti-feudal reovolution in which 'the people', 
including the national bourgeoisie and middle and small landlords, could 
serve the national liberation and social reform. 
Because of Japan's intention to expel all other foreign powers from 
China, the Japanese invasion in 1937 simplified and clarified for Chinese 
nationalism the question of whom to fight and what for. The war also 
opened the way for sociopolitical reform, since it dest~oyed, or severely 
damaged, the existing sociopolitical system. It is well-known that Mao's 
concep~ of 'the people' is flexible and that the classes included in 
this category have changed according to different situations. In the 
Yenan period, when the CCP worked in the rural areas with the primary 
purpose of defeating Japan, the definition of 'the people' was the 
broadest it has ever been; any Chinese who did not cooperate with the 
Japanese invaders was included among 'the people'. There was theoretic-
ally no public enemy of the revolution in the Communist areas, except 
for spies and collaborators with the Japanese. Class conflicts were 
moderated by policies of compromise, especially by the replacement of 
land revolution with rent reduction. What, then, were the existing 
classes in rural China in the Yenan period? Using both scholarly works 
on the rural Chinese economy and Communist documents, the classes in 
rural China during the war may be distinguished as follows. 
Hired farm hands or hired or employed peasants, who were landless, 
and employed by rich 9easants or landlords for agricultural work on a 
permanent basis. Poor peasants, who were landless, or who owned a piece 
1 See, for: example, "On New Democracy," Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 7, 
pp.147-206. 
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of land too sma·11 tC?. be self-·supporting, who rented land, or hired thein-
selves out each year for agricultural or other manual labour on a part-: 
time basis. Lower-middle peasants, who, in terms o:·: land-ownership, 
were similar to poor peasants, but with the difference that renting land 
and hiring their labour was on an occasional rather than annual basis. 
They had no large farm appliances. Upper-middle peasants, who owned 
land which was fully self-supporting, or if not quite self-supporting, 
could be supplemented with other income, who hired part-time agricultural 
labourers every year, or occasionally. They owned some larger farm 
appliances and draught animals. Rich peasants, who owned more than 
enough land to support themselves and sometimes rented a small part of 
their land, who hired one perman9nt or some part-time agricultural 
labour, who owned large farm appliances and draught animals, and some-
times small manufacturing units such as water mills and oil mills. 
Landlords, who owned land, all or large part of which was rented out, 
who lived mainly on land rent, and did not work in the fields, who 
often had other jobs such as merchants, usurers, army officers, indus-
trial managers, government officials and so on. Intellectuals, who had 
completea at least secondary education and lived on income from such 
occupations as government officials, teachers, medical doctors, and 
students in higher education. Small merchants and craftsmen, who were 
small shopkeepers, pedlars and craftsmen working by the:nselves or with 
one or two employed assistants. Workers, who were factory workers, shop 
and craft assistants and servants. 1 
The cadre (kan-pu) is a different category from the class or occu-
pational group. The cadres, both Party members and non-Party personnel, 
were full-time administrative, organisational and military officers for 
1 In CCP documents the hired farm hands are often included in the 
category of the workers, or· the proletariat. 
.. " 
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the Party, the government, the army and the 0 mass organisations. They 
were not necessarily 'intellectuals', and illiterate cadrel; were not 
uncommon at the lower levels, although the majority of the cadres above 
the hsien level were of intellectual origin, even after 1942. 1 
The dual tasks of the revolution - anti-imperialism and anti-feud-
alism - were a combination of nationalism and the class struggle. 2 By 
'anti-imperialism' the CCP in the Yenan period meant both anti-imperial-
ism and anti-feudalism, but with heavy emphasis on the former as the 
primary task, with the latter relegated to a secondary position, as 
exemplified by the moderate land policy. Was the land reform programme, 
however, merely of secondary importance for the CCP? Was anti-Japanese 
nationalism the main factor in the CCP's accession to power after the 
war? These are central questions to be discussed in the present study. 
4. Purpose of this Study 
Before discussing the theme and purpose of this study, its chron-
ological and geographical framework should be made clear. The period 
when the Central Committee of the CCP was in Yenan extends from October 
1935 to March 1947. The Yenan period in the history of the Party, 
therefore, extends over the eleven and a half years between these dates. 
1 According to a SKN Border Region government resolution, in 1943, 90 
percent of the district and hsiang level cadres were of peasant origin 
and "generally ... deficient in cultural and intellectual development." 
At the hsien level, the majority of the cadres were of peasant origin, 
but 40 percent had received primar·y ana secondary education, while at 
the Border Region level more than 70 percent of the cadres.were young 
intellectuals who had joined the communist government service after the 
outbreak of the war. "Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ii chien-cheng shih-shih 
kang-yao," (A summary programme for simpler administration in the SKN 
Border Region) , Chieh-fan jib pao (referred to hereafter as CFJP) , 
6 March 1943. Selden quotes this part of the lengthy resolution from a 
pamphlet published under the same title. See Selden, op.cit., pp.146-
147. 
2 The words 'class struggle' are used in this study in a slightly 
broader sense, as the CCP uses them, than they carry in strict Marxist 
terminology. 
' . 
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The ! Yenan Period', however; is usually regarded as the ei,1i1t-year 
period of the Chinese-Japanese War, from July 1937 to August 1945, 
when the CCP fought a nationalist war as part of the united Chinese 
forces against the invader. In tern1s of the Party's experience, the 
two year period before the war broke out was characterised by a 
theoretical and political preparation for the forthcoming united front 
against the Japanese, and in terms of the Party's engagement in actual 
warfare the one-and-a-half-year period after Japan collapsed can be 
said to be a transitional period from a nationalist war to a class war. 
The Yenan period in this study is limited to the eight years of the 
war. 
A limitation is applied also to the geographical framework. In 
geographical terms, North China does not include Shensi, Ninghsia or 
Kansu Provinces, which are very important in the present study, but 
it does include Honan Province which is not discussed at any length. 
North China here is defined as the areas where the Eighth Route Army 
was in action before 1944, 1 in other words, the four Border Regions 
of the SKN, Shansi-suiyuan (Chin-Sui), Shansi-Chahar-Hopei (Chin-Ch'a-
Chi) and Shansi-Hopei-Shangtung-Honan (Chin-Chi-Lu-YU), and Shantung 
Province. With the exception of SKN, these regions correspond 
approximately to the area of responsibility of the Japanese North China 
Army, which was practically independent from the puppet Central Govern-
ment in Nanking. 
There are two reasons for the selection of North China for a 
study of the CCP's mass mobilisation during the Yenan period. Firstly, 
since the aim is to explain the Communists' success in mass mobilisation, 
1 From 1944, the CCP started establishing new Liberated Areas around 
the border between Manchukuo and China Proper, and northern Kiangsu 
was transferred from New Fourth to Eighth Route Army control . 
.. 
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North China, where the CCP was most successful, can offer more in the 
way of both examples and source materials. Secondly, for post-1949 
China studies, North China in the Yenan period is more important than 
other parts of China, because the CCP was able to win power on the 
basis of its political and military success in North China, and it has 
applied the spirit, the methods, and the strategies and tactics of Yenan 
to the period after 1949. 
Chalmers Johnson points out in Peasant Nationalism and Communist 
Power that interpretations of the Communist takeover of China which 
attribute their success to a Moscow conspiracy, the agrarian reform of 
the CCP, or the corruption of the KMT have been proved to be unrealistic. 
It seems clear that the CCP enjoyed mass support before 1949, and that 
the Japanese invasion provided a golden opportunity for the CCP to 
establish its authority among the peasant masses, especially in North 
China where the old Chinese rulers and the ruling system itself were 
almost swept away by the Japanese. 
As Johnson points out, however, it was improbable that the old 
regime or KMT, coula have established authority firmly without 
initiating a social revolution, even if the Japanese had not invaded 
China. 1 The social and economic system which had remained unchanged 
since Imperial times had almost reached explosion point, particularly 
in the rural depression in the 193'.ls, and it is doubtful whether the KMT 
or the warlords would have been capable of adjusting to the situation 
to prevent the explosion. Even if the Japanese had not invaded China, 
it seems clear that the CCP could have survived in North China, where 
the circumstances were more favourable than in South China, and could 
have succeeded finally in defeating the KMT on the basis of social or 
l Johnson, op.cit., pp.17-18. 
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economic reforms in the areas which it occupied. But the Japanese 
invasion accelerated social transformation by de:;troying the old system 
and impelling the Communists to develop more effective policies for mass 
mobilisation. 
Mass organisation and mobilisation are the central issues in the 
Communist contest for power and also in the strategy of socialist and 
Communist transformation of the Chinese economy and society. The pres-
ent study is concerned with the methods by which the CCP succeeded in 
mobilising the peasant masses in its rural base areas during the war with 
Japan. It also examines the reasons for the Party's success in the 
mobilisation. Analysis of the processes of mass movements and mobilisa-
tion should assist in explaining both how the CCP gained mass support 
in the war, and also how it consolidated and has maintained that support 
after the vict9ry of th.e revolution. 
Johnson argues that, mainly because of its nationalism, the CCP 
was able to establish its authority among the peasants and that once 
this authority was established the trust of the people justified its 
actions. This is partly correct, especially if one considers only the 
behaviour of the peasants after they had undergone the process of 
mobilisation. In this process, however, to which Johnson does not give 
full attention, one can see clearly that the CCP was dealing with a 
peasantry that was politically 'unaroused', in the Communist terminology, 
and, being naturally suspicious of all outsiders, was suspicious also of 
the CCP government, and of \:he Party itself . 1 They were motivated 
initially only by the possible benefits that might accrue to them,. regard-
less of whether these relatei to nationalism or communism. 
1 Even after 1942, when the Party attempted to organise the peasants 
into organisational production, it had to face the peasants' suspicion 
and resistance. similar attitudes are seen towards taxation, the hsia-
hs;Jng (down-to-the-village) campaign and in many other cases in which 
outside cadres went into the villages . 
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The C~P-concentrated its efforts on the struggle against Japan; 
all its policies ·were designed to serve the final goal of defeating the 
Japanese. In a sense, this was a matter of survival for the Party, as 
the Japanese efforts were concentrated on elimination of the Communists, 
particularly after 1940. It may be argued that the CCP was forced to 
mobilise the peasant masses simply to keep fighting the Japanese. Even 
given, however, that the immediate goal of mobilisation was survival in 
order to resist and defeat Japan, it does not follow that the CCP's 
success in mobilising the peasantry was attributable to peasant national-
ism or the CCP's propagation of the nationalist cause. 'l'he vicious 
circle described by Johnson, 1 of guerrilla warfare and Japanese pacifica-
tion, cannot explain the Communist success in the early years of the war 
when the Japanese paid little attention to the rural Communist guerrillas, 
or in those areas where the Japnese either did not penetrate or were not 
brutal towards the peasantry. 2 In fact, Donald Gillin gives a number 
of examples which suggest that, from autumn 1937 to spring 1938 when the 
Japanese marched into Shansi, the Shansi peasants were indifferent to 
the war and did not respond favourably to the Shansi and KMT armies 
which were desperately fighting the foreign invaders. Moreover, the 
peasants were even willing to work for the Japanese when paid better; 
they were friendly to the Communist army, although it was not as resolute 
a fighter as other Chinese armies in this period in Shansi. The 
explanation stressed by Johnson is Communist propaganda on the subject 
of nationalism, but this in itself could not have been effective among 
1 Johnson, op.cit., pp.9-12. 
2 See Gillin, "' P.easant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Commu-
nism," pp.277-281. 
the basic peasants, who were illiterate, and indifferent, at least to 
the fate of the Chinese nation. 1 
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There can be no doubt that during the war there was a nationalist 
upsurge among the general peasantry in the a~eas of rural China under 
Communist control. This is evidence at least of peasant politicisation. 
The question is, however, whether this peasant nationalism, or politic-
isation, was sparked by the Japanese invasion or by the socioeconomic 
programmes of the CCP. In other words, the question which has not been 
answered satisfactorily by Johnson is whether peasant nationalism was a 
phenomenon attributable to foreign invasion and Communist propaganda, or 
more the result of peasant politicisation and mobilisation triggered by 
the CCP's socioeconomic policies, which were generally of class character. 
Mass mobilisation by the CCP, even if ultimately in the nationalist 
cause, was founded on economic and political measures which brought some 
benefit to the masses, even though they were not always designed direct-
ly to benefit the masses, nor were all the benefits necessarily tangible. 
In the areas contested by the Communists and the Japanese the class 
struggle was dressed with nationalism, for the protectors of the existing 
order were at the same time the foreign invaders, while the social 
l According to an interview by a Japanese scholar with a sixty-four-
year-old pao head in 1940 in a village in shuni Hsien, about 30 miles 
north from Peking, KMT takeovo:r of Peking in 1928 neither attracted 
the attenti.on of his fellow vi.llagers, nor brought any change to village 
life. All he was worried about was a possible change in taxation. He 
told the interviewer that, as vi·llage headman from 1925 to 1927, change 
in the central government had nothing to do with his village, and that 
the peasants were too busy with their daily work to worry about wars 
and politics. The political indifference of the peasant masses in the 
hinterland was probably much greater than that of the above interviewer, 
if we consider that he was a village political leader in an area close 
to Pe~ing. Chugoku Noson Kanko Ch5sa Kankokai, ed., Chugoku Nason Kanko 
Chosa (Rural Custom Survey in Ch.!.na), (Tokyo: 1953), Vol.l, pp.100-101. 
For the organisation, methods and value for research of this revival 
survey carried out by Japanese specialists, see Ramon H. Myers, The 
Chinese Peasant Economy, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1970), pp.27-39 . 
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reformers were also the nationalist fighters. An American reporter, 
Jack Belden, provides interesting examples relevant to this argument of 
cases in which landlords cooperated with the Japanese troops at the 
expense of poorer villagers, and for their own profit exploited op-
l portunities for collecting levies on behalf of the Japanese. Social 
reform was inevitable if the CCP was to mobilise to the full the 
broadest possible masses, and on this point, greater attention must be 
given to the CCP's argument that the people must be promised greater 
political rights and an improved livelihood, an argument made consist-
2 
ently from 1936 onwards. On the other hand, the old order represented 
the direct opposite of mass politicisation, and as such was extremely 
vulnerable to challenge in the form of a politically mobilised 
peasantry. 
All mass movements carried out by the CCP in the Yenan period 
were, in effect, part of the class struggle, in spite of the appearance 
of compromise even after 1942. For example, the production movement, in 
which most of the peasant masses were organised into production organ-
isations, was directed deliberately towards replacing the influence and 
prestige of the landlord-gentry with the new authority and leadership 
of the cooperative and mutual-aid organisations. Election campaigns 
1 Jack Belden, China Shakes the World, (New York: 1949), p.165. lt 
seems that in some areas the landlords had good reason for collaboration 
with the Japanese, other than their general fear of the CCP. See Gillin, 
"'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," pp.287-288. 
2 See Mao Tse-tung, "A Letter from the CCP to KMT," Selected Works of 
Mao Tse-tung, referred to hereafter as Mao, I, pp.259-261; "The Tasks 
of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan," 
Mao, I, pp.267-268 & 273; "Policies, Measures and Perspectives for 
Resisting the Japanese Invasion," Mao, II, pp.17-18; "For the Mobil-
isation of All the Nation's Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance," 
Mao, II, pp.24 & 26-27; "Inter view with the British Journalist James 
Bertram," Mao, II, pp.50-51; "r,un hs:.n chieh-tuan" (On the New Stage), 
Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 6, pp.212-216 . 
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are another example; the·CCP was· careful to ensure that landlord-gentry 
dominance was eliminated from all levels of administration. Taxation 
and rent reduction policies were also designed to be mass campaigns to 
weaken the economic basis of landlord-gentry power. 
Class antagonism was not encouraged; it was denounced, in favour 
of emphasis on the multi-class united front. But while the CCP's 
policies were not as radical as in the Kiangsi period, they were still 
sufficiently radical to aim at social and economic reforms at the 
expense of the landlords. Even the anti-Japanese united front policy 
itself was implemented in such a way as to force the richer classes to 
sacrifice at least part of their interests for the nationalist cause. 
In terms of the ultimate e:O.:fect of these less radical policies, the 
point is that the CCP made every effort to ensure their full implemen-
tation throughout the territories under its control. And while the 
CCP tried to avoid violent measures in the process of policy implemen-
tation, it did not intervene to prevent violence. The rent reduction 
movements are a good example. The CCP did not object to tenants taking 
violent measures to force landlords to implement regulations on reduc-
tion of land rent and to refund excess rent collected illegally. 
In its propaganda, the CCP tried to suggest that the Japanese 
explo!.tation of the Chinese people did not exempt the richer class, 
and that the only way for richer people to preserve theix property, 
therefore, was through cooperation with the CCP. This was generally 
true, particularly in the last years of the war when the diversion of 
supplies to the Japanese forces in the Pacific resulted in severe 
shortages for the JapanE·se armies in China. It is also true that the 
CCP guaranteed that landlords' property would not be confiscated, and 
that if land was used for investment or renting out, reasonable profits 
and rents were permitted. The CCP badly needed the educational qual-
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ifications and the'wealth of richer class. It was also careful to take 
steps to prevent the landlord-gentry class from reasserting dominance 
over the peasantry by means of capital investment or land renting. 
The position of the landlord-gentry class in the Yenan period was 
somewhat similar to that of the Shanghai businessmen in first decade 
of the People's Republic, with the exception of those who were political-
ly active. Their property was protected and their skills were respected, 
but they were not permitted to exploit this privilege to establish a 
dominant position in the community, nor were they allowed to use their 
wealth to indulge in a luxurious life. If they were politically active, 
however, their class was 'qualified'; they were either 'enlightened' 
landlords or national traitors. 1 The test of whether a landlord was 
'enlightened' was the sincerity, activism, and extent of his support 
for Communist policies. To be 'enlightened', therefore, he had to put 
aside his personal interests, and in return, he was allowed to share in 
political leadership in his community, or to hold office in the 
Communist-led political machiPe. 
Because of wide variations in the situation in the villages, where 
the cadres enjoyed broad autonomy in implementing regulations and poli-
cies, it is extremely difficult to prove by concrete evidence whether or 
not nationalism was generally the primary lever of Communist mass 
mobilisation; or to what extent the CC!? was willing to mobilis'" the 
masses for the class struggle. Moreover, for the greater part of the 
Communist base areas, it is impossible to obtain source materials on 
implementation of policies at the basic level. In the areas where the 
1 Class affiliation, in Chinese Communist terms is not exactly a matter 
of how a person lives in terms of production relations, but rather, it 
is a matter of a person's way of thinking. This was observed still. in 
the Cultural Revolution. See Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in 
China, (Penguin Books; 1969), p.15 . 
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.' villaqers were confronte.d· wi·tJ:i frequen:t Japanese .'mopping-up' operations, 
it is' . of course, lik~{y' that propagz.tion of :al")ti~Jap~f)es~ .n~tionali15m .. 
was exploited effectively by the CCP; that the masses, whose survival· 
was threatened by the Japanese 'three-all' policy, could be mobilised by 
such an appeal. 
Nationalism, however, was more probably the result of mass politic-
isation rather than the cause. For example, in 1939 when the worst 
floods for a hundred years attacked central and southern Hopei, the CCP 
and its infant local governments were able to use these floods as an 
opportunity to mobilise the people in the affected areas. The Party's 
relief work was far more efficient and effective than that of the 
Japanese and their puppets, and as a result the masses were more willing 
to lend their support to the Communist administration,_ and the commun-
ists were able to consolidate their control of this region. 1 
The first and primary means of mobilising the peasant masses in 
China was economic and/or social rather than ideological. Nationalist 
appeals were effective in the villages only when the villagers were 
persuaded of the relevance of the nationalist cause to their own village 
life. In the rear areas, the CCP had to direct its propaganda to the 
hardship of village life under the Japanese and KMT, and the harshness 
with which the peasants were treated by them. 
The ccP's mass mobilisation programme was accompanied by enormous 
efforts in education and indoctrination. In addition to the establish-
ment of large numbers of primary and secondary schools, the CCP 
instituted widespread literacy courses for adult peasants, in which 
l K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang ch'u kai-k'uang (General 
Situal:ion of the Liberated Areas in the Anti-Japanese War), (Peking: 
1956)' pp.67-69. 
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1 indoctrination was an essential part of the curriculum.- The mass 
movements also were exploited as great opportunities for mass indoctri-
nation, and in many cases, the primary concern of mass movements seems 
to have been more with education than with the announced goals. Take, 
for example, the rent reduction movement, the immediate task of which 
was to reduce rent by 25 percent or to 37.5 percent of the crop yield. 
From the way in which the Communists carried out this movement, however, 
there is reason to doubt whether the CCP considered it more important 
to reduce rent and refund excess rent, than to give the tenants more 
confidence in their power, to eliminate their fear of the landlords 
and to make them trust the Communist government and the army. Although 
the village government was normally responsible for implementing all 
the regulations at the basic level, in the rent reduction movement it 
did not usually take the initiative, but passed responsibility and 
leadership to the peasant associations. It seems that the government 
did not want simply to impose rent reduction from above, preferring 
that the tenants should demand and win rent reduction on their own 
initiative. In the process of the movement, the cadres of the peasants 
associations were warned repeatedly by the Party not to do everything 
for the tenant masses (pao-pan tai-t'i), it "lid not want them to 
regard rent reduction as a favour bestowed from above. 
The CCP apparently tried to focus on the psychological functions 
of mass mobilisation, which it believed to have more lasting effects. 
In other words, it believed, and still believes, that no institutional 
1 For a full discussion of the regular education in the SKN Border 
Region, see Peter J. Seybolt, "The Yenan Revolution in Mass Education," 
China Quarterly, No. 48 (October-December 1971), pp.641-676. The 
significance of education in mass mobilisation in SKN is discussed 
also by Mark Selden. See Selden, op.cit., pp.267-274. 
2 See an example of the rent 
also William Hinton, Fanshen, 
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reform could last long without psychological re:orm of the people who 
comprised and supported the institution. Similarly, the psychological 
transformation of the masses would not permit old institutions to 
survive or revive. This idea is based on Mao's concept of man, who is 
the basic unit of society and whose perception of society and the 
world determines the direction in which a society will move. The most 
distinctive feature of the Chinese communist revolution is its 
emphasis on education or psychological indoctrination of the people; 
and the most important element of the Communists' social revolution 
has been the attempt to transform the minds and the value systems of 
the basic peasants. 
The central questions posed in this study are what moved the 
peasants to support the Communists and how did this occur; how were 
they changed mentally and politicised by the CCF, and by what means 
was the CCP able to mobilise them . 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE COMMUNIST BASI: AREAS IN NORTH CHINA 
If one accepts Chalmers Johnson's argument that the CCP's success 
in mass mobilisation depended mainly upon mass nationalism generated by 
Japanese brutality and fed by Communist propaganda, then the situation 
in which the peasants lived before the arrival of the Communists would 
be of little relevance. Johnson's explanation, however, is not in all 
respects convincing. A combination of Communist propaganda and Japan-
ese ruthlessness is only a partial explanation, and Johnson's thesis 
tends to minimise the significance of other relevant factors, particu-
larly the relative importance of revolution and the class struggle in 
the mobilisation process. If the CCP succeeded in arousing mass 
nationalism for the first time in rural China, why was it that it was 
the CCP's propaganda that was eff.,,ctive, and not that of the KMT or other 
groups. And if this was the case, how was the CCP's propaganda effec-
tive? If the brutality of the Japanese was one of the two major 
causes of rising mass nationalism, the Communist success in the first 
three years, represented by rapid growth of Party membership, of the 
size of the Communist armed forces and of the Communist-controlled or 
influenced areas, simply cannot be explained when compared with the 
years after 1940, when the Japanese were much more brutal towards the 
rural populace in the notorious 'three-all' policy. 
Johnson seen\s to underestimate the economic and social aspects of 
peasant mobilisation in this period, or what the Communists themselves 
would call the elements of 'class struggle', and to put too much 
emphasis on mass nationalism. Although he states that there was "a 
dialogue of mutual interest" between t'.le CCP and the pe'."santry, and 
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that the latter felt "that it is to their advantage to follow ·govern-·~,,,. 
mental directives,"1 if on~ looks at the overall perspective of the 
Chinese revolution and its development through this period, one can 
only regard Johnson's analysis of the peQsants' interests as inadequate, 
to say the least. He argues that "their (the Chinese masses') interests 
lay with plans and abilities that offered a means to cope with conditions 
of mass destruction and anarchy." 2 Since he seems to mean social and 
political chaos caused by war, that is, by "mass destruction and 
anarchy," the significance of the communist "plans and abilities" in 
social and political revolution has been overlooked. His implication 
is that the peasants had been somehow satisfied with the economic and 
political circumstances in which they had lived before the war. 3 
Johnson does not overlook the crisis in the Chinese rural economy, 
and admits that this a.lone might have led the peasants to revolutionary 
mobilisation. 4 What he has overlooked is the socioeconomic effects of 
the Japanese invasion on rural China. Even though the Chinese peasants 
1 
2 
3 
Johnson, op.cit., p.10. 
Ibid. 
It would be fair to point out that Johnson writes: "Obviously, an 
argument based solely on the economic situation in china ignores the 
influence of the Japanese invasion, and thereby misinterprets the role 
of the Communist Party as leader of the anti-Japanese peasant armies. 
This is not to argue that if the Japanese invasion of China .•. had not 
occurred, the prewar government could have continued to exist unassailed 
or that the process of social change associated with the Communist 
governments would never have begun. If the invasion had never occurred, 
a severe economic catastrophe in the future, or a prolongation of the 
rural depression of the 1930's, might well have produced revolutionary 
mobilization. But a constantly or slowly evolving, rate of economic 
deprivation would still have constituted only a conditioning factor in 
the subsequent revolt't.ion<~ry movem<=nts; and it is unlikely that such 
revolutionary movements would have confined themselves to economic re-
forms, just as the Chinese communist government aims at more ambitious 
goals than the relief of rural misery ..•. An economic analysis alone 
offers no insights into the potentiality of a revolutionary movement, 
and commonly distorts attempts at political analysis of the policies 
pursued by postrevolutionary governments." Ibid., pp.17-18. 
4 Ibid. 
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experienced the brutality of the Jap~nese, and even though the Communists' 
nationalist propaganda was effective, it is unlikely that the ordinary 
peasants would have been moved simply by an abstract idea of nationalism 
if this had nothing to do with socioeconomic or political reform, or at 
l least expectation of such reform. 
Obviously, nationalism drove the intelligentsia, the students, teach~ 
2 
ers, and local government officials, to resist the Japanese. But the 
Communists offered prospects for protracted resistance by introducing the 
concept of class struggle, even if modified to a certain extent by the 
united front. 3 It was not simple nationalist propaganda that enabled the 
Party to mobilise the masses, but the introduction of the idea of class 
struggle to the Chinese peasantry; in other words, socioeconomic and pol-
itical reforms and transformation. 4 
If we are to interpret the CCP's success in mass mobilisation in the 
Yenan period and to understand Communist policies and techniques in mass 
mobilisation at the basic level, it is essential to understand the rural 
situation in North China when the war started and the history of mass 
mob~lisation in the five Communist bases in North China which, with 
the exception of the SKN Border Region which had been a Soviet region 
since 1927, were established in the first three years of the war. The 
general economic and political situation in rural North China is 
important for understanding why the great majority of the peasants 
welcomed even the moderate Communist reform programmes. Description of 
1 Donald Gillin gives examples of Shansi peasants who were indifferent 
to the war in 1937/38, but welcomed the Communist army because they 
expected it to carry out social reform. See Chapter I, p.23. 
2 Gillin gives a good example of Shansi officials and students on this 
point. See Gillin, "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese 
Communism," pp.273-274. 
3 The CCP was careful in this period not to use 
but it was in fact class struggle that the Party 
level of the administration. 
the words 'class struggle', 
promoted at the basic 
4 This point is supported by the fact that the Communist success in 
mobilising the masses occurred after 1942 when they became less concerned 
with the united front and more concerned with socioeconomic transformation 
than they had been during the period befoie 1942~· · 
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the Communist bases in North China also provides a background to Cornmu-
nist mass mobilisation in these areas. · And discussion of mass mobilisa-
tion must be set against Communist policies in t.he early years of the 
\o.Jar .. 
l. The General Situation in Rural North China 
From the 1911 Revolution until 1949, when the People's Republic 
was established, China was never unified. The KMT defeated the warlords 
in South and Central China, but after the Shanghai Coup of April 1927, 
in which the KMT eliminated the Communist elements in its own ranks, the 
warlords in North China and the Manchuria were absorbed rather than 
defeated. The KMT completed the 'unification' of China mainly through 
compromises in which it recognised the governing institutions and 
military systems of the warlords as part of the National Government. 
This was significant in terms of the CCP's subsequent operation. First-
ly, it meant that the administration of the National Government never 
penetrated very far in North China. Secondly, the absorption of the 
warlords, whose power rested on the old land-owning class, contributed 
to the reactionary character of the KMT administration. In short, at 
least in North China the KMT preserved the old ruling system at the basic 
level; it simply adopted the new dress of 'modern' government in Nan-
king, based on Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, which was 
1 basically oriented to western parliamentary democracy. 
l 
'Modern' here does not mean 'democratic'. On the basis of Sun's 
political concept, the KMT defined this period as the period of political 
'tutelgae' in which the KMT .:uled the central and local administration by 
itself while training the people for the period of 'constitutional gov-
ernment'. The KM'r was to convene the National Assembly to adopt the 
constitution in 1937, but that was postponed until 1947 because of the 
war. 
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In this section it is not intended to discuss in detail the rural 
situation in North China in the pre-Communist period, but to outline 
the economic and political factors which at the basic level contributed 
to the acceptance of and support for Communist power. The greater part 
of this discussion, moreover, is devoted to the economic situation, since 
it was the depressed economic situation of the peasant masses on which 
their political and social positions in the villages rested, a position 
without power and without rights. Among economic problems, the land 
owning system lay at the root of all the others. 
Land Owning System and Agrarian Management. 
China was, and still is, an agricultural country, with at least 
seventy percent of the population engaged in agriculture. 1 A basic 
feature of the Chinese agrarian economy by the 20th century was over-
population and shortage of land. Food production was not sufficient 
for the enormous population of China; 2 too many people were competing 
1 R.H. Tawney, 'Introduction' to Agrarian China: Selected Source 
Materials from Chinese Authors, (London: 1939), p.xii. 
2 Hsiao Kung-chuan writes that the unequal rates of increase in pop-
ulation and land under cultivation eventually gave rise to a problem 
of population pressure on land from the eighteenth century onwards. 
Figures shown are as follows: 
Year Population Land (mou) 
1685 607,842,992 
1710 123,312,200 
1724 693,792,427 
1766 208,095,796* 741,449,550 
1792 307,467,200 
Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, (Seattle: 
1960), pp.379-380. Although the figure for the 1710 population quoted 
by Hsiao is 23,312,200, this should probably be 123,312,200 otherwise 
it does not make sense when compared with other figures. *Ho Ping-ti, Stud-
ies on the Population in China, 1368-1953, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1959i, 
p. 281. 
Agrarian population per acre of cultivated land in North China sur-
veyed by J.L. Buck is abou~ 30 percent less than that of Central and 
South China. It does not mean, however, that the living conditions of 
the North Chinese peasantry were better than those in Central and South 
China because the soil is frozen for about five months of the year in 
North China, and annual precipitation in North China is less than half 
that in Central and south China . 
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for food to eat and land to till .. 1 Here was the basic cause of 
extremely intensive labour, high rates of land rent and debt interest, 
and low wages, which characterised the Chinese ec<)nomy. Land hunger 
inhibited China's industrialisation, because investment t~nded to flow 
to land, which was safer, more prestigious, and more profitable than 
manufacturing, in which Chinese capital had to compete with European 
and Japanese capital, even in the domestic market. It should be borne 
in mind that there was no powerfu.l centra.l government in China to pro-
tect and encourage industrialisation or to resist 'imperialist' capital. 
The National Government tried to regain China's independence by its 
economic and financial policies in the mid-1930s, but before the effects 
were felt, the Japanese invasion intervened. Infant Chinese industry 
and commercial capital were concentrated in the coastal cities, which 
were occupied by the Japanese after 1937. Chinese capital, evacuated 
from the coas·cal cities when the National Government retreated to 
Hankow and then Chungking, tended to be invested in land in Szechwan 
rather than in industrialisation in the hinterland of China. Prestige 
and the economic advantage of land ownership formed the basis of the 
social system in rural China, and without radical reform of the whole 
economic, social and political structure, industrialisation was almost 
impossible. 
Population pressure also affected agrarian management; rather 
than developing capitalist management of agriculture, large landowners 
tended to divide their land into small lots which they hire.d out to 
tenant farmers, since this was .-;asier and safer than hiring their own 
labourers. One reason for this tendency was that landowners could 
1 This had been accelerated 
had caused a decline in land 
and handicraft products, and 
less peasants . 
by the rural depression after 1931, which 
values, and in the price of agricultural 
consequently increased the number of land-
. · .·· .... ,, 
. ':::~~ .. ·-.:~. ·=-~·. ~: .. ":.: . 0 .. :. '.: :·~·. '• . ,, :. ·.' . : . ... . . . ••• • • 0 ·.' ... 
'· . : 
. . . . . . 
' .. ,·· 
. .. ·:. ·'. .· .·.:' 
''• ., . 
.. · ... · '. 
. · ... ~ : . 
.. ,. 
•C ', 
•• _; ·. 
. . · 
.. 37 
.. 
avoid the risk of bad harvests and unstable markets, because they 
could ignore harvest conditions in their rent collection. Another 
reason was that by renting out their land the landowners could impose 
'land taxes and levies' on their tenants for their own land taxes. In 
North China, however, the great majority of agricultural management was 
in the form of small-scale owner-farming, 1 which was reinforced by the 
1 . h . t . ld . . h' 2 equa in eritance sys em, a centuries-o practice in C ina. 
Most 'owner-farmers' in China had only a small plot of land, too 
small to support one family. According to an investigation report of 
the Land Commission of the Ministry of Industry, the distribution of 
land ownership was as follows: 3 
TABLE l Percentage of Agrarian Households Classified 
by Size of Land Owned 
Size of Land Owned Percentage of Households 
Under 5 mou* 35.50 
5 - 9.9 23.99 
10 - 14.9 13 .17 
15 - 29.9 16.21 
30 - 99.9 9.68 
100 - 499.9 l. 27 
500 - 999.9 0.05 
1,000 and over 0.02 
* 1 mou is approximately 0.15 acre. 
1 According to J.L. Buck's survey in 1929-1933, the average size of a 
farm in North Ch.ina was 5. 09 acres. He reports that 76 percent of the 
farmers in North China were owner-farmers, 18 percent part-owners and 
only 6 percent tenants. The tenancy ratio is about one half of that in 
South China. Land Utilization in China, (Nanking: 1937), pp.197-268. 
2 The equal inheritance system, among sons, was well-entrenched. Where 
rural surveys have been conducted, there is almost no case in which a 
father's property was inherited, owned, and managed jointly by his 
sons. Niida Noboru, Chugoku no Nason Kazoku (Rural Family in China), 
(Tokyo: 1954), pp.106-122. This study is based on the extensive 
surveys carried out by Japanese scholar.s in Hopei Province in 1941 and 
1942. 
3 Shih-yeh-pu T'u-ti wei-yuan-hui, Ch'uan-kuo t'u-ti tiao-ch'a pao-kao 
kang-yao (A Summary Report of the Land survey in China), (Nanking: 
1937), quoted in Muramatsu Yuji, Chugoku Keizai no Shakai Taisei (Social 
Structure of the Chinese Economy), (Tokyo: 1949), p.303. 
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A' rural investigation_5'y the South Manchuria Railway company (SMR) in 
1937 concluded that it was impossible to sustain 'ordinary rural life' 
1 in North China at that time on less than 5 mou of land per person. 
2 Assuming that each family had an average of five members, it needed 
38 
at least 25 mou of land to support itself. Table 1 indicates, therefore, 
that almost 90 percent of the peasants who actually owned land did not 
in fact have sufficient land to support their families. The total 
shortage of land was even more acute than is expressed in Table 1, which 
excludes landL~~s tenants and farm labourers. 
In addition to the overall shortage of land, there was also a 
serious problem of unequal distribution. Seventy percent of agrarian 
households owned only about 20 percent of the total cultivated land; 
landless peasants accounted for more than 20 percent of the total. 
About 10 percent of agrarian households owned more than 50 percent of 
the land. The following investigation by the SMR in Hopei Province 
clearly shows the uneven distribution of land. 3 
TABLE 2 Distribution of Land and Land Ownership in 
Hopei Province in 1936 
East Hopei Ting Hsien 
Strata (Central Hopeil 
Household Land HousehoJ.d Land 
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) 
Upper section 4.64 42.71 4.90 31. 20 
Upper-middle 
section 5.24 14.68 l Middle section 13 .66 20.92 23.60 39.30 
Lower section 76.46 21.69 71.50 29.40 
- ·. : .· 
1 SMR, Kahoku-sho Enzan-ken Dai-San-ku Bojuchin-son Gaiyo Chosa Hokokusho 
(Survey Report on the Outline ofWang-shu Village, Third District, Yen-shan 
Hsien, Hopei Province), (Tokyo: 1941), pp.5-6. Other feports agree on this 
point. 
2 
The average size of a rural family in North China at this time was 
.. · . 
...... : 
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Another survey i.n ten villages in Pao-ting 'Hsien, central Hopei, in 1930 
by Ch'en Han-seng obtained the following results. 1 
TABLE 3 Land Ownership Distribution in Pao-ting Hsien 
in Hopei Province 
I Household Land Size of land Strata (percent) (percent) per household (actual number) 
Landlords 3.7 13.4 58.5 (mou) 
Rich peasants 8.0 27.9 56.3 
Middle peasants 23.1 32.8 23.2 
Poor peasants & 
Farm labourers 65.2 25.9 6.6 
As these tables indicate, it can be assumed that at least 70 percent of 
the peasants were suffering from shortage of land and were unable to live 
by tilling their own land, that they had to rent others' land, take side 
jobs such as hiring themselves out for farm labour or manual labour in the 
cities and Manchuria. 
In sum, the inequality of the distribution of land ownership was not 
as extreme as in south China. and the dominant form of agrarian management 
in North China was small-scale owner-farming. Because of general shortage 
of land, 'owner-farmer' did not mean one who had enough land to support 
his family, and in most cases the owner-farmer had to seek more land to 
till, or hire himself out in order simply to support his family. Improve-
rnent or expansion of production by such owner-farmers was almost out of 
the question. 
footnote 2 cont'd 
between 5 and 6. See Buck, op.cit .. pp.368-369; Niida, op.cit.pp.106-122. 
3 SMR, 
China), 
1 
Kita Shina no Noqyo to Keizai {Agriculture and Economy in North 
(Tokyo: 1942), p.356. 
Ch' en Han-sheng, "Gendai Shina no Tochi Mondai" {Land Problems in Con-
temporary China), in Chung-kuo nung-ts'un ching-chi yen-chiu-hui, ed., 
Gendai Shina no Tochi Mondai, translated into Japanese by Horie Yuichi, 
(Tokyo: 1938) , p. 5. 
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serious that the great majority of the 
·peasantry were in fact forced to be part-time farmers. They were 
naturally unhappy with their small landownership and the situation 
which forced them to seek side jobs with low wages. Their desire to 
obtain more land, at least sufficient land to maintain themselves, pro-
vided the Communists with potential mass energy to be released by eilen 
a small prospect of improving this situation. The tenancy system, tax-
ation, loans and other oppressive practices were based on the serious 
inequalities and breakdown in the land•owning system, and made the lives 
of the landless and land-hungry peasants more depressed, and accordingly 
sharpened their desire for socioeconomic reform. 
The Tenancy System 
Although small-scale owner-farming was common, the tenancy system 
was also present on a significantly wide scale. Pure tenancy accounted 
for only about 10 percent of all agrarian households, but partial ~en-
ancy was widespread and rent-paying peasant households accounted for 
1 
almost 40 percent of the total. The widespread existence of tenancy 
was both politically and economically important, for the circumstances 
of the tenants were sufficiently difficult to arouse dissatisfaction 
or resentment. Furthermore, as with all other 'disasters', the Japanese 
invasion in 1937 br:ought chaos to the villages in some parts of t<orth 
China, and the peasants could not plant crops in the autumn. Since they 
had no store of food or cash, many peasants were forced to seJ.1 their 
1 Although J.L. Buck reports that tenant and partial tenant households 
in North China comprised 24 percent of the total agrarian households, a 
Chinese source gives the following figures for the ten provinces in 
North China: 60.7 percent owner-farmers, 20.3 part-owners and 19.0 
tenants. Kita-Shina no Nogyo to Kaizai, p.678. 
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order to procure food. 
The practice of tenant-farming varied both in the period of tenancy 
and in the method of fixing and paying rent, and in the degree of land-
lo·cd intervention in the actual management of land. Rent varied from 20 
to 90 percent of crop yield according to the conditions of tenancy and 
the quality of land. In a typical tenancy in North China, the contract 
was renewed every two or three years, or agricultural seasons; rent 
was paid in grain the rate being about 50 percent of crop yield; and 
the landlord did not interfere with actual cuJ.tivation. 2 Extra payments 
or some form of service, usually.the provision of labour, was normally 
given by the tenants to the landlords out of fear of cancellation of the 
tenancy contract. It was a common practice for landlords to use 
measures from 10 to 20 percent larger than the standard measures when 
collecting grain rent, and smaller ones when lending grain to the 
3 
starving peasants. 
As seen in the previously cited Japanese rural survey from 1940 to 
1942 in Hopei and Shantung, land ownership meant not only wealth but 
4 
also power. Because of the general shortage of land and land hunger 
among the great majority of the peasants, the landlords were able to 
exercise power over both tenants and potential tenants, intimidating 
1 Kahoku-sho Enzan-ken Dai-san-ku Bojuchin-son Gaiyo Chosa Hokokusho, 
pp.8-10. 
2 Hsueh Mu-chiao, Chung-kuo nung-ts'un ching-chi ch'ang-shih (Outline 
of Chinese Rural Economy), translated into Japanese by Yonezawa Hideo, 
(Tokyo: 1937), pp.47-53; Muramatsu, op.cit., pp.318-322; Kita-Shina 
110 NBgyo to Keizai, pp.418-441. 
3 For example, "Ma-tien-chen chien-tsu tou-cheng" (Struggle for Rent 
Reduction at Ma-tien Village), CFJP, 14 December 1942. The burden on 
the tenants also included payment of guarantee money for the tenancy 
contract, transportation of rent grain to the landlords' store houses, 
food and wine for entertaining the landlords or their rent collectors 
when rent was collected. 
4 See Chapter I, p.24, Note 1. 
politics later in this section . 
See also the discussion of village 
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the former by .t!;ireatening to cancel their tenancy! ·~·n~; in~l.u~n~i:ng the 
latter by offering some hope of renting land. This was of vital 0 impor-
tance for a peasantry on the verge of starvation. The pea•·ants' fear 
of landlords, which was the hardest wall for the CCP to break through, 
was ):Ooted deeply in the peasantry, since the landlord determined whether 
they would survive or whether they would starve in the next bad year. 
Taxes and Levies 
The main tax on the peasantry was land tax, usually about 3 percent 
of the value of land owned. The problem for the peasantry lay in the 
advance collection of land tax and in the various taxes additional to 
this. More than half of the Chinese provinces collected land tax in 
advance. rt was quite usual for land tax to be collected twice or three 
times a year; and actual land tax was often so high as to account for 
1 
a half of the year's crop. 
The additional or miscellaneous taxes were collected on production 
and consumption of goods. For example, salt tax accounted for from 60 
to 70 percent of the price of salt. There were also taxes on pigs, 
cattle, silkworms and so forth. The government also collected, when it 
considered it necessary, special taxes for such matters as education, 
the self-defence corps, highways, air services, 'national salvation', 
2 
etc. The amount of tax paid by the people often reached several times 
that which the government prescribed; and because government officials 
at every level from the province to the village added their own profit 
to the taxes, the actual amount the peasants had to pay grew to a few 
l Hsiieh i'\11-chiao, op.cit., p.129. 
2 Ibid., pp.132-135. 
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l times the amount of the original tax. 
In addition to taxes, of which there were 
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kinds, levies were made by order of the p::ovi.acial, hsien, district and 
township governments, without any limitation by the Central Government. 
The same corrupt practice occurred with levies as with taxes, by which 
local officials added their own profit at each level. There are many 
reports on the burden of the peasants. An interesting monograph was 
published by the Academia Sinica on military requisitions: 
The collections are carried out by threats and deceit and 
in the last resort the collectors can always make their gains 
by false measurements and by manipulation between coins and 
paper money. Sometimes the requisition is purposely divided 
into several instalments so that additional demands may be 
made at each instalment. For instance, in the district of 
Weinan, in the middle and eastern part of Shensi, four 
instalments were demanded in the year 1930 to 1931 on 10,000 
piculs of wheat. At the end of the fourth instalment 
11,000 piculs had actually been collected, of which however, 
oniy 7,000 were reported and delivered by the magistrate, 
Chang Kung-fu. The provincial autµorities then demanded the 
collection of an additional 3,000 piculs to make up the 
original sum. On this pretext a further collection of 4,000 
to 5,000 piculs was then made, of which only 410 were handed 
over to the provincial authorities.2 
. .: .. 
. .. 
Not only was the taxation system itself corrupt, discriminatory and 
oppressive, but the procedure for tax collection was also chaotic. Even 
though the National Government tried to abolish the traditional tax 
farming system and to organise the collection of taxes by the Taxation 
Eureau at the hsien level, 3 the old Ch'ing system of tax collection 
1 Various malpractices in tax collection in the late Ch'ing period are 
described by Hsiao Kung-chuan, op.cit.,pp.113-124. As Arthur Young 
witnessed in 1937, these malpractices remained after the 1911 Revolution. 
See China's Wartime .Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
1965)' pp.22-26. 
2 Wong Yin-seng, et al., 
Agrarian China, p.106. 
"Military Requisitions and the Peasantry," 
3 Yi Ming-shi who worked for a Land Registration Office of the KMT 
Government in 1936 or early 1937 describes the bureaucratic attitudes 
and corrupt behaviour of the officials who were providing a new land 
cadastre for the 'modernised' taxation system of the KMT. See "EKperiences 
of an Official in the Land Tax Consolidation Bureau, '1 in ibid., pp.149-
153. 
.. - .. 
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kinds, levies were made by order of the provincial, hsien, district and 
township governments, without any limitation by the Central Government. 
The same corrupt practice occurred with levies as with taxes, by which 
local officials added their own profit at each level. There are many 
reports on the burden of the peasants. An interesting monograph was 
published by the Academia Sinica on military requisitions: 
The collections are carried out by threats and deceit and 
in the last resort the collectors can always make their gains 
by false measurements and by manipulation between coins and 
paper money. Sometimes the requisition is purposely divided 
into several instalments so that additional demands may be 
made at each instalment. For instance, in the district of 
Weinan, in the middle and eastern part of Shensi, four 
instalments were demanded in the year 1930 to 1931 on 10,000 
piculs of wheat. At the end of the fourth instalment 
11,000 piculs had actually been collected, of which however, 
oniy 7,000 were reported and delivered by the magistrate, 
Chang Kung-fu. The provincial autl;l.orities then demanded the 
collection of ar additional 3,000 piculs to make up the 
original sum. On this pretext a further collection of 4,000 
to 5,000 piculs was then made, of which only 410 were handed 
over to the provincial authorities. 2 
Not only was the taxation system itself corrupt, discriminatory and 
oppressive, but the procedure for tax collection was also chaotic. Even 
though the National Government tried to abolish the traditional tax 
farming system and to organise the collection of taxes by the Taxation 
Bureau at the hsien level, 3 the old Ch'ing system of tax collection 
1 Various malpractices in tax collection in the late Ch'ing period are 
·.:. 
described by Hsiao Kung-chuan, op.cit.,pp.113-124. As Arthur Young 
witnessed in 1937, these malpractices remained after the 1911 Revolution. 
See China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
1965)' pp.22-26. 
2 Wong Yin-seng, et al., 
Agrarian China, p.106. 
"Mili.tary Requisitions and the Peasantry," 
3 Yi Ming-shi who worked for a Land Registration Office of the KMT 
Government in 1936 or early 1937 describes the bureaucratic attitudes 
and corrupt behaviour of the offi.cials who were providing a new land 
cadastre for the 'modernised' taxation system of the KMT. See "Experiences 
of an Official in the Land Tax Consolidation Bureau,'1 in ibid., pp.149-
153. 
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per·siste~·.un.~il :193'.7 in North China. 1 . .. •, . Since the land registration on 
which the Ch' ing taxation system rested •:as inherited from the Ming 
2 dynasty and the land cadastre had been kept by the local tax collectors, 
whose positions at the basic level were in many cases hereditary, direct 
taxation by the National Government was only nominal. The Government 
could not avoid farming out taxes and the collectors could collect any 
amount they wished, so long as they paid the required amount to the 
!Jsien or district governments. 
Heavy and arbitrary taxation in the pre-Communist period offered a 
great opportunity to the CCP to impress the people with its efforts to 
lighten their burden and to eliminate the corrupt practices of the 
officials. Since it depended entirely on administrative work, the tax-
ation system was easier for the CCP to reform radically than were other 
practices which were more complex and more closely related to the socio-
economic system as a whole. The collapse of the KMT and warlord administra-
tions with the Japanese invasion made the reform task even easier for 
the CCP, as it meant that the Party did not have to cope with resistance 
from the existing ruling order. ·As soon as the new administration was 
set up, the Communists introduced an entirely new system of progressive 
taxation, which was designed to place a heavy burden on the richer 
3 people. Because of the war, the tax burden was still heavy, but by 
eliminating miscellaneous levies and corrupt practices, the CCP was 
able to lighten it to an impressive extent by comparison with the old 
taxation system, es~ecially for poorer people. 
1 A progressive hsien magistrate in western China under the KMT told Edgar 
Snow, presumably in 1S39, that he had found an old and corrupt tax 
collection system when he had become the magistrate after the outbreak 
of the war. See Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia, (New York: 1941), 
pp.313-314. 
2 Hsiao, op.cit., p.85. 
3 See Chapter V, pp.245-246. 
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Rural Loans 
Since they had to live on extremely small plots of land, and yet 
were forced to pay taxes and levies which often amounted to half the 
crop yield from this land, the corrunon peasants had to cut their living 
expenses to the absolute minimum. According to an SMR survey on the 
peasant home economy in east Hopei in 1937, the annual living expenditure 
of a peasant household which operated less than 25 mou of land was 237.80 
1 Chinese dollars, roughly equivalent to 80 u.s. dollars. Of this amount, 
expenditure on food occupied about 60 percent, while expenditure on 
maintenance of health, on education, and on entertainment amounted to 
less than 1 percent in each case. Although 60 percent of the total 
expenditure was on food, the meals of even the middle peasants in North 
China, eaten twice a day and three times daily in busy seasons, consisted 
mainly of staples and very little protein. Meat and eggs were eaten 
only at festivals, weddings or funerals. The poor peasants did not even 
eat wheat, which was dearer than millet and kao-liang. 2 
As their income from land was scarcely enough to maintain even this 
standard of living, peasants who could not earn enough from side jobs 
were forced to support themselves with loans, particularly in the pre-
harvest seasons. According to an official Chinese source in 1936, a 
normal harvest year, in Hopei and Shantung Provinces, more than three 
quarters of the peasant households earned less than 150 Chinese dollars 
a year, and those who earned more than 400 dollars accounted for less 
1 Kita-Shina no Noqyo to Keizai, p.736. J.L. Buck's survey gives 
C$190.63 in North China in 1922-1925. The difference between the two 
figures is due to inflation during the decade, 
than these figures indicate, for Buck's figure 
his informant households, including large land 
Chinese Farm Economy, (Chicago: 1930), p.385. 
which was more serious 
is the average of all 
owners. See Buck, 
2 Kita-Shina no Noqyo to Keizai, p.741; 
421. 
Chinese Farm Economy, pp.382-
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than ~ percent. This meant that a subst1'ntia·i :~~~b:i~r>:,jf: p~asant house"-
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holds in North :::hina spent more than they, e~r-~e~ ."~~r{~~; a year. 2 For 
special occasions such as weddings or funerals, or L1 times of sickness 
or famine, the majority of peasants had to borrow smns often equivalent 
to or more than their annual income. They borrowed from their richer 
relatives and friends, and from usurers who were in most cases landlords, 
merchants. 3 gentry or In 1933, rural households paying interest on loans 
amounted to 62 percent of the total. 4 
The nature of the loans themselves also compounded the debtors' 
burden. Firstly, the debtor obtained a loan in order to support his 
fomily and only extremely rarely to expand production, 5 and the principal 
and the interest could only be repaid from what he could earn by his 
labour. Secondly, the rates of interest were extraordinarily high. 
Given below are the interest rates in rural China in 1934, compiled by 
the Central Institute for Agricultural Experiment of the National 
6 Government. 
1 Ch'uan-kuo t'u-ti tiao-ch'a pao-kao kang-yao, p.49, quoted in Ramon 
H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1970), p.242. 
2 Same source as referred to in above Note 1, quoted in Myers, op.cit., 
p.242. Myers states that in a normal harvest year an average of one 
third of peasant households had to borrow because their expenditure 
exceeded their income. 
3 Myers, op.cit., p.242. Buck states that the average cost of a 
funeral or wedding in North China in 1922-1925 was about C$50. Chinese 
Farm C'conomy, pp.416-417. 
4 Survey by the Central Institute for Agricultural Experiment in 1933, 
quoted in Hsueh Mu-chiao, op.cit., p.113. Sun Hsiao-ts'un, however, 
quotes slightly different figures from Nung-ching pao-kao, Vol.2, No.4, 
published by the same Institute: "Cash-indebted rural households occu-
pied 65 percent, grain-indebted occupied 48 percent among all rural 
'10useholds in China." Gendai Shilla no Tochi Mondai, p.217. Myers 
quotes much smaller figures from the above cited National Government 
source: in 1936 in Hopei 43 percent and in Shantung 28 percent of rural 
i.ouseholds were in debt. Ibid. 
5 See Myers, op.cit., p.243. 
6 HsUeh Mu-chiao, op.cit., p.119. See also CCP's report quoted in 
Selden, op,cit., pp.13-14; Myers, op.cit., pp.243-244. 
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TABLE 4 Rates of Interest·on Rur.al Loans. 
Annual rate of P"'rcentage among 
interest (%) the whole rural loan 
10 - 20 9.4 
20 - 30 36.2 
30 - 40 30.3 
40 - 50 11. 2 
50 and over 12.9 
Total 100.0 
The rate of interest on grain loans was much higher than that on cash 
loans; it was over 85 percent annually, and most of those who were in 
1 debt for grain loans were poor peasants. According to a report by Lee 
Kuo-ch'un, moreover, between 1932 and 1936, the interest rates roughly 
doubled and the number of usurers increased considerably. 2 
Thirdly, the terms of loan repayment 1·:ere short. Land was usually 
required as security for a long-term loan, and as poor peasants had not 
enough land to mortgage, the terms of their loans could not but be short, 
usually within one year. According to the 1933 survey by the Central 
Institute for Agricultural Experiment, 77.3 percent of the loan contracts 
in rural China were for less than one year. 3 Frequently, the debtors 
were even required to pay interest for one whole year on loans of less 
than one year's duration, so that the actual monthl.y interest rate was 
more than 50 percent higher than that for long-term loans. In the case 
1 
2 
3 
Ibid. 
"Usury in the Rural Districts of Szechwan", Agrarian China, p.194. 
Hsueh Mu-chiao, op.. cit., p.120. Lo Kuo-hsien reports that in pawn-
ships in the rural areas the terms of loans were reduced from three 
years to two and a half years at the beginning of the present century. 
From then on a series of reductions occurred, and in 1935 pawnshops in 
many hsien reduced the redemption period to six months. "Pawnships and 
Peasantry", Agrarian China, p.192. 
. . . ' . . 
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of grain 1.oans, 
'·.~. '·. ·:·~. · .. :· ,· ·.· ~:; .. :·.· '·. 
the ordinary ·i:·erm .. was- si~· m(?nths and the monthly inter-
1 
esc rate exceeded 10 percent. 
Fourthly, the creditor was usually the local landlord or merchant. 
The 1933 survey by the Central Institute for Agricultural Experiment 
gives the following percentages for the sources of loans: 2 
TABLE 5 Sources of Rural Loans in China, 1933. 
Bank 
Co-operatives 
Pawnshop 
Private money exchanger 
Shop 
Landlord 
Rich peasant 
Merchant 
2.4(%) 
2.6 
8.8 
15.5 
13.l 
24.2 
18.4 
25.0 
If one considers that most private money exchangers and owners of 
pawnshops and shops were often actua.lly the same people as the landlords 
and/or merchants, 95 percent of the creditors were landlords and mer-
3 
chants. 
The power of the landlords was reinforced by the system of lending 
money, which was as vital as tenancy for survival of the poorer majority 
of the peasants. This was another source of the peasants' fear of the 
landlords. If two-thirds of the rural population had to depend on 
loans from the landlords simply for survival, it is not difficult to 
understand how deeply landlord rule permeated the basic level of society 
in rural China, or how difficult were the problems which the CCP had to 
face when it tried to mobilise the peasants for rent and interest 
reduction, which was a class struggle. This was the crucial question in 
mass mobilisation. The CCP understood from its experience that so long 
1 HsUeh Mu-chiao, op.cit., p.120; Gendai Shina no Tochi Mondai, pp.193-
213. 
2 Hsueh Mu-chiao, op.cit., p.122. 
3 According to a survey of pawnships in Kiangsu Province in 1933, the 
source of the capital of pawnshops was either landlord or merchant. 
See Agrarian China, p.192. 
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as the· fear of· t~~·. iandlords persisted, institutional er organisational 
transformation would be insecure and the old system could be easily 
revived. 
'Jillage Poli tics 
In this economic situation, therefore, about seventy percent of 
the peasantry was barely able to maintain the lowest standard of living, 
and had to supplement income either by side jobs or by going into debt. 
What, then, was their political status in the villages? How did the 
administration work at the village level at the time the war broke out? 
It is a commonplace in writings on China's political history that 
the Chinese villages had for centuries enjoyed an inter·nal autonomy. 
National administration extended only as far down as the hsien level, 1 
although after 1929 the power of the Kuomintang central government did 
penetrate increasingly into the villages. 2 Central governments, of 
course, had tried for more than ten centuries to organise villages in 
accordance with the number of households, ignoring the natural shape of 
the villages. 3 The National Government was no exception; in 1929 it 
set out to reorganise the villages into hsiang (township) , each of which 
was to comprise a hundred households. But the natural village (tzu-jan 
ts'un or ts'un), the basic unit of rural life, survived all attempts 
at reorganisation by central governments, and remained as the basic 
administrative unit with lts own administrative organisations. 
l Shimizu Morimitsu, Chugoku Goson Shakairon (Rural Society in China), 
(T~kyo: 1951), p.13. 
2 Sydney D. Gamble, North China Villages: Social Political, and Econ-
omic Activities before 1933, (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 1963), pp.2 & 4. 
3 For example, the pao-chia system of the Ch'ing dynasty made a division 
into pao, consisting of 110 households and subdivided into 10 chia of 
11 households each. Usually a pao coincided with a natural village, and 
the number of households varied widely. 
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Who work.ea'"fri .. the 'village office? What kind of self-government .. 
did the Chinese villages have? Did autonomy mean self-government by 
all the villagers? 
In theory, all villagers were equal, and eliqible to hold adminis-
trative positions in the village, particularly af:er 1929, when the 
National Government enforced the Hsien Organisation Act which stipulated 
popular suffrage for villages officers. The practice, however, was 
significantly different. 
Village administration was carried out normally by various assoc-
iations (she or Jmi) 1 within the villages. The purpose of these associa-
tions varied considerably over time and also from one place to another; 
they might be religious, military, 'crop-watching', financial, or what 
Sydney Gamble describes as 'mixed', that is combining several functions 
within one association. Many villages had a number of associations with 
different purposes. But the most universal were the crop-watching 
associations, which in most cases actually assumed the role of village 
administration, to an extent that in some areas the term for the crop-
watching asscciation was regarded by the villagers as another term for 
the village office. 2 Even after the KMT Government introduced, in some 
areas at least, its programme for a well-defined village administration 
organisationally independent of the association, the latter remained 
almost synonymous with the village government.. The village office, in 
1 For a description of these associations, see Gamble, op.cit., pp.32-44. 
2 See, for example, the surv."y by Japanese scholars in 1940-4 2 in Hopei 
and Shantung, on the use of the terms Ch'ing-miao hui in Hopei and 
Kung-k'an i-po hui in Shantung. Chugoku Nason Kank~ Chosa, Vol.l, pp. 
3, 6 & 190; Vol. 5, p.7. Simizu Morimitsu, a Japanese sociologist who 
specialises in Chinese rural society, has given special attention to the 
class character of crop-watching associations which comprised only 
landowning villagers. He states that one of the purposes of the associa-
tions was to descriminate against landless villagers. Chugoku Shakai no 
Kenkyu (A study of Chinese Society), (Tokyo: 1944), p.297. 
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most cases concurrently the association secretariat, was usually in 
the miao (temple), which normally also ,accommodated the prirr.ary school. 
The physical proximity of the administrative, religious and education-
al organisations in the village reflected a degree of organisational 
solidarity. The associations carried out religious 'oelebrations and 
festivals; the administration and school were run by the association 
leaders, with funds provided by the association. The association had 
1 
several leaders who had equal responsibility for the joint management 
of the association and of the village administration. 
Qualifications for village (association) leadership did not 
necessarily include wealth or education. In practice, however, a 
degree of wealth was essential, because the leadership positions 
carried no salary, and the leaders themselves needed t.ime for meetings 
and other work associated with village administration. In fact, most 
informants in the 1940-42 Japanese survey said that it was impossible 
for men without property to be village leaders. 2 Although education 
was not a required qualification for village leadership, some regular 
education or knowledge of the world outside one's village commanded 
respect. 
The position of the association leader was not, at least in 
theory, hereditary. The term of office varied from one or two years 
to lifetime appointment. Where the term of office was short, the 
association lead~rs were usually elected by the members; where it was 
3 permanent, they were appointed by other leaders. Irrespective of 
1 The number of leaders varied from 3 to 40 in accordance 
with size of the 
association 
village. 
2 Chugoku Nason Kanko Chosa, Vol. l, p.10; Vol. 4, p.24, Vol. 5, p.20. 
3 The former was the case in Shantung and the latter in Hopei. 
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whether the leaders were elected or appointed, land ownership was, in 
practice, an essential condition for appointment, because both the 
associations and the village administration and school were maintained 
by fees assessed on the basis of land ownership. 1 It was unusual, 
although not unknown, for those whose contr'..bution was small to be 
elected or appointed to village office. 
According to the Hsien Organisation Act of 1929, the village 
headman was supposed to be elected annually by all villagers above 
the age of twenty, irrespective of sex, but this provision proved 
little more than nominal. 2 In many villages, the association leaders 
appointed the headmen, and an election was conducted among male 
family heads merely as a formality. 3 Even in villages where the 
election was more than a formality, only male family heads who could 
pa!,' taxes and village association fees were able to vote. Usually, 
the poorer half or two-thirds of the villagers did not attend the 
election. If they did, it made little difference to the outcome of 
the election. The poorer villagers knew whom the village leaders 
wanted to be elected and they also had to write their own names on the 
ballots together with the names of the candidates which meant that 
they 'voted' for the leaders nominee. This was partly due to the 
fact that the position of village headman was both difficult and with-
l Association fees were usually about l Chinese dollar per mou annu-
ally. Myers states that village leaders were chosen on the basis of 
the socioeconomic ranking of their family or clan in the village. Op. 
cit., p.259. 
2 Some villages had a ~ystem of election of l:jeadman by family heads 
even before 1929. But in most villages elections were introduced after 
1929 on the orders of the hsien administrations, which often sent 
officials to in~pect the village elections. But the case described 
by Chao Shu-li in his novel Li Yu-ts'ai pan-hua, in which one person 
assumed headmanship for more than ten years, was not uncommon in other 
parts of China, including, according to Japanese investigation, Shan-
tung and Hopei. See Li Yu-ts'ai pan-hua (Li Yu-ts'ai's Story Songs), 
l.n.p.: 1949), p.25; Chugoku Ni3son Kanki3 Chi3sa, Vol.l, p.97; Vol.4, 
pp.6 & 354. 
J See Chugoku Ni3son KankB Chosa, Vol. 1, pp.123, 128, 168, Vol.4, 
pp.24, 25 and 28. 
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1 
out financial reward, and therefore not s.)ught after by poorer villagers. 
But it was also a product of the village s:>cial system, and of the sub-
servient position of the poorer villagers. 
The village was under joint leadership of the headman and the 
association leaders; neither in the extensive Japanese rural survey 
nor in the survey by Sydney Gamble is there evidence of dictatorship by 
one man. The headman convened meetings of leaders to discuss important 
matters as they arose. On administrative and financial matters, the 
2 
villagers apart from the leaders were rarely consulted by the headman, 
and they were not active participants in village administration. 3 
Since the hsien government enjoyed absolute power over the villages, 
the richer families with personal connections in the Iisien could control 
the villages, and the other villagers had little means of resisting. 4 
Village autonomy was, in fact, oligarcl',ic self-government by the richer 
villagers, who comprised 20-30 percent of the village population, who 
owned on average more than 20 mou of land, and who had some education 
1 Since the main task of the headman was to collect taxes and levies 
from the villagers for the hsien government, it was difficult to satisfy 
both the villagers and the hsien, when the hsien required large amounts 
of taxes and levies. See Gamble, op.cit., pp.294-295. The headman 
was entirely responsible for collection of taxes and levies in his 
village, which meant that he had to pay for the poor villagers when they 
could not pay in time, or else face imprisonment by the hsien administra-
tion. In addition, he had to spend a large part of his time on village 
activities. 
2 It was uncommon for meetings to be convened of all the villagers, 
although thd.s was not unknown, Even when a villagers' meeting was 
held, the poorer villag·ers, who had no time to spare for such meetings 
and felt that their presence would be ineffective, did not attend. See 
Chugoku Noson Kanko Chosa, Vol.l, pp.51, 97 & 125, Vol.4, pp.9, 38 and 
354. 
3 See ibid., Vol. l, pp.127 and 135, Vol.5, p.20. 
4 The case of Tieh-so, described in Chao Shu-li's novel Changes in Li 
Village, was neither exceptional nor exaggerated. A case of a middle 
peasant whose daughter-in-law committed suicide is reported in ChDgoku 
Noson Kanko Cliosa: he was exploited by the village leaders who settled 
the case with the hsien gover:nment on his behalf. 
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or knowledge of the admi.nistrative system. The poorer seventy to eig~ty 
percent were left powerless, and had virtually no part in the 'self-
government' of their villages. 
The politicisation of this powerless seventy to eighty percent, the 
inculcation of confidence in their own strength ar,d security and in 
Communist power, was the main task for Communist mass mobilisation. 
However, the poweL· of the rich could not be broken immediately by the 
CCP. In the period from 1937 to 1941, particularly when the Party was 
more concerned with establishing a new administration on the basis of 
the united front rather than with mobilisation of the poor for class 
struggle, the Party needed the education and administrative skills of 
the rich, and landlordism tended to survive. 
There may be exceptions to the general situation described above, 
but generally, about seventy percent of the peasantry were in a depressed 
condition, both politically and economically. For such peasants, war 
and famine were disasters which threatened death. A Japanese investiga-
tion of a village in Yenshan Hsien in Hopei Pronvince provides a 
representative case of the difficulties caused by war. In the autumn 
of 1937, just before the Japanese troops arrived, many villagers fled 
to the ~ities and to faraway villages to avoid the levies and butchery 
of the Japanese, and thus missed the wheat sowing season. In their 
absence, Chinese troops stationed overnight at the village stole their 
food stocks. Consequently, from the winter of 1937 to the spriny of 
1938, many of the villagers suffered from starvation. Many were forced 
to go to Manchuria, both to earn money and to reduce food consumption 
in the village. But even this was not sufficient to relieve the problem. 
The remaining families had to oorrow grain, or go into debt to purchase 
grain simply in order to survive. Some of them had to sell their live-
stock, furniture, clothes, and other personal effects to purchase food. 
·: •' 
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In the worst cases, they had to sell or mortgage their land, but the 
value of land fell by 20 percent because so many wanted to sell, and 
too few people were willing to purchase. Over eightt villagers, 
especially the old, the weak, and the very young, starved to death. 
If this were not sufficient privation, drought attacked the village in 
the next year, 1939. Although the peasants adopted the same defensive 
measures as they had in the previous year, almost a hundred villagers 
died from hunger in 1939. 1 
In times of disaster, the peasants seem not to have expected 
relief from the administration, while the government, in turn, appeared 
2 to have no serious concern for the peasants' welfare. There were, of 
course, some warlords who attempted to reform the administration, but 
as long as their power rested on the .traditional social system, radical 
political reform was impossible, or at least improbable. 3 The KMT 
government system was no exception, even though it tried to 'modernise' 
the government system as a whole. At the basic level, the behaviour 
of its officials differed little from the corrupt traditional practice 
of the Imperial bureaucrats. 
This is not to deny that there were idealistic officials who tried 
rigorously to operate a 'modern' administration under the warlords. 
But they were exceptional, and they were not able to effect fundamental 
changes in the traditional practice of the local level administration. 
Even at the top level of the administration, the National Government 
l SMR, Kakoku-sho Enzan-ken Dai-San-ku Bojuchin-son Gaiyo Chosa 
HBkokusho, pp.8-12. 
2 See, for example, Edgar snow's description of the famine in 1929 
and 1930 in suiyan and Shansi Provinces and the attitudes of the 
officials towards the 20 million dying people. Journey to the Begin-
ning, (New York: 1958), pp.7-11. 
3 See for example, Yen Hsi-shan's attempt to reform the administration 
system in 1922. Donald G. Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi 
Province, 1911-1949, \Princeton: 1967), pp.53-58. 
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never appeared serious in its proclaimed intent to implement the basic 
platform of its agrarian policy, reduction of land rent. 1 Generally, 
the administration at the village level remained unchanged from the 
Ch'ing period until the Communlsts attempted to reform it after 1937, 
and most of the Imperial administrative practic"s were kept alive by 
virtue of the peasants' political inaction. 
Against this background of rural Chinese society, the Japanese 
began in the autumn of 1937 to try to establish control over agricultural 
production, 2 and the Chinese Communists attempted to set up political 
control over the villages. In the ea~ly period the resistance forces 
were a motley collection, and the CCP concentrated its energies on 
attempting to unify them and bring them under its influence, and, in 
the process, on seeking bett<=r techniques of mass mobi.lisation. 
The peasant masses in North China, their depressed socioeconomic 
conditions exacerbated by the war, had been abandoned by the KMT and 
the warlord army and administration in 1937. They were ready to take 
action to improve these conditions, if effective leadership and vision 
were forthcoming. The Communists were the first revolutionaries in 
the history of Republican China to provide the rural masses with such 
leadership and such vision. This was directly related to the vital 
question of the CCP's own survival against its two powerful enemies. 
To mobilise the peasant masses, the CCP had to develop new techniques 
to break through the existing ideas and thinking among the peasants. 
Socioeconomic transformation and mass psychological breakthrough were 
inseparably intertwined; neither was possible without the other. 
1 For the implementation of r.ent reduction under the KMT, see Lin 
Chu-ching, "The Kuomintang Policy of Rent Reduction," Agrarian China, 
pp.144-149 
2 The essential interest of the Japanese 
secure food supplies for their troops, and 
the coastal cities in China and in Japan. 
in rural North China was to 
cotton for their mills in 
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In the first five years of the war, however, mass mobilisation by 
the CCP did not operate to its full extent. The Party seems to have 
been more concerned with the establishment and maintenance of its 
administration in the new areas on the basis of the multi-class united 
front policy, rather than with full mobilisation of mass energies. 
It should not be surprising that there existed serious debates among 
the top leaders over the question of whether to pursue a moderate 
'united front' line or a radical 'mass' line, and that there was some 
indecision in Party policy concerning mass mobilisation. The following 
two sections describe briefly the Conununist base areas in North China, 
and the changes in mass mobilisation policies in the early years of 
the war. 
2. Communist Base Areas in North China 
The five major base areas in North China - the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia 
(SKN), Shansi-Chahar-Hopei (Chin-Ch'a-ChiJ, Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan 
(Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu) and Shansi-Suiyuan (Chin-Sui) Border Regions, and 
Shantung Region - were established gradually in the period between 
1937 and 1941. With the exception of Shantung, four of the five were 
'border regions', extending into parts of a number of provinces, 
separated by railways. That is to say, the CCP built its strongholds 
in the mountains, remote from the administrative centres and thr 
strategic cities of the Japanese, and from the Japanese forces position-
d 1 ·1 l' 1 e a ong the rai way ines, This was patterned after the Party's 
experience in South China in thci early 1930s. Even in the Shantung 
base, administrative districts were separated by the railway lines, and 
the Conununist strongholds were in the mountains; the administrative 
1 For Mao's thinking on base areas, see "Problems of Strategy in 
Guerrilla War against Japan," Chapter 4, Mao, II, pp.94-98 . 
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districts .operated almost as independent units, since .the Provincial 
government of Shantung had difficulties in =ommunicating with the local 
governments. 
The SKN Border Region was distinct from the others. It was not 
really an 'anti-Japanese war base' but was actually a soviet area 
which had a history of Communist control since 1927. It was the nerve-
centre of the Communist system. All other bases were referred to by 
the Communists as 'base areas behind the enemy' (ti-hou ~n-chU-ti), 
and were set up after the outbreak of the war. 
The SKN Border Region 
The SKN Border Region was the only 'soviet region' left in Commu-
nist hands after the National Government's successful extermination 
campaign against the soviet regions in south China. After 1937, 
however, SKN became the most advanced of the Communist base areas, 
partly because of the location of the CCP Central Committee in the 
region and because of its longer history, and partly because it was 
not directly subject to Japanese military attack. Many of the fund-
'lil\ental policies and political strategies were created and first put 
into practice in SKN and then extended to other areas. 
In 1937, the Border Region covered twenty-three hsien in northern 
Shensi, the northeastern corner of Kansu and the eastern corner of 
N. h . 1 ing sia. It had a population of about 1.5 million, most of whom 
2 
were peasants. At about the time of the arrival of the Central 
Committee in 1935, the Communists became particularly active in 
l K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang ch'ii kai-k•uang, p.7; 
Selden gives a description of this region. See op.cit., pp.1-18. 
2 The only published work on the history of the Communist guerrillas 
in this region is that of Mark Selden, although he devotes only about 
one-third of his book to this subject. Selden, op.cit., pp.19-78. 
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expanding the territory south- and eastward. Jan Myrdal has described 
the process of peasant mobilisation carried out by the 2ommunists in 
1935 from interviews with old village cadres at Liulin in Yenan Hsien. 
From these reports, it is possible to reconstruct a simple pattern of 
the peasant mobilisation process at that time. First, propaganda corps 
of the Red Army entered the villages and organised the peasants into 
mass organisations, such as peasant associations, and armed them with 
a few rifles, old spears and swords. Second, the mass organisations 
instructed their members to stop paying land rent and taxes, confronted 
the armed forces of the landlords and the KMT, and, if they were able 
to defeat them, established peasant administration in the villages. 
Finally, the mass organisations conducted redistribution of the land-
lords' property, including land, reinforced the peasant armed forces, 
and by land redistribution and the dismantling of th~ old administration, 
l heightened the peasants' morale. This pattern remained basic.:ally 
unchanged until 1949, although there were many subsequent variations, 
depenqing on local circumstances and the practical application of the 
Party's united front policy. 
The Communists entered directly into the villages, ignoring the 
KMT officials who lived in the cit.ies and came to the villages only for 
tax collection. To the peasants, who had little contact witt the 
administration except for payment of tax, the Communists, who urged 
them to ~top paying taxes and rents, were most welcome 'officials' . 2 
This ill4strates the vulnerablilty of the KMT regime at the basic 
level, and the potential for common ground between the Communists and 
the poor peasants. 
1 Jan 1'jyrdal, Report from a Chinese Village, iPenguin Books: 1967), 
pp.86-95, 106-109 and 120-123. 
2 Ibi<'l. , p. 107 . 
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As Selden stresses, mass mobili·sation in the pre-1937 land 
revolution had important effects on the later development of mass 
movements in the Border Region. First, by 1937, the socioeconomic 
basis of landlord rule in the greater part of the Border Region where 
the land redistribution had bee::i carriE,d out. Secondly, the SKN had 
established peasant political rule at the basic level of its own 
administration and of society. The results of the 1937 local election 
in four hsien recorded in the Government Report illustrate these two 
points. More than ninety percent of the local assembly seats at hsien, 
district (ch'u) and hsiang levels were occupied by workers, poor 
1 peasants and middle peasants. Thirdly, and most significant for later 
mass movements, the peasant activists in the land revolution had become 
local cadres at the basic level, and assumed the role of linking the 
peasant masses with both the Communist government and the Party. 
Base Areas Behind the Japanese Lines. 
The Communist territories in China amounted to nineteen at the 
end of the war. After the Japanese pacification campaign began in 
1938, Communist areas were divided into three categories; base areas 
(ken-chil-ti), guerrilla areas (yu-chi ti-ch'Ll) and enemy areas (ti ti-
ch'u). These corresponded to the Japanese division into 'non-order 
areas' (mi-chian chiku), 'semi-order areas' (jun chian chiku) and 
'order areas' (ctian chiku), depending on the degree of Communist 
influence. Normally, the 'base areas' were in the mountain regions, 
where the Japanese armoured troops could not operate, although in the 
later period of the war the Communists were able to establish 'base 
1 Chung-kuo k'e-hsiieh-ylian li-shih yen-chiu-so, ed., Shefr-Kan-Ning 
pien-ch'U ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi (Collected Documents of the 
SKN Border Region Assembly), (Peking: 1958), pp.17-18. 
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areas' on. the plains, partly because of the transfer of Japanese 
troops to the Pacific theatre. 
As a consequenc~ of the military situation, the borders of these 
areas were c.:instantly changd.nq. The Japanese tried to destroy Commu-
nist strongholds, even in the mountain regions, by frequent 'mopping-
up' (soto) campaigns, while the Communists tried to establish their 
influence in the Japanese 'order areas' by infiltrating armed propaganda 
corps. The term 'base areas' in Communist documents often includes 
'guerrilla areas' that is, those under the 'dual' control of the 
Japanese and the CCP, and which paid tax to both sides and/or had two 
village headmen. The term is used in this study to mean the areas 
where the CCP government could collect tax behind the Japanese lines. 
Most tase areas were established through cooperation between the 
Communists and local nationalists who had started resistance to the 
Japanese before the Communists arrived. The CCP's role was to unify 
the nationalist groups under an integrated military and political 
authority. In the process of this unification the CCP, ;•i.f:h its 
political programmes, succeeded in assuming leadership of the resistance 
as a whole. The united front policy pursued by the CCP was, therefore, 
more practical than theoretical in the areas behind the enemy lines. 
The Communist attempts to establish bases behind the Japanese lines 
began with the Eighth Route Army's march into Shansi; the 115th 
Division moved to northeast Shansi, the 120th Divison to northwest 
Shansi, and the 129th Division with the Field Headquarters of the 
Eighth Route Army to southeast Shansi. 1 By the agreement between the 
l For the organisation of the Communist army, the Eighth Route Army, 
at the beginning of the war, see Johnson, op.cit., p.96. From that 
time on, the Headquarters of the Communist army never returned to 
Yenan, where the Rear Headquarters was located . 
.. · 
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areas' on the plains, .partly because of the transfer of Japanese 
troops to the Pacific theatre. 
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As a consequence of the military situation, the borders of these 
areas were constantly changa.ng. Tr,e Japanese tried to destroy Commu-
nist strongholds, even in the mountain regions, by frequent 'mopping-
up' (soto) campaigns, while the Communists tried to establish their 
influence in the Japanese 'order areas' by infiltrating armed propaganda 
corps. The term 'base areas' in Communist documents often includes 
'guerrilla areas' that is, those under the 'dual' control of the 
Japanese and the CCP, and which paid tax to both sides and/or had two 
village headmen. The term is used in this study to mean the areas 
where the CCP government could collect tax behind the Japanese lines. 
Most base areas were established through cooperation between the 
Communists and local nationalists who had started resistance to the 
Japanese before the Communists arrived. The CCP's role was to unify 
the nationalist groups under an integrated military and political 
authority. In the process of this unification the CCP, with its 
political programmes, succeeded in assuming leadership of the resistance 
as a whole. The united front policy pursued by the CCP was, therefore, 
more practical than theoretical in the areas behind the enemy lines. 
The Communist attempts to establish bases behind the Japanese lines 
began with the Eighth Route Army's march into Shansi; the 115th 
Division moved to northeast Shansi, the 120th Divison to northwest 
Shansi, and the 129th Division with the Field Headquarters of the 
Eighth Route Army to southeast Shansi. 1 By the agreement between the 
1 For the organisation of the Communist army, the Eighth Route Army, 
at the beginning of the war, see Johnson, op.cit., p.96. From that 
time on, the Head~uarters of the Communist army never returned to 
Yenan, where the Rear Headquarters was located. 
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KMT and the CCP for the united front, th: Eighth Route Army, the 
former Red Army, was now part of the Chinese army under Yen Hsi-shan, 
commander of the Second War Zone. The Eighth Route Army fought in 
cooperation with Yen's Shansi Army and the KMT troops under the 
command of Wei ·Li-huang to defend Shansi, from September 1937 to March 
1938. 
After the partial victory at P'inghsinkuan in northeast Shansi, 
in late September 1937, 1 Nieh Jung-chen, Vice Commander of the llSth 
Division, led about 2,0002 troops to the Wut·'ai mountains and 
founded the first base behind the enemy lines, the Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
Border Region. The main part of the llSth Division under Lin Piao 
joined the 129th Division in southeast Shansi and established the 
T'aihang-T'aiyueh base, 3 which later became the heart of the Chin-Chi-
Lu-Yu Border Region. The 120th Division prepared to set up the North-
west Shansi base which later expanded into the Chin-Sui Border Region. 
1 The battle of P'inghsinkuan later enjoyed a glorious historic 
position in Chinese Communist military history, as the first victory 
over the Japanese in a long series of Chinese defeats. Although 
the Chinese army could not prevent the Japanese capturing Taiyuan, 
the battle was an encouragement to Chinese nationalism and resistance 
to Japan. For a description of the battle itself, see Johnson, op.cit., 
pp.218-219, Note 3; Boeich6 Boei-kenshujo Senshi-shitsu, ed., Hoku-Shi 
no Chian-sen (The War for Public Peace in North China), (Tokyo: 1968), 
Vol.l, pp.37-40; Jen-min ch'u-pan she, ed., K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-
ch'i ti Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang chun (The People's Liberation 
Army of China During the War of Resistance), (Peking: 1954), pp.11-20. 
2 The size of the force which went to the Wut'ai mountains with 
Nieh Jung-chen is unclear. See Johnson, op.cit., p.97. But a Chinese 
Communist source states that Nieh led 2,000 troops, which comprised 
one brigade and one cavalry battallion, to Wut'ai on 23 October 1937 
and set up the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Military Region Headquarters there on 7 
November. K'ang-Jih Chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-
fang chun, p.26. 
3 Lin Piao himself went back to Yenan and became president of K'ang-ta 
(Anti-Japanese Military and Political College) having left his Division 
under the two brigade commanders, Ch'en Kuang for the 343rd, and ·Hsu 
Hai-tung for the 344th Brigades, who led them to the east and set up 
new base areas. 
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It is significant that Shansi Province became the nucleus for all 
communist base areas. Divided by the Tatung-Pochow and Chengtung-
Taiyuan railways, the Northeast Shansi base extended northward into the 
Chin-Sui Border Region, the Wut'ai base to the east and northwest into 
the Chin-Ch'a-Chi and the Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning Border Regions, the 
T'aihang-T'aiyueh base east- and southeastward into the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu 
Border Region and the Shantung Region. Shansi presented the CCP with 
certain .advantages; first, because of the radical nationalist organ-
isation, the Shansi Sacrifice League for National Salvation (Shansi 
hsi-sheng chiu-kuo t'ung-ming hui or Hsi-ming hui), 1 and its armed 
2 force, the Shansi New Army, both of which were organised under Yen Hsi-
shan to fight the Japanese in the initial stages of the war, and 
secondly because the oppressed peasants had had contact with the Com-
munist Army in the previous year and were to some extent already ac-
quainted with its programme of social reform. 3 
Shansi was divided into several guerrilla administrative regions 
4 by Yen after the fall of Taiyuan in the autumn of 1937. It was at 
this time that Yen removed many of his local officials and replaced 
them with Sacrifice League members for the purpose of conducting a 
guerrilla war. Among the newly sppointed officials there were a number 
of young patriots who later held leading positions in the Communist 
Government, including Po I-po, a Standing Committee member of the 
1 On the formation of the Sacrifice League and its cooperation with 
the Communists, see Johnson, op.cit., pp.97-100; Gillin,· Warlord, 
pp.231-232. 
2 The New Army comprised volunteer students and Taiyuan workers armed 
with rifles which were supplied by Yen. It adopted a system of political 
commissar and put emphasis on political education of the soldiers, even 
though its senicir commanders were from Yen's old Shansi Army. 
3 See Gillin. "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Com-
munism," pp. 280-281. 
4 Gillin, Warlord, pp.274-275. 
·l · .. · .· · .. ,:··· .... ··· · .. ,. 
.,,.' ·· .. '····. ' . >' .. ··.· 
• 0 ". 
.. 
. .. 
..... 
sacrifice League.and a Communist since 1926. 1 
. . . •:· .. 64. " 
·.· 
At the basic level of administration, the War Region Mobilisation 
committee !Chan-ti tung-yUan wei-yUan-hui) with its voluntary armed 
force, which had been encoucaged by Yen, was to act as the basic ad-
ministrative organ in the general retreat of Yen's administration.2 
Tz1e communist army apparently tried at the basic level to encourage 
mass anti-Japanese organisations where they existed, and where they 
did not, the troops attempted to create such organisations by convening 
3 
mass meetings, propagating the nationalist cause and reducing tax. 
The Communists not only made use of the Mobilisation Committee 
and its militia, but also exploited Chiang Kai-shek's words 'those 
who have money, contribute money [for national salvation]' (yu-ch' ien 
ch'u ch'ien) to impose he.:.vy tax and military requisitions on the richer 
4 people. If they resisted, they were branded 'traitors' (han-chien) 
and were subject to arrest and property confiscation. 5 Thus, in ~he 
initial stage of the war, the Communists carried out their revolutionary 
policies in the name of the nationalist cause. 
In their pacification campaigns in 1938 and 1939, the Japanese 
found that the peasants in the Wut'ai mountains had been well-organised 
by the Communists, to an extent that the Japanese could not obtain 
1 Ibid., pp.274-275; K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih~ch'i chieh-fang ch'U 
kai.-k' uang, P.• 44. 
2 K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang ch'u kai-k'uang, pp.26-27. 
3 See Agness Smedley's eyewitness accounts in China 
(London: 1938), pp.97,104-105,134, 159-161,163-168 & 
Fights Back, 
206. 
4 See 
p. 283. 
5 
Gillin, "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," 
Ibid., pp.283-284 . 
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. l" 1 accurate intel igence. Mass organisation and mobilisation in this 
period, however, do not appear to have been as successful as the Japan-
ese believed. The radical policies pursued by the CCP in new areas 
in this period were shortly replaced by much more moderate policies, 
and mass mobilisation was made subordinate to the maintenance of the 
multi-class united front in the villages. This fluctuation between 
radical mass mobilisation and the united front continued until 1942. 
J, Changes in CCP Policies, 1937-1941. 
As soon as the Central Committee arrived in north Shensi, the 
CCP established the policy for the anti-Japanese united front at the 
Politburo meeting in December 1935. After its dramatic invnsion of 
Shansi, the CCP strengthened its calls to the KMT for a united front 
against Japan, changing the 'Crush Chiang and resist Japan' slogan 
to 'Force Chiang to resist Japan'. Meanwhile, the Party modified its 
policies toward the landlords and rich peasants and entered into an 
agreement with the Northeast Army in Sian for a united front. 
The changes in land policy in 1936, however, were not necessarily 
for the formation of the united front, although the CCP propagated 
them as such. Mao had been known as a proponent of a mild 'rich 
peasant line' in land reform since the Kiangsi soviet period, and it 
is possible that the Central Committee wanted to take a moderate line 
for the economic and political benef·it of the Party in SKN rather 
than for the sake of the united front. Wu Liang-p'ing, then Head of 
the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, has described the 
l The change in the CCP's attitude to Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT is 
illustrated by a comparison between the Politburo resolution in 
December 1935, "The Current Political Situation and the Party's 
Tasks," Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 5, pp.19-40, and the Central Committee's 
"Letter to the KMT" in August 1936, pp.67-76 . 
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change in the Party's policy toward the rich peasants. His views 
may be summarised as follows: 
On the basis of the Party's experience with the anti-rich peasant 
polic:y J.n the Soviet Regions in the last few years, the Party has 
reached the following conclusion: 
(1) In the present stage of the democratic revolution, peasants 
are not our primary enemy. 
(2) Ruthless struggle against the rich peasants pushes them into 
the counterrevolutionary camp and into alliance with the 
landlords, who are our primary enemy in rural areas. 
(3) An anti-rich peasant policy will discourage the middle 
peasants from increasing production and make them fear the 
Government. 
(4) Heavy taxation and grain levies on the rich peasants, and 
confiscation of their land, spare oxen and farm iTplements, 
deprive them of the means to increase production. 
The main reason for the change in policy towards the rich peasants, 
therefore, appears to have been the failure of the previous policy. 
Further justification could be found in the CCP's position on the 
united front; that is, the Party wanted to unite with the secondary 
enemy in order to isolate the primary enemy, the landlords. Mao 
Tse-tung, having learned from the failure of the Kiangsi Soviet, had 
concluded that isolation of the primary enemy of the revolution and 
preservation of the means of increasing production were vitally impor-
tant for the survival and development of the revolution and of the 
revolutionary party, the CCP. It was in 1937 that the CCP retreated 
further to a position of compromise with the landlords, by substituting 
a rent reduction policy for the redistribution of land. 2 
l Wu Liang-p'ing, "On the Change in the Rich Peasant Policy," Hatano 
Ken'ichi, Shiryo Shusei Chugoku Kyosanto shi (Documentary History 
of the CCP), (Tokyo: 1961), Vol. 6, pp.169-178. 
2 Pai Yu-teh, the Soviet Chairman for Fusze Hsien from November 1935 
to January 1936 and the responsible person for the newly established 
United Front Office in central Shensi from March 1936, told Jan Myrdal: 
"Chairman Mao came to us [at the end of 1935 or early 1936) and spoke 
of the necessity for forming a united front. The Central Committee 
now stopped our activities against the landowners. They i.nsisted 
that we had been guilty of departing from the correct revolutionary 
way, so we reinvestigated the true class circumstances of every family. 
We had been far too strict, we were told. We were now to fight 
shoulder-in-shoulder even with the landlords. 
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The formal collaboration between the KMT and the CCP was created 
in September 1937, against the background of the nationalist upheaval 
against Japanese military action in North and Central China. But 
since 1935, when the agreement which obliged Chinese armies and political 
parties to withdraw from Hopei Pro:vince was signed between Generals Ho 
Ying-chin and Ume2u Yoshijiro, the CCP had defined the contradiction 
between Japanese Imperialism and China ~s the primary contradiction 
l 
and all the others as secondary. 
According to Lin Po-ch'li's government report, started to implement 
moderate policies in SKN prior to the formal establishment of the 
collaboration with the KMT. According to a CCP source, in March 1937, 
land redistribution ceased and in May civil rights were restored to 
the landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists by the new election law 
of the SKN Border Region. 2 The principles of the new land policy 
were as follows: 
1. All land belonging to landlords which has not been 
confiscated during the period of the Soviet Govern-
ment shall no longer be confiscated. 
2. When they return to the Border Region, landlords 
whose land and houses have already been confiscated 
shall be given land and houses on an equal basis with 
the ordinary peasants. 
3. The Government will not in~erfere with tenancy as long 
as the rent is reasonable. 
Footnote 2 cont'd 
While this (arrangement for a united front between the CCP and 
the Northeast Army) was going on, the class struggle in the villages 
and countryside hau had to take second place and we had stopped our 
attacks on the landowners." Myrdal, op.cit., pp.95 & 100. 
It is not clear whether Pai means that land redistribution was 
stopped or that only violent attacks on the landlords were stopped. 
According to Lin Po-ch'il's official report in 1939, land confiscation 
ceased in March 1937. Shen-Kan Ning pien-ch'Ll ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien 
hui-chi, p.14. 
l See "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of 
Resistance to Japan," Mao, I, pp. 263-265. 
2 The landlords, rich peasants and capitalists were permitted to 
enjoy civil rights at the end of 1937. But the results of the first 
elections indicated that they were far from being restored to political 
2ower. See Chapter IV, p.6, Note 1. 
3 
Shen-Kan-Ning pein-ch'U ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, p.15. 
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The Communist government, faced with the problem of the high rate of 
illiteracy, 1 introduced this policy at least partly because it needed 
the help of educated people. It is in any case a fact that many land-
lords, rich peasants and capitalists returned to the Border Region and 
a considerable number joined the service of the government after these 
policies were implemented. 2 This worked in favour of the traditional 
elite, offering some opening for it to restore or to preserve its power 
and influence in the new political system, particularly after the 
subsequent introduction of Communist policies to 'regularise and 
stabilise' the administration and of the 'three-third' system in 
which the participation of the traditional elite in the administration 
was encouraged. The dilemma the CCP had to face was that the skills 
of the privileged were so valuable that the Party had to utilise them, 
but such utilisation helped them maintain their privileged status 
and might eventually undermine the revolution. 
The three principles of the new land policy were apparently so 
vague that they resulted in a decline in the pace of mass mobilisation, 
and disorder at the basic level. Some landlords and rich peasants 
demanded the return of their former land, houses, oxen, farm appliances, 
etc. some creditors demanded re·payment of debts which ho.d been can-
celled. And some lanclords compelled their tenants to pay rent for 
the period of their absence from the Border Region. In May 1938, the 
CCP had to issue the following proc::lamation forbidding such demands 
and the disruption of the mass organisations: 
1 In north Shensi, one of the most backward areas in China, illiteracy 
was estimated at over 90 percent. An old Communist in Yenan told 
Jan Myrdal: "In the old days, it often happened that there was not 
anyone able to read for several villages around." Myrdal, op.cit., 
p. 409. 
2 
Shen-Kan-Ning pien-c/J'li ts'an:-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, p.15. 
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The Government {of the SKN Border Region) and the Rear 
Headquarters (of the Eighth Route Army), in order to protect 
the rights already secured by the people, forbid any unaui:horized 
change in the distribution of land or houses and in the can-
cellation of debts made within the areas under the jurisdiction 
of the Border Region Government before internal peace was 
established .... 
The Government and the Rear Headquarters will protect the 
activitie's of all the military, political, economic, cult.lral 
and mass organizations which were in existence when internal 
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peace was established and which have since advanced and expanded 
in accordance with the principle of the united front, will promote 
their progres)' and stop all intrigues and disruptive activities 
against them. 
F.l though this might have helped to prevent the richer people from 
regaining their former authority and power in the villages, the new 
land policy of rent reduction was obviously no• c~rried out as actively 
as land redistribution had been. This may have been partly because 
of confusion among the basic-level cadres, and partly because of the 
central Committee's policy of giving more importance to the united 
front than to the mass movement. It is apparent that the CCP had 
little interest in mobilising the masses for the rent reduction struggle 
in the early years of the united front. Only a few official documents 
deal with mass mobilisation or rent reduction, while a great number 
of documents on the united front appear in the Party's official organs. 2 
Mark Selden defines the 1937-1941 period as the period of stabilisation 
and regularisation of the political system, from his close investigation 
of Party documents in the SKN Border Region. With the rise in tho: 
number of cadres from an elite background, the role of cadres from 
<evolutionary backgrounds was proportionately diminished. The mass 
organisations lost their activism, while the administration was 
l 
Mao, II, pp.75-77. 
2 
See for examples, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, the Chieh-fang 
c:lwu-k 'an (Liberation Weekly) , the Chi eh-fang j ih-pao and the Ch' iin-
chung (Masses Weekly). 
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consolidated through its vertical chain of c''rrunaPd, in the cause of 
'efficiency'. 1 The CCP later had to confront the serious consequences 
of this excessive stress on the united front and 'regularisation', 
and of its indecisiveness in land policy. 2 
The problem of the contradiction between the class struggle, 
er social revolution, and the multi-class united front including the 
landlord class, the primary enemy of the social revolution, had not 
been solved when the CCP moved into Shansi, Hopei and other provinces 
in North China to establish guerrilla bases. Two articles written in 
October 1937 and February 1938 on the basic policies of the CCP by 
Liu Shao-ch'~ then Secretary of the North Bureau of the Central 
Corrunittee and responsible for Party activities in the whole of North 
China except for SKN, indicate the great difficulty faced by the Party 
in the Wut' ai Region in the first ten months of the war. 3 The. first 
article is concerned with popular suffrage, democratic government, rent 
and interest reduction, redistribution of 'traitors'' land, protection 
of the workers, free marriage, and protection and encouragement of mass 
organisations, all policies which represent the 'class struggle' or 
social revolution line. In this article Liu does not even mention the 
united front. 
1 Selden, op.cit., pp.144-148. 
from the CCP's education policy. 
'l'his 
See 
is confirmed by Peter Seybolt 
Seybolt, op.cit., pp.649-656, 
2 Mao admitted in a report to a Party conference in December 1942 
that the peasants in a great part of the Border Region were still 
suffering from heavy rent and interest because the rent and interest 
reduction policy had not been implemented rigorously, and that this 
was one of the main factors 1mdermining their enthusiasm for increasing 
producti.)n. Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, p.196. 
3 I must thanJ.; Professor Imabori Seiji for his drawing my attention 
to these two articles of Liu Shao-ch'i in his article, "Enan-seiken 
ni okeru Nashonarizumu to Kaikyii.-t6s6" (Nationalism and the Class 
Struggle within the Yenan Government), Ajia Keizai, Vol. II, No.6 
!June 1970), pp.2-30. 
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The second article indicates a retreat to emphasis on the united 
front at the expense of the basic policies Liu had expounded in his 
first article. The policies advocated here are protection of private 
property, encouragement of runaway land lords to return to the base 
areas, voluntary reduction of rent and interest; temporary suspension 
of guarantees of permanent tenancy, of uppPr limits to land rent, of 
an eight-hour working day and of lower limits on wages. In this 
article .the 'elements' to be included in the united front extend even 
to the 'traitors', on the condition that they help the Communist 
guerrillas, and with the justification that they had been forced to 
collaborate with the Japanese by threats to their lives and property. 
This article suggests the virtual abandonment of social reform 
for the sake of the 'broadest' possible united front. But it does 
not seem to have reflected Liu's personal opinion on the policies the 
CCP should pursue in the new areas. 'rhe significant fact is that Liu's 
second article, despite the fact that it differs greatly from Mao.'s 
line in "On the New Stage 11 , 1 written in November 1938 only nine months 
later than Liu's second article, was apparently accepted and published 
by the Central Committee. 2 It can be assumed that the line presented 
l This was Mao's lengthy report to the Sixth Plenum of the Six~h 
Central Committee of the CCP, which fixed the guidelines of the CCP's 
wartime policy in the perspective of the rapid growth of the base areas 
and the dispute between Mao and Wang Ming on united front policy. 
Although Mao's basic line in this article is to put the class struggle 
in a subordinate position to the national struggle, his attitudes 
toward the landlords and the 'traitors' are quite clear and harsh. This 
was later developed into 'On New Democracy' in 1940 in which Mao 
argued that the proletariat sh'1uld take the initiative to Japan. "Lun 
hsin-chieh-t'uan" (On the New Stage), Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol.6, pp.163-· 
240. 
2 Both of Liu's articles are included in K'ang-chan i~lai chung-yao 
wen-chien hui-chi (Important Documents Since the Resistance) , compiled 
by the Central Committee Secretariat, published in Yenan in 1942. 
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in Liu's second article became the guideline for policies in the base 
areas, after a brief period of radical policies such as are described 
by Gillin, 1 when the CCP found that the concrete situation in the 
areas behind the enemy lines made it much more difficult to mobilise 
the masses and set up new governments than had been expected. Liu's 
retreat from the 'class struggle' line to the 'united front' line of 
second article may indicate that in the intervening four months he 
had found that rural conditions in North China were not sufficiently 
favourable for his 'class struggle' policies to be implemented 
successfully. 
In the period from 1937 to 1940, Liu, as Secretary of the North 
Bureau, assumed supreme leadership of the Party in the North China 
base areas, which covered the whole area north of the Yellow River. 
It may be said, therefore, that Liu was at least partly responsible 
for the relatively low level of mass mobilisation in North China bases 
in the first four years of the war. There are Communist sources which 
indicate that spontaneous movements of the poorer peasants were suppress-
ed by the Communists in order to allay the richer peasants' fears and 
keep them in the united front. 2 The Central Committee in 1939 noted, 
in the context of the threat from the anti-Communist tendencies of 
Yen Hsi-shan and the KMT, that cadres had been inactive in mass 
mobilisation, putting too much emphasis on the united front with the 
landlords, and on 1 November 1939 th•= Committee issued a decision on 
mass work. The decision points out: 
1 See Gillin, "'Peasant 
ism," pp. 282-288. 
Nationlism' in the History of Chinese Commun-
2 
P'eng Chen writes on the period in which new political power was 
being set up in the Chin-Ch' a-Chi Border Region: "The broad peasant 
masses, who had undergone thousands of years of oppression, suddenly 
attained liberty and could not avoid excessively leftist acts of 
vengeance. They went so far as to infringe the personal, property, 
and land rights of the landlord class .... But when we brought up and 
implemented the 'three-thirds' system of political power, and strictly 
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Many leading bodies of the Party have not even put mass work in 
their schedules, have been unable to dire:t their subordinates 
on how to do mass work, or, there has been little discussion and 
few directives. Many branches and Party ~embers have stayed 
apart from the masses, and have either done nothing or do not 
know how to do mass work. 
In the areas where mass work was developed in its initial 
stage, many leading organs of the Party have gone no further 
in discussion on and leadership1in mass work, (with the result that) it has ceased altogether. 
This indicates that almost no satisfactory work had been done in 
mass mobilisation, on the excuse that prior importance should be given 
to the united front with the landlords. In practice, this had developed 
into what was known as the Wang Ming line of 'everything through the 
united front' at the basic level of policy implementation, which was 
criticised by Mao at the Sixth Plenum. 2 
Footnote 2 cont'd 
guaranteed the political rights and property rights of all anti-Japanese 
people, the landlords finally felt like supporting the anti-Japanese 
demot:ratic regime a.nd participating in it." Chung-kung Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
pien-ch'U chih ke-chung cheng-ts'e (Various Policies of the CCP in 
the Chin-Ch'a-Cbi Border Region), quoted in Lyman P. Van Slyke, 
Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History, 
(Stanford: 1967), p.152. 
Ch'i ~iu, a Chinese Communist historian, records a similar situation 
in Chin-Chi-Lu-YU. When the bases were set up, mass struggles for 
anti-corruption, reform of the old political power, and rigorous 
implementation of the 'reasonable burden' occurred in many places. 
There were also many peasants who spontaneously stopped paying land 
rent and debt interest. From the viewpoint of the leadership, however, 
in this period, initiating the resistance and mobilisation for war 
service were emphasised at the expense of the improvement of the 
people's livelihood and the struggle for democracy. Accordingly, the 
CCP had not yet been able to implement rent and interest reduction 
rigorously. Ch'i Wu, ed., I-ke ke-ming k~n-chu-ti ti ch'eng-chang 
(Growth of a Revolutionary Base Area), (Peking: 1957), pp.116-117. 
1 
"Chung-kung chung-yang kuan-yli shen-ju ch'lin-chung kung-tso ti 
chiieh-ting" (Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Penetration of 
Mass Work), K'ang-chan i-lai chung-yao wen-chien hui-chi, p.111. 
2 See "The Question of Independence and I'nitiative within the United 
Front," Mao, II, pp.213-216 . 
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The Central Conunittee decision of November 1939 cited above 
demanded that the Party organs "in the areas where the Eighth Route 
and the New Fourth Armies are operating," implement radical economic 
and political reforms which were beneficial to the broad masses. In 
the economic field, the decision required local Party organs to implement 
three policies promptly: rent and interest reductfon, abolition of 
exhorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, and improvement of the 
workers' livelihood. Those organs which had already implemented these 
policies were asked to check up on how rigorously they were practised. 
In the political field, the Central Conunittee decision called for the 
implementation of popular elections. Furthermore, the decision demanded 
that all who disrupted the ma.ss movements, primarily the landlord class, 
should gradually be expelled from the governments at all levels, with 
l 
mass support. 
According to Ch'i Wu, the mass struggles for rent and interest 
reduction and wage increases, which were encouraged by the Central 
Committee decision, were launched with some violence during the winter 
of 1939/40, and the peasants became so radical as to threaten the 
collapse of the united front. 2 The bloody rift between the Communist-
influenced New Army and Yen Hsi-shan's old Shansi Army in the same 
winter accelerated radicalisation of the mass movement. Reacting to 
this situation, in April 1940 the North Bureau convened a conference 
at Li-ch'eng in southeast Shansi to adjust the mass movement within 
the united front. Ch'i Wu states that the Li-ch'eng conference was 
called in order to define toe local Party organs' tasks of rent and 
interest reduction and mass organisation. Ch'i admits, however, that 
1 
2 
Ch'i Wu, op,cit., p.112. 
Ibid . I p . 118 . 
I 
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the conference emphasised correction of the 'leftist' tendency in the 
united front, making light of rent reduction and mass mobilisation. 
The conference resulted in a deterioration in the mass movement in 
l 1940 and 1941. Lacking a consolidated basis of mass mobilisation, the 
base areas had to face their worst crisis in 1941 and 1942, with the 
Japanese 'three-all' policy and severe natural disasters. 2 
This suggests that the North Bureau may have inclined more 
to the united front with the landlords than the Central Committee, 
which demanded that local Party organs mobilise the masses and reduce 
rent and interest. It seems reasonable to assume that from 1938 to 
1941 the North Bureau was dominated by the guidelines of Liu Shao-ch'i's 
second article, as there is no evidence to suggest that the North Bureau 
tried to change that line and become active in mass mobilisation. The 
Central Committee decision of 1939, which was presumably drafted by Mao, 
suggests that the North Bureau's policy, emphasising the united front 
at the expense of radical mass mobilisation, might be extremely danger-
ous in the event of "a possible incident which would be disadvantageous 
1 Ibid. 
2 1n 1939 Hopei Province was affected by bad floods, which actually 
helped the CCP to consolid~te the new guerrilla administration, 
because the government had an opportunity to show its concern for the 
people. See K'a~g-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang ch'U kai-k'uang, 
p.33. In 1941, 1942 and 1943, however, the situation was catastrophic; 
T'aihang-T'aiyueh did not have rainfall in 1941 and 1942, while Hopei 
suffered from disastrous flooding again. Locusts attacked all over 
Shansi in 1942 and 1943, and the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region had to 
accept refugees from the KMT region of Honan Province where the 
famine was even more severe. See Jack Belden, op.cit., pp.61-62; 
Theodore H. White, Thunder Out of China, (New York: 1946), pp.166-178. 
Natural disasters, mainly drought, the intensified Japanese mopping-
up campaigns and hostile KMT action came together. Mark Selden com-
pares the Party crisis.in these years with the ones in 1927 and 1934-35. 
See Selden, "Yenan Legacy: the Mass Line," Barnett, ed., op.cit., 
p.99. For the serious economic difficulties in SKN, see Selden, op. 
cit., p.177-187. On the difficulties in the Chin-Chia-Chi Border 
Region, see eyewitness accounts of Michael Lindsay, "The Taxation 
System of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, 1938-1945," China 
Quarterly, No.42 (April-June 1970), pp.7-8 . 
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to the Party and the resistance." such as an armed attack by the KMT 
or Yen Hsi-shan, either of which was predictable in November 1939. 1 
In reality, the 'possible incid1:nt' occurred soon after the Central 
Committee's warning, in the so-called West Shansi Incident: the 
sacrifice League and the New Army were attacked by Yen's armies 
throughout Shansi. The North Bureau, however, does not seem to have 
learned from this incident. On the contrary, as soon as the Incident 
was over, the North Bureau at its Li-ch'eng conference tried to dampen 
down the mass radicalism inspired by the Central Committee decision 
and the Incident. Mass mobilisation seems never to have been the 
primary concern of the North Bureau until the Central Committee's 
Decision on Land Policy in Japuary 1942. 2 
The remarkable expansion of the Communist territories and 
membership of the Party and the mass organisations in the first three 
3 years of the war may be regarded as one of the great successes of 
the CCP, particularly in comparison with what the CCP had achieved 
before the war. Even after it lost control over a great part of its 
territory in the military crisis of 1941 and 1942, the CCP claimed 
that it still controlled 52,800 villages in 455 hsien and had 12 
million members in various mass organisations and 6 million militia 
l The KMT adopted "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien 
Parties" at its Fifth Central Executive Committee in January 1939, 
in response to rapid expansion in Communist political and military 
strength, and as a result of the repeated armed clashes between the 
KMT and the CCP in 1938 in North China. The ''measures" signalled th.: 
beginning of the KMT's open hostility to the CCP 1 which developed 
into the blockade of the SKN Border Region in December 1939 and 
culminated th~\ New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941. 
2 For the Decision and the Party's land policy, see Chapter V, 
Section 3, pp. 222-230. 
3 Party membership had grown from 40,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940, 
regular forces from.80,000 to 400,000, population of the base areas 
behind the Japanese lines from O to more than 50,000,000 . 
.. ,.. 
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l in its base areas.· If one considers that the CCP had Lad neither 
territory, nor mass organisations nor militia under its control in 
these areas before the war, the achievement was amazing. 
These figures, however, do not necessarily represent the real 
strength of Communist power in these areas. It was reported that 
1:ven in the SKN Border Region, people listed as members of the mass 
organisations often did not know they were members, nor did they pay 
membership fees. The peasants regarded the mass organisations as the 
government and their cadres as the officials. 2 An example of 
organising the Sacrifice League in a village in Shansi in late 1937, 
described in Changes in Li Village, is obviously more than fiction; 
one of the village leaders, when asked by a League cadre from the 
district government, said that he enrolled members simply by putting 
their names on the list. 3 
As reported in Mao's speech to a Party conference at the end of 
1942, the cadres tended to be concerned more with formal appearance, 
such as the lists o! membership, meetings, slogans and written orders 
and directives, than with the fact of how far the peasants were 
really organised and how firmly the Communist policies were implement-
4 
ed. Until it faced the crisis in 1941-42, the CCP did not appear 
to be concerned seriously with such 'formalism' in organising the 
masses and implementing its policies. As Mao later admitted, the CCP's 
l Wang Jo-fei, "Wo-men tsen-yang tsai ti-hou k'ang-Jih ]<en-chu-ti 
chien-she ch'i hsin-min-chu chu-i ti cheng-chih' (How we Started to 
Establish the New Democratic Politics in the Base Areas behind the 
Enemy Lines), CFJP, 7 July 1942. Th~ figures 
but do include the bases in Central China. 
2 
"Ch'un-chung 
Organisations) , 
t'uan-t'i tsen-yang kai-tsao'' 
CFJP., 29 June 1942. 
do not include SKN, 
(How to Reform the Mass 
3 Chao Shu-li, Changes in Li Village, pp.113-115. 
4 Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, pp.195-199 . 
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success in 1937-40, therefore, had a fragile footing, which was one of 
the factors that caused the crisis in 1941 and 1942. 
How, then, was the Conununist government system working, and what 
sort of measures were taken to consolidate the Conununist control over 
the base areas and SKN? 
....... 
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CHINA 
PART I: THE ARMY AND THE PARTY 
The following two chapters examine the system of communist 
government, that is, the institutions which assumed the key roles 
in mobilisation of the general population, which not only carried 
out revolutionary war and CCP policy but which were the institutional 
means by which the CCP interacted with the people. Numerous articles 
have been written on individual aspects of the CCP in this period, but 
no scholarly work has yet attempted to present a total picture of the 
various arms of Communist government in the interaction with the 
peasant masses which resulted in politicisation and mobilisation, There 
were four main components of the system; the army, the party, the 
government and the mass organisations. These were closely interrelated 
and affected each other in their roles of supporting communist rule 
and fighting a war of resistance, The point on which the work of all 
parts of the system was ultimately focussed, mobilisation of the masses 
for war, also suited the revolutionary interests of the CCP, whose 
raison d'etre was the prosecution of the Chinese revolution. 
The Japanese invasion resulted in the expulsion of most of the KMT 
and warlord armies with their administrative organisations and personnel 
from North China. The areas into which the Communists moved, therefore, 
were areas in which administration by central or provincial authorities 
for all practical purposes did not exist. The inability of the Japanese 
army to control such a vast and densely populated area as North China 
made it relatively easy for the Communists to take control of villages 
• .. · ·. 
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l 
which were of no strategic importance to the Japanese, Although 
it was often extremely difficult for the CCP to capture big or 
middle-sized cities like hsien capitals, it could still set up hsien 
administrations based in countryside villages from which it could 
exercise control over the local people, 
Over-population of the Chinese villages, 2 although a problem in 
terms of the Chinese economy, gave the Communists an advantage because 
the CCP found its strength in the support of the masses. If they could 
be mobilised in the nationalist cause, concentrations of rural 
population would work to the political advantage of the CCP rather than 
to the advantage of the Japanese. Another advantage for the CCP was the 
fact that in rural North China, as distinct from central 
or local, administrcttion was still largel: :_ .e same as it had been 
in Imperial times. Since the rural inhabitants were accustomed to 
inefficient and corrupt administration, even minimum efficiency and 
honest administration by the CCP might enable it to gain support from the 
masses and arouse them from their traditional unwillingness to take 
direct political action. 3 
1 The Japanese North China Army recognised the fact that shortage of men 
made it unable to control the rural areas or prevent the Communists from 
extending their influence there. "Kahoku-sho nai Chian-jokyo Chosa Hokoku" 
(Investigation report on the public peace in Hopei Province) , quoted in 
Hoku-Shi no chian-sen, p,178, 
2 The density of rural population in North China was lower than that in 
Central and South China: 422 and 653 persons per square kilometer of crop 
area respectively. Buck, Land utilization in China, pp.167 & 362. In 
North China, however, the proportion of land under cultivation was much 
higher than in Central and South China. It is assumed, therefore, that 
rural population was more equally distributed over wider areas than in 
Central and South China.. Although it was less dense and more scattered 
than in other parts of China, the rural population in North China is still 
a problem, because of lower productivity of the land, conditioned by a 
colder and drier climate, and because of a rural population density which 
even in North China reached as much as fourteen times that of Denmark, 
Buck, Chinese farm economy, p.352. 
3 
Muramatsu Yuji, op, cit,, pp.207-209, See also Chapter 2, Section l on 
village politics. The rural control system and its effects on the basic 
level of society in Imperial China is fully described in Hsiao Kung-chuan, 
op. cit. 
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The KMT Government, and some warlords, had tried to reform the 
traditional system of government, but their efforts had not been very 
successful because they were unwilling to reform the economic and 
political system at the basic level of society. The Japanese, whose 
intention was to control the whole of North China permanently if 
possible, were also reluctant to carry out such basic reform. The 
rivals of the CCP in the struggle for control of the Chinese peasantry, 
therefore, were not fighting on the same terms, and their failure to 
implement basic level reforms worked very much to the advantage of the 
CCP. The warlords were not particularly concerned with the 
establishment of a modern political and economic system. The KMT and 
the Japanese, on the other hand, tried to set up modern administrations 
but did not succeed, at least at the local level" The Communists were 
the first to understand clearly the importance of the common people as a 
power base. 
The CCP tried to build a system of government in such a way that it 
could utilise all the human and material resources available to it in the 
area under its control. This was necessary for the CCP in two ways: 
on the one hand, as a matter of revolutionary principle, the CCP tried to 
politicise the masses to bring them into active support of its government, 
and on the other, as a matter of survival, it had to utilise all means 
available to it in order to face the superior numbers and equipment of the 
Japanese and the KMT armies. The Communists could not afford a large 
number of government personnel, even though the salaries for their officials 
were extremely poor; they were forced to depend upon voluntary work. 
This very dependence also served the CCP' s purpose, in that popular 
organisations were a means by which the Party could advance its cause 
of politicising the basic mass of the people. 
-.- · .. 
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Popular organisations, therefore, were an integral part of the 
communist concept of the institutional dynamic of government as well 
as being simply a part of the administration. Although the Party as 
an organisation was distinct frc·m the government, which consisted 
of a variety of groups working together in the anti-Japanese united 
front, it assumed leadership by means of its rigid organisation, its 
army, and its well-defined political and economic programme and 
military strategy and tactics. 
This chapter is concerned with the two rigidly organised, 
disciplined and centrally controlled institutions of the Communist 
government system, the army and the Party, which operated on a much 
larger stage than the other two arms of the system, the government 
administration and the mass organisations. The army and the Party 
had their supreme authority in Yenan. From Yenan, the Central 
Committee of the CCP and its Military Affairs Council controlled the 
whole Party organisation and all regular Communist troops in China, 
The administration and the mass organisations, which are discussed in 
the next chapter, were more decentralised and locally based and had 
less rigid and disciplined organisations. 
1. 'People's Army' 
The Chinese revolution had been an armed revolution since 1911, 
and the army was given a special sig:1ificance by the CCP. From 
1927, when the CCP first established an army, this army was essential 
to the Party's own survival. During the war with Japan, its role was 
even more vital, since the CCP faced an enemy which possessed one of the 
most impressive armed forces in the world, and at the same time had to 
con.tend with an uncertain ally which had devoted a great deal of energy 
to attempting to eliminate the communists by armed force. For the CCP, 
" ~, ",. : .. : ...... . 
a revolutionary party, the revolution at this stage meant war and the 
army was the instrument of war; all other institutions were elements 
supporting the army. In his speech at the Sixth Plenum of the CCP 
central Committee in November 1938 Mao Tse-tung said: 
In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is 
the main form of organisation. Other forms such as mass 
organisation and mass struggle are also extremely important 
and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be 
overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. 1 
The significance of the army did not, however, lie only in its 
military function, but also in the indispensable function of mass 
mobilisation. Mao '.s comment on the historical significance of the 
Long March, for example, illustrates the importance attached to the 
non-military function of the army: 
The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced 
to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road 
of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without 
the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so 
quickly about the existence of the great truth which the 
Red Army embodies? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. 
In the eleven provinces it has sown many seeds which will 
sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a 
harvest in the future.2 
This comment could be applied equally to the resistance war period 
83 
in North China, substituting for 'Long March' the 'Eighth Route Army', 
In other words, after 1937, when the Communist army joined the war, 
a vast new area was opened to it, in which it could function as a 
'propaganda force' and a 'seeding-machine' . 
Before discussing the political work of the army, it is worth 
reviewing briefly the situation of the Communist army in North China 
in the first three years of the war, which has been described in 
1 
Mao, II, p.221. 
2 
"on Tactics against Japanese Imperialism a report given at the 
Wayaopo conference of Party activists on 27 December 1935 1 Mao, I, 
p.160 
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detail by other writers. The Eight Route Army of the Chinese National 
Revolutionary Army was substantially the former Chinese Red Army, 
1 
organised in August 1937 in accordance with the KMT-CCP agreement, 
The Communists' deployment was flexible enough to enable them on 
many occasions to spare at least some troops to help the voluntary 
corps which were fighting the Japanese, This enabled the Eighth 
Route Army to absorb many. of the voluntary armed forces, including ex-
KMT troops such as those under the command of Lu Cheng-ts'ao; and this 
process of absorption contributed to the increase in the size of the 
. 2 Eighth Route Army from 80,000 in 1937 to 400,000 in 1947, 
The effectivenc,ss of the Communist army as a fighting machine 
is undisputed; its morale was high, and its use of guerrilla tactics 
was both skilful and successful. In the three years from the Battle 
of P'inghsinkuan in September 1937 to the Hundred Regiments Offensive 
beginning in August 1940 the communists conducted very few large 
scale operations against the Japanese and "concentrated their efforts 
on expending their effective strength rather than on armen con-
3 frontation with the Japanese."· The Japanese Army was aware that, in 
1 At the time of reorganisation, the Eighth Route Army, formally the 
Eighteenth Group Army from November 1937, had three divisions, the 115th, 
the 120th and the 129th. One division consisted of two brigades and one 
brigade consisted of three regiments, For details of the leaders of the 
Eighth Route Army at the time of reorganisation, September 1937, see 
Johnson, op. cit,, p.96. 
2 John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, (London: 1967), p.303, 
3 Ibid., p. 52. This is confirmed by Japanese military sources, The 
Japanese North China Army was aware that the communist influene was 
growing rapidly, although it had difficulty in making contact with the 
Communist guerrillas .\.n its pacification campaigns because of the 
guerrillas' tactics of rapid retreat to avoid confrontation with 
superior Japanese troops. See military reports quoted in Hoku·Shi no 
Ch1an-sen, pp,55, 60 1 64-65, 
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its pacification campaign in the areas which it occupied following the 
defeat of the regular Chinese armies in 1937, the Communists were the 
d . . l main an uncompromising enemy. The Japanese did not appreciate, 
however, the real strength of the Communists, and until the Hundred 
Regiments Offensive they still believed that the~• could destroy the 
communist 'bandits' by routine 'mopping-up' campaigns, such as they 
conducted against other armed groups who opposed them. 
Political Work of the Army 
The political work of the army both within its own ranks and among 
the populace in general was of critical importance for the political 
success of the CCP, since for the CCP th& army was not merely a 
fighting machine but a 'propaganda corps' directed toward the general 
population. The role of the army as a 'propaganda corps' had been 
er\unciated by Mao Tse-tung himself as early as December 1929, in the 
2 Kutien Resolution of the Red Army. This Resolution was enshrined as a 
sacred text for the political work of the army during the Yenan period. 3 
The Resolution defined the tasks of the Communist army as 1) fighting, 
2) raising funds, and 3) mass work. According to the editor of the 
l See, for example!. the following statement in the "Gun-senryo-chiiki 
Chian-iji Jisshi-yoryo" (Essentials for Peace Maintenance in the 
Occupied Areas of the (Japanese] Army) , issued by the Japanese North 
China Army: "Among the various bandits· at large we should concentrate 
on subjugating the Communist bandits, and especially try to destroy the 
Communist bases at their point of origin •. ,,We must completely 
eliminate the communist bandits [though other bandits can be won over]," 
Quoted in ibid. 1 pp.54-55 
2 For discussion 
pp. 102-105. 
of the Kutien Resolution, see Gittings, op.cit., 
3 In the campaign to 'support the government and cherish the people', 
beginning in October 1943, the CCP Central Committee designated this 
Resolution as one of the rectification documents within the army, 
According to the editorial note of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi edition of the 
Selected f'1orks of Mao Tse-tung, the Resolution is "one of the earliest and 
most important documents about construction of the army and the party of 
the Chinese Communists; its principles, methods and basic content are still 
perfectly applicable.'' Nao 1'se-tung hsiian-chi 1 (n,p.: 1944), Vol.3, p.135, 
. .... 
·· .. · ': :· 
· ... 
r_ .. ··.'J 
'·'" 
rl 
. 1 
·. •. 
. ; ... 
:·:.: : . · ........ '. 
... · 
86 
selected works of Mao Tse-tung published in 1944 by the Party organ in 
the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, which includes the Resolution as an 
appendix, the tasks of the Communist army at that time were the same 
as those of the old Red Army as defined in the Resolution, except that 
'raising funds' had been replaced by 'production•. 1 
The Kutien Resolution does not describe the first two tasks of the 
army in detail; it concentrates almost exclusively on political work, 
including propaganda work as a most important component, which is a 
clear indication of the relative priority of political work of the 
army. The Resolution stresses that propaganda work is the first and 
essential stage in the general tasks of the army, the aims of which 
are"to organise the masses, arm the masses, set up political power, 
eliminate reactionary forces and accelerate revolutionary upsurge. 112 
The Resolution defines more than the principles of the political work 
of the army, and it goes on to describe in detail procedures for 
organisation of propaganda corps within the army. 
'!'he suggested organisation of such propaganda corps was that 
each detachment (brigade) was to have one propaganda company of 21 
members, with a company commander, a deputy commander, 16 propaganda 
workers, a porter and two clerks. The propaganda workers were to be 
divided into several squads, consisting of a leader and three propaganda 
workers, for work at battalion level and below. The propaqanda workers 
were to be drawn from progressive civilians nominated by local govern-
ments, and suitably qualified soldiers from the ranks. 
1 Ibid. After 1949, the three tasks of the army have still been 
regarded as relevant for the PLA, ana particularly in the period after 
Lin Piao became Defence Minister, the last two tasks have been stressed. 
Se<C Lin's speech "Long Live the Victory of People's War" in 1965. In 
the Cultural Revolution political work in the army has been emphasised 
even more. See, for example, joint editorial of the Jen-min Jih-pao 
!People's Daily) , Rung-ch' i (Red Flag) and the Chieh-fang chiin-pao 
(Liberation Army Daily), 1 August 1970. 
2 
Nao Tse-tung hstian-chi, Vol.3, p.160. 
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At each level of the army responsibility for training propaganda 
workers and supporting their activities, and command of the propaganda 
l 
squads, lay with the Political Department. The system of political 
commissars and political departments is a well-known and distinctive 
feature of communist armies, to which many western scholars and 
military men have given attention. In the case of the Chinese Communist 
a1:my, 2 the political commissar, who assumes the ultimate responsibility 
f.or, and leadership of, Party activities and political work within the 
army, is appointed only at division and brigade levels; these Commissars 
are responsible to the General Political Department in the army corps 
headquarters. They command the Political Department at each level and 
the Poli ti cal Officers (literally, cheng-chih chih-tao-yiian, or 'Polit-
ical Instructor') at regiment level and below. 3 According to Japanese 
military information, the organisation of the Political Department at 
4 the division level during the war was as follows: 
1 Ibid., p.165. 
2 This has been studied in detail by Gittings, Samuel Griffith and 
Alexander George. Gittings and Griffith give a full description of 
the organisation of the political apparatus in the army, while 
George concentrates mainly on its operation. See Gittings, op.cit., 
pp.99-116; Griffith, The Chinese People's Army, (New York: 1967), 
pp.254-264. George devotes a whole book to a detailed study of 
political control in the Chinese Communist army during the Korean 
War. Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its 
Aftermath, (New York: 1967). 
3 For the organisation and role of the Political Department during 
the anti-Japanese-iilar, see Johnson's description based on a ~1ew 
Fourth Army document captured by the Japanese. Op.cit., pp.71-91; 
"Ti-shih-pa chi-t'uan-chiin cheng-chih kung-tso t'iao-li" (Regulations 
for Political Work of the 18th Group Army), quoted in Tada Corps, 
SBkyB Jitsumu KyBan (Teaching Programme for the Elimination of the 
Communists), (Tokyo: 1942), pp.216-217, SMR, Dai-Hachiro-gun Shin-Shi-
gun ni kansuru Shiryo (Source Materials of the Eighth Route and the 
New Fourth Armies), (Tokyo: 1941), p.82. 
4 Tada Corps, op.cit., p.217. This is slightly 
of the New Fourth Army described by Johnson, but 
the ~ame principle. See Johnson, op.cit., p.82. 
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The political work of the army, which the CCP regarded as decisive 
for its survival, consisted of three components: work within the army 
itself to give officers and men political training and improve relations 
between them; work directed toward the local people to win sympathy and 
to organise mass organisations and new local governments; and work 
directed at enemy troops with the aim of demoralisation. 1 Within the 
army "political work was, and still is, regarded as a totality which 
embraces all aspects of the army's everyday life, of its cultural, 
educational, and sparetime activities." 2 
Although there have been a number of studies of political work in 
the Chinese Communist army, it is important for this study and deserves 
some discussion here. Its importancecannot be overemphasised, partic-
ularly in the perspective of the Chinese revolution and in the context 
of the peculiar role allotted by Mao to the army in his theory of 
revolution. The three major western studies on the Chinese army, while 
recognising the importance of political work, are concerned mainly with 
political control of the troops, Party-army relationships or morale 
maintenance; none of them focuses attention on the army's political 
function in the revolution. It is with this latter aspect of army 
political work that the present study is concerned, and in the following 
pages an attempt is made to exar»ine how the army worked in mass political 
and social mobilisation, and how it served the CCP in bringing revolu-
l 
Mao Tse-tung hsiian··chi, Vol. 3, 16 P· . 
2 
Gittings, op.cit., p.105. 
I 
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tionary changes to the Chinese villages. 
From this point of view, political work within the army, aiming at 
radical transformation of the political personality of individual 
soldiers, may have had more significance for the CCP than the securing 
of Party control over the army or the maintenance of morale. As 
illustrated by the first rectification campaign, political education 
and thought reform had, and still have, special importance in the 
Chinese Communist revolution. One of the distinctive elements of the 
Kutien Resolution, the first chapter of which is included in the post-
1949 editions of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung as "On Correcting 
Mistaken Ideas in the Party," is that it suggests that most of the 
eight 'mistaken ideas' of Party members within the army could be 
corrected by education and thought reform. 
Nomura Koichi interprets this as an attempt by Mao to use the army 
to create a 'vanguard of the revolution', or proletariat, out of the poor 
peasants who comprised the majority of the members of both the Party and 
1 the Red Army. This interpretation appears to be confirmed in a talk 
by Liu Shao-ch'i in 1946 with Anna Louise Strong on "Mao's inventions 
in Marxism." Strong writes: 
Even the concept of the 'proletariat', said Liu, gets a new 
meaning in China. " ... [I)n China we have very few such people 
(industrial workers) .... So Mao Tse-tung has been training 
another kind of people - the farm hands and poor peasants in the 
army - who have the same qualities of discipline <ind devotion 
that the industrj_al workers have. They give their lives in the 
fight against foreign and native oppressors even when very young. 
They fight now for the 'new democracy', but when the time comes 
for socialism, they will be ready to build that too."2 
In the rural situation, in which there were virtually no factory 
workers for recruitment into the CCP and the 'army, the Communists were 
l 
Nomura K~ichi, Chugoku Kakumei no Shiso (Thought of the Chinese 
Revolution), (Tokyo: 1971), pp.94-95. This book is an outstanding 
and most comprehensive study of Mao's revolutionary thought. 
2 Strong, The Chinese Conquer China, (New York: 1949), p.58. 
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forced to create, through political education of the peasantry, the 
political consciousness and discipline which, according to orthodox 
Marxism, are supposed to attach to the urban proletariat because of 
their oppressed or alienated position in society and factory life. 
Mao seems to have been attempting tc create in individual members 
of the army and the Party the consciousnE·ss which makes the urban 
proletariat the vanguard of the revolution. Party members were, however, 
more isolated than the members of the army, since they were scattered 
in a variety of units throughout the society. The highly organised 
nature of the army, and its size, made it a more suitable substitute 
for the non-existent proletariat in rural China than any other institu-
tion or group of people available to the Chinese Communists. In effect, 
the army did become the vanguard of the revolution, not only by pro-
viding physical security for the newly established revolutionary 
political power, but also by being the embodiment of revolutionary 
thought and behaviour, and by contributing to the social and political 
transformation of the rural population. 
If the Kutien Resolution is seen in this context, "mistaken 
ideas" 1 were particularly dangerous in the army. On the other hand, 
through political education or indoctrination, mistaken ideas were more 
easily ccrrected in the army than in any other institution because of 
the army's organisational character as a rigid full-time organisation 
with a clearly defined vertical chain of command, which exercised full 
control over the lives and actions of its members. Thought reform or 
political education was not, of course, demanded only in the army but 
also among all Party members. It should be noted, however, that in 
the army all cadres and men were expected to be constantly aware of 
1 
Mao, I, p.105. 
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their mission as the vanguard of the Chinese revolution, 1 no matter 
whether they were Party members or not, whereas only Party members 
were required to undergo thought reform in other fields. 
Political education in the army become even more important in the 
Yenan period when the nwnber of ~oldiers rapidly increased as a result 
of recruitment from the peasants and the absorption of nationalist 
guerrillas, and when the scope of the army's activities was many times 
larger than in the Kiangsi period. Failure to carry out political 
education in the army might result in serious losses, not only in the 
military field but also in mass political mobilisation on which the CCP 
depended for survival. 
The behaviour of the individual soldiers, particularly in areas 
newly occupied by the Communists, was one of the critical factors 
determining whether or not the CCP would succeed in the war and the 
revolution. After examining major theories about the success of the 
Chinese Communists, Roy Hofheinz concludes that none of them can be 
completely satisfactory, and he suggests that: 
1 
the contextual and motivational theories lie at the two poles 
of a continuum of explanations which centers on what is perhaps 
the most important and least examined of all the possible explana-
tions of Chinese Communist success: the behavior of the Chinese 
Communists themselves. 
[Alt least half of the credit for the revolution belongs 
to the Communists themselves. The expansion of Communist forces 
in any area during any period was likely to be better correlated 
with Communist presence in the vicinity than with any other social 
phenomenon. 2 
Alexander George has noted from his interview with Chinese prisoners 
in the Korean War that: "The Chinese Communist military model was 
imbued with an ethical and missionary flavor that was appreciably 
stronger than that typical in the history of the Soviet Army. As a 
result, the type of small group life the PLA tried to establish recalls 
in some ways the closely knit military-religious orders of the past." 
Op.cit., p. 27. 
2 
Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural 
Influence Patterns, 1923-1945," Barnett, ed., op.cit., p.77. 
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BY 'the behavior of the Chinese Communists' he does not mean only the 
behaviour of the Communist soldiers. But in the context of the pattern 
in which the CCP established contact with the people, a great part of 
"the behavior of the Chinese Communists" was that of the Communist army. 
Propaganda by the army among the civilian population depended prim-
arily on the establishment of good relations between them, for which 
strict discipline was a minimal requirercent; the Communist troops also 
experimented with various methods of winning over the local masses when 
they marched into new areas. Many reports testify to the rigid dis-
cipline of the Communist army. For example, at the beginning of the 
war, an American reporter Nym Wales travelled with the newly reorganised 
Eighth Route Army moving from Shensi to Shansi, and gives an eyewitness 
account: 
The Red Army never carries tents, but camps in deserted buildings 
or in the peasants' houses. They pay for everything, even includ-
ing a few coppers for the use of a cooking stove for a few minutes. 
In the Soviet districts payment was made in Soviet currency, but 
in other places it was in Kuomintang notes. No matter how tired 
and exhausted they were at night, the soldiers swept the floor and 
courtyard and cleaned up their quarters before retiring, following 
army regulations to the letter. We sometimes passed melon patches 
and pear orchards in a hot, deserted valley, but the Red soldiers 
never turned their heads - the price was high, and they were too 
poor to buy anything but shao mi. Their respect for private pro-
perty was a little startling - in a Communist movement. But, of 
course, it is this nicety which has kept the support of the pea-
santry for them all these years. All the people along the way in 
these "White" areas were friendly to the Red travellers, including 
merchants and landlords, and the travellers were very courteous to 
them. 1 
The "arm:t" regulations" in the above quotation are the well-known 
'three main disciplines and eight points of attention' which were 
observed by the soldiers "to the letter," for the army could not 
survive in a 'water' of hostile people. 2 
1 Nym Wales, Inside Red China, (New York: 1939), p.129. 
2 Anna Louise Strong reports a story of an officer of the New Fourth 
Army who answered a foreigner who protested at a death sentence given 
to a soldier who 'raped' a girl: "What the girl did has no bearing. . .. 
If a peasant father considers his daughter's honor violated by a man of 
our army, we must eliminate the cause. Unless the peasants can trust 
our army to sleep in their homes, knowing that their women are safe, our 
army cannot survive." Op.cit., p.201. For other stories on disciplinary 
practices, see pp.198-201. 
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The good behaviour of the soldiers was not merely essential for 
the survival of the Communist army, but in the vast areas into which 
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they marched after the outbreak of the war, it was one of a few critical 
elements which contributed to winning the favourable judgment of the 
people. The army tried to win over the peasants not only by its 
courteous attitudes and its care not to annoy·them, but also by positive 
attempts to exploit every opportunity to help them. For example, the 
soldiers often off~red to help with simple work, such as carrying 
water and repairing furniture, for the family with which they stayed; 
the troops were mobilised to help the peasants on the fields in the 
busy seasons; the army supplied medical services to the local people 
among whom they were stationed, particularly after 1943, in the 
campaigns to love the people and to eliminate superstition. 
such pract~ces helped to make political work effective. A Japan-
ese investigation of Communist army political work in He-shun Hsien in 
Shansi Province reveals the care and efficiency with which the Commu~ 
nists approached the tasks of propaganda and organisation. 
1 
In August 1937, one battalion of the 129th Division entered 
He-shun.hsien. Its political workers started a propaganda 
campaign for national salvation utilising Yen Hsi-shan's 
administration and the Sacrifice League. In April 1938 when 
the Japanese troops occupied He-shun, the Communist troops 
withdrew. As soon as the Japanese moved out in the next 
month, the Communists came back to try to establish their own 
hsien administration. When they found that they had failed 
to gain sufficient sympathy for the establishment of the 
hsien administration, they mobilised every soldier and . 
political worker of the Army stationed there, and also the 
cadres of the Sacrifice League, to help the peasants harvest 
wheat and millet. This banal tactic was quite successful 
in winning over the peasants. For two weeks after the 
harvest, the CCP propagated rent reduction and reasonable 
taxation bc'.sed on the cause of national salvation, and 
economic benefit for the tenants. The landlords and rich 
peasants were in the minority and dared not express their 
objection to this propaganda. The Communists organised 
various mas~ organisatio£s for national salvation in the 
rent reduction campaign. 
Excerpt from the report of Misaki Ryoichi, who was sent by the 
Japanese North China Army to He-shun hsien for a month in May and June 
.-;... .. .. 
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The effectiver.ess of the political work of the army among the 
civilian population, which depended heavily on the behaviour of the 
individual soldiers, is undoubted. Besides numerous western reports 
which testify to this, there are countless Japanese military reports 
stating that the Japanese trOOfS found the Communist mass work skilful 
enough to have enabled them to win over the local inhabitants, who 
worked for the Communist guerrillas and provided them with intelligence. 
Although the Japanese regarded the Communists' success in winning 
over the local people as deception or manipulation, they did appreciate 
the skill of the Communists and their effectiveness in this work. 
Recruitment, for example, is one indication of the effectiveness 
of the army's political work among the local people and its relations 
with them, since the Communist army recruited on a volunteer basis 
and not by conscription. In the Chieh-fang jih-pao, there was no 
indication of difficulties in recruitment until the first half of 
1944. After June 1944 a 'join the army' campaign was launched even 
in such areas as the SKN Border Region, and between June 1944 and 
April 1945 the army was expanded from 320,000 to 600,000. This may 
indicate that the Communist army had no difficulty in maintaining 
its numbers at a level of 300,000, but that when it wanted to expand 
rapidly beyond that, it needed some kind of campaign, persuasion or 
pressure. Even Anna Louise Strong, a well-known reporter with close 
relations with the CCP, admitted that at least social pressure was 
applied in recruitment. She describes how this operates: 
Meetings were held at which speakers said: "Our army needs 
men; we expect such a quota from this county." Communists 
and government officials were expected to be the first to give 
their ~ons. Militiamen volunteered, considering the regular 
army a promotion. Often the meeting refused some volunteer on 
Footnote l cont'd 
1939 on a fact-finding investigation on Communist activities. Lengthy 
citation in Hoku-Shi no Chian-sen, pp.91-92. 
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the ground that he was the sole support of a family. Men who 
had no such excuse found their neighbors watching them, expecting 
them to go. 
From whatever motives they come, when the list is made up 
they are all "volunteers," celebrated and honored as such, in 
which they have horses to ride, paper flowers and rosettes to 
wear, special seats at puppet shows and Yang-ke dances. Gifts 
are given to their families. In every way their community. 
cheers them on. Under such circtimstanies the quota of recruits 
for a county is usually more than met. 
It is perhaps this last sentenc~ which is the most significant. 
Jack Belden, another reporter close to the CCP, writes that it was 
not easy for the villager to avoid joining the army because of 
'terrific' pressure. Besides the propaganda in mass meetings, day-to-
day gossip and in discussions and plays the support of family members 
was enlisted in persuading prospective recruits to join the army; if 
this did net work, then the whole village might be mobilised to 
persuade them to join up. 2 
The important point here is not the existence of pressure, but 
that it came from the local people as much as from the Party. In other 
words, the local people had accepted the army, and also its recruit-
ment of their sons, brothers and husbands to defend their own lives 
and their new-found political power. The CCP itself tried to make 
the potential recruits feel that joining the army was an honour, that 
they were to fight not only for a great cause but also on behalf of 
their ftillow villagers and for their own interest. 
As many writers have observe&, the transformation of the image 
of the army in society by the CCP was revolutionary, if one remembers 
the place of previous Chinese armies, including the KMT army, in 
3 
society and in the eyes of the people. The transformation was im-
. .. · .. ' .. 
l Strong, op.cit., p.198. 
ed by persuasion, propaganda 
Jack Belden writes: "Soldiers were obtain-
and local social pressure." Op.cit., p.341. 
2 Belden, op.cit., p.342. 
3 See, for example, ibid., pp.341-348. Gillin describes the differ-
ences between the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese armies in their 
behaviour toward the local people and also different reactions of 
the people to these armies. See "'Peasant Nationalism' in the His-
tory of Chinese Communism," pp. 276, 280-281. 
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possible without political education of individual soldiers. Political 
work was the critical element in building up an entirely new type of 
army in China, and in changing the image of the army among the people. 
Movements to Overcome Difficulties after 1941 and Their Political 
significance. 
The function of the Communist army as the vanguard of the revolu-
tion was achieved not only by study, discussion, instruction and 
criticism-self-criticism, but also by mass campaigns launched after 
1941. After the fall of Wuhan in the autumn of 1938, the Japanese 
turned their attention to the consolidation of their position in North 
China, and found Communist guerrillas building an administration over 
an increasingly wide area. In 1939 and 1940, they developed the 
tactics of what has been called a 'cage policy' in order to contain 
the Communist base areas. As Gittings describes it, "Hundreds of miles 
of roads were built, and a network of key poir.ts, fortified with 
blockhouses, trenches, and barbed wire, spread through Hopeh and 
Shansi."1 The effectiveness of this 'cage policy' can be seen from 
the fact that the Communists had to launch the Hundred Regiments 
Offensive in the latter half of 1940. The reason for the Hundred 
Regiments Offensive was not seen by the Japanese Army as a result of 
the effectiveness of its 'cage policy' . 2 It is, however, agreed 
among foreign observers that the 'cage policy' forced the CCP to 
launch a large scale battle to cut off the Japanese communication 
lines, to destroy the containment and blockade network, even though 
l Gittings, op.cit., p.53. 
2 See "Kita-Shina Homen Kyosan Seiryoku ni taisuru Kansatsu" (Obser-
vations on the Communist Force in North China), l October 1940, 
Hoku-Shi no Chian-sen, pp.384-385. 
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it meant heavy losses in men and material and also predictable 
1 Japanese countermeasures. 
Following the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Communists dis-
covered that their position was quite vulnerable. Alerted by the 
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Communist military strength «nd excellent intelligence system demon-
strated in the Hundred Regim~nts Offensive, 2 the Japanese intensified 
their efforts to eliminate the Communists and became more brutal 
and ruthless. Moreover, in January 1941 the armed clashes between 
the KMT and the CCP culminated finally in an open rift brought about 
by the New Fourth Army Incident. 3 The financial support for the 
Eighth Route Army by the Central Government was stopped and the 
blockade around the SKN Border Region was tightened. 4 
Partly to overcome these difficulties the Communists devised 
three policies, summarised in three slogans: 'Better troops and 
simpler administration', 'Production and self-sufficiency' and 
'Rectification to correct style of study, style in Party relations 
and style of writing!. 
These movements were, of course, not entirely military, but 
were designed to affect the political education of the army, and the 
army's relationship with the civilian people. The intention of the 
first policy was to reduce the number of regular troops and to replace 
them by local guerrillas and militia. The Communist armed forces 
1 See, for example, Griffith, op.cit., pp.69-70; Gittings, op.cit., 
p.53. 
2 The Japanese did not detect any ~rior indication of .the Hundred 
Regiments Offensive and it was a great surprise to them. "Kita-
Shina Homen-gun Kiroku" (Record of the North China Army [of Japan)), 
quoted in Hoku-Shi no Chian-sen, p.338. 
3 For the details of the Incident, see Johnson op.cit., pp.136-140. 
4 For the serious effects of the cutoff of the KMT support and the 
tightened blockade on the SKN economy, see Selden, op.cit., pp.'177-
187. 
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consisted of the regular army, guerrilla troops and the militia. The 
regular army, which in North China was the Eighth Route Army, was under 
the command of the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP and supplied 
by the border region governments. The guerrilla troops were also full-
time, but were local small-scale units with great autonomy, under the 
d f h 1 . h ·1· . 1 comman o t e regu ar army in eac mi itary region. Guerrilla 
troops had originally been organised by local leaders for resistance 
against the Japanese, especially after the KMT regular army had 
collapsed and withdrawn south. They were gradually integrated into 
the Eighth Route Army, a process which was completed at the beginning 
of 1941 when the last of the ten military regions in North China was 
established. But local guerrillas still retained economic independ-
ence; they were supplied by local governments at hsien or district 
level, or, if the local government was not able to meet their require-
ments, they had to seek supplies from higher military or administrative 
2 
organs, or obtain them from the local people or the enemy. 
In terms of military tactics, the Communists became more 
dependant on the guerrillas and militia, and turned from pitched 
battles to concentration on small-scale guerrilla warfare, in which 
the emphasis was on destruction of the Japanese lines of communica-
tions. It was as a result of this policy change that the well-known 
'tunnel warfare' was introduced by the guerrillas and militia in 
the Hopei plain. It was more than three years before the CCP was 
again in a position to launch a pitched battle. 3 
1 The CCP set up military regions one after another after the 
establishment of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Military Region in Ol:tober 1937. 
Most of them in North China were established in 1939-1940 when the 
Communist-controlled areas were being expanded continuously. A 
military region corresponded to a sub-region of an administrative 
district, except in the SKN Border Region where no military region 
was set up. After 1944 new military regions were set up, particu-
larly around the border with Manchuria. 
2 Liu Shao-ch'i, "Chien-ch'ih hua-pei k'ang-chan ti wu-chuang pu-
tui," (Armed Forces Which Maintained the Resistance War in North 
· .. •' 
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A more important effect of this poU.cy change was in the economic 
field, which was the first and primary purpose of the policy change. 
The economic effects were obvious. A reduction in the size of 
regular forces meant .a reduction in military taxation. 1 Greater 
reliance on guerrillas and militia eased the shortage of manpower, 
by reducing the number of soldiers serving.away from home and unable 
to take part in production. 
The political effects of the 'better troops' policy on both the 
army and civilian population were apparent in many ways. Firstly, 
its educational effect appears to have been immeasurable. A 
. 2 
substantial reduction of the number of the regular forces made both 
soldiers and civilians realise how serious were the difficulties they 
faced. This was helped by an intensified indoctrination, the rectifica-
tion campaign which followed the 'better troops and simpler administra-
tion '. policy. Secondly, the 'better troops' campaign contributed to 
improvement in the political standard of the guerrillas and the 
militia, because of the influx into their own ranks of well-trained 
and well-indoctrinated troops from the regular army. These soldiers 
who joined local guerrilla corps and the militia contributed also to 
Footnote 2 cont'd 
China), Chieh-fang chou k'an (Liberation Weekly), Yenan, 
(1 July.1938), p.52. 
No. 43/44 
3 l'rom the beginning of 1944, the Communists started to capture 
the Japanese garrison spots in the guerrilla areas. It was in the 
latter half of 1944, however, that the Communists became able to 
attack hsien capitals, being helped by the Japanese move to the 
south in order to secure the communication lines from China to Indo-
China. 
l For example, in T'aihang Subregion, the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border 
Region, where the 'better troops and simpler administration' policy 
was well implemented, the grain tax was reduced by 120,000 piculs in 
1942, which was one-third of that· collected in 1941, This was 
enabled by the 'better troops and simpler administration' according 
to the Chi eh-fang jih-pao, 4 December 1942'. In 1943, the Border 
Region reduced grain tax by one-fifth again, partly because of the 
above campaign and also because of production by the army and govern-
ment staff. 
2 In the first half of 1941, the number of the regular fotces of the 
Eighth Route Army was reduced from 400,000 to 300,000. 
.. · 
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the improvement of the relationship between the regular Communist 
system of government and the local mass organisations, which included 
the militia. 
A third consequence of this campaign was that the army supplied 
many of the leaders in the political and economic life in the villages. 
The soldiers who 'returned to production work' were able to assume 
leadership because of their ~igh degree of political consciousness 
1 
and the discipline derived from their life in the regular army. 
This enhanced the prestige of the army among the peasants and 
2 
strengthened the link between the army and the populace. 
In sum, the 'better troops' campaign achieved a greater degree 
of involvement of the basic level masses in the Communist political 
process. At the same time, it secured a stronger position for the 
Party and the army leadership and a greater receptivity of the lead-
ership among the masses at the basic level of society. 
1 A number of cases are reported in the Chieh-fang jih~pao where the 
retired soldiers assumed leadership at the basic level in administra-
tion and production. See, for example, 28 February and 4, 24 March, 
23 May, 12 December 1942, 24 February and 5 April 1944. 
2 An outstanding example in the CCP literature of a retired soldier 
who assumed leadership in a non-military field was Yang Chao-ch'en, 
who challenged Wu Man-yu, the first and most distinguished labour 
hero, for competition in the production campaign between individuals, 
production teams, army units, etc., which later spread into other 
fields such as study, military training and transportation. Yang 
started reclaiming a p~ece of land on a hill in An-sai hsien in the 
SKN Border Region, after he retired from the army in early 1942, 
refusing to live on pension. After one year of hard work and the 
introduction of better methods of cultivation, he was able to 
achieve a very good harvest, while giving assistance to the local 
government and to fellow villagers. In the production drive after 
1943, he organised his whole ~illage into mutual aid teams, and 
became om• of the highest level labour heroes in the SKN Border 
Region. What is striking, not only in Yang's case but also in many 
other cases of retired military men who became leaders in the 
production campaign, is that the 'glorious tradi ti.on of the Eighth 
Route Army in helping others to solve difficulties' and to be loyal 
to the Party, was emphasised both by the retired soldiers themselves 
and by the CCP "Yang Chao-ch'en h~ t'ui-wu chun-jen ti ch'i-chih" 
(Yang Chao-ch'en and the Banner of the Retired Soldiers), CFJP, 8 Jan-
uary; "T'ui-wu chun-jen ts'an-chia sheng-ch'an" (The Retired Soldiers 
Join Production), editorial, CFJP, 6 March 1943. 
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burden on the peasantry in terms of material and manpower. The CCP 
tried, therefore, to devise a system in which the arII\Y• the govern-
meni.: and the schools could produ:::e all or part of the goods they 
consumed.. This was the point of the second policy, 'production and 
self~sufficiency'. 
Production work by regular troops was introduced well before the 
all-out.production ca~paign initiated by the Central Committee in 1942. 
The garrison troops in the SKN Border Region had engaged in agricultural 
production since 1938, and it was in fact their successful example, 
particularly that of the 359th Brigade of the l20th Division in 
Nanniwan district, which encouraged the Central Committee to call for 
an all-out production campaign by both army and government. The 359th 
Brigade was recalled from the Northwest Shansi Military Region in 194!, 
to garrison the Nanniwan district in SKN. Shortly after it reached 
the district it revived a project for reclamation of wasteland, which 
had been abandoned by the suppressed Mohammedan rioters about a 
hundred years before. It also established a weaving factory, a paper 
mill, an oil press, 14 flour mills and a number of handicraft factor~ 
ies, with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency. These manufactures 
helped to control inflation in the·SKN Border Region, which had been 
particularly serious after 1941, pY supplying 'industrial' goods at 
cheaper than market prices, while contributing to the improvement in 
the standard of living of the local people. According to the Brigade 
Commander, by the end of 1940 the 359th Brigade, which "didn't have 
enough to. eat" when it had come to Nanniwan, was self-sufficient in 
vegetables and was able to supply its members with one catty of pork 
l 
a month per head. 
1 Brigade Commander Wang Chen's talk to foreign journalists in 1944. 
Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, (London: 1945), pp.52-54; 
Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, pp.286-287 • 
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As Mark Selden observes, the reason why the 359th Brigade was 
made the 'banner' of the production drive was its 'spirit' of self-
sufficiency 1 self-reliance and h;ird work, which enabled it to create 
new methods to overcome difficulties, rather than its practical 
h . 1 ac ievements. Its example suggested to the CCP possible ways of 
developing the economy with a few 'experts', poor technology, small 
capital, and with the creative spirit of self-reliance and hard work. 
This was later revived as the 'guerrilla' way of industrialisation 
after 1949. 
As with the 'better troops' campaign, the production drive was 
of importance in the improvement of relations between the army and 
the people. As Gittings has suggested, the Communist leaders seem 
to have been interested as much in the psychological, or political 
effect of these two mass movements as in the more tangible benefits. 2 
We should not, however, overlook the fact that the first and primary 
purpose of the CCP in the production movement was undoubtedly economic. 
Even so, according to Mao, through the production campaign the army 
not only won great sympathy from the populace, but also acquired 
the habit of frugality in the use of daily essentials. 3 He says 
that by cultivating wasteland the troops of the 359th Brigade 
gained great sympathy from the local people. The small factories 
of the Brigade, which supplied basic commidities at lower prices 
to the local people, helped to establish close ties between the 
l Selden, op.cit., p.253. 
2 
"The significance of these two mass movements (reduction of the 
number of the regular tropps and production by the army) probably 
lay more in the psychological boost which they gave towards creating 
a much-needed sense of solidatiry between the army, government 
officials, and civilians than in producing tangible benefits for 
any of the parties involved." Gittings, op.cit., p.58. 
3 Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, pp.286-287. 
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1 troops and the masses. Thus the 359th Brigade became a model for the 
production drive and also for the 'support the government and cherish 
the people' campaign within the army after 1944 . 2 
The role of the army in this kind of work was of critical importance, 
since the nature of such a full-time military organisation meant that 
any campaign in the army demanded conformity from each and every member. 
The army had to respond very quickly to the call of the Central Committee 
for mass movements. The advantages of the army for mass education and 
mobilisation were further exploited in the 'support the government 
and cherish the people' campaign, which was similar in its effects to 
the rectification and production campaigns. 
'Support the government and cherish the people' (yung-cheng ai-min) 
It was natural that the CCP should wish particularly to strengthen 
the ties between the army and civilian population dmring the difficult 
years of 1941-42. The campaign to 'support the government and cherish 
the people' was initiated in 1942 by the Rear Corps in the SKN Border 
Region. The CCP appears to have felt impelled to launch such a move-
ment because in the difficult year 1941 it believed that the army was 
not as close to the people as it was expected to be. The weakness in 
its mass work was exposed when it fac.:ed serious difficulties, as Mao 
pointed out at the end of 1942, in hiE report on the relationships 
between the government and people in the SKN Border Region. 3 In 1943, 
l Ibid. 
2 The success of the 359th Brigade in reclamation of wasteland 
Nanniwan reached a stage in 1944 where cultivated land became so 
ab"ndant that the Brigade invited landless peasants from the north to 
migrate and cultivate the land; Nanniwan had to set up a new district 
government for the newly settled inhabitants. 
3 Mao pointed out in his lengthy report to the Senior Cadres Conference 
of the Party in the SKN Border Region that even in Yenan hsien, the 
most advanced hsien in mass political work in SKN, many cadres were 
... : ·: :, 
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this campaign, which was coupled with a campaign among the government and 
the mass organisations to 'support the army and give preferential treat-
ment to the soldiers' families' was proclaimed throughout the Communist 
1 
regions, by the October 1 Directive of the Politburo of the CCP. 
The twin campaigns were a part of a series of mass movements launched 
in the base areas from 1942 onwards. Like other Communist mass movements, 
they had a seasonal character, as indicated by the fact that the Politburo 
directive was issued on 1 October 1943, calling for the introduction of 
the mass movement for the season after.the autumn harvest. The. Directive 
called for rent reduction, preparation for the following year's production 
work, and a set of campaigns for improvement of relations between the army 
and the people, all to be implemented during the winter slack season 
around the Chinese New Year celebration. 2 
The 'support the government and cherish the people' campaign was 
3 
a mass education campaign within the army, under the joint leadership 
of the Political Department of the military region and the Party 
Committee of the region. Accordingly, the precise form of the campaign 
depended on the military situation in each military region, although a 
universal pattern had been established by the Political Department of 
Footnote 3 cont'd 
inactive and bureaucratic in their work among the peasant masses; and 
in early 1943 some peasants ran away from their villages, some others div-
ided their family property so that they could avoid the heavy burden of 
progressive taxation, and yet others sold their draught animals to curtail 
their production scale. These phenomena indicate an extensive distrust 
of the Communist government among the peasantry. See Mao Tse-tung, "Ching-
chi wen-t' i yU ts' ai-cheng wen-t' i" (Economic and Financial Problems) , 
Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, pp.197-198. 
l 
The October 1 Directive was written by Mao as an inner-Party directive 
and most of it was later included in his Selected Works. Mao, III, pp. 
131-135. 
2 
The campaign was carried out in the winter slack season, since the sol-
diers also e~gaged in agricultural production work. Winter was the usual 
season for mass campaigns, as illustrated by the example of the winter 
schools. 
3 
Gittings interprets the campaigns of production and 'support of govern-
nient and cherish the people' as a part of the 'rectification'. See, 
op.cit., pp.115-116. 
. : ' .. 
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i:he Garrison Corps in the SKN Border Region in 1942-43. 1 The campaign 
was initiated by a directive issued by the Political Department of the 
military region, which ordered that one month around Chinese New Y'ear 
should be devoted to the 'support the government and cherish the people' 
2 
campaign, and stipuliited what 5hould be done during that month. 
The 'support the government and cherish the people' campaign was, 
apparently, an army version of the 'r•:.ctification', with more practical 
than ideological aims. Given the importance placed on the maintenance 
of good relations with the civilian population, and Mao's determination 
to carry out a rectification, the revolutionalisation of the thought 
and behaviour of the 'vanguard organisation' was a first concern of the 
central Committee. This is one of the distinctive characteristics of 
the Chinese Communist revolution. The 'support the government and 
cherish the people' campaign, therefore, as a mass movement for reform 
of thought and behaviour had to be carried out rigorously. 
The first part of the campaign consisted of education of army 
personnel on relations with the civilian population. Meetings for 
officers were held first, in order to correct erroneous ideas and 
attitudes toward civilians through discussion, ipvestigation, and self-
examination. The officers then gave lectures to the men and led them in 
discussion and self-criticism meetings at platoon or company level. 
Discussions and self-criticism had to be related to concrete facts and 
the experiences of the soldiers, and the leaders were particularly 
cautioned against "conformity". 3 
1 
For the process 
Corps in 1943, see 
uary 1944. 
2 
of the yung-cheng ai-min campaign of the Garrison 
a detailed report in the Chieh-fa~g jih-pao, 19 Jan-
The Chieh-fang jih-pao at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 
reports the directives of all Party committees and military regions in 
North and Central China in detail. 
3 
'rhe technique of small group self-examination, criticism and self-
criticism was developed in the rectification campaitn. See the following 
section. 
'0 • 
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The second part of the campaign was devoted to practical action 
to improve relations between the army and the people. The most common 
action projects were propaganda activities among the people through 
stage plays and yang-k~ (folk dancing with simple plays on the street) 
pl~ys dc~ing the New Year holidays. Another common activity was for 
the company or platoon to organise an aC:. hoc campaig.n committee which 
checked with every household in its gari:ison area to discover whether 
the troops had damaged property. Where damage had been done, the troops 
imnediately had to make repairs or give compensation. A third common 
measure was the organisation of social evenings for the army and the 
people, at which the army personnel pledged to 'support the government 
and cherish the people' , 1 and criticised their past activities. 2 These 
social gatherings of the army and the local people were also a part of 
the other campaign to 'support the army and give preferential treatment 
to the soldiers' families' (Yung-chi!n yu-k 'ang) . To these meetings 
the local people brought gifts for the army, such as grain, meat, 
vegetables and shoes. 
Part of the yung-cheng ai-min campaign was an offensive to organise 
the soldiers' families for production. The aim was to reduce preferential 
1 Pledges to 'support the government and cherish the people' were 
normally publicised together with pledges of the mass. organisations to 
'support the army'. The pledge consisted usually of eight to ten items, 
for example, as follows: 
"We will: l) resolutely implement government decrees and respect 
government staff, 2) actively fight, defend political power and protect 
the people's life and property, 3) help and train militia to fight, 
4) help the people's production work and solve the people's difficulties, 
5) cherish the people's property, take not even a needle or a thread, 
6) protect the people's economic and physical strength, implement the 
Resistance War Service Act, 7) accept the people's opinions, and protect 
the mass organisations against Japan, 8) have a friendly attitude toward 
the people, and respect the people's customs." Pledge for yung-cheng 
ai-min of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Military Region, CFJP, 8 January 1944. 
2 
CFJP., 31 December 1943; 2, 7, 8 & 19 January, and 5 February 1944 . 
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treatment for the dependants and thus lighten the burden on the government 
1 
and the non-dependent masses. The CCP s•mght through organisation of 
collective labour to overcome the shortage of labour among the soldiers' 
families, and through indoctrination to make them refuse preferential 
treatment, which was a burden on the border region economy. In the pro-
auction drive in 1943 the CCP first gave individual praise to soldiers' 
wives who worked hard and supported their families well. 2 It was not, 
however, until the yung-cheng ai-min campaign for 1944 that the CCP 
set out to organise all soadiers' and cadres' dependants for production, 
to lighten the above burden and to utilise in other ways the labour 
investe4 in tai-keng, tilling the soldiers' and cadres' land. 
To the CCP, the problem was not solely economic. More serious was 
the possibility that preferential treatment might result in ideological 
problems. The CCP was aware that preferential treatment had in some 
cases corroded the revolutionary spirit of the dependants and fostered 
the tendency to 'exploiting' behaviour. The CCP was alert. to the 
fact that preferential treatment was fostering a form of a social injus-
tice. The CCP was concerned that this would influence the children, the 
successors of the revolution. 3 In February 1944, the Yenan Subregion 
convened a conference of cadres' (military and civilian) dependants~ 
r;imilar meetings followed throughout Communist territory, at which a new 
mass organisation, the Union of Cadres' Families, was established. 
1 
Various forms of preferential treatment were given to the soldiers' 
and cadres' families, such as exemption from taxation, and tai-keng or 
the tilling of their land by other people without material reward. How 
heavy a burden this pu~ on the non-dependant peasants is shown in Lin 
Po-ch'il's report. For example, in An-ting Hsien in SKN, every peasant 
had to spend one month per annum on average for tai-keng in 1939. Shen-
Kan-Ning pien-ch'U ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, p.9. 
2 
For example, CFJP, 30 May and 16 November 1943. 
3 
Wang Chen's lecture at the conference of cadres' dependants of Yenan 
Subregion, CFJP, 21 February 1944 . 
. ·.·.· 
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Although they made every effort to indoctrinate the soldiers, the 
conununists still seem to have experienced some difficulties, and they 
had to rely on the civilian population to keep some soldiers in army 
service. The 'support the army' campaign by the government and mass 
organisations, for example, in early 1943 included kui-tui kung-tso, a 
campaign to ensure that soldiers on New Year leave returned to their 
units. Judging from the reports and articles in the Chieh-fang jih-pao, 
it seems that there was a considerable problem with soldiers who did 
not want to go back to the army after their home leave at Chinese New 
Year, at least in 1943. Apparently, the CCP did not want to force them 
l 
back to the army, but wanted the local governments and mass organisations, 
and their families and friends to persuade them to return. Hence, the 
kui-tui kung-tso was included in the 'support the army' campaign. The 
Chieh-fang jih-pao reports kui-tui kung-tso only in the SKN Border 
Region and in the Central Shantung subregion, 2 but this does not 
necessarily mean that there were no such problems in other regions. 
Reports on kui-tui kung-tso appeared in the Chieh-fang jih-pao only 
in early 1943. It is not clear whether the problem was as serious in 
other years, or whether the newspaper simply did not bother to report 
it. It can probably be assumed that 1942 was in fact the worst year for 
the army, and that the rectification campaign had not yet produced the 
effect of persuading the soldiers to cope with serious financial and 
military hardships. 
The 'support the government and cherish the people' campaign was 
a special form of rectification, in which the Politburo presented to 
l According to Jack Belpen, even soldiers who ran away were not put in 
jail or beaten. Their home villages were asked to try to persuade him 
to go back to the army. Only after they deserted three times were they 
turned over to the district magistrate for hard labour. Op.cit., p.342. 
2 
See CFJP, 2 February, 2 and 5 March 1943. 
' .: . 
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the individual soldier the problem of relations between the army and the 
peo?le as the central question of the army's role in the revolution. 
Nhereas the Party rectification campaign wa:; designed to indoctrinate 
the cadres, the production drive in the army was aimed at indoctrination 
of the men through economic activities and manual labour. The yung-cheng 
ai-min campaign combined these two, and defined the role of the army as 
military, political and economic. It was logical, therefore, for the 
central Committee in January 1944 to use the Kutien Resolution as one of 
the rectification documents for the army. 
These mass movements launched by the army, and other institutions, 
were applied forms of 'education and production 1 , 1 defined by the CCP 
as the primary tasks for the year 1943 and after. 'Education' did not 
mean only regular school education but also political or ideological 
education. 'Production' was a means of educating the people, particularly 
those who had not engaged in production and considered themselves non-
productive workers, such as armymen and intellectual cadres. 'Education' 
in turn was necessary for effective production work, since it was essential 
that everybody should understand the importance of production for revolu-
ti on and war. 'Education and production' were of special significance 
in the army because of the CCP's theories about the character of the Chinese 
revolution and the 'vanguard' role of the army: the current stage of the 
revolution in China involved war, and the army had to be the 'vanguard' 
of the revolutionary forces. 
The role of the army in the Yenan period was indispensable both in 
1 
At the Senior Cadres Conference of the SKN Border Region, which lasted 
nearly three months in 1942/43, the CCP stressed that production and 
education should be macle the primary tasks of the Party from 1943. This 
was put into practice in the all-out production drive in 1943 and the 
reform of the basic educational system in 1944. See Chapter VI, Section 1. 
·. 
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the military and political development of the Chinese Communist revolu-
tion. The first and primary task of the army was, of course, military -
to secure and expand the Communist territory. The political task of 
the army, however, was not regarded as secondary. Military tasks were 
essential for the survival of Communist political power, but the survival 
of the army itself depended on its political work. Its military role 
could be carried out effectively only if the political tasks had been 
carried out effectively. The military role was an integral part of the 
political role and vice versa. 
'i'he political task was a component of the everyday life and 
behaviour of the individual soldiers, even during military campaigns, as 
long as they had contact with the civilian population. Although the 
question had been raised by the Kutien Resolution in 1929, it was 
probably necessary for the CCP and the army to go through the crisis of 
1941-42, and the mass campaigns for self-strengthening, to develop to 
the full the role of the army as the vanguard of the Chinese revolution. 
After 1942, this vanguard role, which involved sacrificing oneself for 
the cause of the revolution with clear consciousness of one's mission, 
was carried on throughout the army ranks. The mass campaigns wrought 
a critical change in Party and army life. Discipline was tightened; 
the revolutionary mission was constantly inculcated in the individual; 
daily behaviour was more strictly controlled by the techniques of dis-
cussion, criticism and self-examination. 
The army became, in effect, an organisational and functional 
substitute for the proletariat which China lacked, both in the 'new 
democratic' and the 'socialist' revolution. The Party, which is dis-
cussed in the following section, assumed a similar vanguard role but 
with somewhat different characteristics. 
.· 
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2. The Party 
The formal relationship of the Communist Party to the government 
system in the base areas was similar to the situation in early years of 
People's Republic. The government was compused of various groups which 
made up the united front, of which the Communist Party was, in theory, 
only one. In practice, however, the Party ruled. The relationship bet-
ween the administration and the Party was symbolised by the process of 
making the 'political programmes', which were in fact provisional 
constitutions, of the border regions. These programmes were all drafted 
by the local Party committees and submitted to the border region assem-
blies for approval. Not only the political programmes, but also the 
major decrees and policies, were enacted by a similar process. This 
did not mean that the Party disguised its rule by united front govern-
ment, but that the Party used the united front policy to obtain help 
a;,d support for its rule, particularly from the intellectual-gentry 
class. 
The Party was similar to the army in terms of organisational 
di~cipline and in the performance of a vanguard role in the revolution. 
The important difference between these two organisations, however, was 
that the army was a professional institution, whereas Party members, with 
the exception of higher level full-time cadres, were engaged in other 
occupations and served the Party on a 'part-time' basis. Unlike the 
army, which exercised total control over the lives and actions of its 
members, the Party was a relatively decentralised organisation. 
What distinguished the Party most clearly from other institutions 
was that Party members were scattered in virutally every small unit of 
the military, the administration, and the economic and mass organisations, 
and in all of these uni ts they assumed the leading role. I.n other words, 
the role of the Party was of critical significance, in that it exercised 
'; •.· .. ,·,;· ·. ·:·. 
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a directing capacity in almost all the basic organisations in the Conunu-
nist areas. In this respect, the Party was more deeply rooted in the 
daily life of the populace than the army, which, by necessity, moved 
constantly from place to place. 
Among the four major institutions which made up the Communist govern-
ment system, the Party occupied a key position, integrating all four 
institutions into one system, and directing them all in the pursuit of 
the 'nationalist' war and social revolution. Party members in the army, 
the government and the mass organisations were controlled by the Central 
committee through a hierarchical chain of command, and were expected to 
assume leadership in their working units, and by th~s means the Party 
was able to implement its policies. The Party was, in practice, a 
policy-making institution for the Communist 'state', and the other 
institutions were policy-implementing. However, the leadership of the 
Party was exercised not only in its role of policy-making, but also in 
actual implementation, through the capability and hard work of its mem-
bers at the basic level of the policy-implementing institutions, by 
which Party members acted as agents for social mobilisation of the masses. 
It was the Party members who were the first to become involved in the 
Communist political process; and they had to be constantly aware of 
their revolutionary mission and to give expression to this in their 
daily life. 
Party Organisation in North China 
Since the Party assumed the integrating role for the whole govern-
ment system, the chain of command of the Party was, in effect, the 
chain of command of the government system itself, through which policies 
flowed down for implementation, and mass response flowed up for considera-
tion in policy making. Alt.hough the main interest of this study is not 
I 
.·· 
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in the Party organisation itself, it i2 necessary to describe briefly 
it• organisation in North China, the organisational background against 
.,,hirh Party members played their roles in ot:her organisation::;. 
During the decade from 1927, the greater part of the Party orgil11i s.:i-
tion ici North China had been destroyed by Kf!T suppress ion. 1 However, as 
the Communist-compiled histcdcy of the border regions, K 'ang-J ih chan-cheng 
shi/J-ch'i chieh-fang ch'ti kai-k'uang, points out, there were many examples 
of local Communists who had lost contact with the central Party organ-
isation, who took arms and led guerrilla corps at the outbreak of the war, 
ar<d who together with the guerrilla units under their command later were 
. h h . d 'l . 2 nebsorloed into t e Party, t e Conununist army or CCP-le guerri la units. 
;,s the CCP increased the number of its troops and expanded the guerrilla 
';ases, it was able to reconstruct the Party organisation, partly on the 
foundation of these 'abandoned' Conununists, who became the nucleus in 
many areas and whose existence made the reconstruction process much 
easier. In the rural areas, however, the Party had had no organisational 
l;2se before the war; and if for no other reason than that it was fighting 
on the basis of the peasants' support, it was essential for the Party to 
have locally based branches composed of native activists. The 'native 
activists' were found and trciined by the local administrative bodies and 
mass organisations which were designed to provic1.e as many opportunities 
1 
'rhe exception, of course, was the north Shens1 Soviet region. Apart 
from this area, CCP organisations in North China had been sonfined almost 
'"Xclusively to the cities, and on this point John Isreal writes in 
reference to the period 1935-36: "Although the CCP had practically no 
organized strength in the cities, the party acquired valuable assets in 
the minds of China's young intelligentsia." Student Nationalism in China, 
ZP27-,3?, p.102. 
2 
i:'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang ch'i.i kai-k'uang, pp.4,8, 49, 
81 " 83. A typical story of an 'abandoned' Party member's organisation 
of local guerrilla corps ~s given in Pai P'ing, ''Feng-huang-shan ch'ien 
ti hung-ch' i" (Red Flag in Front of Feng-huang Mountain) , Hung-ch' i 
P' iao-p' iao (The Red Flag Waves), !Peking: 1958), pp-122-145. 
. , . ' 
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35 2ossible to invol,1e the ger1~t·cil popula~1011 1.n their activities. 1 
The following chart of the ?arty Juerarchy shows the chain of 
command, and the position of the bas1·: ·.:..rg.;n·s, which are tl1e main focus 
of interest of this study, both 111 the ·~ha1n of command and in relation 
to other Party organs. The h1gher ·committees and bllreaus were, of course, 
"''portant, since the Pan:y was a highly centralised and disciplined 
organisation. For purposes of this study, however, it is the basic orga11s, 
'.·:hose members work.,d with the non-Party masses at the basic level of 
society, which are most important. Until the autumn of 1939, the CCP 
orga:1i.sation in North China was in the following form: 2 
1 
Tada Corps, op.cit., pp.56-57 & 82-83. 
2 
Ibid., dia<;Jrams after p.53; Na\cayasu Yosaku, Shina Ky6sant6-sh1 
!History of the Chinese Commun1.st Party\, ('Pokyo: 1942.1, pp.433-434. 
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The supreme power given to the National Congress in theory, was in 
practice nominal, and during the Yenan period the Congress did not, in 
fact, meet ewm once. Although the Party did plan to convene the 
.·.·. 
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.·ongress in 1938, J.t was postponed rep•.,atedly, and d1d not meet until 
. " 1 i\pr il 1 9 '. · In practice, therefore, the Central Committee, especially 
its Politburo, held supreme power over the whole Party. 
In the astual process of mobilisation and pol1ticisat1on of the 
masses, the really .impor·tant sections of the Party hierarchy were the 
lowcX levels, particularly the basic unit of local Communist organisation. 
Both because of the Party's views on organisation and because of the war 
situation, the basic organs were giver1 b!r"oad autonomy., Uniformity in 
methods of policy-·implementatlon appears to have been disliked by the 
Central Cammi ttee. In most of its directives and circulars, the Committee 
emphasised that th-=re should be a variety of methods to implement policies, 
according to different places, times and conditions. Under certain 
ccmdi tions, however, broad autonomy in the lower level organs seems 
to have become a problem; the final stage of the rectification was 
aimed at t.his problem, at the question of discipline. 
But the dynamic strength of the Party was generated at the basic 
'~vcl, through contact and interaction with the non-Party masses. The 
basic unit of Party organisation was the branch, of three or more 
memb.,,rs in the village, in mass organisations, enterprises and the army. 
Ils main task was to mobilise the general populilt1on to implement or 
support the policies of the Central Committee; ill though within the broad 
framework of Party pol icy; there was room for in~tiative at the branch 
level. ~'be mobilisation tasks of the local Party branches are described 
by one Japanese source as fol.lows: 
1 
See Mao, "Lun hsin-chieh-t.uan," Chapter 8, Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 6, 
~p.239-240. 
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1 Propagat i.on of C'.>:nmun1sm (during the war, national sai '1ation 
shonld be the main point: of propaganda1. 
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2 Irnplen1entation of the x·es-:)lut ions and programmes of the Party, 
and mobil1sat1on cf the masses outstde the Party. 
3 Rec:r:uitment and educatic.'n of n.:w members. 
4 Political, economic and cultur.ll work a1med at involvi11g Party 
members a?d the r1or1-Party rno:ss 2s in the politic al and economic 
strugglr->. 
The b·canch was cont~·oJ.led by a C')mmi ttee d"'cted by a meeting of 
members and comprising 3 t<) 5 members 1nc1 ud i ng a secret a r~:r'. The commit tee 
execut8d the resolutions of thr members' meetings and the directives of 
the Jngher Party organs. The branch was divided into several cells, each 
c.f which had an elected chairman (chu-jen). The cell met at least once 
a •,ie0k. The cl1airman collecteod the Party fee, attended the cell chair-
men's meet1ngs convened by the higher Party organs, and was cesponsible 
for implementation of the directives of the higher organs. 
The activists of the local governments and the mass organisations 
were often Party members, because the Party had been concerned constantly 
t:c recr'li t v1 l lage activists - the be·,t elements of the basic uni ts of 
'.Jrganisation. Tl1ese basic members played a crucial role in mass n1obilJ.sa-
c:1on. In the mass movements by which ':he Central Committee sought to 
2c:t1vate the populace and implement its polis1es, their role was to stir 
the masses to action, to provide leadership, and t.o act as models for 
the masses to follow. Mass movements were in1t:1ated in two ways; either 
oy the Central Comnittee, in which case the movements were usually broader 
in scope, or locally. rn the latter c.ase the movement usually originated 
frcm locally adopted 'better' methods of carrying out Central Committee 
policies, which were then taken up by the Central Committee and propagated 
u 1 l over Cornmunist territory Hass m'.>vements were usually launched by 
1---
Tada co·:ps, op.cit., p.45, based on captured Communist documents and 
on rnvestigation reports by the Japanese. 
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neetings of cadres from the l oc<'.! 1 Party bicanch or •;e 11, and from the 
government and the mass organisations, 'rhey info.rn1ed themselves on the 
nature and objectives of the rnoV2G1.f:nt by study of the documents and 
discussion \\1i th caclres from thr~ 11ig11er lr:~v,=l Party organs or governments, 
and discussed the te:;bn1ques winch mi•;ht be used to inform the masses 
about the movement and win thc,ir support and partic1pation. Local Party 
:r,embers had an 'mpoi:tant i:unc·tional r'.>le in tl:at they had responsibility 
for rousing the masses to ac:tion and sustaining their acti'Te participation 
until the objectives of the movements were achieved. 
Equally important, in the process of mass movements Party members 
were expected to act as models for emulation by the masses, which under-
lines the critical importance of the personal behaviour of local Party 
members. For their model role to be accepted by the masses as worthy 
of emulation, they had to be at the very least 'good' people in the 
broad sense that t;iis is generally understood. The model role, in fact, 
demanded that in their everyday behaviour Party members give priority 
LO the public interest, putting their private interests last. For example, 
even if they shared the initial suspicions of their fellow villagers 
about the effectiveness of cooperatives and mutual aid teams, it was 
expected of them that they should take the lead i.n joining such organisa-
tions. Where the tendency of some villagers was to understate their 
income for taxation purposes, Party members were expected to report 
their income accurately. Parl:y members were expected to work hardest 
in mutual aid iabour and to be the least demandi.ng in the distribution 
of the benefits of this labour. The model role was important for the 
Party in gaining prestige among the villagers. The Party was anxious 
that its members should be elected chairmen of mass campaign committees, 
leaders of mutual aid teams and, particularly, labour heroes, It was 
essentia 1, therefore, that c:hey should be good examples. 
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~·loreover, tl1e Pacty al.s-:-; sought to recruit into its ranks tl1ose non-
party leaders \Vho were e1ested by the mu.ss2.s, in order to n1aint..iin and 
strengthen the link between the Party and the masses. Acti.v1sts, who had 
liberated themselves from the lraditional political mentality of the 
generc.l population, and fr0m the fea,: of establislwd authority, and who 
·.·:ere preparec't to struggle to overthrow the social order, were vitally 
•r.iportant to the PaJ:ty in bi:c>aking through the wall. 0f popular political 
1 
quiescence. 
Abov·= the district level, there were hsien, subregion and .region or 
·crovince ~ommittees whose organisation and functions were similar to those 
of the dist.i:ict committees. They elected a secretary who had the supreme 
responsil:oi li ty foic the committee work of each level. The committees above 
the hsien level set up six departments, with responsibilities as shown 
below: 
l 
1 Organ1sat1on Department 
Registration of new Party members, allocation of cadres, and 
collection of Party fees. 
2 Propaganda Department 
Propaganda and education work outside and inside the Party, 
and control of various Party schools and training teams. 
3 Arnu.ng and Mobilisation Department 
Planning, l e;~der.ship, recl:ui tment and a 11 other work concerned 
with guerrillas, self-<lefenre corps, and other local armed 
forces. 
4 Enemy and Puppet Woi:k Department 
Propaganda directed towards the Japanese and puppet armies 
and erl11catioG 0f wat: prisoners. 
5 11ass Movement Department 
Organisation and leadership of the mass organisations. 
6 Social Department 
Investigation and e:rnmination of disputes and counter-cevolution-
ary acti ·v1 ties, 
For the role of a::tivists in Communist mass mobil.isat1on, see Richard 
Solomon, "On Activisto and Activists," Ch;na Quarterly, No.39,pp.76-114, 
•sracially 89-92. 
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In addition, the subregion and region committees had a military 
department for the education and leadership of the military regions and 
local regular armies. 0,'he committees at the hsien level and above ~1ere 
supposed to edit and publish newspapers or magazines. The division of 
the subregion for the Party organisation did not fol.low the regular 
administrative district. Being similar to the administrative district, 
the !!arty was flexible enough to set up regional committees covering two 
or more provinces or a part of a prorvince, and hsien committees covering 
a part of several hsien or several hsien committees controlling one 
'1dministrative hsien. 
'rhe region and subregion committees had from forty to sixty staff 
who lived in the peasants' houses in the rural areas, under the protec-
ti on of regular or guerrilla troops, and who moved around the region. 
According to Japanese military information, around 1940 in North China 
excluding SKN the CCP had 18 regional committees, 73 subregion 
committees, 461 hsien committees, and numerous committees below the 
. . 1 1 l :1s1en eve . 
The Party organisation within the army was formally separated from 
the local Party organisation, and was responsible to the political 
department. The political commissar of a division controlled all Party 
organisation and activity within the division. Brigades and regiments 
had Party committees and political commissars, while companies had 
Party branches or cells and politic al leaders without political depart-
ments, and the platoon had a Party cell. The Party branch of the company 
was the basic unit for Party activities within the army. 2 
1 
Tada Corps, op.cit., p.53. These figures are only for the Party 
organs discovered by the Japanese army. 
2 
Ibid., pp.213-214. 
. ··. . ..... 
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The relationship between the local Party organ and the army Party 
organ was one of close cooperation. They held meetings frequently anci 
tile Party in the army was supposed to participate in the local Party's 
activities. When there were dif:terences o.C op..1..il_;_ull, botl"l OJ.:.d~;::. :.~ei. tc 
report to the next highest level of the Party, the branch or political 
department, for settlement. In the new areas, however, where no Party 
organisation existed, the Party organisation within the army was respons-
ible for mass organisation, and for setting up a Party organisation until 
such time as the higher-level local Party appoli.nted cadres to lead the 
. t' l new organisa ·ion. 
There seem to have been conflicts of opinion between the army Party 
cadres and local Party cadres, and also between cadres appointed by the 
higher Party organs and local cadres. These conflicts affected the 
centralised leadership and efficiency of Party work. Mao had to make 
it clear in the rectification that the local cadres' opinions must be 
respected 'if poor relations develop'. In making this suggestion to 
give more power to the local cadres rather then to military and/or 
outside cadres, Mao's assumption was that in dealing with mass 
mobilisation, it was better to trust the cadres of peasant origin than 
those of intellectural origin. 2 
Unlike the administrative organisation in the border regions, the 
Party organisation was designed to be rigid, excll.usive and highly 
centralised. Mao emphasised democratic centralism as the principle 
of organisation, and explained democracy as being manifest in the 
process of policy-making, and centralism in the process of policy 
1 
Ibid., pp.219-220. On the subject of the army's role in organising 
the local masses in the new areas, there is an eye-witness account 
by Aqnes Smedley, of November 1937 in Shansi. See China Fights Back, 
(London: 1938) , pp. 52-53, 99 & 107. 
2 
Nao, III, pp.45-47. 
. . 
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executiun. It seems that 'democracy' was intended to mean the election 
system from the bottom of the Party or.ganisation, participation of 
every member in the decision-making process in a Party branch or cell, 
and the broad autonomy of lower level organisation. In practice, the 
election system could not operate effectively because of the war, and 
for the same reason centralism was almost inevitable. 1 Within the 
Party organisation as a whole 'centralism', or discipline, was actually 
emphasised more than 'democracy'. Mao summarised Party discipline as 
follows: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
The individual is subordinate to the organisation; 
The minority is subordinate to the majority; 
The lower level is subordinate to the higher level; 
The entire membership is subordinate to the Central 
and 2 Conuni ttee. 
It is of th., greatest signficance that the CCP and its army had 
this rigid and highly centralised organisation and that it extended 
throughout the Communist areas in China, when other institutions, which 
rested on the united front baSLS, were of a local nature. Through its 
individual members, the CCP was the only institution that was able to 
:ontrol the whole administrative and military system in its tenitory. 
This was one of the reasons for the rectification campaign, an intention 
to keep the quality of Party members high, in order to maintain political 
and military achievements in a large and rapidly expanding territory. 
l 
One of the purposes of the rectification campaign was to control 
local Party organs more rigidly. 
2 
Mao, II, p.204. In the rectLfication, d.iscipline was one of the main 
targets. The 'Central Committee Resolution on the Unification of 
Leadership in the Anti-Japanese War Bases' of 1 September 1942, 
required lower--level Party organs to carry out unconditionally the 
directives of higher-level organs. Chieh-fang she, ed., Cheng-feng 
«ien-hsien (Rectification Documents), (n.p.: 1949), pp.137-138. 
English translation: Boyd Comption, Mao's China: Party Reform 
Doruments, 1942-1944, (Seattle: 1952), p.163. 
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'l':ic hcctification Campaign 
~Jost of the new members who came, into the CCP in the years from 
1937 to 1940 were peasants anc'I young intellectuals. 1 Due to the rapid 
e:<pansion of the base areas, the Party, as well as the administration, 
suffered from shortage of cadres, and the new members lacked sufficient 
political training. Reflecting the long Chinese tradition of a wide 
sap between officialdom and the masses, cadres without sufficient 
training tended to become arrogant and self-content. The link between 
cadres and the masses, which had been somewhat tenuously established, 
was weakened by malpractices by Party cadres in mass work. According 
w i>lao, the economic difficulties in North China in 1941 and 1942 were 
caused not only by KMT and Japanese attacks but by the Party's incorrect 
policies and the cadres' bureaucratic style of work, which failed to 
2 
mobilise the masses to the full. 
Mao had been fully aware of Lhe significance of the work style, or 
life style, of Party members; in fact, his attention has always been 
on ':his point. •ro him, Party members, the revolutionary elite, should 
ce distinguished from non-Party people by their strict self-discipline, 
by their example of serving the interests of the people and the revolu-
tion and ignoring their own interests. Mao pointed out in September 
1937 that one of the manifestations of 'liberalism' in the Party was 
l 
To be indifferent to them (the masse3) and show no concern for their 
well-being, forgetting that one is ~ Communist and behaving as if 
one were an ordinary non-Communist. 
According to Hu Hua, a Chinese Communist historian, 90 percent of new 
members were from the petty bourgeois class, including intellectuals, 
middle and poor p£.asants. Hu Hua, ed., Chung-kuo ke-ming shih chiang-i 
(Lectures in History of the Chinese Revolution), (Peking: 1962) , p .422. 
2 
3 
Nao Tse-tung chi, Vol.8, pp.196-198. 
"Combat Liberalisra," Mao, II, p.32. (My emphasis). This is one of 
the few articles in the Selected Works to which the editor does not add 
an explanatory note, and it is noL known for what purpose the article 
. . i24 
Another manifestation of 'liberalism' in Mao's view, was "to be aware 
of one's own mistakes and yet make no attempt to correct them, taking 
a liberal attitude towards oneself . 111 In this article "Combat Liberalism," 
;.iao listed eleven types of 'liberal' attitude which could bring about 
"poli i:ical degeneration in certain uni ts and individuals in the Party 
and the revolutionary organ1.:ations." 2 Most of these eleven types of 
J.iberalisrn are iclentical with the errors which were said to require 
'rectification' in the rectification campaign in 1942. On the causes 
of liberalism, Mao states that 
Liberalism stems from petty-bourgeois selfishness, it places 
personal interests first and the interests of the revolution 
second, and this gives ris3 to ideological, political and 
organisational liberalism. 
If erroneous 'liberalist' attitudes, or work styles, existed and 
had to be corrected in 1937, it is not surprising that by 1942, after 
Party membership had expanded by twenty times within the three years 
1937-1940, a large-scale Party rectification campaign became necessary. 
In 1937, Party membership was as low as 40,000, but these 40,000 were 
mc,stly well-tried members who had come through the difficulties in the 
war with the KMT in South China and the Long March. Even among them, 
according to Mao, there were 'liberalist' tendencies which came from 
'petty-bourgeois selfishness' . It was natural that the Party should 
see the need for a rectification movement for 800,000 members, 90 percent 
of whom were of petty-bourgeois origin. 
Footnote 3 cont'd 
was originally written. Presumably, it was an inner-Party circular or 
a speech to a Party meeting. 
i 
2 
3 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p.31. 
Ibid., p.32 
... 
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In "Reform Our Study," a report to the cadres meeting in Yenan in 
:·lay 1941, which marked the start of the rectification campaign, Mao 
pointed to the widespread existence of 'subjectivism' and 'dogmatism' 
in the Party. 1 The "Central Cornrni ttee Resolution on Strengthening the 
125 
Party Spirit" dated l July 19H, which was probably written by Mao him-
self, recognises that the •Jni ty and discipline of the Party was damaged 
by "a broad agrarian environment characterised by long-range, dispersed, 
independent, guerrilla warfare," and also by the very high "gravity of 
small producers and the intelligentsia in the Party. " 2 Although some 
important articles on anti-subjectivism appeared in the Chieh-fang jib-
pao from September 1941, this did not become a full-scale campaign until 
1 February 1942 when Mao gave a lecture entitled "Reform in Learning, the 
Party, and Literature" at the opening day ceremonies of the Central Party 
School. In this lecture, he presented three problems: 1) the question 
of thought or subjectivism, 2) the question of the Party's internal and 
external relations or sectarianism, and 3) the question of literature 
3 
or Party formalism. These problems were interrelated and stemmed from 
the same general problem, which was, in Communist terms, "petty-bourgeois 
;deology and ways of thinking ... 4 
i 
2 
3 
4 
Mao, ITI,pp.20-21, Compton, op.cit., pp.60-61. 
Compton, op.cit., p.157. 
Nao, III, pp.35-36; Compton, op.cit., p.10. 
Ibid. Ho Kan-chih states the cause of these problems thus: "As the 
Party was working in the rural areas, it could not help being constantly 
affected by the broad mass of petty-bol.irgeoisie which surrounded it. The 
bourgeoisie also tried every means to influence the Party. After the 
outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, a large number of progressives of 
peasant or urban petty-bourgeois origin joined the Party. As the Party 
represented the interests of the whole nation as well as of the working 
class and enjoyed a very high prestige among the people, it was both 
inevitable and reasonabl·e that a large number of progressives of petty-
bourgeois origin should join the party of the Chinese working class and 
constitute a majority of its .membership." A History of Modern Chinese 
Re,olution, (Peking: 1959), p. 376. 
. · .. 
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The full-scale campaign was initiated by this lecture. Immediately 
afterwards a leadership study committee was organised in the SKN Border 
Region government with Li~ Po-ch' U as chairman and Li Ting-ming as vice-
chairman. These two were Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Border Region 
Government. The Committee required all staff of the Border Region govern-
ment to 'study' two hours a day. 1 On 5 February the Chi eh-fang jih-pao 
carried an editorial calling for reeducation of cadres in service, and 
at the end of February the Central Committee issued a resolution on the 
same subject. 2 In-service cadres here means government staff, whether 
or not they were Party members. The CCP suffered from a serious shortage 
of educated administrative staff; quite a number of in-service cadres 
were even illj terate. 3 It is likely that these cadres without political 
or 'cultural' training regarded themselves as 'officials' in the old 
4 
sense, and easily became arrogant towards the people. Moreover, the 
CCP had to contend with their administrative inefficiency. The repeated 
emphasis on reeducation of in-service cadres in the rectification indicates 
how seriously the lack of political and 'cultural' education among them 
5 
affected government work. 
On 8 February the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee 
convened a meeting of the propaganda workers in Yenan at which Mao gave 
1 Two hours of study each day was still the rule in 1944, when foreign 
journalists visited Yenan. See Stein, op.cit., p.105. 
2 The "Central Committee Resolution on the Education of Cadres in 
Service," 2e February 1942, was later made one of the rectification 
documents, 
3 See Lin Po-ch'u's report which states that in the SKN Border Region 
the great majority of cadres below hsien level had no educational 
background. Quoted in Selden, op. cit., p.146. 
4 
See the example of Hsiao YUan in Chao Shu-li's novel, Li Yu-ts'ai 
pan-hua, pp. 52-·56. 
5 
'Cultural' education means basic education consisted mainly of 
literacy education and giving basic knowledge on China's history. 
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a lecture, "Oppose Party Formalism," and ever~, participant was given a 
pamphlet, "Propaganda Guide," both of wliich were later included in the 
twenty-two rectification documents. On 11 February another edi<torial 
"Heighten the Cultural Standard of the Cadres" appeared in the Chieh-fang 
jih-pao, K 'ang Sheng delivered two lectures to the cadres of the SKN 
Border Region on 21 February and 3 March which were also to be included 
l in the twenty-two documents. In February and March, the Chieh-fang 
jih-pao reported that the higher level Party organs and Party schools 
had undertaken discussions and investigations. 
In April 1942, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee 
issued a resolution2 directing all Party organs to carry out a thorough 
study and discussion movement. The resolution named eighteen documents 
to be studied by every Party organ, as well as setting out the schedule 
of the campaign. Out of the eighteen documents, fifteen were written 
by leading figures of the CCP or were Central Committee resolutions, 
one was from Stalin's work on Bolshevisation of ':he party, one was the 
,oonclusion to the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, " 
and one was a pamphlet which consisted of quotations from two Chinese 
and two Russian works about propaganda. Among the fifteen Chinese 
documents, seven are listed under Mao's name, but most of the five 
Central Committee resolutions seem also to have been drafted by him. 3 
4 Another four are by Liu Shao-ch'i,Ch'en Yun and K'ang Sheng. On 16 
----1 ~hE,se are not included in Cheng-feng wen-hsien, see CFJP, 24 February 
and 8 March 1942. 
2 This was later called 'April 3 Resolution'. Compton, op.cit., p.1-7. 
3 One of these Central Corrunittee resolutions, "On Methods of Leadership," 
was later included in Mao's Selected works. 
4 This reflected the relationship between the Chinese and Russian 
Communist Parties at this time. As symbolised by the attacks on Wang 
Ming in the rectification, practical experience in the Chinese revolution 
was becoming increasingly powerful in the CCP compared with Marxist-
Leninist theory which was based on the experience of Europe. As to 
Wang in the rectification, see Compton, op.cit., pp.xxxvii-xxxix, and 
--~···· 
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,~pril, four Russi<;n works were added to the eighteen documents by the 
d D tm f h ~ 'tt 1 Propagan a epar ent o t e Central _omm,J. - ee. 
It is interesting that the works of Mao and his Central Conunittee 
colleagues occupied the main body of the rectification documents, while 
the Russian works were given only supporting positions. This marks the 
final emergence of Mao as a 'Chinese Marxist', who stands on the reality 
of Chinese society and the practice or experience of the Chinese revolu-
tion, using Marxism-Leninism as a way of thinking and a method of revolu-
2 
cionary struggle. In a sense, the rectification was a campaign to 
make the Chinese revolutionaries acquire this Marxist way of thinking and 
Viarxist methods of revolutionary struggle and enable them to use them' in 
the practice of the Chinese revolution. Mao states that the purpose of 
studying Marxism-Leninism is "to seek from this theory the stand, view-
point and method with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems 
of the Chinese revolution,' comparing the Chinese revolution and Marxist-
3 Leninist theory to the target and the arrow. '.l'he twenty-two documents, 
therefore, provided the basis of the rectification objeftives of seeking 
a Marxist-Leninist 'stand, viewpoint and method' and of utilising these 
in the Chinese revolution. 
A significant fact is that Mao put more emphasis on dialectical 
materialism than on historical materialism, when he introduced Marxism 
Footnote 4 cont'd 
Nii~ima Atsuyoshi, Gendai Chugoku no Kakumei Ninshiki (Perception 
Revolution in Contemporary China), ('rokyo: 1966), pp.51-59. 
1 Compton, op.cit., pp.7-8. 
of 
2 Nomura Koichi sees this point as a distinctive feature of Chinese 
communism. In Chinese conununism, he points out, the emphasls is placed 
on materialist dialectics rather than historical materialism, on 
utilisation of a theory rather than construction of a theory. See 
Nomura, op.cit., pp.131-136. 
3 
"Reform Our Study," Mao, III, p.22; Compton, op.cit., -p.66. 
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1 to his Party members. This helped him to 'Sinicise' Marxism, that is 
to say, to use Marxism as a tool, not a dogma, to promote the Chinese 
revolution. This is why it did not occur to Mao that nationalism could 
be incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. To Mao, all ways in which the 
Chinese revolution r;ould be advanced were Marxist-Leninist. Nationalism 
was no exception. In other words, his first and main concern was with 
the revolution in China. When he saw in nationalism a great driving 
force of social revolution, Marxist dogma concerning 'proletarian inter-
nationalism' did not worry him. 
The schedule of the rectification campaign is given in the April 3 
Resolution. The first stage was to be devoted to study and discussion 
of the twenty-two documents and at the end'of this period an examination 
was to be held. This stage was to take three months from 20 April for 
ordina:y Party units, and two months for schools. The second stage, 
for which no time limit was given, was tc involve investigation of Party· 
work by the 'investigation committee' elected within the individual 
units and schools. TLe third and final stage was for summarising the 
study and discussion and for making reports, which were directed to 
improve the work of the individual units and schools. The reports were 
to be submitted to the higher Party organs. 2 
There are two points which should not be overlooked in the April 3 
Resolution. The first is that non-Communist cadres could be included in 
the discussion and investigation, and although they were not coerced, 
in practice all non-Communis<-. cadres joined the campaign. 3 The campaign 
was not limited, therefore, to reeducation of Party members only, but 
1 See, for 
311-346. 
2 
example, "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," Mao, I, pp. 
Compton, op.cit. , pp. 3 & 8 • 
3 
Ibid., p.5; CFJP, 1 June 1942. 
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1 extended to all cadres in the administrative and military organs. The 
cu.: .• 'c . .i.qn was carried out by the Party branches in the political, military, 
~conomic, educational and mass organisations, in conjunction with the 
'better troops and simpler administration' campaign. In addition to 
political indoctrination, an important part of the campaign was the 
professional training of in-service cadres. 
The second point is that 'incorrect' opinions and minority groups 
were not to be oppressed in the discussion and investigation, and all 
opinions were to be included in the final reports to the higher Party 
organs. This was intended to_provide a means by which the opinions Qf 
minority groups could be communicated to the higher organs, right up to 
the Central Committee if necessary. Boyd Compton writes: 
Tr,e object of Cheng Feng was not physical control of the Party's 
members. Its purpose was the type of intensive indoctrination 
and training which would allow the Party to operate with unanimity 
in a situation when c2ose administrative control and inspection 
were out of question. 
The campaign aimed not only at ideological rectification of the 
Party members but also at professional and technical improvement. The 
Central Committee Resolution on the Education of Cadres in Service 
stresses this point. It urges 'cultural education', meaning the provision 
of a knowledge of characters and of elementary education, especially 
among "most of our Party's cadres of worker and peasant origin." 3 At 
the beginning of April 1942, supplementary schools for in-service cadres 
were set up in the SKN Border Region for 'cultural' and professional 
1 The Central Committee Resolution on Education of In-service Cadres 
starts with the following statement: "Under present conditions, the 
task of cadre education should occupy first place in the qeneral 
educational program, and in the task of cadre education, priotity 
shouL..: be fiven to the task of cadres in service." Compton, op.cit., 
p.80. 
2 Compton, op.cit., p.xxxvi. 
3 Ibid., p.81. 
: .. 
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training. Improvement of efficiency in every office and 'army unit was 
necessitated by the reduction in the number of cadres during the 
'better troops and simpler administration' campaign. 
A variety of methods was adopted to carry out the study campaign, 
1 
which concerned particularly the twenty-two documents, in April and May. 
In June, in meetings held to review the experiences of the previous two 
2 
months, the Party found that it had been unsuccessful. It seems that 
it was in June that the Party determined to go through a prolonged 
rectification campaign, by setting up a hierarchy of study committees 
under the newly established Central Study Control Committee which had 
T t . h . 3 Mao se- ung as its c a,irman. 
The second phase of study was characterised by self-examination, in 
4 
accordance with the twenty-two documents. In the three months of June, 
July and August, numerous meetins for self-investigation and self-improve-
ment were held. The significance of criticism and self-criticism meetings 
5 is, as Richard Solomon has pointed out, in making a psychological break-
through, in enabling cadres to 'liberate' themselves from the 'face' 
culture in Chinese tradition. Fear of losing face had to be eradicated 
if the cadres were to establish close links with the masses and mobilise 
1 
'I'he most common method in April was to send investigation teams from 
higher organs to lower levels to investigate cadres' work and work 
style. In May, group reading dnd discussion of the twenty-two documents 
was most common. See editorial, nI-ting yao hsueh-hsi erh-shih-erh ke 
wen-chien" (We MUst Study the Twenty-two Documents), CFJP, 5 May 1942. 
2 "Ye~~an i-ke-yiieh hsileh~hsi yll.n-tung tsung-chieh" (Summary of 
Month Study Movement in Yenan), editorial, CFJP, 5 June 1942. 
One 
3 Ibid. 
4 The Chieh-fang jih-pao states 
Investigate Ourselves" on 23 May 
seriously, and put the spirit of 
into practice, the documents are 
in its editorial entitled •we Must 
1942: ~Unless we investigate ourselves 
the dobuments sincerely and correctly 
in danger of becoming a dogma." 
5 Richard H. Solomon, "Communication 
China Quarterly, No. 32, pp.87-90. 
Patterns and the Chinese Revolution," 
'. 
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them. Solomon analyses t!us as follows: 
In the context of the general notion of the "mass line" approach 
to leadership, the Party institutionalized the technique of group 
"criticism-self-criticism," by which traditional attitudes towards 
the use of authority were to be overcome: the mandarin posture of 
stern aloofness and arrogance towards the lao pai hsing which had 
helped to maintain the political passivity of China's peasants 
was to be abanCl.oned in favour of direct and active communication and 
social contact with those whose support was seen aI necessary to 
the success of a mass political-military movement. 
Criticism and self-criticism was a technique by which the CCP 
mobilised the cadres' political activism through generalising their 
personal problems in study and work. This corresponded to the method 
known as the 'speaking bitterness' meeting used in mass psychological 
mobilisation, which socialised the personal experiences of the oppressed 
to mobilise their resentment and hatred of the oppressors and develop 
these feelings into a political force which cou·ld change the social 
system. 
The fact that all administrative organisations and schools spent 
haH a day for study and self-criticism meetings 2 indicates how firmly 
resolved the Party was tllat its members should carry out this movement. 
It is reported that on the first day of the Yenan Literature Forum in 
May 1942, when he received the news that KMT troops were about to attack 
Ycman, Mao said: "I will i;tay in the mountains with cadres and continue 
Lhe rectification there, if Yenan falls; we must by all means and under 
all circumstances go through with the rectification. " 3 To Mao, the fate 
1 Ibid. , p. 88. 
2 After May 1942, when the Central Committee recognised the necessity 
of extension of study period, many organisations increased time for 
study an1 meetings. 
3 Yang Chun-ch'en, 
Yenan Rectification 
op.cit., p.114. 
Hui-i Yen-an cheng-feng yiin-tung (Memoirs on the 
Movement), (Changsha; 1957), quoted in Niijima, 
. . 
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of Yenan, the capital of the Communist state of China, could not be 
compared to the rectification, on which to him the future of the Chinese 
revolution depended. 
In September, with the Central Committee Resolution of the first of 
that month on the Unification of Leadership in the Anti-Japanese War 
l 
Bases, the emphasis shifted to rectification of the style of the Party's 
internal-external relations. The Central Committee now recognised that 
the Party had reached the stage where it should establish good relations 
with non-Party people, as well as tightening Party discipline, on the 
basis of the study and discussion which had gone on in the preceding 
half year. In this stage, the Party sought to secure its leadership 
among the masses, a task which was approached from two directions. One 
was that Party members had to win acceptance as the masses' own leaders, 
through outstanding activism and modesty in the mass movements. The 
other was that the Party sought to recruit to its own ranks activists 
from among the masses. Mao repeated in an article entitled "Some 
Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership," written in June 1943, that 
a leading group which was closely linked with the masses could be formed 
only gradually in the process of a movement, or struggle. He continued: 
In the process of a great struggle, the composition of the leading 
group in most cases should not and cannot remain entirely unchanged 
throughout the initial, middle and final stages; the activists who 
come forward in the course of struggle must constantly be promoted 
to replace those original members of the leadin~ group who are 
inferior by comparison or who have degenerated. 
"
0
···" ~i, 0 ~"""'"!-" of the drive to secure Party leadership, the intra-
Party campaign to bring Party nembers close to the masses and the 
recruitment of activists, came together, in the process of struggle to 
1 
2 
For the text, see Compton, op.cit., pp.161-175. 
Mao, III, p.181. 
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."· 
··. :·,· .. · .. 
.. : : . ,. 
. ' . . . ; ~ 
....... 
r· •. i 
., 
134 
overcome the political.passivity of the masses and bureaucratic attitudes 
of Party cadres, at that point where mass mobilisation was occurring. 
Illustrating Mao's concept of the mass movement was the shift in 
emphasis in the CCP's policy from rectification to production at the end 
of 1942, which was an indication of the Central Committee's intention to 
make use of a 'great struggle', both for further rectification of Party 
cadres and for generation of the masses' activism in the course of 
improving their own livelihood. 
Reviewing the campaign in "Our Study and the Current Situation" in 
April 1944, Mao said that "the rectification movement and the development 
of production have yielded results of a fundamental nature, thereby making 
our Party invincible both ideologically and materially." 1 The success 
of the series of policies and movements carried out in the same period -
the thr~e-third system, rent and interest reduction, better troops and 
simpier administration, unified leadership, and the development of 
production - owed much to the rectification campaign, which guaranteed 
a high efficiency and morale among the Party members who assumed leader-
ship of the basic units in the movements. The mass movements in turn, 
helped revitalise the Party at the basic level. 
One of the major ideas put forward in the rectification documents 
concerns the responsibility of the vanguard party. As far as the CCP 
;,as concerned, responsibility consisted of two aspects: one is self-
central, self-education or ethical stoicism, and the other is leadership 
or responsibility to other people or organisations. The Central Committee 
Resolution on the Unification of Leadership in the Anti-Japanese War 
Bases states: "The Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and the 
highest form of proletarian organisation; it should lead all other 
1 
Ibid. , p .169. 
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organisations whether military, governmental, or mass." 1 Leadership 
does not necessarily mean control or domination but means, according to 
Mao, "the Party's correct policy and the example we set by our own work 
to convince and educate people outside the Party so that they willingly 
2 
accept our proposals." This was applied to the leadership of the army, 
and also to the higher organs within the Party. The Central Committee 
required the cadres at higher levels to undertake more study and more 
work, and it delegated more responsibility to senior cadres than it did 
to the lower levels and junior cadres. 
A significant point about Party organisation in this period is the 
fact that the Party was the only centralised political organisation in· 
North China, whereas the Communists' government organisation was 
decentralised and lacked any form of central government. In fact, the 
Party was the link between the border region governments, and it assumed 
the role and the policy-making functions of a de facto central government 
for all governments throughout Communist territory. As a highly 
centralised organisation of the best elements in the base areas, the 
Party was willing to share power and responsibility with non-Party people 
in the administration and the mass organisation, securing its own leader-
ship. Party linkage between the base areas served to spread better 
methods and techniques of mass mobilisation and new policy implementation, 
because Party members at the basic level of society carried the task of 
radical mobilisation of the non-Party masses. 
Another important point which deserves more attention is the fact 
that the Party was built as a vanguard of the proletariat by intense 
political education and thought reform. For Mao, the decisive factor in 
1 
2 
Compton, op.cit., p.162. 
Mao, I I , p. 418 . 
. .... 
I ... , 
.•.'i36· . 
.. : 
. . . . . . . . .. : .. · .... : .; .. :.::· .. ·,.. .· . 
determining a person's class affiliation is not so much the family one 
is born into, but the kind of 'thought' one holds. A person can, there-
fore, be transferred from one class to another by individual efforts to 
acquire new 'thought' and new behaviour. Thus, through thought reform 
it is possible to create people of one class from people of other classes. 
The rectification was an intensive phase of the CCP's attempt to trans-
form the best elements of the petty-bourgeoisie, that is the activists 
of peasant and intellectual origin, into a proletariat, the vanguard of 
the revolution, by providing them with discipline and a consciousness of 
their historical mission. 1 
In the rural situation, where there was an almost complete absenc7 
of any proletariat, the Party was not only the vanguard of the proletariat 
but often assumed, like the army, the role or character of the proletariat 
itself. When Party documents refer to the leadership of the proletariat, 
they often mean the leadership of the CCP. It must be remembered, however, 
that this 'proletariat' included many members who were not politically 
motivated. As Liu Shao-ch'ipointed out, there were members who had 
joined the Party because "they h11ve not found their way in society - they 
have no profession, no work, no education, or they want to get rid of 
their families or wives," or "because they wish to rely on the Party to 
2 
escape taxation or be certain of 'something to eat' in the future." 
Against the background of China's history, an organisation which served 
primarily the interests of the proletariat, and the liberation of the 
nation and mankind, rather than the interests of its members, was 
entirely new. It was natural, therefore, that many Party members under-
stood the CCP and the revolution only in the context of their individual 
experience and knowledge, in which there was little place for such 
1 Cf. Selden, op.cit., p.196. See also his excellent analysis of the 
rectification campaign, pp.188-207. 
2 Liu Shao-ch'i, "Training of the Communist Party Member," Compton, 
op.cit., p.118. 
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concepts as placing the highest value on the people, the masses, mankind 
or the public. From such basic raw material the Party had to create 
the vanguard of the proletariat, which "should possess all of the greatest 
and highest human virtue, 111 to assume leadership in the Chinese revolu-
tion. Political education was essential, therefore, for the Party to 
maintain the qualitie3 necessary for the vanguard of the Chinese 
revolution. 
The Party, and its army, ruled with an intense consciousness of 
a revolutionary mission and with ethical self-control. The latter was 
produced through political education and training during the mass 
campaigns. Another condition which enabled the CCP to control the vast 
territory of North China was that it had no rival with as well-defined 
a programme and political strategy, well-trained and active political 
and military leaders at the basic level, rigid organisation and particular-
ly mass suvport. But the Party could not exercise its rule without a 
government administration and mass organisations, which were constructed 
at the local level and on a united front basis. The Party's prestige 
and mass support were won through the participation of its own members 
in these two institutions, which provided the Communists with opportun-
ities to demonstrate to the non-Communist cadres and the masses how 
capable, hard-working and modest they were. The government administration 
and the mass organisation were different in nature from the Party and its 
army. 
1 Ibid. I p. 113 . 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CHINA 
PART II: THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE MASS ORGANISATIONS 
The two highly disciplined and rigidly controlled institutions 
in the Communist government system, on which the CCP placed the 
vanguard role of the Chinese revolution, present a contrast to the less 
disciplined, less rigid and local institutions, the government 
administration and the mass organisations. These were organised on the 
basis of the multi-class united front and functioned with the primary 
purpose of resistance to Japan. They were essential and integral parts 
of the Communist government system, and through them the CCP was able to 
link itself with the broad mass of the people and to put its policies 
into practice. 
Due to their local nature, and the fact that they provided a more 
permanent presence than the army and to some extent also the Party, the 
administration and the mass organisations were rooted more deeply amongst 
the local inhabitants. They were the organisational means by which the 
daily life of the local people was linked to the resistance war. In 
practice, the CCP had to depend very much on these two institutions in 
its task of mobilising the people for war and revolution. They also 
enabled the Party to develop close contact with non-Party people and to 
involve them in the Communist political process. 
1. The Administration 
From 1937, when it agreed to collaborate with the KMT, until the 
establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the CCP never claimed 
that its government represented the entire Chinese nation. In a 
sense, the local governments it controlled were legally under the 
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central Government of the KMT; and the Conununists themselves insisted 
that, on the basis of the KMT agreement, the SKN and Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
Border Region governments were Special Region Governments of the KMT 
l dm . . . l Centra a in:i.stration. They established local governments from 
the basic level upward: that is, village governments came first and 
when there were a certain number of village administrations in one area 
the CCP established a district (ah'Ul government and then a hsien 
administration. The highest-level governments in the Conununist territories 
were border region governments, which corresponded to the provincial 
administration under the Central Government. 
Under the system of KMT tutelage, neither the province nor the 
hsien had the right of self-government, whereas the township (hsiang 
~r ahen) office was supposed to be elected by a township assembly 
consisting of two representatives from each pao head was elected by the 
pao assembly and the ahia chief was elected by the family heads of 
each ahia. The pao-ahia system, which had been a Ch'ing local security 
control system, was revived by Chiang Kai-shek in the former Conununist 
areas in South China after the KMT extermination campaign against the 
CCP succeeded, and in 1939 extended to the whole of China under its 
control. This was manipulated to encourage peasants to spy on each 
other, by the threat of arrest of the whole ahia or pao if one 
Communist was discovered among its members. The Kuomintang's adop-
tion of this guilt-by-.~ssociation system indicates its resolution 
1 In August 1937 when the KMT-CCP agreement for the united front was 
reached, the SKN Border Region government was approved by the Central 
Government as a local government under its jurisdiction. The Chin-
Ch'a-Chi Border Region was similarly recognised after its inauguration 
in January 1938. See George Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 
(New York: 1940), p.35. After the war, the Conununist-established 
local governments became one of the two main issues in the KMT-CCP 
negotiations. See Note 1, "On Chungking Negotiations," Mao, IV, pp. 60-63. 
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to eliminate all Communists, even if 100 innocent peasants' had to be 
imprisoned for the guilt of one. 
When the war began in 1937, local government control was not 
uniform throughout the country. "In some parts of the country 
where recalcitrant militarists of the old order were in power, the 
central government could do little to enforce its will," 1 though the 
'centralised area' was expended year by year. In the 'centralised 
area' the Central Government exercised control over the local 
governments through the appointment of personnel, Its orders and 
2 
ordinances, and local KMT organisations were quite effective,, as 
far as central control was concerned. In terms of administrative 
reform and the rent reduction program, however, the KMT government 
was far from efficient. 
The war interrupted the trend towards administrative central-
isation. Most high officials of the local governments in North China 
abandoned their offices and fled to the south. The Communists then 
moved in and replaced them, The CCP took the various local anti-
Japanese organisations as the nuclei of the local administration, 3 
This method gave the Communists a twofold advantage, in addition to 
economising on the use of their own personnel. Firstly, the native 
administration was more acceptable to, and effective among the local 
people; and secondly, the CCP was able to win new members and sym-
pathisers from among the local people through the non-Communist 
l 
Chien Tuan-sheng, "Wartime Local Government in China,• Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. XVI, No,4, December 1943, p.445. This article 
(pp.441-460) examines the whole system of local government under the KMT. 
2 Tbid., p.446. 
-'For the origin of the Communist base areas, see Johnson, op. cit., 
pp.92-122. 
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administration. Since they were distinct from the army, which belonged 
to the Party, local governments in the Communist territory were, at 
least in theory, completely separate from the CCP. 
The System of Government Administration 
The government was divided into two parts: the assembly (ts'an-
Z-hui) and the government (aheng-fu), which were legislative and adminis-
trative departments respectively. The judicial department was supposed to 
be independent and was nominally under the direct jurisdiction of the 
Nationalists' Supreme Court. However, the president of the higher court 
was elected by the border region assembly and its staff were appointed by 
the government; and below the hsien level, the judicial department was 
1 practically a part of the administrative department. The three depart-
ments made up the 'government' in its broadest sense, and the word cheng-fu 
in Communist documents of ten means all three departments as integral 
parts of the government. 
The assembly was based on the Provisional Assemblies of the 
Provinces and Municipalities Organisation Act produced by the KMT 
government in 1938. At the same time the National Government ordered 
each provincial government to enforce the regulations for the 
establishment of provisional hsien assemblies. The CCP made use of 
these KMT legislative measures for its own purposes. 2 The provincial 
or border region assembly was elected by the residents in the 
1 See the section below on the judicial system. For the judicial system 
in the SKN and Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Regions in this period, see Leng 
Shao-chuan's "Pre-1949 Development of the Communist Chinese System of 
Justice," China Quarterly, No.30 (April-June 1967), pp.101-108. 
2 Under the KMT law the assembly was not able to assume more than a 
consulative function, nor were the members elected by the people. 
Fukushima Masao, Chugoku no Jinmin Minshu Seiken (People's Democratic 
Power in China), (Tokyo: 1965), pp.174-176 & 264-265. 
·. \. 
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province or border region above the age of eighteen, and was given 
2 
similar powers as legislatures in western parliamentary systems, 
There were assemblies at three levels, the border region, the hsien, 
3 
and the township (hsiang or chen) • The function of the assembly 
of the border region and the hsien was approximately the same; to 
elect members of the administrative body and decide all important matters 
within the area. 4 
Figures for the kind of people who became assembly members by 
popular election are available only for a few cases below hsien level. 
The followinga.re the resultSof the village election in 1941 at 55 
administrative villages in 11 hsien in northwest Shansi. 5 
1. Administrative village chairmen and assembly members 
Landlords & rich peasants 
Middle peasants 
Poor peasants & farm workers 
2. Natural village headmen 
Landlords & rich peasants 
Middle peasants 
Poor peasants 
17 (percent) 
44 
38 
14 (percent) 
32 
54 
1 Article 2 and 3, Regulations for Election of the SKN Border 
Region, 1939, Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'u ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, 
p.53. 
2 Regulations for Organisation of the Assemblies of All levels of the 
SKN Border Region, 1939 & 1941, ibid .. , pp.55-58 & 116-12l;Regulations 
for Organisation of the Provisional Assembly of the Chin-Chi-Lu-YU 
Border Region, 1941, Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu pien-ch'li cheng-fu, ed., Fa-ling 
hui-pien (Collection of the Laws and Decrees), (n.p.: 1942), pp.1-4. 
3 Article 6, Regulations for Organisation of the Assemblies of All 
Levels of the SKN Border Region, 1939, and Article 7, same, 1941. The 
size of a hsiang at tl1at time varied, from less than 500 to more than 
2,000 in population. There were cases, despite the Regulations for 
organisation of the Assemblies, in which the assembly was at district 
level, depending on local military and political conditions. 
4 Articles 10 & 11, Regulations for Organisation of the Assemblies of 
All Levels of the SKN Border Region, 1939. 
5 K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti chieh-fang ch'u kai-k'uang, 
p.104. 
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Significantly, these figures indicate that 'the CCP ensured that the 
14~ . 
poor and middle peasants secured a majority in the village political 
power organisation in the first three years of the war. This was so 
in northwest Shansi and presumably also in all other Communist bases. 
Ch'i Wu, for example, gives figures for class composition in the 
village administration in T'aihang Region in 1942, which shows a 
roughly 20:40:40 ratio for landlords-rich peasants: middle peasants: 
1 poor peasants-farm workers. The proportion in the category of landlord-
rich-peasant' was, however, much greater than that in the SKN Border 
Region, where 'landlord-rich peasant' occupied no more than ? percent 
of the assembly seats below hsien 2 level. These figures do not show 
wPat proportion was occupied by Party members, but it can be assumed 
from the later 'three-thirds' (san-san-chih) policy that more than 
one third, or approximately one half of the assembly and the 
administrative committee members were Communists. 3 Source material 
on the class composition of Party membership at each level is not 
1 h' . w . t 95 C 1 U I Op o CJ_ o t p • o 
2 Lin Po-ch'U's report in 1939 on the local election in 1937, The 
result of the 1946 election of the SKN Border Region Assembly was 
reported by Li Ting-ming as follows: 6 workers, 18 poor peasants, 
69 middle peasants, 26 rich peasants, 9 merchants, 34 landlords 
and 8 others were elected for 170 seats. In comparison with the 
figures given by Lin, the proportion of rich peasants and landlords 
is remarkably high.. The change of class structure through rent 
reduction and the production deive in early 1940s might be one 
explanation for the increase in the number of rich peasants, Another 
explanation is that the rich peasants and landlords were educated 
people who were necessary for the higher level government. Li's 
report is in Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'U ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, 
pp.296-303. 
3 The three-thirds system was put into practice after the 1941 election, 
at least at border region level in SKN. Japanese sources do not deny the 
existence of assemblies whose members were elected by the people in the 
Communist areas, although they are suspicious about the purpose of the 
CCP in establishing a 'democratic' system. See, for example, Dai-Toa-
sho Somu-kyoku, chukyo Gaisetsu (Outline of the Chinese Communist 
Party), (Tokyo: 1944), pp.51-55; Tada Corps, op. cit., pp.233 & 
244, 
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available, but it appears that at lower levels Party members were 
mainly poor and middle peasants, whereas at higher levels the majority 
were educated people from elite backgrounds. For this reason, the 
proportion of Party members in assembly and government seats was 
not necessarily smaller at higher levels than that at lower levels, 
even though the proportion from the richer class was greater. 
Basic Administration 
The basic administration, the hsiang and the natural village, 
played a most important role among all branches of government in 
political mobilisation of the people, in close connection with- the 
mass organisations. The Communists were sufficiently practical 
to create a hsiang assembly system different from that of the 
higher level assemblies, in that it was also given the functions 
f th d .. t t' 1 o e a minis ra ion. In the Chin-Ch' a-Chi and the Chin-Chi-
Lu-Yti Border Regions there were respectively village meetings and 
villagers' representative councils instead of village assemblies. 
For all three types the villagers were organised into small residents' 
group of from 15 to 60 people, which elected representatives to the 
assembly or the representative council. According to Hsieh Chlieh-tsai, 
then Vice Chairman of the SKN: Border Region Assembly, the assembly 
member elected by the residents' group should also be the leader of 
that group; that is, he should lead the group members in carrying out 
the policy decided by the assembly, and the group members should 
express their opinions to him as their representative. If the elected 
representative did not act properly he could be recalled. When the 
people felt that their interests were properly represented by him they 
l The natural village usually had villagers meetings instead of 
assemblies. 
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would come to believe that elections were important. 1 
The system was well designed to involve all people in the political 
process in the village. Small residents groups were more easily convened 
to discuss village matters and directives from higher levels in the 
administration than were the meetings of the whole hsiang which had been 
held occasionally before 1937. The leader, or the representative, was 
closer to villagers by virtue of being elected by the small group. The 
villagers were actively involved in village politics. And most significant, 
the peasants were required to communicate not only with the village g~vern-
ment but also with their fellow peasants. This was essential if they were to be 
to be politicised and mobilised; the first step in political involvement 
was for the peasants to regard themselves as part of the whole society 
and to know where they stood in relation to the society. Through the 
CCP's system of government at the basic level, the villagers now had to 
confront and communicate with the la~ger world outside the family circle. 
The executive body of the hsiang administration was the hsiang 
office (hsiang-kung-so) or government (hsiang cheng-ful which was 
composed of a headman (hsiang-ch ang) and several council members. 
The headman was elected by the assBmbly and was also the chairman 
of the legislative body. The hsien government could veto the election 
cf the village headman and council members, and was able to exploit 
this power to remove the influence of the landlords and gentry from 
t!1e village administration. As election campaigns provided an 
opportunity for the CCP to educate and indoctrinate the villagers, 
short terms of office for the village headman and assembly members, 
1 
"Hsiang-shih ts'an-i-hui tsen-yang kung-tso" (How the Village or 
Town Assembly works), Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch 'ii ts 'an-i-hui wen-hsien 
hv.i-chi, p .189. 
usually one year, as well as the veto of the hsien ,,overnment, 
l 
were necessary to the success of the Communist pol.i.tical system. 
The function of the election campaign is discussed below. 
There were several committees in the hsiang office, both 
permanent and temporary. Permanent committees included those for 
education, construction, security, hygiene, grain control and con-
ciliation, while the temporary committees were for such matters as 
. 1 h' . . t' d h 2 spring p oug ing, irriga ion an autumn arvest. The hsiang did 
not have to follow strictly the organisation regulations of the town-
146 
ship government, and since the system combined political, economic and 
military functions, Communist regulations on township administrative 
organisation were flexible and varied from place to place. The hsiang 
government was encouraged to absorb skilful villagers into the 
committees and make them propagandists for the hsiang administration; 
this practice served both to create political leaders and to bring the 
3 
administration close to the masses. 
As a rule, all hsiang government staff were part-time and honorary, 
4 
except for the headman and the secretary. This followed the practice 
of the traditional village administration in which even the headman was 
not paid. In making the above two positions full-time and paid, the 
CCP wanted to ensure that poor villagers could take the headmanship, and 
l . 
The terms of off ice of the elected members of the Communist government 
were generally short: assembly members were elected every year for 
the border region and the hsien, and every half year for the village. 
The administrative heads were elected every one or two years for the 
border region and the hsien, and every year for· the village. 
2 Articles 12 and 13, Regulations on Organisation of the Township 
Government of the SKN Border Region; Article 7, Regulations on 
Organisation of the Village Government of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border 
Region, Tada Corps, op.cit., p.264. 
3 Hsieh Chueh-tsai, op.cit., p.181. 
4 Sometimes the hsiang was able to have full-time vice headmen and 
miJ.i tary leaders. 
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to give more responsibility arid power to the headman and the village 
administration than had existed before. Part-time and unpaid adrnin-
istration, however, also had its own significance for the CCP and was 
more than simply a question of following the traditional practice in the 
villages. It could be utilised as one means of working towards the 
communist ideal of abolishing the bureaucracy, or for eliminating the 
distinction between the government and the people. The CCP actually 
attempted later in the Cultural Revolution to make local governments 
part-time and unpaid. 
In the base areas the hsiang headman was concurrently commander 
of the militia squad, whose deputy commander and political leader·were 
both also full-time. 1 After the elimination of the landlords and local 
gentry from the hsiang administration, the CCP apparently suffered from 
a shortage of clerical workers for village offices, and to overcome 
lhis, it stressed that use should be made of primary school teachers 
2 for secretarial work for the office and the assembly. The supreme 
power in the hsiang seems to have been with the headman, but as in the 
traditional village administration he shared power with the committee 
members; decision-making involved the committee and the headman was 
expected to carry out the decisions jointly made. 
Below the hsiang level, the administrative village (hsing-cheng 
ts'un) in SKN had an office, run by a ts'un chairman (chu-jen) and a 
vice chairman who were elected by mass meetings in the village. 3 In 
1 Article 6, Regulations on Organisation of the Village Government of 
the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. 
2 Hsieh Chlieh-tsai, op.cit., p.184. The part played by school 
teachers in the Chinese resistance to Japan was significant. Jack 
Belden found in 1947 that almost all the fifteen or twenty hsien 
magistrates he met had been school teachers before the war with 
Japa.n. Belden, op.cit., p. 72. 
3 Article 10, Regulations on Organisation of the Township Government of the 
SKN Border Region. 
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other base areas no administrative village existed and the natural 
village was directly under the hsiang. The work of the natural village 
(ts'un) office was similar to that of the hsiang office and was managed 
by a small staff who were representatives of the mass organisations 
(in Shantung) or of residential areas (in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi) •1 The 
te~·m of office of the ts' un chairman and vice chairman was half a year 
in the SKN2 and one year in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region. 3 In the 
SKN Border Region, the natural village was under the administrative village 
and had also a village head (ts'un-ch ang) elected by mass meeting• 4 
Two points about the basic administration system of the Communist 
government should be stressed. One is that all village office-holders 
in the administration were elected by the villagers in one way or 
another. The effect on village politics, especially on the majority 
who previously had been virtually ignored, was profound. The other is 
that the Communist administration penetrated right down to the natural 
village, and the Party ensured that its influence persisted at this 
level, by exploiting the power of vetoing the appointment of the hsiang 
headman, the ts'un chairman and the hsiang council members, and by 
frequent elections, For the first time in Chinese history, a 
government attempted to extend its political control to become closely 
involved in the natural village. 
Another point of interest lies in the CCP's use of educated man-
power, As Mark Selden has pointed out, the acute shortage of educated 
1 Article 2, Regulations on Organisation of the Ts'un Office of 
Shantung Province, Tada Corps, op.cit,, p.267. In the Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
Border Region the village representatives meeting elected the ts'un 
chairman.. Article 2, Regulations on Organisation of the ts'un Office 
of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, Tada Corps, op,cit., p.266. 
2 
Article 10, Regulations on 
SKN Border Region. 
Organisation of Township Government of the 
3 Chou Erh-·fu, Chin-Ch'a-Chi hsing (Travel to the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border 
Region), (n.p.: 1946) pp.51-55. 
4 Article 10, Regulations on Organisation of Township Government of the 
SKN Border Region. 
___ , __ 
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manpower in LUral China made it imperative for the CCP to make use of 
the landlord-gentry in its administration, particularly in the period 
between 1937 and 1941. 1 Apparently, however, these people were needed 
more by the higher level administration than by the villagers, and as 
a result and also because of the CCP's careful attention to the elim-
ination of landlord power in the village, the traditional elite was 
· t 11 a f · 11 l' · 2 v1r ua y remove ram vi age po 1t1cs. After the elimination of the 
native gentry, the village government lacked educated staff, and was 
encouraged to appoint the village primary school teacher to the position 
of secretary of the village office. 
Elections 
It is not difficult to imagine that there were formidable problems 
involved in campaigning and voting, although popular election of 
administrative positions was essential for the CCP to secure mass 
support. In election campaigns it was necessary first to explain the 
electoral system to the villagers before the actual carepaign could 
commence. To this end, the government, the mass organisations and the 
Party first convened meetings to discuss methods of propaganda, and 
organisec'. pr0paganda teams to be trained and sent among the peasantry. 
The mass organisations assumed the most important role in election 
campaigns, both because they were concerned with the question of who was 
to be elected to the administration, and also because in many cases 
they had their own quotas for assembly and council seats. In most 
Communist bases, all members of mass organisations, political parties, 
and if there were any present, members of the army, were eligible for 
1 Seldon, op.cit., pp.130-131, 169-224. 
2 See Lin Po-ch'il's report, quoted in ibid., p.146. In 1943, 90 
percent of the district and hsiang cadres were poor peasants. 
· .. 
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elections. In typical cases, after one week of campaigning, the mass 
organisations would call a meeting of all voters in the village, at which 
the candidates would give their final speeches, and the voters would 
criticise the existing government and the platforms of the candidates. 1 
The actual process of voting presented certain problems, because 
the overwhelming majority of the voters was illiterate, and because 
the Election Regulations adopted the principle of the secret ballot. 2 
The voting method had to be simple and clear enough to convince the 
villagers that the election was carried out properly. The stipulation 
of the secret ballot was, in many cases, rather nominal, and the simple 
method of raising hands at the village election meetings was apparently 
widely practiced, particularly at the natural village level. 3 When 
the secret ballot principle was observed, the use of 'bean and bowl' 
seems to have been extensive in many of the regions, although concrete 
4 
methods of voting were not laid down in the la•<s. 
In effect, the election was a mass campaign, which involved the 
whole population of each village. The reasoning behind the CCP's 
approach to elections was that if the peasantry had once experienced 
self-government, and if this was supported by the economic benefits 
of rent reduction and progressive taxation, they would probably resist 
1 For the role of the mass organisations, the Party and the army in 
the elections, see Strong, op.cit., pp.93-96. Many news items in the 
Chieh-fang jih-pao report that the mass organisations, the Party and 
the army were playing an active role in the elections. For example, 
16 Ju!'le 1941 for the Youths National Salvation Association, 3 July 1942 
for the army, 24 May 1941 for the Women's National Salvation Association, 
9 July 1942 for the Party, and for the propaganda team training, 11 
August 1941 and 26 July 1942. There are numerous reports on election 
meetings, e.g., Harrison Forman, Report from Red China, (New York: 
1945), pp.98-·99; Chou Erh-fu, op.cit., pp.51-55; Hai Yen, "Hslian-min hui 
shang," (At the Voters' Meeting) , CFJP, 23 June 1942. 
2 Article 2, Regulations for Election of the SKN Border Region. 
3 Selden, op.cit., p.134. 
4 Strong, op.cit., p.91. This and other methods of voting are 
described in Jack Belden, op.cit., pp.85-86. 
\ 
, 
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1 the revival of the old system of government. Mark Selden states in 
relation to election in the SKN Border Region in late 1937: 
If the land revolution had destroyed significant 
elements of the old order, the election movement 
was a step toward the integration of a new polity 
and a new community. In it the Communists sought 
both to harmonize broad elements of the population, 
including the former eld.te, and to establish new 
channels of legitimate power to insure the economic 
and political gains of the revolution. 2 
1.51 ... 
This is why the election campaign was as important as the voting itself. 
The party found opportunities in the campaign to educate the villagers 
for participation in its political programme. 
The election meeting also provided the villagers with an 
3 ~pportunity to criticise the government openly, which made it easier 
for them to overcome their fear of government. The whole process of 
the election campaign and voting was designed to achieve the ultimate 
goal of political participation of the whole population in the new 
system. Hence, for the CCP the election was a very important mass 
4 
movement. 
1 In the period of tutelage, the KMT did not recognise that the 
people were ready to carry out local self-government. On the KMT 
local government system, see Chien Tuan-sheng's article cited above, 
and Fukushima, op.cit., pp.260-273. In 1944, Teng Fa, then head of the 
Mass Movement Committee of the CCP Central Committee, told Israel 
Epstein, "[I]f the people take a single step forward by their own 
efforts and organization, they are there to stay. Even if an enemy 
cancels their gains with fire and sword, he can't kill the memory 
i'ond they'll try again when they have a chance." Epstein, The 
unfinished Revolution in China, (Boston: 1947), p.254. 
2 Selden, op.cit., p.128. 
3 Chou Erh-fu, op.cit. Li Ting-ming said in his report to the Third 
Assembly of the SKN Border Region in 1946 that one of the most 
important tasks in the election was to investigate whether the govern-
ment had been working properly. 
4 Cf. Selden's analysis of the election in the SKN Border Region 
in 1937. Op.cit., pp.127-136. 
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In order ·to secure dominance by the po.;rer: pe·ople, 'the CCP 
adopted a quota system for the seats in the government in the greater 
part of the base areas. According to Article 7 of the Regulations 
for Election of the Assemblies of All Levels of Lin-i Hsien in 
Shantung, the groups and their quotas in the assemblies were as foJlows: 
1. At least 12 percent for trade unions. 
2. At least 20 percent for the peasants national salvation 
association. 
3. At least 10 percent for the youths national salvation 
association. 
4. At least 15 percent for the women's national salvation 
association. 
5. At least 13 percent for the intellectuals and anti-
Japanese gentry. 
6. At least 12 percent for the local guerrillas, self-
defence corps and other military groups. 
7. The remaining 18 percent should be won by free 
competition.1 
These figures indicate that about 80 percent of the assembly seats 
were reserved for those who were poor, active and loyal, even if some 
elements of the intelligentsia and gentry might oppose the CCP. Items 
1 to 6 above were minimum quotas and the remaining 18 percent could be 
taken possibly as nil in case the six groups of from items 1 to 6 up 
by representatives of the first six categories. 
The quota system had the advantage of consolidating the mass 
organisation and of linking them closely to the government administration, 
as well as ensuring that the anti-Japanese elements remained in control. 
As Chou Erh-fu relates, these groups held meetings to decide platforms 
and candidates before election meetings for the whole village. 
1Lin-i Hsien Ts' an-i-hui, ed., Min-chu kuang-hui hsia ti Lin-i (Lin-i 
Hsi en under the Lustre of Democracy) , (Lin-i, Shantung?: 1941), 
(mimeo), p.8. 
.......... , -';:..-::· :>."· :·· . ."< 
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Ai.though the CCP was concerned with securing the peasants' rule 
in the government, it was also ready to share power with the privileged 
elements for the sake of the united front. The three-thirds system 
(san-san ·chih) was a peculiar 'self-restriction' policy of the CCP in 
the Yenan period. 
T!·.c 'i'hree-thirds Syr:; tern (san-san chih) 
Until the establishment of the North China People's Government 
in 1948, there was no integrated Communist government in North China 
owing to the war and poor communications. Each border region govern-
ment was organisationally isolated from the other anc'i the link between 
1:11r.r1 was the Communist Party and the army. Party members were usually 
leading members of the mass organisations and local governments 
because they were the most active elements among the anti-Japanese 
forces, and the border regions were·protected by the Communist army. 
One of the roles given to the administration was.to keep the broadest 
possible strata on the Communist side by maintaining the united front. 
'!'he government administration was the main institution of the Communist 
system which could absorb the political demands of all strata. 
The CCP had a clear idea of what kind of people should be in the 
government administration. Although the three-thirds system was 
propagated by the CCP as a great effort of self-restriction and as 
indicating a willingness to cooperate with non-:Party people, one of 
the most important objects of the three-thirds policy was the party's 
desire to enlist non-Barty people, mainly from elite backgrounds,·into 
the administration. The Party first called for this policy just after 
the bloody rift between the Communist-influenced Shansi Sacrifi-:e 
League ~nd the New A~my and the old Shansi Army of Yen Hsi-shan the 
so-called West Shansi Incident, or as the CCP later called it, the 
first tide of the KMT anti-Communist offensive. 
! 
·· . .'·. 
The three-thirds systerri"was ·1auncn~d. by Mao Tse-tung in a cir-
cular of the Central Committee in May 1940: 
In accordance with the united front principle 
concernii:g the organs of political power, the 
allocation of places should be one-third for 
communists, one-third for non-Party left progressives, 
i.rnd one-third for the intermediate sections who are 
neither left nor right .... 
The non-Par1..y progressives must be allocated 
one-third of the places because they are linked 
with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. 
This will be of tremendous importance in winning 
the latter over. 
Our aim in allocating one-third of the places 
to the intermediate sections is to win over the 
middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. 
Winning over these sections is an important 
step in isolating the die-hards.l 
As Lyman Van Slyke argues, this policy did not mean that the CCP's 
intention was to relinquish its political leadership in the govern-
2 
rnent, "but rather to make that leadership more acceptable." Mao 
writes in the above circular: 
We must make sure that the. Communists play 
the leading role in the organs of political 
power, and therefore the Party members who 
occupy one-third of the places must be of high 
calibre. This will be enough to ensure the 
Party's leadership without a larger representation. 
Leadership is neither a slogan to be shouted 
from morning till night nor an arrogant demand 
for obedience; it consists rather in using the 
Party's correct policies and the example we set 
by our own work to convince and educate people 
outside the Party so that they willingly accept 
our proposals. 3 
-154 
Since this was an inner-Party circular, Mao was preseumably quite 
serious in proposing that his Party should give two-thirds of the 
1 
Mao, II, p.418. This was apparently a by-product of the West Shansi 
Incident from November 1939 to February 1940. The three-thirds system 
was adopted by the Central Committee for the first a.ssembly of Hopei 
and the election of the Hopei Administrative Council which was begun 
in February 1940. 
2 
Van Slyke, op.cit., p.144. This book has a full description of the 
three-thirds system, pp.142-153. 
3 Nao, II, p.418. 
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positions in gove:cnment to non-.Party people. The vangua1·d organisation 
had to work harder and assume more responsi.bility than others. But the 
proportion of representation was almost a secondary concern so long 
as the Party recruited the best elements in society, and hence, Mao's 
emphasis on the quality of Party members. 
The immediate purpose of the system was. to consolidate the united 
front within the border regions, particularly in the face of the 'anti-
communist high tide' by Yen Hsi-shan and the KMT. The three-thirds 
policy was aimed at winning over the 'middle-of-the-readers' in the 
communist-governed areas; those who were willing to resist Japan but 
not very happy with or indifferent to the CCP. 
There is no doubt that the CCP was sincere in putting forward 
this policy, but the Party had difficulties in carrying it out, both 
in the old liberated areas and the newly occupied areas. In the old 
areas, most political activists and members of the governments had 
in fact already been recruited into the Party. In the new areas, the 
middle elements such as groups of national bourgeoisie, left-wing 
landlords and remnant troops of the warlords or the KMT, were 
reluctant to cooperate with the CCP, and in some cases even tried to 
take power from the communists. 1 The Central Committee incorporated 
the three-thirds principle into the Political Programme of the SKN 
1 P'eng Teh-huai wrote in 1941 that the three-thirds system was 
implemented only where the CCP, the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth 
Army was dominant; for the anti-Communist reactionaries would take over 
and destroy the solidarity of the united front, making use of the system 
when1 the Party and its army were not powerful enough. "Democratic 
Politics and Organisational Form of the Three-thirds Government: 
Report of the Party School at tne North Bureau of the Central Committee" 
(Japanese translation fro!!! Chinese), Toa Kenkyujo, ed. , Sen-Kan-Nei 
henku no Seisaku to Kinkyo (Policies and Current Situation of the SKN 
Border Region), (Tokyo: 1942), p.68. 
•,·. 
Border Region, adopted in May 1941. 1 Al.though the CCP made s0me 
efforts to implement the system in the election of 1941, in the old 
areas in the Border Region, Party members still occupied from 40 to 
50 percent of the assembly members at all levels. In the new areas 
communists came closer to one-third of the assembly and government 
council merr~ers. Mac himself, in the circular, did not expect that 
every local government could enforce the policy rigorously: 
The above figures for the al~ocation of places 
are not rigid quotas to be filled mechanically; 
they are in the nature of a rough proportion, 
which each locality must apply according to its 
specific circumstances. At the lowest level, the 
ratio may be somewhat modified to prevent the 
landlords and evil gentry from sneaking into the 
organs of political power. 2 
156, 
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Hsieh Chlieh-tsai excused the preponderance of party members in the old 
areas by saying that the system was not enforced by law, and if people 
3 
wanted to elect Party members nothing could be done. 
In 1942, however, the three-thirds system was taken up more 
positively and emphasised as an important policy of the CCP. The 
Chi eh-fang jih~ pao began to promote it in December 1941; 4 and in March 
1942 this was repeated. To some extent, this was a part of the 
rectification campaign. The campaign aimed at 'rectifying sectarianism, 
subjectivism and Party jargon'; and the three-thirds system was both 
a method of rectifying Communist sectarianism in local government and 
1 Shen-Kan-ning pi en-ch' li ts' an-i-hui ~ren-hsien hui-chi, p.104. 
2 Mao, II, p.419. 
3 Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'li ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, pp.201-202. 
This article, "San-san chih ti li-lun yli shih-chi" (The Theory and 
Practice of the Three-thirds System) , first appeared in the Chieh-
fang-ji-pao 27 and 28 March 1942 and was later included in the book 
as appendix. 
4 
"Chia-ch' iang hsien-ch' li hsing-cheng ling-tao" (Administrative 
Leadership in Chia-ch'iangHsien), editorial, CFJP, 21 December 
1941. 
··---·-·· 
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a consequence of this rectification. 1 Together with the rectif.tcation 
campaign, the three-thirds system was of vital importance to the CCP 
in overcoming the difficulties of 1941 and 1942. 
From the end of March 1942, where the number of Communists was 
more than one-third in hsien assemblies and governments, Communists 
began to resign and to be replaced by non-Communists. At the village 
essembly election of that year in SKN, the CCP was eager to 
implement the three-thirds system at the village level. Yet many 
articles and essays by leading Communist figures at that time 
indicated that there were doubts and fluctuations about the system 
among Party members. Some thought it was a 'temporary tactic', 
and tried to ensure that the non-Communist two-thirds were without any 
real competence. Others thought that the Communists would not be 
able to exercise leadership if they occupied only one-third. 2 Mao 
had to emphasise repeatedly the Party's sincerity in introducing this 
3 
system. 
It seems that the Party failed to implement the three-thirds 
system particularly in the base areas behind the Japanese lines. 4 
In his government report to the first assembly of the Central 
Shantung Subregion in July 1945, Administrative Chairman Ma reported 
that in the guerrilla areas it was hard to implement the system 
1 
"Fan-tui cheng-ch'uan chien-she chung ti kuan-men chu-i" (We Oppose 
Sectarianism in Building Political Power), editiorial CFJP, 29 
December 1941. 
2 Hsieh Chlieh-tsai's article, Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'U ts'an-i-hui wen-
hsien hui-chi, p.203. P'eng Teh-huai pointed out the same tendency 
of Party members. Toa Kenkyujo, op.cit., pp.67-72. 
3 See "New Democratic Constitutional Government," Mao, II, p.418; 
"Current Froblems of Tactics in Anti-Japanese United Front," pp.427-
428; "Unity to the Very End," p. 438; "On Policy," p. 455. Hsieh Chlieh-
tsai also emphasised this in his article, pp.203-204. 
d 
· Hsieh Chlieh-tsai states that in the new areas of SKN, the three-
thirds system was well established. p.202. 
••••• 
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because of ti1a ilux of the middle forces, and in Lhe old liberated 
areas it was also difficult because most ~cLivists at all levels had 
become Party rnemb..;rs, It. is ub·11i0us r..hat Comrnt.1nists occupied \·:ell 
over one-third of positions in most areas. In this report, for 
example, Communists occupied about 40 percent OL more of positions in 
r.he local government in Cent!:'dl Shantung SubregJ.on; t:l1e progressives 
comprised about 30 pe:::cent, and the middle forces less than 30 per-
1 
:ent. In spite of Mao's surmis2 c!rnt the Pai.ty could not easily 
muster even one-third in newly established local yovernments behind 
the enemy lines, the reverse was in fact the case, In the Wut'ai 
Region, for example, the elected representatives comprised at minimum 
2 34 percent CCF members, and in some cases as many as 75 percent. 
van Slyke quotes another statistic in which Bo percent of village 
government members and 60 percent of the village headmen in T'ai 
Hsien in Kiangsu Province, were Cornmunists. 3 
The expected benefits of the three-thirds system were achieved 
ev•.:n thuug't1 the sysi:t:m \\1as not. implemented r igoLous ly, The Pa.cty 
i.mpressed the middle elements with its fair and open attitude toward 
them, and with its willingness to share power wich non-Party people, 
This helped to legitimise Communist governmenc as representing the 
whole population, By sharing power wi t:h non-Party middle elements, 
i:he Comnrcm is ts obtained pol.i tic al training in w0rking with all. classes 
a..nd parties fighting tlie common enemy.. i•ic..r.euvcr, in order to ensure 
1 Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu, Lu-chung ch'u k'ang-Jih min-chu 
cheng-ch'uan chien-she ch'i-nien lai ti chi-pen r:sung-chieh chi chin-
hou chi-pen jen-wu (Summary of Seven Year's Work for the Building of 
che Anti-Japanese Democratic Power in Central Shantung and its 
Future Tasks), (n.p,: l945i, pp.22-23. 
2 P'eng Chen's report on Communist poJ.icies in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
Border Region, quoted in Van Slyke, op.cit., p,150, 
3 Ibid, 
.... 
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Part:.y le-::i.dt::.rsl1ip, it. wc..s 8S~e:it.:...al tha•. t.he Pa.!. t.:i members deve:.i·:>iJ the 
spiri~ of haLd work, active pa~L~.-~pat~J:i ir1 the political processr and 
Th1~ yoi~1L 15 sLressed by Hsiel1 
chileh-tsa.i, 1 But- t:.he ma.inLenance:: or P.:i.tt.y lee:.de:c~hip does not mean t.liat 
t;;e three-thirds policy \•!as nuc efrect:ive in at tr,;_ t:ing che middle ele-
2 
ments int.:i government wo..c::k. 
It should be r~cogn.i.sed, howeve·i: r t:.hd.t. the go·Jer:nment in c.he Yena..n 
period was not really a pJli~j-making insLit:ucion, b'Jt rather a policy-
impleT11enting institution. Ei.ren J.n t.he tasks of P'.)licy imple1nenta.tion, 
.\ t \·1as not the governmenr whi,:h played the dominant role among the 
it1a.sses, but the mass organisations. The gove1nmer1t, whi.::h was 
responsible both to the assembly and higher level government, assumed 
a sec:retaria..l role fo!'. t.he policy implementat.ion, 
The secretarial fun.:t.ion \Vas impo!'.tant.; it tv·:i:r:ked as a means of 
liaison 1)et~veen the parts of the sy~Lem,. Jack Belden w.ritas on the 
Chin-Chi-Lu-YU government:: 
(~;~overnment did noc have the ~onL£olllng 
power in t:he Border Region. Th2it. was ves•.2d 
in an org-ani3ation Known a.s the National 
Salvation Asso:iationi whi·:h c~nLtoiled and 
m:Jbi.lized the 'ma.:;.ses' [T)hi::.Le was a 
say i·ng in r.:he Borde:r.: R2g ion: I The gJve.cnmenL 
ha..s t.he right; the Sa·L\1'0.t:..1;..)11 A.56·:)Cldt.i.on h::iS 
the power. '3 
1 S"i1npler Ad1n1n1strattiJri' 
lllt!'.:)du.:ed a.t r..l12 sa.rr1E: t....ime a.::; r..he t.hrE:e-r..h.l.rd.s system was Lhe 
'bett2r r.roops and simpleL a.dmini.sr.r:c...ti.)n' .::;amfidi.gnr whi~h v1as more 
enthusiastically purs·..ied because it was directly :ceLat.ed t.o che 
question of c.:nnmunist: surv ivaL This had originally been proposed 
l 
Shen-Kan-Ning plen-~·h' u ts' an- L -hu.i. •ren-hii;en hLi.L-ch" .. pp- 204-20 i -
Van Siyke, op.cit. pp. L4b-152 
., 
) 
Belden, ~p.cic,, p.so 
• 
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rh·~ n?n-;,...omrnun.:.st 'ii er~ Chairrr.an :.;£ tht:. 
Li 'J' i1~g-1n.i..ng, who put t.he .:.aed }J~:1·sun,.i L ·L.Y t.) t·l<.'10 and, with ~1=t·:,';::: 
ci!.=·Proval, ra.L,.;·2;.l it. at: o:.ne B..:;.rde~ R<-.:·.;:.-.<...1~~ As.sernbly in Noveuti)e.r l94i. .. 
~Ji 's inc.cnt.ian wa,;; n:a.inli to redu.c::.: the '2:-.:.iuunt.~ .. c burden on t.he 
government and peop:Le in the 3i<N il;)rde" Region, ~n the face of the 
cd.sis :::aused by the KMT blockade and by d:t.ought, 1 The CC!? 
i.mplernented at -r.he top i~veis of the adrr' .. i.ni.si:.::t:.tio:n in the SKN Bv.rdei. 
::.:eg.:.on in December 1941, 2 
Alc:hough the economic difficulr.ies provided t.he orig~nal impetus, 
there were otl1e£ effects on bo.rd2r rBgion politics :Jf 'simpler 
J.drninistro.tion'. As Selden points our., ~n t.he period from 1937-1941, 
Lne SKN Bo.cde::.: Region built.. 1 Leg;.J..l.ax 1 a.drnini.strat.ion, w·nic·h followed 
the provincial government under the KMT; educat.ed manpowe< was ,;on-
cent.rated at the. 11igher levals r varti::al control of the government 
departments was strengthcn2d, and t.he lower J..evel administration 
~c:ided t.:; be igno:ct::d A cypi~al bureau~rdcisati~n ct governmen~ was 
corniTJ.g i..:1t·..J tf1e Conm1uni.st. areo..s. ~ ·This do~s n,.:;r.. seem to have been a 
2henomeno11 peculiar t~ SKN. 
'simpiar admin~straLi·::>n' cc,rr1.i;:;o..L9"n i·n 1.ht::; T'ai11a.ng Regionr tne ot.11er 
base areas ~eLe also b~iJ.ding b jregulhL' ou~saucca~y i!l this period, 
::i.Lmplified a.dminist.rdti.:.in \.\1as lmp~racivi::: o~)Lh t.:ir ·cha expansion of 
re:v;:ilur.iou d:.:ii.-1n t:.:. v.~il::.ge: .LS'Jt:?-1.; aod o.is0 iol. mvrs srfi.:..:.ent w::;e ._;f 
l 
See Gunt.11er Steir1' s i~1t2rview wi t..h Li ·ring-ming in Stein, op, .::it~ , 
pp. 110-llL 
2 
:;ccording t·:i Lir.'. Po-ch' U' s :t.:epor t, the Border Reg ion reduced the 
number •.)f offi::ials by l,598 at ali lcvals d·u.:c::.i.ng five ffi()nths from 
D~cembez 1941 to Ai;:ril 1942; 300 of them weL"a ll:ansferred to lower 
level admini3r..:rar.Lon and the rest were .;~nc for tlai:ning o:c back to 
product.ion. CEJP, 1 June 1942. 
j 
See Selden, op.cit., pp.Ul-Uo. 
- ·;... ·-·· -···· 
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~Q1_;cated 1naripww1-.:1· 3.t the rniddi~ and l0h"".::!L l~vel.s of the admini;;;;tration. 
1.'h·:-: si1nr:1ler admi11istr2.t1.on camp~i 1.Jn ;_~lso 11ad it.s effect on the 
political education of cadr~s As the three-thirds policy affected 
the political training of Pa.rt:y n1embers, the simpler administration 
campaign required govecnment ,.idres t:> transform their thinking. This 
transfo1·1nation was more fundamental 1.:.han in tl1e cas-= of the three-thirds 
system, because tl1e pol i 1:. ir::a l educ at i.on 1nvol v~c1 .tn lh.e simpler admin.is-
tra ti on catnpaign required tl1e el.imina ti.on oi tbe old va 1 ue systems 
rooted in the minds of cadres, particularly among those who were of 
intellectual origin. The simpler adrninistrat ion was an important form 
of the rectification, in \·1h1ch the CCP pursued a new model of government 
administration, attempting to era.dicate contempt for manual labour and 
manual labourers and old ideas of government adm1nistrat1on on the 
1 regular 1 \·1estern model. 
At the beginning of January 1942 the simpler administration campaign 
reached the hsien level, and the Communists called on every anti-Japan-
1 
ese base to implement the same pol Ley. It was t.lns stage that the 
campaign became a part of the Party rectif1cat1on campaign. It now 
involved the ideology of the cadres as well as problems of the economy. 
l~riting on the si1npler admin1strati.on r::amp<7.i.1gn in Septi::.mber 1942, in an 
editorial in the ClHeh-fang jih-pac;, Mao said: 
1 
2 
But men's minds ace l 1able to be fettered by circwnstance and 
habit from which even re•1olutionaries cannot 2dways escape .... 
When the 1'1eatl1!:~J: c-l1anges, it bec:Jn1es necessary to change one 1 s 
clothing .... Ent owing to the force ot habit people sometimes 
fall to make it at the proper t•nn and they fall ill. Present 
conditions in the base areas alread:,• require us to shed our 
winter garments and put on summer clothing so that we can move 
about nimbly to fight the enemy, but we are s~1ll heavily padded 
and weighed down, and quite unfit for combat 
Ch'i Wu, op.cit , p. 97. 
"?.Most Important Pol1C'y," Mao, III, p 101. 
. . . . . . 
162 
. : : .. ::.: . .... 
~ao demandeJ tl1at 2adres ~h:nk flex1h!y so as t~ ad~pt t~ the changed 
51 tuat~.~n. r0flec~111g .,n~ ~E ~he t·hr~0 slogans of ~he rectif1cation, 
1 0ver~ome sub]ect1v1~m' 
The ~11~n-Chi-Lu-YU B~~der Regton was said to h~ve made the best 
:.;;sp9nS'? t.o th-: Central C•.)mm1~_-.tee'3 ~.::ill f":)r simp1.C2r .::tdmin1st1·ation. 1 
The following gencral1sea. a··.~ount of a campaign is b-3.sed largely on a 
u>pori: in the Ch1,-,,h-f3ng J1h-pa0 on the ·~·omplere ptx·ess of the campaign 
Ll1 r.he T'aihang Region 1n the Ch1n-Ch1-Lu-Yii B•)rder F.egion, with the 
additian of sorne inform::it1on drawn fr .. Jm the campa!.gn in SKN 
In the first campaign, up ro Apr.i 1 1942, the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border 
Region reduced the number of off1c~.als t0 less than one per:-::ent of the 
nurab~r of Y8Stdents, by s;..mpl1fy1ng the '3..dm1n1strat.:..ve system. Trained 
cadres were transferred to lower 1_e~r8ls 1n order to rectify the top-
heavy system of administration and improve efficiency at lower levels. 
The serond ram pa ign was launched in May, both in the SKN and the Chin-
C:lli-Lu-Yi.i Border RegionE. The former sent work teams from the Border 
i\egion Government to lower levels to gi\ie more power to the lJsien gov-
"'rnm.,nts, while the latt<?~ 1:educed the number of offici.als in the 
upper two levels of government. t:he Border Region and the subregion. 
i:.;y t\·:o-th1rds or thtee-quart:ers, and reorganised the whole -:1.dministrative 
machine, particularly at lower levels. 3 
In the second campaign from May 1942, the Chin-Chi-Lu-YU .Border 
Kegion found tf-:at the tna1.n t:a1·9et o:Jf the Ja.pan~:se pacification campaign 
was the natural v1ll.age, while the loc·al guerrilla headquarters and 
Ibid., p, 99, 
2 
For the process of the campaign in the SKN Border Region, see 
Selden, op.cit., pp.212-216. 
J 
CFJP, 20 & 21 May. 4 J1Jne .;ind 9 July 1942, and "T'ai.hang ch'u san-
tzu chien-cheng tsung-ch1 <?h" 'Synops 1s of the Three 'Simpler Administra-
t1on' r.ampaigns in i:he T'a1hang Regicm', CF·.JP, 7 May 1944. 
-·----·-··· ------· 
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~<lwinistratian were concent~ated at t11e h5iang l0vel 
bi·o}~e out, therefore, natl1ral vil1age.s larked lead12rs, while the hsiang 
easily lost thl?ir supportLng natural •1il lases and became isolated. This 
was not only a problem of warfa~" but also of administration. Since 
all the cadres, military 3nd admin~strative, were i~oncentrated at the 
::siang level, they became u;rnote from the residents undec their admin-
istration: meec1ngs of th•2 natural village residents 1·1ere rarely 
convened; the problems and d1fficult1es tn natural villages could not 
oe identified and solved quickly. During the s~c'.Jnd c-ampai.gn, the 
hsiany government was simplified to an administrative council of several 
!'eople, and was spread into natural. v1 llages which consisted of about 
JOO ho•Jseholds. 
This ill us tr ates the problem of bureaucratisation during the first 
four y1?ars of the war. As with the traditional Chinese administration, 
so also had the Communists taken the hs.iang as the basic unit of admin-
istration, to the relative neglect of the natural villages. The result 
was that the natural villages were vulnerable to the .Japanese mopping-
up campaigns, partJ.cnlarly since the Japanese attacked natural villages 
h'ith the purpose of completely eliminating the villages themselves. 
i1lthough the ch.:eh-.fang jib-pao d'.:>es n0t admit tho. fact, it may be 
assumed tbat the Communists failed 1n rnany cases to mobil1s-== t11e masses 
in natural i1illages in tl1e face of t11~ Japanese attacks. Effective 
penetration 0f the Communist adm1nistrat1on int'.:> the natural village 
was not really achieved until 1941. Decentral1satton of the village 
administration from the hsiang to the natural 1•1llage in the process of 
the sinpler administration campaign helped the CCP to consolidate its 
administrative posit.ion at t.hE' bottom of S'.:>~iety, and to bring itself 
closer to the villagers. 
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rhe third campaign begar. tn Janua?Cy 1943, and it emphasised unifica-
tion of leadership and strengthening the d1str1ct and village a&ninistra-
tion; it corresponded to tl1e final stage of the rectification campaign 
1 
'"hich concentrated on unification of J."adership in the Party. Many 
officials at higher levels were transferred to lower levels again; 
iiigher level administration continued to function by the combination of 
departments with similar functions, and c~ncentrat.!..~n on 'primary work' 
to the relative neglect of work of secondary importance. By these 
measures the Chin-Chi-Lu-YU Border Region reduced administrative 
personnel by a total of 51 percent of its personnel. For example, in 
the course of the three campaigns, the Border Region Government was 
2 
reduced from the original 548 to 100. In Central Shantung, 2,282, 
d . 3 or one-third of the personnel were transferre outside the government. 
However, the total by which the number of cadres at all levels was 
reduced in the simpler administration campaign should not be over-
estimated. As Mark Selden points out in the case of SKK, 4 although 
the number of cadres at the border region level was reduced drastically, 
it is possible thac the overall total of administrative personnel was 
not reduced significantly. But there can be no doubt that the top-
ilt'21VY system of administration was rectified, and lower level adminis-
tration was strcengthened by the addition of more and better qualified 
cadres. 
Together with the hsia-hsiang campaign among the cadres of 
lntellectual origin, which was part of the t"ectification movement, the 
------1 
2 
3 
4 
See the preceding chapter, Section 2, on the ~arty. 
,, T' aihang ch 1 ti san-tzu chien-cl1eng tsung-ch1el1 
Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu, op.cit., p.10. 
Cf. Selden, op.cit., pp.215-216 . 
.. 
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do\VnWa:rcJ transfer Of higl1er level Cad res from an elite ba~·kg!..·ound 1 \VaS 
an exp.:cess1.on of ~1ao 1 s am\:>i t ion 'to ,... lc-s·--:· tb•:-: e:in11nous gap between the 
educated elite and the illiterate masses, a gap which had helped to 
secure elite rule in ~he old Chinese sosiety. In order to build a new 
egalitarian society, gap had to be eliminated, not so much by the 
efforts of the massc·s but Ly the transformation ·~f the old value system 
helcl by c.he elite class This was not simply an ideal but a revolutio1>-
aij necessity; Mao believed that the revolution would not survive 
unless old ways of thinking wece swept away, b"'c3use 'men tend to 
build the objective world in imitation of tlwir subjective world.' 
The CCP expected cadres who were transferred to lower levels to 
bring to the village both new ideas and methods and administrative 
skills and efficiency. Conflict, or tension, between outside cadres 
and native cadres seems to have been widespread, since Mao had to make 
clear that outside cadres had to bear responsibil.ity if poor relations 
, 1 a 1 aeve ope . 
The simpler administration campaign s2cved the CCP's purposes 
in many ways. Economically, to a certain extent., it lightened the 
financial burden on the government and re1'2ased more manpower for 
production. Politically, it helped change conventional ideas of 
administration and government, it strengthened lower level administration 
by providing i.t with more educated manpower; and it fed into the 
production organisatiori.s better-t..ra1nea manpowP..r f.or '.)rganisat1on and 
mandyement, which was especially necessary in the al 1.-out production 
drive from 1943. Finally, as suggested above, the campaign was of 
criticiil importance in bringing the government adm1nistrat1on close to 
1 
"Rectify the Party's Style of Work," l February 1941. Mao, III. p. 
45. For the best discussion on the hs1a-hsaing (to-the-village) 
campaign, Selden, op.rit .. , pp.224-229. 
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·-·il 1 age. 
From 194.~. t:he s1mp1-:·r actm1n~s~ra.r::.0n campa!.gn b~~am'= s11bmerged in 
the 'production and se 1 f-suffi·:; !..en~·y' m0·.'e1ne~1t:-., :..n t•.1hi.-::h the -=mp11asis 
was no longer on adm1n1s1:l':·a1-_:..·.'e str2.::i.ml:..ning. Although it: had been 
torced by ec.·onoff11~: r:1r::u::.1~-::.t.-::\:es to ;.ntre>duce s.Lmple~r admin1strat1on, 
oh~ CCI' obviously fc>'.rnd l:tns to be a new and useful. way of bringing 
~overnment ~a.ares r.~ l :'Jser to t.he- m'3.5SE?S, t.hr".)ugh manual J.ab011r and simple 
ott1(::e 1,vork, a process by wh1:~h b·•t:h ~adres and rhe mass'2;s to ident1fy 
1 
with each 0ther. 
Thi:. governme:'lt admin:.s~ration, then, w;..:;s desi.gned deliberately 
process- Th-2 CCP's object:l~lle \oJa.5 +:ypJ..f1ed by the electi:>n s~·stem and 
the election ca1npaign- Universal suffrage in ele~tions for all respons-
ible positions enabled the. Commun ts .. :; +:o :-laim l~g1timai:y for the1r 
') 
local governments." The masses ,cient1fied with the government by 
elec-r_i..ng ass'3rnbJ.y members and execur.ive personnel and also by open 
c::-tr:t::-1sm of local. g'.);,1ernme:-it \Vor.-k in the ::-:;urs2 of the election 
The three-thads po1-1c:-y was another dev1c-'" by wh,_;::h the CCP 
It both made use of 
•he influence and sk:lls of ~he pr1viledged class. and help~d to win 
1 
'1·ransfer of the ~adres from the bo=der reg10:1 level, wh~re those of 
~c.nl:.ellecr:ual ori.g·i.n \<Ve.re ('On·"".'"el"),trat<::>d, +-o the J.0v1er- level was expl0itef1 
by the CCP expl 2 c '- t l y for the reform of the cadres' thought. See, 
for example, CF·JP, 16 May 1941, en wh1c-h t:hs s1mp1.er adm1n1stration 
C"ampa:!.gn was regarded as pa:t :if t:hs rec+.: l f1cat1on. 
The CCP claimed to the Central G·J~rernm-=nt af1:er the war that the 
l~·g1t1macy of i~s local governments der!'TSd fr0m ~he fact that they 
\·:c re elected by the people. See Mao, IV, pp, 61-6 3 -
--~. 
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this cl~ss o~er to the s1d2 of the CCP. It also had been an important 
effect on thought reform of Pa.rt~i lT',(·"'m1)t-;rs. The 1 si1npler administration' 
campaign dec8ntra l ised adrn1n1stra ti on dot-Jnward to the na tura. l village, 
trained the cadres from elite backgronnds, provided the lower level 
administration with educated cadres, and brought ;:,bout a revolutionary 
transformation of the government administration, involving denunciation 
Ji bureaucratism and privilege. 
'l'hP. ultimate intention of the CCP in all aspects of government 
administration was mass mobilisation and participation in the political 
process. Although one cannot say that every objective of the CCP was 
ct:bieved, the Party did succeed in transforming the system of political 
power in the course of the campaigns described above, and in the process 
established the basis of a J.ong-lasting revolutionary power. Even 
thongh the role of the government administration in policy-making was 
not as important as it is in western political systems, the administra-
tion was still of considerable significance because of its indispensable 
function in policy-implementation, mass mobilisation, and communication 
between the vanguard organisations and other ·:i.rga nisat ion and the people. 
2. Th-= .Jt1dic1a.l System 
\;hat made the Communist judicial system in the Yenan period a means 
of mass mob1 lisation werf~ its educational anc1 pr•.Jpaganda cha.rJ1.;ter is tics. 
It was qnite distinct from other judicial systems, both Chinese and 
foreign. Being free, simple and informal, the system was open to the 
masses, who in traditional China had be-=n alienated from the judicial 
system, and an essential. instrument for mass political mobilisation. 
:t is also distinguished by its lack of independence from the executive 
or from the tasks oi education and propagation on laws and policies of 
·---- - ~·· 
1 :~lie Par-ty and the government. In othc:c ,·,'Ords, de:spite nomina.. l indep-
Gndcnce from the executive under Lilo;: Y!,i"1, jod.icial systerri, the judiciaJ 
department of the Communist government in the Yenan period was designed 
to serve the purpose of mass mobilisation as an integral part of the 
administration. 
in the ee.rly Yenan F<:'riod, the CCP made greater efforts to follow 
2 judici<il system, at least formally, than it did subsequently. 
Tiois is clear from a comparison of the Regulutions on Organisation of 
the Higher Court of the SKN Border Region (Shen-Kan-Ning pi en-ch' li kao-
teny fa-yuan tsu-chih t'iao-li) adopted in 1939 with the Regulations on 
Organisation of the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Borde.: Region Government (Chin-Chi-
Lu-Yli pi en-ch' li cheng-fu tsu-ch1h t 'iao-1 i I of 1941. The former 
stipulated that the higher court was under the Jurisdiction of the 
Central Government <.Article 2) and that the higher court executed its 
judicial competence independently (Article 3), while the latter 
stipulated only that the higher court was under the Border Region 
3 government's leadecship (Article 20J. The Chin-Chi-Lu-YU Border 
Although in the Yenan period the CCP avoided to argue against 
'independence of the judicial department', it believed apparently 
thal: the judicial work should be part of administration and sho•ild 
serve t..:.i advance the revolution. See K'ang Shu-hua, 11 'Ssu-fa tu-li' 
ti fan-tung P'~n-·c:hih" (The Reactionary Nature of '1ndependence of 
,Justice'), Cheng-fa y;;n-chiu, 1958, No. 2, pp.49-55. 
2 
Throughout the Yenan period, the CCP continued to name its decrees 
'regulations' !t'iao-li) instead of 'laws' tfa,1 implying that they were 
local regulations included in the KMT· legal system. 
3 
The Chin-Ch' a-Chi B:irder Region enforced the Regulations on Organ-
isation of Courts in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region (Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
pi en-ch' ii fa-yilan tsu-r::hih t 'iao-li.1 in 1943. It stipulated that 
the higher court was under the control of the Central Supreme Court, 
i::ut had no clause about independence of the judiciary. Fukushima 
c'iasao, "Shin Chugoku no .:;h1h6-se1do to sono 1okushoku ( 1 I" (The 
Judicial system of lfow China and Its Character 11) I , Toyo Bunka, 
l';o.13 (November 1953), pp.19-20. 
· ... 
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:\:.::s: 10n '.5.:i.c.1 !10t even b".J th er to enforce .separate or:-ganisa t ional regulations 
1 for its judicial system. 
The hsien was supposed to set t1p a local court <ti-tang fa-yiian) 
which 1·1as to be independent and dire-::tly under the higher court. But 
in practice most hs.an ran judicial affairs through the justice bureau 
(ssu-fa chtil of the execut-i·ve department and did not establish indepen-
'2 Jc;:-: local courts. Eve11 1.-.1here a lacal court \11as set up, the 
"'"gistrate was concurrently the head of the local court, while at higher 
levels the court president was elected by and responsible to the border 
region assembly. Ma Hsi-wu, 3 who served as head of the branch higher 
court of the Lung-tung Subregion in SKN, has written of his own 
2xperiences, and these provide some insight into the CCP's JUdicial 
4 
system Ma's article confirms the CCP's intention to make use of 
judicial cases for mass education and mobilisation. He writes that 
the judicial organs at all levs.ls formed part of the government at the 
corresponding levels, and carried out thetr work under the unified 
5 leadership of the government. 
Infot-n1ul i ty and tbe educational funct1orl ·.vere the two basic features 
of the ,,dm1nistration of JUSt1c-e. No formal proc:edure was required to 
t::tng a suit, nor was any cost charge made. Anybody could bring a case 
to court:, either his O\V"n, :>L that of a family membr:;r, r-elative or 
friend. 'I'he case could be presented in oral or in wrt tten for.m. If 
requested, the clerk of the court had to do clerical. work for the 
iitigants, free of charge. This represented a most significant advance 
1 
For the SKN Regulations, see Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ii ts'an-i-hui 
<1en-il.'He11 hui-chi, pp. 61-65, and for the Chin-Chi-Lu-YU Regulations, 
se•2 Fa-ling hui-pien, cited above, pp. lG-19. 
2 
Ma Hsi-wu, "Hsi n mi n-chu chu-i k e-mi ng chieh-tuan chung Shen-Kan-
:;ing pien-ch'li ti jen-min ssu-fa kung-tso" l_The People's Judicial in 
tile SKN Border Region in the Stage of the New Democratic Revolution), 
~·1ir::ng-fa ye11-chiu, No. l, 1955, p.8. 
c·ia Hsi-wu was a native ofChih-tanlls.!en in north Shensi, from a poor 
. .. : 
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5 ; 11ce 80 pe!:cent of the population was illiterate, and in the history 
of Chinese justice procedural formalities and costs had usually been 
f;;r beyond the edur:ational and economic means of most: people. Informal-
1ty was applied to the trial itself, which was carried out in th<" form 
of discussion an;ong the litigants and the judge, without legal trappings. 1 
rnformal and free JUSt1c•o was designed to 'serve the people', which 
rne<ent to in•;olve th0 people in the Communist judicial and government 
';vstem. The CCP was interested in much more than simpLified court 
procedures. A typical method of adjudication for mass education purposes 
· .. ;as the public or mass trial lkung-shen). 
:·lass Trials 
Mass trials often took place during the Land Reform after 1949 
in China and included vigorous action by those present against the 
defendants, the land) ords. In the Yenan period, however, when the CCP 
restricted the scope of the class struggle, mass trials do not seem to 
ha·,·e been held primar Uy for furthering the class struggle. As Ma Hsi-
wu states, for a mass trial the courc carefully chose a case which might 
be useful for propagation of the government's policies and decrees, and 
also for pol it ica 1 tra 1 ning of the masses. 2 
~~ootnote 3 cant 1 d 
family, and an old revolutionary of the Shensi Soviet. He became the 
first jurist hero in 1943 when he was in charge of the branch h.tgher 
coi.;rt of Lung-tung Subregion in SKN, because of his fauc judgment based 
on lus at.ti tude of 'seeking truth from facts' . 
4 Ma Hsi-wu, op.cit. 
5 
Ma, op.cit., p.8. 
1 
Shu Yen, ''Pien-ch'll shih-lu'' 
To·a Kenkyujo, op.cit., p.181. 
2 
IA True Account on the Border Region), 
Ibid. , p 18 2; Ma Hs i-wu, op.cit. , p. 12. Ma writes that there were 
three kinds of mass trial, mass meetings (ch'i.in-chung kung-shen hui), 
judgment meetings (shen-p'an ta-htli) and representative meet1n;rs, 
(tai-p'iao kung-shen hui), but he does not explain the difference bet-
w~~n th err,. 
,,, 
,i 
,I ,, 
I 
• 
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Mass trl.als, th-=1~efo::-t~. <J1d n')t ~ncan tr.La.ls by the nlJ.sses b·1t 
ti:ials in front of the masses, ai1 i..mp•_;i.:_.tant and often overlooked dis-
tinction. Shu Yen ':ji,1es ~ br 1ef des·::~. t.:;>ti:in of the process of mass 
uials. The preparatory st,ige was as impori:ant as trial itself. It 
began \\1ith a close investtgation {)f the case by the prosecutor's office 
an(1 carried out a preliml.naY.y examination. Then, the court asked tl1e 
:nass organisatio11 c.-Jncerned 1.111th th~ case to send their representatives 
to the mass trial as jurors, and mean\..;h1le the court appointed the 
judge for the trial. These Jurors held a preliminary meeting with the 
:iudge •.-;1-,:o explained the known facts of the case. Participants were 
the judge, the jurors, the prosecutor, pres>? men and representatives 
of th~ mass organi.sat1on. Ind1viduals co•1ld also attend. The clerk 
read the brief and the prosecut'.)r stated the reasons for the litigation. 
'!'he judge questioned 1-he defendants directly, and the representatives 
of the mass organisations also gave their opinions based on prior 
presentation. Then the final statement was given by the defendants. 
The judge and rh•= jurors 1-eft the c•;urt and dis:cussed the decision. 
Voting was held by the Judge and the juro1·s, and the judge delivered 
t ' d. 1 ·ne ver ict. 
Mass tcials ~ . ..,ere employed both in cr1rni.nai and riv1l cases at the 
levels b'J:-l·, of thi: h1gher and o:C the lo,-:-a1. courts. 'I'he two ex.an1rJles 
shown to the foreign Journalists who visited the SKN Border Region in 
1944 were a d1spu~e between a father and h1s daughter 0'1er her marriage 2 
1 
Shu Yen's article based on his 
op.cit., p.183. Shu Yen observed 
Region, presumably in early 1941. 
eyewitness account, Toa Kenkyujo, 
a mass trial in the SKN Border 
All mass trials in the Yenan period 
were not, of course, in conformity with this form. 
2 
This was introduced in detail in the Ch1eh-fang j1h-pao, as one of 
two typical cases of the way in which Ma Hsi-wu conducted trials, 
praised as the highest examplP '.'Jf C·-Jrnmunist. justice~ "Ma Hsi-wu t'ung-
ch1h ti shen-p'an fang--sh1h" •.Comrade Ma flsi-wu's Method of Trials), 
CFJI', 13 March 1944. T'11s c2se wa;, related to the western press men 
in 1944 and was introduced outside: the Border Region. Harrison Forman, 
op.cit., pp.102-103 
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~!!U a c:ase of 3 •.11it~'h doctor r....;hc. killed her pati.ent by 'superstitious• 
t~:ea tmen t: . •rhe former was c0ndurtecl by Ma Hs1-\.,."U on behalf of one 
of the t~·10 bran•:hes of the SKN h1g1-1er c.~:i1Jrt, wh1le the latter 1,.;as 
conducted by the loca 1 court . AcC"cr-d:ng to ShlJ '!en, in the first one 
and a half years of the existence of the higher court of the SKN Border 
:-zegion, three mass trials WE.""!:c: l1eld by the higher court; one v1as of a 
'"'tional traitor, anoth•n- was of a soldier who sold the troops' 
'C'.fl~s, and the third was of a couple who tri.ed to commit double 
. • 2 
su1c10.e. 
From these examples, one can see which aspects the CCP sought to 
~mphas1 se 1 n its use of mass tr i.a ls to educate tl1e masses. It could 
have been the case, as Leng Shao-chuan has suggested, that anti-traitor 
c2mpaigns by mass trial wel'.'e particularly common in the al'.'eas contested 
iJetween the Cornmunists and the Japanese, although no evidence is 
3 
ava1L1ble. Propagation of the new marriage law was one of the promin-
ent Con1munist policies in this period. Shu Yen reports that the double 
su1c1de case •~·aused a sensation among t.be young people in the Border 
. 4 R~q.i.on, whereas the other two cases did not: cause so much exc l tement. 
lt seems that the CCP was part1cular.ly bent on full implementation of 
c.he new marriage Law, a.nd that it gave a special educational value to 
marriage ca.>es. The new marriage law was designed to liberate the 
oppressed in the old fam1 ly system. to break their. vertical ties with 
society, and ro attract them to a r1ew society. 
i 
2 
Stein, op.cit., pp.283-285. 
Toa Kenkyujo. op.cit., p.184. 
Leng Shao-chuan, op.cit., p.106. His statement here about the role 
cf mass trials in anti-counter.rav..:ilutionar-y campaigns is, I think, too 
S\·leeping. He writ\,s: "There is no question that mass trials p.layed 
a major role in campaigns against counter-revolutionaries and frequently 
cesulted in on-the-spot. execution." This is cor.rect for· the Civil War 
period but not in the Yenan period. 
TOa KenkyUJo, op.cit-, p.184-
---- - -
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Elimination of superstition was another policy emphasised by the 
cc:P. For such cases as those concerning marriage and superstition, 
mass trials were effective in making entirely new social concepts 
acceptable to the masses. In those cases which were deeply concerned 
with customs and habits of daily life, concrete examples illustrated 
by mass trials were more persuasive to the ignorant peasants than 
l 
simple presentation of policies or enforcement of laws. From the 
viewpoint of the government, it could thus bring itself physically closer 
to the masses, and by directly interfering with disputes or criminal 
cases which had previously been thought unimportant, it could obtain 
their participation in the political process. As the government came 
closer to the people, the people could also identify themselves with the 
government through their participation in this process. 
Three prominent features of the 'Ma Hsi-wu method', pointed out 
by the Chieh-fang jih-pao, were 1) proper and detailed investigation 
on the sept, 2) adherence to principles, resolutely implementing govern-
ment decrees as well as respecting customs and habits of the masses and 
protecting their interests, and 3) simple and informal procedures and 
trials. 2 For the purpose of the first and third points, on-the-spot 
trials and circuit trials were employed by the higher court and its 
branches, particularly for complicated cases of longstanding. In 
practice, many mass trials also took place as on-the-spot or circuit 
trials. The purpose of these was concentrated on one point, "to bring 
the courts into direct contact with the masses, gather firsthand infer-
mat1on and evidence, settle the disputes with the aid of the local 
l The above mentioned article in the Chieh-fang-ji-pao stressed this 
point, of giving proper examples for political education of the masses 
and also of the court staff. "Ma Hsi-wu t'ung-chih ti shen-p'an fang-
shih •II 
2 Ibid. 
. -~·-- .I 
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people and educate the masses through participation in trial proceed-
Informality was fully applied to the conduct of his circuit courts 
by Ma Hsi-wu. He himself was the court; the people could ask him 
anywhere and at any time to bring suits for them. The most famous 
marriage case dealt with by Ma \;as brought to court after a girl had 
told Ma her story when she came across him in the street. 2 Informality 
was the keynote of another remarkable method of judicial work in the 
Yenan period, conciliation for civil and minor criminal cases. 
Conciliation 
From 1943 onwards, the CCP became increasingly intent on solving 
dispuces by conciliation rather than by lawsuits. One possible reason 
was a shortage of judicial personnel partly because of the war and also 
because of the simpler administration campaign. 3 Another reason was 
probably that the Communists had found more opportunities to educate 
the masses through conciliation than through lawsuits, both in the 
number of people contacted or affected and in the degree of thoroughness 
with which the educative process was carried out. The official reasons 
were to promote solidarity among the people, to make production more 
convenient, to educate the people to love the country and respect the 
law, and to reduce the number of lawsuits. 4 
In 1943 the SKN Border Region governmerd: issued a directive to 
promote conciliation, and the higher court also issued a detailed 
1 
2 
3 
Lei Shao-chuan, op.cit., p.107. 
"Ma Hsi-wu t'ung-chih ti shen-p'an fang-shih." 
Ma Hsi-wu admits that the CCP suffered from, a shortage of qualified 
staff for judicial work, even though it tried hard to train them. 
Na, op.cit., p.8. 
4 Ibid., p.13. 
.. · 
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directive on methods of conciliation. 1 The proportion of the cases 
2 
settled by conciliation increased remarkably from 1943: 
Year Civil Cases Minor criminal cases 
1942 18 (percent) 0.4 (percent) 
1943 40 5.6 
1944 48 12 
Almost all cases which provided models for judicial work carried by 
chieh-fang jih-pao after 1944 were cases settled by conciliation, 
including another case of Ma Hsi-wu involving a land dispute. 
This land dispute case is interesting and is worth recounting 
the 
briefly. It gives a very clear idea of what the CCP regarded as a good 
example of conciliation, especially where it concerned land disputes, 
which occupied a considerable proportion of the conciliation cases. 3 
In this case, Ma first sent a judge to investigate the case in the 
village, after which he himself went to the village and called a meeting 
of several villagers including four 'respectable' gentry and village 
elders, at which he asked for opinions about the dispute. This meeting 
lasted two days. On the next day Ma went along with about twenty 
villagers and village cadres for an on-the-spot investigation with the 
village cadres and once again ascertained the villagers' opinions. 
Finally, a group consisting of village activists and cadres under a 
judge and the district chief proceeded to the actual process of concilia-
tion between the parties, and persuaded both to accept a compromise 
4 
settlement. 
The points appreciated by the CCP in Ma's settlement of the above 
case were a careful investigation of the facts, the solicitation of 
1 
2 
3 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Land and marriage disputes accounted for over 60 percent of all 
civil cases, and they seem usually to have been settled by conciliation. 
See ibid. , p. 8. 
4 
"Ma rlsi-wu t'ung-chih ti shen-p'an fang-shih." 
·. __ _,,_., 
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opinions from the 'respectable' and 'reliable' people in the village 
and also from other villagers, and conciliation by local activists; thus, 
the conciliation could be acceptable to both parties and to other 
villagers. The principles were the same in the conciliation of criminal 
cases. Given below is a criminal case settled by Ao Hai-ch'ing, a judge 
ofChih-tan Hsien, in the SKN Border Region, who became a model judicial 
worker. Yuan stole 3. 6 tou of grain belonging to Wang, at a time when 
everybody was starving in the season just before the harvest in 1939. 
Wang brought a suit against Yuan. The district government summonsed 
Yuan, but he denied being guilty of the crime. Ao Hai-ch'ing went to 
see Yuan at his home, and saw the nearly starving situation of the 
family. He summonsed both parties and tried to persuade Yuan to admit 
to the crime, and Wang to withdraw the suit. Yuan would not accept this. 
Ao said to Wang, "It is not right just to leave grain in this starving 
season, not to give it to others to eat. Why didn't you lend it to 
others to eat? Everybody is nearly ill from starvation." When he 
heard this, Yuan suddenly admitted that he was the one who had stolen 
the grain, and told Ao that nearly 3 tou of grain was still left in his 
house although his family had eaten a part of it. 1 
It is unlikely that Yuan was given any punishment by the court, 
though the Chieh-fang jih-pao does not mention what happened. It was 
more a question of teacher and students discussing what was the right 
thing to do, rather than judge and litigants trying to discuss what was 
an enlawful act. An educational purpose was applied to the plaintiff 
and also all witnesses and informants, as was the case in Ma's concilia-
tion of the land dispute. As seen in Ma's conciliation case, social 
pressure was mad,~ use of for acceptance of the conciliation. The court 
Cl'JP, 23 April 1944. 
... ' 
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tried to ascertain villagers' opinions on the dispute to find out what 
they thought reasonable for settlement. If the great majority agreed 
on a reasonable settlement, it was usually taken by the court, and the 
parties had to accept it. The villagers, thus acquired a feeling of 
participation in the government decision-making and identity with the 
communist government. 
Mass trials could involve more people as participants, but concilia-
tion could involve people more deeply in the decision-making process. 
Both methods were designed to educate and mobilise the people, as was 
the whole Communist judicial system. Apart from the security work of 
exposing traitors, which was mainly carried out by the militia and lower 
level of government, the whole judicial department worked for educational 
purposes. For example, the prisoners were taught characters, and had 
evening meetings every day for indoctrination, besides manual labour. 
They were fed the same food as the court staff, and any behaviour 
insulting to them was strictly prohibited. 1 As Gunther Stein writes, 
the "conviction that man is not born evil and that most wrongdoers can 
be improved by proper social education apparently determines the judicial 
2 policies in Yenan. '' 
It was more practical for the CCP to educate and 'win over' the 
criminals than to punish them, when it suffered from shortage of man-
power. This was not, however, a matter of economic necessity, but a 
matter of the r.1ost fundar.<ental politic al. philosophy of the Party; that 
is, as discussed above, "to change the objective world, and at the same 
time, their (the proletariat and the revolutionary people) own subjective 
1 Shu Yen's report, Toa Kenkyujo, op.cit., p.82. 
poor building and conditions of facilities of the 
2 Stein, op.cit., p.227. 
Shu points out the 
jail. 
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world. ,,l Mass trials and conciliations were designed to give the people 
opportunities to transform their inside and outside worlds, as were all 
other mass movements. The mass organisations were the keynote which 
provided the contact point for the CCP to mobilise the masses for its 
policy and strategy for socioeconomic transformation . 
. . 
3. The Mass Organisations 
The organisation of the masses by the CCP represented a radical 
change from the traditional Chinese view of the pos~tion of the masses, 
who had been passive objects of political change throughout Chinese 
history, except for short chaotic periods of peasant uprisings. As 
Richard Solomon has observed, lateral communication and ties had rarely 
been established in traditional Chinese society, while hierarchical 
communication based on uncritical obedience by the 'inferior' to the 
2 
'superior' had dominated the social system. The gap between the 
literate elite and the illiterate masses had divided society into two 
isolated worlds. Within each world, vertical obedience had dictated 
human relations, and to express one's own opinion in front of superiors 
or even among peers had been an almost unforgivable sin. Solomon 
explains the silence of the inferiors in front of the superiors by 
filial piety, and among the peers by the desire to avoid conflict of 
opinions. This had, howi=ver, an economic background, in that all 
inferiors ne.;ded the superiors' protection and help to obtain their 
livelihood. 
The advantage to the CCP when it came to mobilise the peasants 
was that most of those who lived in the traditional hierarchical society 
1 
'On Practice,• Mao, I, p.306. 
2 Richard H. Solomon, "Communication Patterns and the Chinese Revolution;" 
China Quarterly, No.32, pp.88-101. 
' . 
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were dissatisfied; but the fear of losing their livelihood was a major 
pillar of the established social order. Once they knew that the CCP had 
the power to provide them with a livelihood, they were ready to speak 
out and support the Communists. 1 This is of tremendous importance. The 
CCP brought a message of different prospect of the future to those who 
had been humiliated in the old social order. The weakened authority 
of the establishment as a result of the war also worked to the advantage 
of the CCP. 
The organisation of the masses into mass organisations, that is, 
'national salvation associations' (chiu-kuo-hui), involved cutting the 
traditional vertical ties between association members and the old 
authorities, and establishing new horizontal ties between members and 
new vertical ties with the new Communist authorities. The name 
'national salvation association' was taken from those which had long 
been organised by urban intelligentsia before 1937. However, the mass 
'national. salvation associations' organised by the Communists were 
quite different in nature and function from those older ones whose 
purpose was to fight directly against the Japanese economic and military 
invasion, but had little interest in their members' welfare. On the 
oti1er hand, the Communist-organised mass chiu-kuo-hui were firstly and 
directly concerned with their members' welfare, or livelihood, and their 
indirect and ultimate purpose was 'national salvation'. They were 
l An old village cadre in north Shensi told Jan Myrdal about the peasants' 
basic psychology in 1935 when the CCP first redistributed land in his 
village: "Most families were happy to have been given land, but some 
of them were worried. They did not believe that we could keep power 
.... But, then, gradually they became calmer, as they saw that the power 
of the landlords was beginning to be broken .... Those years, life was 
better than it had been before. Now, after this land reform, I was 
mo~e politically-minded than I had been, and in August 1935, I joined 
the party." Hyrdal, op.cit., pp.122-123 . 
.... 
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organised more like the peasant associations and the trade unions in 
the Kiangsi period. They were in fact the legitimate successors of those 
mass organisations in the Soviet period. 1 
The Party provided the young and the poor, the oppressed majority 
'lf the rural Chinese population, with a patriotic cause and an organ-
isational unity. No~ did the CCP overlook the place of women, who made 
up half of the Chinese population but who had remained in the household 
for hundreds of years and had not been mobilised for work outside. 2 As 
the war removed young labour power from the fields, the CCP had to 
mobilise women for production, and also for primitive textile industry, 
being cutt off from textile supply from the cities. This in turn 
strengthened their status within the family. Organisation further 
promoted women's productive capacity and reinforced their improved 
. . t 3 status in socie y. 
The significance of the mass organisation lay in their class 
nature; the fact that, unlike the urban intelligentsia's chiu-kuo-hui, 
the rural mass chiu-kuo-hui could not work without first consideration 
on their members' living situation. Thus, the mass organisations 
became inevitably an expression of the class struggle, which was 
directed at social transformation at the basic level. Organisation 
and mobilisation of the masses had to go through transformation of 
1 As the fact that the peasant association and other mass organisations 
were transformed into the peasants 'national salvation' association and 
other chiu-kuo··hui indicates, 'national salvation' does not mean those 
associations were organised primarily for nationalism, but rather in-
dicates the CCP's formal attachment to the KMT-CCP agreement for 
collaboration against Japan. 
2 In contrast to South China, where women had widely engaged in 
agricultural worl:, in North China women with bound feet had not usually 
worked in the fields. 
3 Jack Belden gives a remarkable example of the emancipation of women 
with help of the women's association just after the war. See op.cit., 
PP 275-311. 
.· .. 
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p~oduction and human relations and class structure, being bound by the 
severe socioeconomic conditions in which the rural population had lived. 1 
The CCP, carrying the revolutionary mission, was helped by the mass 
organisations in its ambition of mass mobilisation for war and revolution. 
These two organisations, the Party and the mass organisations were iden-
tical in their ultimate goal, transformation of the old social system, 
and were in interdependent relations in their function. 
In the first phase of the war, popular anti-Japanese organisations, 
which had been organised locally since the loss of Manchuria in 1931, 
were used by the Communists to set up political power in the areas 
h l . 2 behind t e Japanese ines. · By recruiting into the Party leading 
members of these mass organisations, the CCP gradua.lly established Party 
3 leadership within them. In addition, the CCP, or the army, also created 
new anti-Japanese associations, both as a device for establishing local 
political power, and as a means by which the whole population might be 
absorbed into. mass organisations. 4 
Through the mass organisations the Party was able to bring its 
1 See Chapter II, Section 1. 
2 A typical case is the Shansi Scarifice League of Yen Hsi-shan, 
described in detail by Chalmers Johnson, op.cit., pp.97-106. CCP 
sources report the existence of local anti-Japanese organisation in 
North China organised by non-Communist local leaders. George Taylor 
lists eighteen anti-Japanese organisations, armed and non-armed, which 
sent representatives to the Provisional Assembly of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
Border Region in January 1938. Taylor, op.cit., p.35. 
3 The Party organisation within the mass organisation was under the 
local Party branch. In practice, all local Party members joined the 
organisations, and assumed leadership as the most active elements. 
mass 
4 As typified in the case of the Sacrifice League, local non-Communist 
anti-Japanese organisations normally consisted of young literate people 
and excluded the masses. This occurred because of the desperately wide 
gap between the intelligentsia and the masses, and also because of 
indifference of the masses on the fate of the nation. 
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policies right down to the masses. The peasants association, for 
example, was given power to carry out rent reduction, whiJ.e the women's 
association was enlisted in implementation of the new marriage law. 
The youth association played an important role in organising militia 
dnd local guerrilla corps and production work teams. The militia corps 
took the place of local police and protected the achievements of social 
reforms such as rent reduction and the new marriage law against the 
destructive activities of spies and traitors. 
Literacy Schools: The Primary Task of the Mass organisations 
The primary task of the mass organisations, however, was 'education 
and lifting up'; that is, raising literacy and political levels among 
1 the members. An important task of the mass organisations, therefore, 
was to establish and maintain what were known as 'winter schools' 
during winter slack season which lasted about three months. Although 
these were primarily literacy schools for the peasants, they also 
functioned as schools for political education and mobilisation. Through 
the winter school committees, which comprised representatives of the 
Party, local government, local troops and mass organisation, the schools 
were an institution for propagating the nationalist cause, the principle 
of the united front, and new policies and decrees of the Party and 
government. In many cases the school texts were the political programmes 
of the border region governments, new laws and decrees, or Party documents. 
In order to maximise the effectiveness of the schools, the characters 
1 This is stressed repeatedly in various articles in the Chieh-fang 
j1h-pao. For ex;i,mple, "Hua-pei ch'ing-yi.in tung-t'ai" (Trend of the 
Youth Movement in North China), 3 February 1942; "Ch'un-chung t'uan-
t' i tsen-yang kai-tsao" (How to Reform the Mass Organisations), 29 
June 1942. 
... l 
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taught were those most closely related to the peasants' life. Even in 
the busy seasons the winter school committees tried a variety of measures 
to maintain literacy and political standards until the next winter. 
An example of the operation of winter schools is that of northwest 
Shansi, which in the winter of 1942/43 took the newly adopted Political 
Programme, and the laws and regulations of the provisional assembly of 
the Region as the central curricula. The emphasis was on propaganda 
and education cencerning the following slogans: 
1. Carry out guerrilla warfare, join militia corps, support anti-
Japanese troops, carry out war service and give preferential 
treatment to the soldiers' families. 
2. Implement the three-thirds policy in political power, consider 
the interests of all classes equally, and reduce rent and 
interest. 
3. Pay grain tax, increase agricultural production and develop 
the spinnin~ and weaving industry, so as to improve people's 
livelihood. 
These slogans represented the whole of Communist policies, military, 
political and economic. The mass organisations were expected to 
propagate the Party policies among their members, the masses. 
The contribution of the winter schools to indoctrination and 
organisation was immeasurable. The K'ang-chan jih-pao (Resistance War 
Daily!, the organ of the CCP in northwest Shansi, reported a model case 
in v:hich almost all the villagers of one natural village were enrolled 
in the village winter school, the head of which was a village labour 
hero. The school organised its 'students' into five study groups which 
were also ·ccncurrently 'winter production' groups for charcoal-making, 
charcoal-carrying, cooperatives, spinning and weaving, and militia. This 
;1as due to the outstanding leadership of the head, who took re.sponsibili ty 
for all manag£•ment and clerical work of the school. All political and 
economic work in the village during the winter, which was the season 
CFJP, 7 January 1943 . 
. ~ ... 
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for mass mobilisation and struggle, such as tax-payment, militia 
training, and shoe-making for the army was carried out through the 
winter school, and successfully carried out, in which 'thought of the 
1 
masses was lifted up' through discussion and the struggle. 
This was appreciated by the CCP as an example of the 'unity of 
study and production'; the villagers received the policies, orders 
and directives from the government or mass organisations through the 
school and they discussed them while learning characters. The school 
became an effective instrument for indocrination, organisation and 
mobilisation of the villagers for production work. 2 
Other Tasks 
The next most important task assumed by the mass organisations 
was implementation of government policies, laws and regulations, A 
typical case was the rent reduction 'struggle' led by the peasants 
association. In the rent reduction struggle at Ma-tien-chen in the 
184 
winter of 1942/43, the peasants association started the struggle with 
a small discussion meeting about the rent reduction problem. This was 
followed by a similar meeting for women only, convened by the women's 
asso·:iation. The main struggle meeting for rent reduction was then 
called by the peasants association, which summoned the representatives 
of the village government and the troops stationed in the village to 
the meeting and asked them to express determination to support the 
peasants association's struggle for rent reduction. While the village 
administration and the troops expressed support, they did not in their 
official capacity have anything to do with the struggle itself. It was 
1 
Mu Ch' uan, "I-yU:eh-lai tiPao-teh tong-hslieh kung-tso" 
Work atPao-teh .'lsien in the Last One Month), K'ang-chan 
January 1945. 
2 
Another example is seen in CFJP, 20 December 1943. 
(Winter School 
jih-pao, 29 
18,5 
die peasants association that decided on the steps to be taken, and 
which led the tenant masses to the landlord's house and forced him to 
pay back rent which he had collected illegally. It was the peasants 
association cadres to whom the peasant masses came to inquire about the 
1 
struggle. 
In this case, the peasants association apparently shared power with 
the village government, and recognised by its members as the promoter 
of the struggle. Apparently, the women's association assumed power to 
protect its members' interests often with violent measures. 2 The CCP 
used the mass organisations to represent their members' class interests, 
and did not mind them applying even violent measures, particularly after 
1942, for the 'struggle', to cut the members' vertical ties with the 
old society, and made them identify with the new organisations. Thus, 
mass psychological breakthrough at the basic level was made possible, 
and the CCP attracted more people who were loyal to the new society. 
The third task of the mass organisations was to protect the inter-
ests of the masses, to help them solve their difficulties, and to speak 
for them and represent their opinions and demands. This task was im-
plemented in part through the process of the election, in which every 
mass organisation had its own candidates; but it was also a continuing 
process facilitated by the close relations between the mass organisations 
and the local government during the period between the elections. In 
special cases involving the young and women, the mass organisations 
often had to use their power to protect their members' interests against 
suppression within the family. 
1 
2 
Chou Erh-fu gives two examples in his report on the Chin-ch'a-Chi 
"Ma-tien-chen chien-tsu tou-cheng," CFJP, 14 December 1942. 
See, for example, Belden, op.cit., pp.275-311. 
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Border Region. In one of them the head of the Youths Association told 
a grandfather to stop punishing his grandson for disobedience by 
refusing him meals. The grandfather was told: "Your grandson is yours, 
and you are responsible for his education. But, at the same time, he 
ia a member of our association. You should not refuse to give him food. 
If he gets sick from hunger and cannot work, our country will sustain 
losses. This is not good." 1 
As a result of the third task of the mass organisation, protection 
of their members' interests, the traditional Chinese family or clan 
authority was replaced by a point of view which stressed nationalism 
and organisation. When lateral communication was established on the 
basis of identity of interests among the inferiors and downtroddens 
\·1i thin the traditional social system, the weak ties of vertical commun-
ication were weakened still further. 
Other tasks assumed by the mass organisations were consolidation 
of the multi-class united front, and mobilisation of the masses for 
war service, that is, organising members into teams for production, 
Wdshing, 2 tai-keng, stretcher bearing and so on. In theory, the CCP 
expected the mass organisations to play a supplementary role to the 
local government incarrying out policies which aimed at effective 
3 
mobilisation of the largest possible number of the masses. In practice, 
1 Chou, op.cit., pp.90-91. 
2 This was washing uniforms for the regular troops without payment. 
The regular army depended on non-military people in miscellaneous 
services such as washing uniforms, shoe-making, and when the troops 
were moving and fig·hting, preparing food and hot water, carrying the 
wounded to the rear and carrying ammunition. 
3 
"Ch' iin-chung t' uan-t' i tsen-yan kai-tsao," op.cit. , Nieh Fu "Cheng-
fu yii ts'an-i-hui ch'iin-chung t'uan-t'i ti kuan-hsi" (Relations between 
the Government and the Assembly and the Mass Organisations) , CFJP, 1 
July 1942. 
··:. ·. 
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however, the government was quite willing to share power with the mass 
organisations, particularly in cases of mass psychological transformation 
which was the basis of the CCP's social mobilisation. It happened, 
therefore, as a result, that the mass organisations were more powerful 
than the government. 
The CCP called the government an organisation of political power, 
but in practice, political power was shared by the government, the mass 
organisations and the Party. The Party, however, restricted itself from 
interfering in the process of policy implementation, although its 
leadership was maintained in political power through its members working 
in the government and the mass organisations. As policy-implementing 
institutions, the mass organisations enjoyed a more advantageous 
position than the governments, as they controlled the masses directly 
as their members, whereas the government's grip of the masses was 
indirect. Mass mobilisation for implementation of the CCP policies 
was, therefore, carried out almost invariably through the mass organisa-
t1ons. The government assumed the role of coordination between the 
policies carried out by various mass organisations by providing a place 
for discussion and communication between the mass organisations and 
between them and the Party. 
The'better troops and simpler administration' campaign extended 
also to the mass organisations, as did the rectification campaign. 
Despite successful recruitment of great majority of the masses into the 
mass organisations, the organisations were not sufficiently consolidated. 
In the campaign, the executive bodies of the mass organisations were 
reduced to half or less than half of their original size, 1 and there was 
1 
For example, 
by 65 percent. 
in the northwest Shansi region the staff was reduced 
CFJP, 19 November 1942. 
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serious criticism of 'formalism', in the form of forced participation 
in the organisations simply to give the appearance of a larger member-
ship. since most of the cadres were Party members of intellectual 
ocigin, the masses had difficulty in accepting them as their own, and 
tended to fear them as 'officia:s•. 1 The Communist mass organisations 
had weaknesses which are universal in mass organisations organised from 
above. Moreover, in China, due to poor communication between the govern-
ment and the people in the old society, the weakness was even more 
serious than in western societies. 
The rectification, which called on cadres to 'enter deeply into the 
masses', was necessary for the full implementation of the 'simpler 
administration' policy, because the movement gave them political train-
ing to free themselves from the arrogance of 'officials', which came 
from a long Chinese history of intellectual-official domination and 
also from the CCP's quick success in expanding its areas in 1937-1940. 
In turn, as the 'simple' executive body could not afford bureaucratic 
inefficiency, it was easier for cadres to realise the difficulties they 
faced in working for 'simple' administration. The 'better troops' 
campaign also affected the militia in the same way, through the reorgan-
isation and retraining campaign in 1942. Thus, in the campaigns of 
rectification and 'better troops and simpler administration' the govern-
ment and regular army intended that the mass organisations should assume 
more power, while at the same time, within the mass organisations, the 
leaders intended that members should take a mo~e active part in their 
work. 
1 
"Ch'iin-chung t'uan-t'i tsen-yang kai-tsao." For 'formalism' in 
making membership list longer, see Chapter II, p. 77. 
. . , ... 
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The Militia 
The militia, which was known variously as the self-defence corps 
and the peace preservation corps., and which included the anti-Japanese 
youth pioneer corps, was an armed mass organisation. It was armed 
usually with old and primitive weapons such as· swords, spears and 
obselete rifles, and was given tasks supplementary to those of the 
regular army and local guerrilla troops. It was composed of volunteers 
of both sexes between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, 1 and was 
divided into three groups according to the standard of armament. Included 
in the first groups were the skeleton self-defence corps and the youth 
pioneer corps, 2 which comprised the best armed, best trained and most 
able-bodied young men, and which often engaged· in campaigns by themselves 
or side by side with full-time guerrillas and regular troops. The 
second group was the ordinary self-defence corps or militia, which was 
armed with primitive weapons and was expected to help the guerrillas 
and regular troops in destroying the enemy's communication lines, making 
and carrying arms and ammunition, working for the intelligence services, 
checking enemy spies, bearing stretchers and other supplementary work, 
and was seldom involved in actual fighting. The third group was the 
peace preservation corps which worked primarily for policing within the 
locality. 3 The militia, although it had its own system of command, 
l The age varied from fifteen to nineteen at the lower limit, and 
from forty-five to fifty at the upper limit. 
2 In some of the base areas, only the skeleton corps was called 'militia' 
(min-ping) • For example, Fang Chi, "Ti-hou wu-chuang tou-cheng chung-yao 
ti i-huan - ming-r-ing' (An Important Part of the Armed Struggle behin·d 
the Enemy Lines - Militia), CFJP, 13 June 1942. 
3 The size of the sk~·leton corps was supposed to be from 25 to 35 
perr.ent of the loca1 population, while everybody qualified was expected 
to join the ordinary militia. In some areas behind the Japanese lines, 
it seems that social pressure was applied for recruitment of every 
healthy person into the militia. The tasks assumed by the militia are 
described in detail in Tada Corps, op.cit., pp.92-99. 
···--·-·-
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oelonged to the basic local government entity, the hsiang, 1 while the 
gnerrilla corps' basic unit was the hsien. 
•rhe militia was trained by regular troops stationed locally, or by 
2 
retired officers and men. At the end of the training period, there 
were large scale inspection and demonstration meetings, with contests 
in military techniques. The meetings elected and praised 'model militia 
corps' and 'militia heroes' for the preceding year, particularly after 
1942. 3 
Militia training by the regular army helped to bring it close to 
the masses, and the meetings held as a great occasion of the 
villages in winter worked for raising the villagers' concern with 
military work, arms, military techniques and the militia. The elections 
of militia heroes were designed to improve the military techniques of 
the militia, and also to find out and bring up basic leaders from among 
the masses, as was the labour hero election. In fact, the militia 
hero system was one of those hero systems in various fields which were 
extended from the labour hero system after the CCP realised its effect-
iveness in encouraging the peopl~ for hard work and better methods and 
also in raising political leaders at the basic level of society, who 
had close links with and prestige among the masses and was loyal to the 
new society. 
The background against which the campaign for reorganisation and 
retraining of the militia launched in 1942 was the 'better troops' 
1 The local governments at all levels had an elected 'popular armament 
commission' which assumed responsibility for the militia's operation, 
training' explo~d.ves production and other war services. 
2 
larticularly after the 'better troops' campaign, many retired soldiers 
were among militia commanders and even among the peasants. But from 
Chi eh-fang jih-pao reports, it seems that militia training by retired 
soldiers was not common. 
3 
For example, see the report on the 
Yenan Hsien on 18 July 1943, CFJP, 28 
militia inspection 
July 1943. 
meeting in 
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campaign and the strategic changes necessitated by the Japanese three-
all policy in North China. The size of the skeleton militia was roughly 
doubled in 1941, and it developed new tactics using homemade hand 
gre n.ides and mines against the Japanese mopping-up campaign. A prominent 
tactic to prevent smalL enemy un~ts from looting grain and stock animals 
was the 'empty house and clear field' (kung-shih ch'ing-yeh) policy for 
which a well-organised and trained local militia was essential. 1 Since 
the training of militia was normally done in the winter slack season, 
the Chieh-fang jih-pao campaign for militia reorganisation, retraining 
and inspection in May and June 1942 reflects a new concern on the part 
of the CCP to depend heavily upon militia for defence of the base areas. 
In early July 1943, units belonging to the forces of the KMT 
commander, Hu Tsung-nan, which had been stationed on the west bank of 
the Yellow River in south Shensi, moved westward and threatened the SKN 
Border Region. The CCP feared an all-out attack by Hu's army, which 
2 blockaded the Border Region with about 400,000 troops. Since the 
Communists could only command 20,000 regular troops in SKN, they 
could defend the Border Region only with popular forces. It was the 
weeding season and the militia corps had to carry out both military and 
agricultural work simultaneously. In other words, the 'unity of labour 
and arms' had to be put into practice; the military situation forced 
1 K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti Chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang chun, 
pp.123-124. 
2 The number of KMT troops around the SKcl Border Region has not been 
published. A figure 400,000 to 500,000 was widely believed by foreign 
observers in China at that time, although an American diplomatic report 
from Sian gives the figure of 11 divisions and 2 brigades (approximately 
165,000) which is apparently from a KMT source. Stein, op.cit., p.32; 
Forman, op.cit., p.74; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, 
China, (Washington: 1957), p.315. For the number of the Communist 
regular troops in SKN, American diplomatic and Japanese military 
sourcPs agree on 20,000. See t'oreign Relations of the United States, 
1943, China, p.372 and Johnson, op.cit., p.76. 
..... ;. .: .... 
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the SKN Border Region to combine military and production organisations. 
In the full-scale production drive, the slogan adopted by the 
militia in the SKN Border Region was 'Defend our lives of abundant 
clothing and sufficient food' (pao-wei feng-i tsu-shih ti sheng-huo) 
1 
which had been achieved under the Communist government. In the areas 
behind the Japanese lines the protection of life was more critical 
because of the Japanese 'kill all, burn all, loot all' policy, which 
aimed at elimination of the people in and around Communist territory 
2 
on whose support the Communist guerrillas depended. Both in SKN 
and behind the lines, defence of the Communist government also meant 
defence of the life of the ordinary people themselves. 
Another important aspect of the militia was the fact that it 
changed the people's ideas on armed force and armed struggle; arms 
were now close to them, and armed struggle became part of their lives. 
The CCP succeeded to make war part of the masses' lives through the 
militia, and thus enabled a protracted war to be fought along with 
socioeconomic transformation, which in turn was supported by their 
confidence in their own forces with arms. The 'unity of labour and 
arms' was a typical expression of this process in which armed struggle 
and revolutionary transformation of the villages were symbolically 
unified. 
'Unity of Labour and Arms' (lao-wu chieh-he) 
The 'unity of labour and arms' was first introduced in northwest 
Shansi by Chang Ch'u-yiian, a militia leader, reflecting the difficult 
1 For a typical example, see a news item about the militia inspection 
meeting at Hsi Hsien, CFJP, 3 August 1943. 
2 See, for 
Existence) , 
exanple, Yu Min, "Wei sheng-ts 'un erh chan" (Fight for 
CFJP, 5 December 1943. 
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situation during the Japanese three-all campaigns. 1 It seems, however, 
that this new method of organisation spread more quickly in the SKN 
Border Region, where military conditions were rather more secure, than 
in the other areas including the Northwest Shansi base. One reason 
for this was that SKN apparently had to rely more on militia than did 
the other areas, particularly when attacked by KMT forces, because it 
had only a small garrison and could not expect to recall regular troops 
fighting the Japanese in other areas of North China. But it seems that 
the basic reason was the long-established position of the SKN as a 
Corrununist base, with a much longer history of mass organisation than 
the other areas. In other words, in 1943, after about ten years of 
Communist social revolution, there were enough leaders among the masses 
in the SKN Border Region to organise the people into a new and sophist,-
icated organisation which could serve both production and defence. 
Examples in the Ch.ieh-fang jih-pao indicate that where both war 
preparation and production work were most effective, the militia corps 
was well organised. This meant that there was a highly conscious and 
hard working native leadership. These leaders were not of intellectual 
origin, but peasants who had come to the fore through revolutionary 
struggle or administrative and production work in the village; typical 
examples were the labour heroes. When they had a sufficient number of 
high calibre leaders at the lower levels, as SKN had, the bases 
behind the Japanese lines followed SKN in organising militia in 
close combination with production teams. 
Chang Ch'u-yuan was elected as a militia hero in 1944, because he 
l 
"Ti-hou chiln-min ti tao-lu - chan-tou yi.i sheng-ch' an chieh-he ch' i-
lai" <The Way to Be Taken by the Army and the People Behind the Enemy 
Lines - Unite Fight and Production) , editorial, CFJP, 2 March 194.4. 
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had introduced the organisational unity of labour and arms in the 
Northwest Shansi Region. He divided and mixed the militia corps of his 
natural village into pien-kung brigade. The advantage of his reorgan-
isation was, according to the Chieh-fang jih-pao, that militia and 
p1en-kung members were easily able to look after each other when the 
enemy launched an attack. At the same time, the pien~kung team was 
reinforced by young militia members, and as militia men were also 
pien-kung members, the-\:iork in their fields was carried on even when 
they engaged in military activities. This system also made it easier 
to select out militia men for sentry and patrol duty arou'.Od the village. 
In this 'organisational unity' at the natural village level, in the 
case of Chang, 720.5 cattle work days and 253 man work days were 
saved, and the quantity of grain looted by the enemy was reduced from 
50 in 1942 to 2 piculs in 1943. 1 
In addition, the Chieh-fang jih-pao stressed the educational 
effects of the unity of arms and labour; the morale of the militia 
and the villagers was heightened, and they became more concerned for 
2 
each other's work and property. 
The unity of arms and labour was one of the most far-reaching 
organisational achievements of the Communists in the war; and it was 
extended to all Communist bases in China during and after the war with 
3 Japan. It was revived by the Communist leaders in the 'everyone a 
soldier' campaign at the time of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, when 
1 
"Ti-hou chiin-min ti tao-lu - chan-tou yu sheng-ch'an chieh-hi ch'i-
la i II. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The CCP selected a model worker and launched a campaign in his or 
her name, In the case of the unity of labour and arms, the 'Chang 
Ch'u-ytian movement' was carried out in northwest Shansi in 1944. 
., .· 
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production organisation in China was extensively militarised; and it 
has been again taken both by militia corps within the people's commune 
and by the PLA. In the above revival of the 'unity of lavour and arms', 
one can see the CCP leaders' concern with its political and educational 
effe~ts on revolutionary transformation of the basic people. By 
weaving arms into the web of daily life of the people, the CCP could 
expect them to be involved further in the Communist political process, 
and bring about further revolutionary transformation in their everyday 
life organisation and also in their own ways of thinking. 
Unlike the Party and the army, the primary concern of the mass 
organisations was with the interests of their own members. They were 
concerned not only with the livelihood and educational standards of their 
members, but also with how far their members' human, political and 
social rights were asserted and protected in pract~ce. Although the 
CCP sought to indoct:·inate the general masses, both the intention and 
substance of political education of the masses were qujte different 
from that of Party and army members. The most distinct feature of 
popular indoctrination was the Party's attempt to impress upon the 
masses that the revolution, or the CCP's policy, was bringing them 
te.ngible benefits. In other words, the Party tried to convince the 
masses that their interests and those of the CCP were identical. The 
mass organisations were the institutions through which the masses 
expressed their opinions, and, through the implementation of Party 
and the government policies, formulated with the assistance of such 
expressions of mass opinion, advanced their own interests. 
It was as members of the mass organisations that the masses 
participated in the political process of the Communist government 
system, and were constantly encouraged to further participation. 
Furthermore, once involved in the political process as active members 
·:.· 
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of an organisation, and as a result became conscious of interests beyond 
their own or those of their organisation, such as those of 'the people', 
'the nation', 'the public' or 'mankind' . 1 Thus, the mass organisations 
also provided activists among their ranks for recruitment into the 
Party, and it was through a series of mass movements that the mass 
organisations created the activists who provided leadership for the 
Communist revolution at the basic level. 
The mass organisations were the keynotes for the whole Communist 
government system, which concentrated on mass political and social 
mobilisation, since they linked the other institutions to the masses 
in the process of mobilisation. The Party and the army took the lead, 
but it was the mass organisations that actually mobilised the masses 
for a new commitment, while at the same time providing mass leaders who 
were fully confident in and actively loyal to the new system. 
The role allotted to the mass organisations by the CCP was one of 
political, social and military education and mobilisation of the masses. 
The CCP's aim was a society composed of highly conscious, active and 
mobilised people, joined in the conunon cause of nationalism and social 
justice. In the process of replacing the traditional value system 
centred on the family by the new cause of nationalism and revolution, 
the CCP had to show the basic masses that the new system was not only 
beneficial to the Chinese riation but also to the broad masses themselves. 
The mass organisation was a useful and efficient device for cutting 
ties with the old social and economic system, protecting the people's 
interests, and thus also mobilising them for war service. The interests 
of the oppressed majority in the old system and of the CCP were essen-
tially the same, cmd to survive the war, the CCP had to rely on the 
1 See Chapter VI, especially on labour heroes. 
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efforts of people who were themselves seeking an escape from their 
alienated social and economic status in the old system. Mass organisa-
tions offered them the cause and the leadership to fight the old system. 
* * * * * * * * * 
The Communist government system as a whole was designed to concen-
trate mass mobilisation for war and revolution. Relative importance 
was given to the army, which provided the whole system with physical 
security, under which alone the Communists could develop mass mobilisa-
tion. But the importance of the army was not only in its function as 
a fighting machine but in its vanguard role in the revolution. The 
mass organisations played the key role in organising and mobilising 
t~e masses. The Party, with its highly-disciplined membership, provided 
the mass organisations with leadership while at the same time nurturing 
new basic leaders among the masses who could then be recruited into 
the Party. The government played a relatively unimportant role, which 
was mainly to provide management for the whole system and coordination 
of the interests of various organisations and classes. 
The whole government system was entirely new to rural society in 
North China, and demanded a new social order on which the system could 
rest. The war was destroying the old social system, by physically 
removing the richer people, those who could afford to flee. The war, 
however, offered nothing to replace the traditional authoritarian 
psychology rooted deeply both in the masses and also among the Party 
cadres. The Communists tried to design the whole government system 
so as to mobilise the peasants' activism by breaking down their fear 
of authority. The mass movements were assigned the crucial role of 
educating the masses and the cadres, to liberate themselves from the 
traditional Chinese system and its rigid distinction between leaders 
,·: .. . ' .. ·. 
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and led. In fact, mass movements and struggles were more effective in 
psychological breakthrough of the masses than all other efforts the 
CCP made to educate and indoctrinate them. 
The mass movements were vitally important in the Communist revolu-
tion in the Yenan period not only because they were effective in mass 
psychological mobilisation but also because they affected significantly 
on the social and economic systems. They provided substantial assistance 
in changing the socioeconomic structure in rural North China. The 
following chapter examines one of the most important mass movements, 
the movement for rent reduction, as an example of breakthrough from 
political passivity to active participation of the masses in the political 
process set in motion by the Communists, as well as of changing socio-
economic structure. 
·,. --_ __,__ __ _ 
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CHAPTER V 
RENT REDUCTION: THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE 
UNITED FRONT 
The two mass movements discussed in this study, the rent reduction 
and the production movements, have been selected because of their out-
standing importance among all the mass movements in this period. The 
importance of the rent reduction movement is readily apparent. The 
land question was one of the most critical and urgent in the Chinese 
economy, and land policy had been one of the basic points at issue 
between the KMT and the CCP. To the CCP, land policy was also directly 
concerned with the theory and practice of nationalism and the class 
struggle during the war of resistance. The rent reduction movement 
demanded, moveover, that the peasants confront the authority of the old 
ruling class, the landlords. This was one of the points of psychological 
breakthrough, eliminating, or at least reducing, the peasants' fear of 
the old authority, and giving them confidence in their own power and in 
the efficacy of Communists. 
The significance of the production movement lay more in political 
organisation and leadership, quite apart from any economic benefits it 
produced. Because this movement was so closely bound up with the daily 
life of the peasantry, the production organisations set up during the 
movement had the advantage of enabling the CCP to carry out continuous 
political mobilisation of a substantial part of the population. At the 
same time, the practice of the selecting labou~ heroes provided the CCP 
with an effective body of leadership at the basic level, leadership which 
was already held in esteem by the masses and closely linked with their 
everyday life. The economic results of the production drive also had a 
political by-product, in that they gave the peasants confidence in their 
own strength and power. 
...... 
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The land policy of the CCP illustrates its concept of the relation-
ship between nationalism and the class struggle, in a period when it gave 
pdority to the former rather than the latter. A moderate land policy 
was one of the major Communist concessions to the KMT for collaboration 
in the anti-Japanese war. Even before the collaboration, however, the 
CCP had already modified its land policy in 1936, and it did not radicalise 
its 'rent and interest reduction' (chien-tsu chien-hsi) policy until 
1946, long after its relations with the KMT had become 'strained', and 
long after the New Fourth Army Incident of 1941. Most writers, and 
the CCP itself, have argued that the CCP modified its land policy only 
for purposes of establishing the united front. But did the CCP have 
other reasons? Was the moderate land policy continued only in order to 
maintain what was left of the united front? If the united front was 
paramount, this implies that the CCP believed it could forego the essential 
confrontation of revolutionary class struggle, against the land-owning 
classes, and win the peasants to its side simply by appeals to thi5 
alleged 'nationalism', But was 'nationalism' in itself really sufficient-
ly meaningful to the peasants to enable the CCP to rely primarily on this 
appeal as a means of mobilising them for the war? 
The fundamental question for the student of the Yenan period was 
also the fundamental question for the Chinese Communists; that is, what 
weight should be given to the class struggle and what weight to the 
united front. The CCP had to mobilise the masses for the war and revolu-
tion, but it also had to do so simply in order to survive extreme 
financial and military hardships. The Party actually gave up its radical 
land policy as soon as the Central Committee arrived in the north Shensi 
base in the last half of 1935, for its own economic and political 
reasons. It failed, :-iowever, to develop a theoretical basis for this 
shift in emphasis from the class struggle to nationalism against Japan. 
.. 
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This was one reason why the CCP suffered from 'rightist' and 'leftist' 
1 nclinations in the implementation of land policy, al though it made 
gr8at efforts to rectify such inclinations among the cadres. 
Generally, the CCP does not seem to have been very enthusiastic in 
the implementation of its rent reduction policy during the Yenan period, 
particularly during the first part of this period. Its attitude to rent 
<eduction contrasts clearly with its efforts in the production campaigns 
after 1943. It appears that the cadres were not sure how far they we~e 
permitted to carry the rent reduction struggle. It is certain, however, 
that even the moderate land policy helped to change the social system 
in the Chinese villages and to prepare the basis for Communist power. 
1. The Moderation of Land Policy: 1935-1937 
The Chinese Comm1'nist land policy in the Yenan period can be 
divided into two stages; from 1937 to 1941 and from 19~2 to 1945. In 
the first period the CCP announced the 'rent and interest reduction' 
policy and commenced its implementation. However, the cadres were 
occupied with establishing political power in the rapidly growing newly 
occupied areas, and they not only lacked the time, but in general were 
not eager to carry out the rent reduction policy in the villages. In 
the last two years of this period, the Party was confronted with a loss 
of momentum in the mass movement, and acute economic and military diff-
lCl~lties. In the second period, with the introduction of a clearly 
stipulated and detailed land policy by the rentral Conunittee, rent 
reduction was carried out and its results began to affect the economy 
and the politics of the base areas. 
The land policy of the Yenan period evolved gradually from 1935 to 
1937, on the basis of the CCP's experience in implementing land policy 
in the Kiangsi and the North Shensi Soviet regions; it was not until 
--.............. 
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1941, however, that it was spelt out in detail, and it was only from 
January 1942 that the policy was translated into action. It is note-
worthy that in land policy Mao Tse-tung, who established his leadership 
wit11in the Party .in 1935, had invariably been a 'rightist' opponent of 
the main current of the Party, and was attacked by the supreme Party 
leaders for promoting a 'rich pea~ant line' . 1 It was to be expected, 
therefore, that he should try to moderate the land policy according to 
his 'rich peasant line' as soon as the Central Committee settled down 
in north Shensi, consistent with his o.ther policies stressing the anti-
Japanese struggle rather than the class struggle in contrast with the 
leftist main current of the Party. For Mao, however, these two struggles, 
national and class, were inseparable; the class struggle was an essential 
part of the national struggle, for the national struggle had to be borne 
by the masses. 
The first moderation in the CCP's land policy in north Shensi, 
concerning the treatment of tho rich peasants, was enunciated in Order 
No.2 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, 
2 issued on 15 December 1935. This order, which stipulated that the rich 
peasants' land, draught animals and farm appliances should not be con-
fiscated except for land rented for "high rent of a feudalistic charac-
3 ter," was one of the products of the Wayaopo meeting of the Politburo 
in December 1935. Order No. 2 prohibited the imposition by local 
governments at all levels to guarantee the rich peasants' freedom to 
manage industry and commerce and to employ workers, although it still 
1 According to Hsiao Tso-liang, in the Kiangsi period, Mao was persist-
ently in favour of a policy of preserving the rich peasants' productive 
power and was attacked by the Russian Returned Student group, who formed 
the leadership of ~he Central Committee, as a 'rightist'. Hsiao, The 
Land Revolution in China 1930-1934, (Tokyo: 1967), pp.20 and 49. 
2 
The text of this brief 
Nao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 5, 
3 
Ibid. , p. 13. 
order on the rich peasant policy is given in 
pp.13-14. 
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excluded the rich peasants from membership of the armed forces and denied 
th2m electoal rights. 1 The major points of the new policy toward the 
rich peasants were mentioned also in the resolution of the Wayaopo 
. 2 
meeting. 
'rhe rich peasant policy of this period corresponded with the 
Party's 'oppose Chiang and resist Japan' (Fan-Chiang k'ang-Jih) policy 
in the appeal for a united front against Japan. The CCP, however, had 
more practical reasons for its moderation toward the rich peasants. 
The 'anti-rich peasant' policy practised in previous years had damaged 
economic development in the soviet regions by depriving the rich peasants 
of the major part of their land, draught animals, farm appliances and 
capital which might be invested for production. Psychologically, the 
'anti-rich peasant' policy antagonised the rich peasants and engendered 
in the middle peasants a sense of insecurity; particularly affected 
were the upper middle peasants, who feared being classified as rich 
peasants. The 'anti-rlch peasant' policy undermined the rich and upper 
3 
middle peasant economy. 
In Mao's 'rich peasant line' there are two elements which are 
significant in relation to the later development of the Chinese revolu-
tion. One is economic; that is, Mao's concern to avoid destruction 
of the production power of the rich and upper middle peasants, the 
only potential for economic development in the Communist rural base 
1 Ibid., pp.13-14. 
2 The resolution, "Current Political situation and the Party's Tasks" 
of 20 December 1935, written by Mao, was the first CCP document to 
show the general policy changes of the Party toward the formation of the 
anti-Japanese united front with the KMT. Fer the text, see ibid., 
pp.19-40, especially p.30 for the rich peasant policy. 
3 
Wu Liang-p' ing, "On the Rich Peasant 
Ha ta no, op.cit., Vol 6, pp .173-174. 
Policy" (Japanese translation), 
. ;, 
. · .. ·~ 
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areas. This concern stemmed from his experience of desperate economic 
conditions in the Kiangsi soviet regions. 1 The other, related to the 
first, is political; that is, Mao's consistent desire to avoid isolation 
of the revolutionary force by winning over as many elements as possible 
in a given situation and attempting to isolate the primary enemy of the 
revclution. This was later developed fully into his theory of the 
united front. In December 1935, ~n his report to the Party activists' 
conference at Wayaopo, Mao denounced Party members who advocated: 
The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely pure, and 
the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight. 
Nothing is correct except what is literally recorded in Holy Writ. 
The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally count2rrevolution-
ary. Not an inch must be conceded to the rich peasants. 
He argued: 
In order to attack the forces of the counterrevolution, what the 
revolutionary forces need today is to organize millions upon 
millions of the masses and move a mighty revolutionary army into 
action. The plain truth is that only a force of such magnitude 
can crush the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and 
collaborators. Therefore, united front tactics are the only 
Marxist-Leninist tactics. The tactics of closed-doorism are, on 
the contrary, the tactics of the regal isolationist .... Its 
adherents' talk of the "pure" and the "straight" will be condemmed 
by Marxist-Leninists and commended by the Japanese imperialists. 3 
In these quotations one can see Mao's fundamental view of Marxism-Leninism; 
to him it was a revolutionary method. If his own methods or tactics were 
effective in promoting the Chinese revolution, they were Marxist-Leninist 
methods or tactics. Thus, Mao could claim that his tactics were 'the 
only Marxist·· Leninist tactics' at a specific stage in the Chinese revolu-
tion. This is what is called Mao's 'Sinification of Marxism-Leninism'. 
1 See his three articles on the economy in 1933 and 1934, "Pay Attention 
to Economic Work," Mao, I, pp.129-136; "Our Economic Policy," pp.141-
145; "Be Concerned with the Well-being of the Masses, Pay Attention to 
Methods of Work," Mao, T, pp.147-151. 
2 
"On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism," ibid., p.164. 
3 
Ibid., p .165. (My emphasis) . 
···,· 
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It may be assumed that the economic losses caused by the discourage-
ment of the development of production by the rich and middle peasants 
were serious for the CCP. In north Shensi, one of the poorest and most 
backward areas in China, the CCP, controlling only about one million 
people, had to support 40,000 troops after the main part of the Red 
Army arrived from the south. The rich and middle peasants wer~, in 
fact, the only source on which the CCP could call for possible economic 
development. A policy shift to the 'rich peasant line', therefore, was 
not surprising in 1935-1936. 
In May 1936, the CCP abandoned the 'oppose Chiang' policy in an 
open telegram to all partisans and armed forces in China, including the 
KMT; 1 soon after, the Party called on the KMT to collaborate to fight 
2 the Japanese. The CCP's change in land policy thereafter was rational-
ised on the basis of its hope of reviving collaboration with the KMT, 
although it had other good reasons for wishing to correct the 'leftist' 
inclination in its land policy. The Central Soviet Governments' 
Directive on Land Policy issued on 22 July 1936 stipulated that the 
rich peasants' L:md and spare production implements should not be 
uniformly confiscated; 3 it made no mention of land or production 
implements rented for 'feudalist exploitation'. The rich peasants' 
land, however, was to be confiscated if the 'basic peasants' demanded 
it. The landlords and rich peasants were to be treated equally with 
other peasants in distrubution after their land and other property 
were confiscated. 4 
1 The English text of· the major part of this open letter is given in 
Nao, I, pp.279-280. 
2 See the CCP's open letter to the Second Plenary Session of the KMT 
Central Executive Committee in August and the CCP Central Committee's 
resolution in September 1936. The main part of these documents is 
given in English in Mao, I, pp.259-261. 
' Mao Tse-tung chi, \lol. 5, p.64. 
4 
Ibid., pp.63-64. 
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The directive indicated a significant change in CCP policy, and 
illustrates clearly the Party's aim of encouraging the rich and middle 
peasants. The definition of 'small holders'' land, which was not to 
be confiscated, included land belonging to 'workers' (kung-jen) and 
obtained by their labour. But the surprising point was that 'worker' 
here did not mean 'factory worke~', the usual meaning of this Chinese 
term, but 'all people who were working, no matter how much property they 
had'. The directive deliberately avoided the words landlord, land-owner 
or even land-holder, and substituted 'worker' instead. This is a 
significant change when one recalls that the CCP tried to eliminate the 
rich peasants in the Kiangsi period, regarding them as rural capitalists. 
The directive conformed exactly with what was called the 'rich peasant 
line' of Mao Tse-tung, and it later became one of the CCP's major 
policies in the production drive, typified in the 'Wu Man-yu campaign' 1 
In other words, the CCP changed its agrarian policy to provide an economic 
incentive for all classes, except for those living entirely on land rent 
and credit interest. A significant exception is made in the directive 
for 'national traitors' (han-chien) , collaborators with the Japanese. 
The directive proclaims in its first article that all land and property 
of national traitors shall be confiscated, while the land of those who 
engaged in work for the resistance was not to be confiscated, regardless 
2 
of class or the amount of property owned. 
It should not be overlooked here that the CCP regarded this policy 
shift as a tactic to promote the revolution, the ultimate goal of which 
was communism. As Mao repeatedly stressed, "revolution always follows 
a tortuous road and never a straight one," and "[t] he alignment of 
l 
2 
See below, Chapter VI, p.301. 
Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 5, pp.63-65. 
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forces in the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary camps can change, ,,l 
without any change of the ultimate goal of the revolution. The modera-
tion of CCP land policy did not mean that the Chinese Communistshad become 
'"erely 'agrarian reformers 1 • 
The land policy of the CCP at this stage was limited to redistribu-
tion of land and other property. Equal districution of land to former 
landlords and rich peasants was not really new, but had distinguished 
Mao's policy from that of the 'leftist' Russian Returned Student group 
. . . d 2 in the Kiangs1 per10 . What was new in the above directive of the 
soviet Central Executive Committee was the simple distinction between 
the land of national traitors and that of resistance workers. In practice 
the CCP was at the same time moving to end all confiscation of land. 3 
Wang Kuan-lan, Chairman of the Land Committee in the Northwestern Branch 
of the Central Soviet Government, told Edgar Snow on 20 July 1936: 
1 
2 
' 
At present estates are still expropriated, but the landlords are 
allowed to retain for their own use land sufficient to provide 
them an average income. Secondly, the land of rich ?easants is no 
longer divided. Owners of farm enterprises are not expropriated 
as long as they remain on the land as managers or producer. In 
certain cases, if the peasants vote to confiscate a rich peasant's 
land, it will be divided. The Communists no longer emphasize this, 
however, and even if the peasants insist on it, the rich peasant 
family must still be allowed a portion to cultivate for its own 
needs. 
In other words, the government will not encourage confiscation of 
~ny land except large estates, in this period. We are experimenting 
to see whether the po~r peasants' support can be won without large-
scale redistribution. 
"On Tactics against Japanese .Imperialism," 1935, Mao,I, p.165. 
Hsiao Tso-liang, op.cit., p.21. 
Kawamura Yoshie argues that the non-confiscation policy towards land-
lords was an inevitable product of the CCP's aJoption of a broad united 
front policy at the Wayaopo meeting, because the land revolution policy 
was contradLctory to Mao's advocacy of a 'people's republic' which "may 
include those who are interested only in the national revolution and not 
in the agrarian revolution." Mao, I, p.166. Kawamura Yoshie, "En'an 
Jiki ni okeru Chukyo no Tochi Seisaku no Tenkai" (Development of the 
CCP's Land Policy in the Yenan Period), Ajia Keizai, Vol. 12, No.l (Jan-
uary 1971), p.6. 
4 
Edg:i.r Snow, 
1957), p.37. 
Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
.. · . 
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Following the Sian Incident in December 1936, the CCP in its telegram 
to the KMT announced for the first time the policy of nonconfiscation of 
landlords' land, as one of four concessions to the KMT for the establish-
ment of the united front. 1 This telegram was both a basic document of 
the Second KMT-CCP collaboration, and the basis of the CCP's land policy 
in the Yenan period. 
The policy shift from the confiscation of land to rent reduction was 
officially endorsed at the Lo-ch'uan meeting of the Politburo on 25 
August 1937. This was an important meeting, in that it adopted the basic 
policies for the united front, which lasted until the end of the war, 
and which included what was known as the Ten-Point National Salvation 
Programme. According to Hu Hua, a Chinese Communist historian, this 
meeting decided to take the policy of rent and interest reduction as the 
basic policy for solving the peasants' problems in the period of the 
2 
war against Japan. 
Of the two changes in CCP land policy after the Central Committee's 
arrival in north Shensi, the first, the return to the 'rich peasant line' 
of Mao, was not necessarily a concession to the KMT, but the second, 
suspension of confiscation of land, apparently was a compromise for this 
purpose. It should be emphasised that not all landlords were the enemies 
of the CCP in the war period, partly because the forerunners of Chinese 
nationalism were intelligentsia and students, most of whom were from elite 
backgrounds, and the CCP needed to attract as many of these people as it 
could, particularly after the loss of so many young members in the battles 
against the KMT during the Kiangsi period and the Long March. 
1 
In a 
Plenary 
Of thd.s 
2 
Central Committee telegram of 10 February 1937 to the. Third 
Session of the KMT Fifth Central Committee. For English text 
telegram, see Mao, I, pp.282-283. 
Hu Hua, op.cit., p.358. See also Mao, II, pp.23-28. 
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To the CCP, the losses it might suffer by giving up land redistribu-
tion were obviously outweighed by the potential gains. They could hope 
to encourage the rich and upper-middle peasants to continue to engage 
in production and to attract support from young intelligentsia and land-
lords, while at the same time makin? a concession which might please the 
Central Government. There were.two main disadvantages. First, the 
middle and poor peasants' support for the CCP might be weakened, and 
secondly, the morale of the cadres might be undermined. It was pos,;ible, 
however, to overcome these disadvantages by education and propaganda. 
Particularly in the new areas which the Communists hoped to penetrate 
as a result of the collaboration, even rent and interest reduction 
toqether with progressive taxation, might be sufficient to attract 
support from the poor peasants. 
The CCP took the L6nd Law of the KMT, promulgated by the Nanking 
Government in 1930, as the basis for its land policy. This Land Law 
limited rent on land to 37.5 percent of the crop yield. 1 The CCP 
adopted the slogans 'Erh-wu ch.ien-tsu' (reduce 25 percent of the original 
rent), and 'Fen-pan chien-hsi' (reduce the annual interest to 15 percent) . 
Although the CCP was sincere in introducing this policy, which in some 
parts of Communist-controlled areas and some hsien in the SKN·Border 
Region, was actually put into effect, in the first three years the Party 
was rather more interested in expanding its influence in North China. 
The shift in the CCP's land policy, therefore, involved two 
'theoretical' questions. One was modification of the 'leftist' line for 
1 Article 177, Land L~w, 30 June 1930, Wu Ching-hsiung, comp., Hsien-
hsing liu-fa ch'uan-shu (Collection of Six Laws in Operation), (Shanghai: 
19351, p.215. Li Ming-hua, a Kuomintang historian, writes that the CCP 
i:ook the Land Law of the Wuhan Government of 1927, and not that of the 
Nanking Government of 1 :!30. Chung-kung ti t' u-ti tou-cheng (Chinese 
Communist Land Struggle) , (Taipei: 1965) , p .169. 
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the Party's own advantage in pursuing the _,,.evolution, and the other was 
abandonment of the agrarian revolution for the sake of the united front. 
The former involved the question of class relations in the Chinese 
bourgeois revolution, and the latter, the status of landlords in the 
national liberation war. The CCP believed that these two problems had 
to be solved together in order to win over the broadest possible strata 
to the Communist side, and that to this end it was necessary to both 
'leftist' and 'rightist' inclinations. 
How, then, did the CCP implement its new land policy after 1937, 
particularly in the newly occupied areas? The policy was supposed to 
be acceptable to the tenants, and mo~e tolerable for the landlords than 
land redistribution. But in the new rural bases in North China, which 
had never experienced any kind of land reform, many difficulties were 
encountered in the implementation, even of a moderate policy such as 
rent reduction. The prablem was exacerbated by the CCP's indecision on 
land policy, reflected in the unsolved theoretical problem of the class 
struggle and the united front. In the first four years of the war, the 
Party fluctuated between the 'leftist' class struggle line and the 'right-
ist' united front line inclining more towards the latter. Accordingly, 
even the moderate rent reduction policy was not carried out rigorously 
throughout the base areas. 
2. Fluctuation in Land Policy 1937-1941. 
The land problem was understood by Mao Tse-tung i.n May 1937 to be 
one in which "the first question to be settled is whether China's land 
will be owned by the Japanese or by the Chinese." 1 Here, Mao was implying 
that nationalism shoudl be predominant over the class struggle. He did 
l 
"Tasks of 
Japan, 11 Mao, 
the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to 
I, p.272. 
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not mean, however, that the CCP no longer ;1eeded to do anything at all 
about the land-owning system. He continued: 
since the solution of the land problem of the peasants is predicated 
on the defence of China, it is absolutely necessary for us to turn 
1 from the method of forcible confiscation to appropriate new methods. 
It was necessary to solve the land problem, by methods other than forced 
confiscation. 
The evidence tends to contradict a widely-held opinion, that the CCP 
'abandoned' the class struggle by its shift from land redistribution to 
the rent reduction policy and the collaboration with the KMT. What the 
CCP changed was the method of attacking the problem of land, while still 
adhering to its ultimate commitment to transform the land-owning system. 
As Donald Gillin has observed, there were many ways for the CCP to carry 
out the class struggle other than land redistribution. 2 
Significantly, Mao did not suggest what 'new methods' might be 
taken. According to Li:c Po-ch'u's report in 1939, the SKN Border Region 
Government suspended the confiscation of landlords' land as early as 
3 March 1937. In May 1937, therefore, when Mao delivered the above 
report, he must have known what kind of 'new methods' were to be under-
taken. But Lin's report also omits any reference to methods. It simply 
emphasises the arguments in favour of the suspension of land confiscation, 
and refers to the joint proclamation of the Government and the Rear 
Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army of May 1938 on protecting the 
4 
"rights already secured by the people." 
i Ibid. (My emphasis) . 
?. See Gillin, '''Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," 
p. 282. 
3 Shen-Kan-Ning pi en-ch 'ti ts' an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, p.14. 
4 See Chapter II,Section 3. For the full text of the joint proclamation, 
see Mao, II, pp. 75-77. 
.... 
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It must be assumed, then, that by 1939 the Party had not yet really 
determined what methods would be adopted. There was a general principle 
related to the class struggle, but the Party lacked a unified and 
detailed land policy. The principle given in the Party's Ten-Point 
Prog~amme for National Salvation in August 1937, 1 that is rent reduction. 
But this Programme does not stipulate to what exten<t the rent should be 
reduced. One of the three principles of land policy outlined in Lin 
Po-ch'U's report was government non-interference in tenancy matters so 
2 long as the rent was reasonable. Yet Lin did not state what was 
considered to be a 'reasonable' rent. The Land Regulations promulgated 
by the First Assembly of the SKN Border Region in January 1939 attempted 
to protect tenants by obliging both landlords and tenants to make contracts, 
which had to include periods of tenure and 'reasonable' rents. But the 
Land Regulations still did not give any direction as to specific amounts 
which might be considered 'reasonable' . 3 
Between the two policies of land redistribution and preservation of 
the existing land-owning and tenancy systems, there was room for consider-
able fluctuation, which continued for the first few years of the war. 
In fact, there is evidence that in the first few months of the war, 
possibly until as late as June 1938, the CCP tried to continue redistribu-
tion, at least of land belonging to 'national. traitors'. Exemplifying 
the uncertainties in the specific implementation of land policy in this 
period are the two articles by Liu Shao-ch'i already discussed in part 
4 
in Chapter IL 
i 
2 
Shen-Kan-Ning pi en-ch' U ts' an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, p·.15. 
Ibid., p.15. See Chapter II, Section 3. 
3 For the full text of the Regulations, see Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'U ts' an 
-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, pp.59-61. The article concerning· tenancy 
is Article 17, p.61. 
4 Liu Shao-ch' i's first article, op.cit., K'ang-chan i-lai chung-yao 
:·1en-chi en hui-chi , p. 27. 
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Although this concession [of confiscation of landlords' land] was 
correct and necessary, it cannot be said because of this that we 
do not advocate solving the land problem of the peasants in the 
stage of the war of resistance. We ended the policy of violent 
and direct confiscation of landlords' land, but we do advocate 
that the government should adopt laws and ordinances to solve the 
land problem of the peasants, to enable the peasants to obtain 
land and to make the tillers have their own land. 
In the base areas of the guerrilla war, we have the following 
proposals on the peasant and land policy: 
!l) Confiscate national traitors' land and distribute it to the 
landless and small landowning peasants. 
121 The land of landlords who have fled should be distributed 
to the peasants to cultivate without payment of rent. 
(3) The local public land should be distributed to the peasants. 
Since Liu was in a position to implement these policies, it is 
probably the case that the Party tried to put them into practice at 
least in the bases the Party controlled in Shansi and Hopei Provinces. 
During this period of implementation the peasants became radicalised, 
with the result that the richer class came to fear the newly established 
Communist governments. This period, however, did not last long. The 
Party could not afford to fight the war without the support of the 
educated class, when its help was needed to establish and run new 
administrations. 
In another article on the same subject in February 1938, Liu Shao-
ch' i expressed a different opd.nion, which showed a retreat to a posci. tion 
which stressed appeasement of the landlords rather than improvement of 
the peasants' 1 i vel ihood. He wrote: 
1 
In order to mobilise and organise the broadest masses to join 
the war of national salvation against Japan, ... the implementation 
of the policies to improve the masses' livelihood (such as reduction 
of excessively high land rent, ... ) by the government is absolutely 
necessary. In the circumstances of guerrilla war, however, in the 
villages the stipulation of the highest limit of rent and guarantee 
of permanent tenure on lan? for the tenants ... could not be imple-
mented for the time being. 
Liu's second article, cited above, K'ang-chan i-lai chung-yao wen-
c/Jien hui-chi, p.47. 
. . . . 
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Liu does not mention distribution of land to the peasants. He also 
asserts that it is necessary to win over the armed forces and staff of 
local puppet administrations rather than attacking them as national 
traitors, on the ground that most of them were forced into the service 
of the puppet administrations without any effective protection by the 
l Chinese armed forces or the government. 
Liu Shao-ch'i justifies these departures from his earlier article 
by stating that the general principles proposed in the first article 
were generally correct. "But, on the ground of recent experiences, 
minor corrections should be made on several concrete questions.• 2 
hlthough he does not explain what are general principles and what are 
not, he seems to be implying that the policies outlined in his first 
article are 'general principles', and their 'suspension' 'under the 
circumstances of guerrilla war' is a 'concrete question'. Alternatively, 
from a Cultural Revolution point of view, one might venture the suggestion 
that the indefinite line of the Party in land policy in this period was 
a reflection of the fact that Liu regarded land policy itself as a 'con-
r:'rete question'. 
Liu's second article suggests concern that radical mass 'struggles' 
against landlords and capitalists in the initial months of the war had 
made them antagonistic to the newly established guerrilla administration. 
It implies also that these 'struggles' made the local KMT elements 
susp1c1ous of the CCP's goals. Repeated emphasis in the second article 
on i:he "unified command and leadership of the Central Government" and 
the "difficult circumstances of the guerrilla war in North China" also 
suggests the existence of serious disputes b8tween the CCP and the KMT 
1 
Ibid., pp.48-49. 
2 
Ibid., p.45. 
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. " .... 
.. . . 
.... 
.... 
'•· 
on the question of radical mass 'struggles'. Liu's intention was to 
settle these disputes by adopting more moderate policies, including 
"strict avoidance of the struggle method•" 1 Surprisingly, he seems 
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to have believed that the richer people could be made to cooperate with 
the Communists by the use of "methods of persuasion and mediation.• 2 
The general tone of this article implies that for the masses, mobilisation 
for the nationalist war necessitated some prospect for improvement in 
their material livelihood, but for the richer elements mobilisation 
could be effected simply by appeals to nationalism. 
There is no evidence that either the CCP Central Committee or Mao 
disagreed with Liu specifically on the content of this second article, 
which outlined the establishment of a broad united front, to include 
even puppet military and administrative personnel, by temporary abandon-
ment of the class struggle. But at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 
Central Committee in October 1938 Mao Tse-tung delivered a lengthy report 
entitled "On the New Stage," which took the same approach as Liu had 
done in the first of the above two articles, although Mao does stress 
the need for the united front and recognise KMT leadership in it. 3 Mao 
does not mention redistribution of land in this report, but emphasises 
the improvement of the masses' livelihood by rent and interest reduction, 
increases in the workers' wages and so on, even in the war areas and 
4 behind the enemy lines. 
The appan~nt differences between Liu and Mao may have derived 
from the different situations in which t:1ey worked, and from the different 
l 
2 
3 
Ibid. , p. 4 7. 
Ibid. 
The report consists of eight chapters, of which only Chapter 7 is 
included in Mao's Selected works. For the original text, see Mao Tse-tung 
chi, Vol. 6, pp.162-263. 
'i ibid., pp.214-215. 
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times at which their articles were written. Liu was engaged in setting 
up new army bases and administrative organisations in rural North China, 
where there had never been any rigorous attempt to carry out agrarian 
:eform, and the power of the landlord-gentry had been preserved. Mao, 
on the other hand, was in the SKN Border Region which, as a result of 
ten years of Communist rule, no longer had a dominating landlord-gentry 
class. In February 1938 when Liu w~ote his second article, the Japanese 
were still rapidly expanding their occupied areas and the KMT troops 
were fighting them in some parts of North China. In October 1938 when 
Mao delivered the report to the Sixth Plenum, Japanese expansion of 
occupied areas in China had reached its limit, the KMT troops had almost 
been swept from North China, and Mao was able to see the prospect of a 
prot~acted war within the Japanese-occupied areas. 
Even to Mao himself, it seems that the contradiction between the 
national revolution and the class struggle was not solved at this stage. 
He emphasised the necessity of subordinating the class struggle to the 
national revolution; but at the same time, under this principle, the 
independence and initiative of the parties and classes and their essential 
rights "mllst be upheld within certain limits." He wrote in his conclud-
ing speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in early November 
1938: 
In a struggle that.is national in character, the class struggle 
takes the form of national struggle, which demonstrates the identity 
between the two. On the one hand, for a given historical period 
the political and economic demands of the various classes must not 
be such as to disrupt co-operation; on the other hand, the demands 
of the national struggle (the need to resist Japan) shouU.d be the 
point of departure for all class struggle. Thus there is identity 
in the united front between unity and indipendence and between the 
national struggle and the class struggle. 
Nao, IT, p.215. 
•· 
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ff one ~ecalls that the significance of the Sixth Plenum lies mainly in 
the settlement of the long-standing dispute between Mao and Wang Ming, 
who was accused of being the promoter of the 'rightist line of everything 
through the united front', in favour of Mao's 'class struggle line', Mao's 
adherence to the class struggle line is to be expected. But in the 
context of the national crisis at this time, 1938, when the Japanese 
appeared to be invincible, it is surprising to find how very firmly 
Mao, now the chief theoretician of the CCP, held to the class struggle 
line. Even during a grave national crisis, he was reluctant to give 
up the class struggle altogether. 
Mao's opinions on the class struggle and the national struggle in 
the above article, however, do not indicate what was to be done for the 
1.mtted front po•l icy in practice at the village level. This left room for 
Liu, or anybody else, to 'sacrifice' the class struggle in the interest 
of maintaining the united front. 
The Land Regulations of the SKN Border Region adopted in January 
1939 were the first Communist land law in the Yenan period. The emphasis 
in this land law was on the protect~on of land ownership by proper 
registration of land, and on avoiding discouragement of cultivation. It 
contained only one article, already referred to above, dealing with 
tenancy, which decreed that landlords and tenants should make tenancy 
contracts bilaterally rather than unilaterally, that contracts should 
guarantee fixed periods of tenancy, and that rent should not be too 
high. 1 The ReguJ.ations stipulated that land owned by national traitors 
should be confiscated and placed under the managment of the hsiang gov-
2 
ernment, which implied that it should not be distributed to the peasants. 
1 Article 17, Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'li t'u-ti t'iao-li, Shen-Kan-Ning 
pien-ch'ii ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, p.61. 
2 
Article 11 , ibid. 
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In practice, however, it is reported that in SKN public land and national 
traitors' land continued to be distributed to the peasants, although 
this did not necessarily mean legal transfer of ownership. 1 
Despite the evidence of Liu Shao-ch'i's later article and Mao's 
report to the Sixth Plenum, in which he says "[We should) start reducing 
rent and interest reasonably in the war areas and behind the enemy lines, 112 
1 t would be wrong to 1".ssume that the Conununists did not reduce land rent 
and debt interest, even if their first concern was with establishing their 
3 guerrilla bases. According to Hsil Ti-hsin, a Conununist economist, the 
Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region government decided in February 1938 to reduce 
land rent by 25 percent, and to prohibit landlords from obtaining any 
additional rent from their tenants other than grain rent. For the 
reduction of debt interest, the Chin-Ch'a.-Chi Border Region Government 
ordered creditors not to demand more than 10 percent annual interest 
4 
on all credits, irrespective of whether they were old or new. There is 
little source material on how the CCP implemented rent reduction policy 
in the newly occupied areas in these early years. The only available 
l Hsu Ti-hsin, "Finance and Economy in the SKN Border Region and 
Japanese Base Areas behind the Enemy Lines" (Japanese translation 
Chinese written in early 1940), Toa Kenkyujo, op.cit., p.116. 
2 Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 6, p. 215. (My emphasis). 
Anti-
from 
) 
The CCP's concern with setting up new administrations in increasingly 
large ~egions is illustrated by the following statement from a Conununist-
compi led history of the Chin-Chi-Lu-YU Border Region: "In this period 
11938-1939) the emphaiss was basically on starting the war of resistance 
and on mobilising for the tasks of the war. Improvement of welfare 
and the struggle for democracy were still treated as a subordinate 
question." Ch'i Wu, op.cit., p.117. The CCP documents of this period 
put great emphasis on the nationalist task of maintaining collaboration 
with the KMT i~ order to continue the resistance to Japan. 
4 
HsU Ti-hsin, op.cit., p.117. 
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article on land policy in the Chieh-fang chou-k'an, 1 "The Urgent Problem 
of Rent and Interest Reduction in Southeast Shansi," however, stated in 
March 1940 that two years had already passed since the Communists had 
b t rd t d •t t• h · 2 egun o e uce ren an in eres in s ansi. They had at least tried 
to carry out the policy, but "had not yet been able to implement rent 
and interest reduction based on an upsurge of enthusiasm for the resis-
tance among the masses in the base area, and had not mobilised or 
organised the broad masses." 3 
According to this articlE, rent reduction in this period depended 
mainly upon persuading landlords to reduce rent voluntarily. Although 
the article laid stress on eliminating fear of landlords among the 
peasants, it did not state what measures should be taken when landlords 
refuse to reduce rent. Emphasis was given to keeping the landlords 
h . h . d f h . 4 wit in t e unite front or t e war of resistance. 
On l November 1939, as the armed conflicts between the KMT and the 
CCP became increasingly serious, the Central Committee of the CCP 
distributed a "Decision on the Work of Deep Penetration into the Masses" 
5 to every leading organ of the Party. The purpose of the decision was 
to warn Party members of the probability of armed attacks of the KMT or Yen 
Hsi-shan,on the CCP's administration. In order to ensure extensive 
Communist influence among the local masses after the Party's withdrawal, 
Party organs were asked to carry out rent and interest reduction 
1 The Chief-fang chou-k'an was the central 
became the Chieh-fang jih-pao in May 1941. 
magazine is unavailable. 
organ of the CCP until 
A complete set of this 
2 
3 
4 
5 
No. 102, 31 March 1940, p.12. 
Ch'i Wu, op.cit., p.117. 
The same article referred in Note 2 above, pp.13-14. 
Ch'i Wu, op.cit., p.117. See Chaper II, pp. 
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immediately where they had not undertaken it, or, where they had already 
reduced land rent and debt interest, to examine the degree of its 
implementation. 1 
The decision illustrates the point that in many areas under 
communist control rent and interest reduction had not been implemented 
at all, or else the cadres had been satisfied with only nominal 
implementation. The Central Committee was unhappy with this situation, 
particularly when the Party contemplated the outbreak of open hostilities 
2 
with Yen and the KMT. After this decision was taken, and with the 
impetus of the West Shansi Incident, the class struggle became radical 
at the basic level. According to Ch'i Wu, the mass movement at this 
time, particularly in Shansi, fell easily into 'leftist deviation' through 
the vengeance of the peasants against the landlords, who were the basis 
of the Yen's power. Another cause of 'leftist deviation' in the mass 
r.iovement was a lack of experience on the part of most of the cadres, who 
had only recently been recruited and were impatient to act. Consequently, 
the united front at the village level was threatened with collapse in 
' ' h ' 3 ~erta1n areas in S ansi. 
The more important fact is that when the CCP faced a crisis of 
survival, the united front, or the national struggle, was put aside 
and emphasis was given to the radical land policy, or the class struggle, 
to mobilise the masses and keep them on the Party's side. This suggests 
that the Party was aware that, ultimately, it could not depend 
1 See Chapter II, pp. 72-74. 
2 The decision called on Party organs to arouse the masses and eliminate 
from the local administration the landlord elements who tried to interrupt 
political, social and economic reform for the improvement of the masses' 
livelihood. 
3 Ch'i Wu, op.cit., pp.117-118. 
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on the united front, even in the period of nationalist war, and that it 
believed that a politically mobilised populace was the only reliable 
means by which the Party could ensure its own survival and drive the 
revolution forward. 
In April 1940, the North Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP 
held a conference at Li-ch'eng in southeast Shansi for the purpose of 
correcting the 'leftist deviation' in the mass movement. The restraints 
on 'leftist deviation' imposed by the Li-ch'eng conferences resulted in 
che suppression of the mass movements in the Chin'Ch'a-Chi and the Chin-
- d . 1 h Chi-Lu-Yu Bor er Regions, alt ough the conference called on the Joint 
Administrative Office of South Hopei and T'aihang, which was preparing 
to establish the Chin-Chi-Lu-YU Border Region, to implement rent and 
interest reduction. The Office enforced a rent reduction decree in 
2 August 1940. 
It is interesting that the Central Committee wanted to arouse the 
masses to implement rent reduction in the base areas, whereas the North 
Bureau was rather more concerned with the problem of 'leftist deviation' 
than with rigorous mass work. This may reflect the uncertainty of the 
Party's attitude toward mass mobilisation, especially in land policy, 
although in 1939 and 1940 Mao himself became increasingly suspicious 
of the KMT's resolve to fight the Japanese, and began to suggest that 
the CCP and the proletariat should assume leadership in China's 'new 
d ' 1 . 3 emocrat1c revo ut1on. 
2 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
The change in Mao's concept of the leadership in the Chinese 
revolution is seen clearly in his two works, "On the New Stage," October 
1938 and "On New Democracy," June 1940. Mao had repeatedly expressed 
bis Party's willingness to accept Chiang Kai-shek and his leadership 
in the united front .i.n 1937 and 1938.. At the end of 1939, he began 
to advocate proletarian (in effect, CCPJ leadership in the 'new 
democratic' revol ui:ion. 
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The apparent difference between the Central Committee and the North 
Bureau and land policy implementation, and on the general policy of mass 
mobilisation, is illustrated by the discussion of the Party documents 
above. The reasons for this difference are not clear from the evidence 
released so far, but it does at least exemplify the uncertain direction 
of the CCP's land policy in this period, and its fluctuation over time 
and even between different areas. Even in the SKN Border Region, where 
the Central Conunittee was located, the landlord-gentry power had been 
considerably undermined, "no official effort was made to implement rent 
reductions. 111 
It took the CCP anothef two years from the sixth Plenum to determine 
finally the course of its land policy in the resistance war, and in 
these two years, 1940 and 1941, the Party was to experience another and 
far more severe KMT armed attack, and the depredations of the Japanese 
'three-all' policy. The promulgation of the Central Committee decision 
on land policy in January 1942 was also made against the background of 
the CCP's failure to reduce rent and interest rigorously, a failure which 
resulted partly in the Party's own difficulties in 1941 and 1942. 
3. Rent and Interest Reduction, 1942-1945. 
The date of issue of the Central Committee Decision on Land Policy 
in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas, 2 28 January 1942, indicates its relation 
to the Party rectification campaign which launched on l February of the 
same year. Having faced the onset of a crisis in 1941, the Central 
Committee seems to have concluded that something had to be done to 
i-----
Selden, op.cit., p.230. 
2 1'he full text in English of the decision and its appendices are in 
Conrad Bt·andt, et al., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, (London: 
1952), pp.275-285. The quotations of the decision hereafter are taken 
from this book. 
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stimulate mass mobilisation as the only means by which the Party could 
survive the crisis. For this purpose, full implementation of rent and 
interest reduction was essential, and reeducation of cadres was also 
necessary in order to eliminate what was described as arrogant 'formal-
ism' in mass work. The Party found it difficult to make young cadres, 
who wanted to fight the Japanese, understand the importance of mass 
mobilisation, which could not be achieved simply by issuing laws and 
decrees. But on the land problem, the first step the Party had to take 
was to formulate a clear and definite policy. 
The decision makes an interesting observation which underlines the 
Central Committee's reasons for issui.ng such a directive at this time; 
that is, popular enthusiasm could be measured in proportion to the extent 
to which rent and interest reduction had been carried out: 
In the areas where rent and interest reductions have been carried 
out more extedsively, more rigorously, and more thoroughly, together 
with the guarantee of rent and interest collections, the enthusiasm 
with which the local people have participated in the anti-Japanese 
struggle and in democratic reconstruction (also) has been higher 
than elsewhere; furthermore, in these areas conditions of work 
are being kept up on a normal level, life is morI stable and orderly, 
and the bases are generally firmly consolidated. 
The Central Committee now concluded that class struggle, or class 
relations, must form the basis for all other tasks and movements. This 
decision provides further evidence that the most critical factor, in 
the CCP's view, for mobilising the masses during the nationalist war 
was not nationalism, but class struggle as it related to the basic 
problem of production relations in rural China, the land problem. The 
Party later saw a similar correlation between land reform and the anti-
KMT struggle (civil war) in 1946. 2 
1 
2 
Ibid., p. 277. 
11 A Three Months' Summary, 11 October 1946, Mao, IV, p .116 . 
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The 1942 decision was the first official document outlining the 
CCP's land policy in detail since the Land Law of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic in 1931, which had adopted the anti-rich peasant line. 1 By the 
1942 decision, the Party officially changed this line into a so-called 
'rich-peasant line', which meant that the production of rich peasants was 
to be protected, and the middle and poor peasants were to be encouraged 
to raise themselves by hard work to become rich peasants. This moderate 
'rich peasant line' was an indication of Mao's confidence in the economic 
basis of the revolution, also in his united front theory which he appears 
to have completed working out in 1940. It embodied two targets, an 
attempt to bring about an increase in agricultural production while at 
the same time winning over both rich peasants and landlords. 
The second guideline laid down by the decision was assistance to the 
peasants in reducing 'feudal exploitation' by the landlords, in carrying 
out reductions of rent and interest rates and in guaranteeing the civil 
liberties, and the political, economic and land rights of the peasants. 
In implementing this policy, the CCP did not want to enforce rent 
reduction from above, as much as it wanted the peasants to secure the 
reforms by their own efforts. The Party was only to assist them in 
reducing 'feudal exploitation'. This was an expression of the CCP's 
idea of how a mass movement should evolve. The masses themselves should 
'transform the objective world, as well as their own subjective world, 
through a great mass struggle'. The struggle must come from the masses, 
sin~e a favour bestowed from above cannot change their 'subjective 
world', even if it might change the 'objective world'. The CCP also 
believed that by only giving 'assistance' it could ensure that reforms 
gained by mass struggle could better withstand counterrevolutionary 
1 
The full text of the Land Law of 1931 
:isiao Tso-liang, op.cit., pp.186-190. 
is available in English in 
· .... ·.:. :-._: ·. 
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upsurge. This is why the Party left the promotion of rent reduction to 
the peasants associations, and insisted that the government itself 
should take a position of 'approving neutralism'. 
Thirdly, the decision offered a compromise policy in which 'feudal 
exploitation' would be reduced but not eliminated entirely. 1 The 
exceptions were 'stubbornly unrepentant traitors', against whom the 
policy of eliminating 'feudal exploitation' was to be adopted; that is, 
their land was to be confiscated. 2 The decision adds that after the 
reduction of rent and interest rates, the collection of rent and interest 
and the landlords' civil liberties, and political, land and economic 
3 
rights must be guaranteed. 
The CCP's dual policy on land contained many difficult problems. 
On the one hand, the Party attempted a thorough execution of rent and 
interest reduction for the peasants, while on the other, it tried to 
guarantee rent and interest collection for the landlords. The Communist 
government was to force the landlords to reduce rates of rent and inter-
est, but was also to force the tenants and debtors to pay rent and 
interest, even if at a reduced rate. The stated purpose was to enable 
the 4 Party to win over both peasants and landlords. But the difficulty 
was that if the Party inclined either to the 'right' or to the 'left', 
it tended to lose the support either of the peasants or of the landlords, 
and in practice policy tended to veer to one side or the other. Avoidance 
of 'left' and 'right' inclinations dep~nded very much upon the cadres 
who were in charge of actual implementation. And the decision admits 
2 
3 
4 
Brandt, et al., op.cit . , p.278. 
Ibid, 
Ibid. 
lbid. 
. . ·.· .' ; ...... ·., ., ·· . 
·· .. ···. 
• '.;'1'1: • .:• ;~;.;:;-1,:: ·. ·~;.,..'-
~~:.~;':~' ·_..,·-.;,~·~;! 
. ,_,,.~....-- -
226 
that in many areas where rent reduction had not been implemented, the 
main reason was not landlord resistance but the indifference and bureau-
1 
cratic attitudes of the cadres. 
The last two paragraphs of the decision are devoted to directives 
to the cadres : 
One must realize that there generally exists a wide gap between the 
promulgation of laws and solgans and the implementation of such 
laws and slogans. If bureaucratism is not punished harshly and 
rightist tendencies unopposed, we shall not be able to implement 
our laws and slogans. 
The guarantee of rent and interest collection and the protection 
of the landlord's civil, political, land, and economic rights are 
the second aspect of our Party's land policy .... We must explain 
clearly the Party's policy, both within the Party and among the 
peasant masses in order to ... enable them to understand that the 
land policy of the Party in the anti-Japanese national united front 
differs i~ certain_ basic respects from the land policy of civil 
war days. 
While adherence to the decision was mandatory, it did not impose 
rigid criteria for the implementation of rent reduction. In an appendix, 
the decision allowed the guerrilla areas to take more moderate measures 
according to different conditions, such as rent reduction by 20, 15 or 
10 percent of prewar rent on all land in all the areas under Communist 
3 
control, irrespective of the status of landowners or the form of tenancy. 
Significantly, the Party did not allow any exemption from rent reduction, 
unlike the Directive of the CCP Central Committee on Land Policy in 1936, 
which listed a number of categories of land which were not to be 
Perhaps more significant is that, contrary to the belief 
of the Central Committee, the peasant masses in the guerrilla areas were 
even mor8 radical than those in the old and well established bases; the 
1,;orth Bureau, in fact, had to calm them down to keep the united front going. 
l Ibid. , p.280. 
, 
Ibid. , p. 281. 
3 
Ibid. I p.282. 
4 
Nao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 5, p.64. 
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The decision adopts a moderate line on the land of public and 
n2.tional traitors. Land belonging to 'most criminal and notorious 
traitors' was to be confiscated and rented out, not distributed, to the 
peasants to farm, under the management of the government. But land owned 
by those who were 'forced' to become traitors, and land belonging to 
landlords who !1ad fled, .~as not to be confiscated. 1 Mao's concept of 
unity was applied here, as it was in the 1942 Party rectification cam-
paign; that is, one should unite with 'sick' people, and not to liquidate 
them, by 'curing their disease' . To Mao, however, unity did not mean 
abandonment of the class struggle, but a broad united front to carry 
out the class struggle more effectively, by uni ting with the middle 
elements to isolate and weaken the primary enemy. 
It does seem, however, that non-distribution of land owned by the 
government, which included confiscated land, was not strictly observed 
by the land ~aws enforced in the base areas following the 1942 decision. 
For example, the Land Use Law of the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii Border Region which 
was amended in October 1942 in accordance with the decision, allowed 
public land to be distributed to disabled soldiers and their families, 
2 the poor dependants of anti-Japanese servicemen and poor peasants. The 
land rights law of the SKN Border Region in 1944 also allowed for dis-
t:ribution of public land to landless soldiers, their families, disabled 
solciers, landless national minorities, refugees and migrants. 3 
The decision was intended as the basis for the land laws of all 
base areas in China. It set forth principles for the reduction of .rent 
Brandt, et.al., op.cit. ,pp.284-285. 
2 
Article 65, Hsiu-cheng Chin-Chi-Lu-Yii pien~ch'ii 
hstng t' iao-li (Amended Provisional Regulations on 
Chi-Lu-YU Border Region), Ch'i Wu, op.cit., p.317. 
t'u~ti shih-yung tsan-
Land Use in the Chin-
3 
Article 9, Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'ii ti-ch'iian t'iao-li (Regulations on 
Land Rights ~.n the SKN Border Region) , December 1944, Shen-Kan-Ning 
pzen-ch'li ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, pp. 239-240. 
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and interest rates: "Rent should be reduced by twenty-five per cent 
from the pre-war rate for rent." At the same time it attempted to provide 
protection of tenure against predictable recapture of land by the land-
lords: "Both parties shal 1 be encouraged to sign long-term contracts, 
for example, for five years or more, to enable the peasants to increase 
production with a feelinCJ of SP.Curi ty." The guarantee of the landlords' 
right to collect rent is stated in the following form: "If a tenant 
gives up cultivating the land for two years without reason or deliberately 
refuses to pay rentals even though capable of doing so, the owner· of the 
1 land has the right to take the land back." 
In these stipulations, one can see the point the Central Committee 
;,as driving at. The aim was not so much to protect the landlords' right 
to collect rent, even at reduced rates, as to reduce land rent and protect 
tenure for the tenants on a long-term basis. If they observed the above 
stipulations ~trictly, it was nearly impossible for landlords to recover 
their land. They had to wait for their tenants to give up cultivation 
for t;io years without reason, which practically never happened, or for 
them deliberately to re.fuse payment when capable of doing so, which, 
given the land hunger in North China, was extremely rare. 
The principle of interest reduction in the 1942 decision is that 
"Jne and one-half per cent (per month) is to be the rate in calculating 
interest. If the total payment of interest exceeds the amount of the· 
or1ginal capital of the loan, interest is to stop; (only) the capital 
is to be r•:paid. If the total payment of interest is double the amount 
2 
of the capital, payment on both capital and interest are to be suspended". 
1 
2 
Brandt et al., op.cit., p.283.(My emphasis). 
Ibid. 
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In a situation in which the majority of the rural population was 
indebted and interest-paying, the social impact of this stipulation can 
hardly be exaggerated. The problem of rural loans was part of the land 
problem, because payment of debt interest at extraordinary high rates 
was one of the major reasons for loss of land and other major property 
by the peasant masses. 
Following the 1942 decision, every base area produced or amended 
its land law along the lines laid down in the decision. In February 
1942 the SKN Border Region Government Council passed the Regulations 
on Land and Tenancy of the SKN Border Region. The Shantung Region 
enforced the Provisional Regulations on Tenancy of Shantung Province; 
the Amended Provisional Regulations on Land Use of the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yli 
Border Region were enforced in October; and in February 1943, the 
Regulations on Tenancy and Rent and Interest of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border 
Region were promulgated. The purpose of these laws was partly to give 
an economic incentive for agricultural production by reducing rent and 
interest rates, as was that of the Central Committee decision itself, 
although their main purpose was socioeconomic transformation at the 
crucial level of 'production relations', land ownership. These purposes 
are stated explicitly in Article l of the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yli land use law: 
These regulations are enacted for the sake of consolidation for 
the resistance, of increasing production and improving the people's 
livelihood, based on the existing land relations, the circumstances 
behind the enemy lines and the Programme of the Resistance and 
National Reconstruction. l 
By the Central Committee decision, the CCP had established a land 
poliry for the period of the united front, for the first time in four 
and half years of resistance war. It is significant that the land policy 
1 
hmended Provisional Regulations on Land 
Border Region, Ch'i Wu, op.cit., p.310. 
Us8 in the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yli 
'", ·.-~-;-u;-- --
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put more emphasis on implementation of rent reduction rather than on 
appeasement of the landlords. In other words, the line it represented 
is more one of class struggle than of 'nationalism' , even though the 
rent reduction policy itself represented a compromise for the national 
struggle. The evidence seems to suggest that in the face of a serious 
military, economic and political crisis in 1941 and 1942, the Party 
realised that unless the peasants were mobilised for economic develop-
ment and political participation, the Party would be unable to survive. 
In the practical process of rent reduction, it is clear that the 
CCP carried out its land policy systematically only after the 1942 
decision. In T'aihang-T'aiyueh and south Hopei, for example, the 
Party began to implement the land policy in May 1942. It was, however, 
only after the enforcement of the Amended Provisional Regulations on 
Land Use in October 1942 that rent and interest reduction developed 
into an extensive mass movement, involving what is known as fan-shen or 
'turnover' , ' as part of the series of the mass movements in the same 
period throughout the Communist base areas. A similar process to that 
in Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu took place in the SKN Border Region. No editorial 
on rent reduction appeared in the Chieh-fang jih-pao until 5 December 
1942, and news items on the subject before this date were more 'formal' 
than in the later period. This suggests that the Party had not yet 
given serious attention to the concrete process of rent reduction 
implementation at the basic level, or that the policy had not yet been 
carried out rigorously and that the concrete questions which normally 
emerge in the implementation process had not yet arisen. 
-
1 Ch'i. Wu, op.cit., p.120. Fan-shen in the context of the Communist 
revolution means that people change the social, economic and political 
order as well as their own way of thinking. In practice, it means 
that the people gain the 'fruits' of the struggle, in the form of 
tangible economic benefits, and that they eliminate their fatalism and 
fear of th~ old ruling class. 
. .• 
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From the last half of November 1942 some advanced areas in the SKN 
acrder Region introduced the policy at the village level. In other 
base areas the 'struggle' (the word struggle had been avoided in previous 
years in relation to rent reduction) for thorough implementation of the 
rent and interest reduction policy bega~ in the same autumn, in a much 
more radical way than in the SKN Bbrder Region. The Chieh-.fang jih-pao 
of 14 December 1942 gave an example of Ma-t'ien-chen in Liao Hsien, 1 the 
centre of the Communist stronghold in T'aihang Region in south Shansi. 
The rent rerluction struggle there was sparked by the fact that drought 
had reduced the crop yield that autumn to 50-60 percent of that in a 
normal year, but the landlords still tried to collect rent on the basis 
of a normal harvest year. The tenants could not afford to pay the rent 
and, not surprisingly, became more enthusiastic about rent reduction than 
they had been before. 
In this example at least, no indication of previous rent reduction 
was evident. Moreover, it seems that if it had not been for the bad 
harvest, the 'struggle' might not have even taken place. Even in the 
centre of one of the oldest Communist base areas, land policy seems not 
to have been widely implemented before 1941. Consequently, rent reduction 
in the base areas was necessarily a 'struggle'. Mass mobilisation in 
this particular area in the four year period when rent reduction was 
not carried out depended, presumably, on what Gillin calls "other reforms 
which ::evolutionized the existing social structure in Shansi by under-
minhg profoundly the power of the rich. "2 The main component of these 
'other reforms' was taxation reform, which imposed heavy taxes o~ the 
rtcher 20 percent of village households which supplied nearly all economic 
l 
Liao is now Tso Ch'i.ian which was renamed after one of the Communist 
mil;tary leaders who was killed in the war in 1942. 
2 
Glllin, "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," 
p 282. 
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,-c=".'"yrcs for the war and administration. This reform was carried out 
with the assistance of armed mass organisations consisting of young 
1 
villagers. 
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Rent reduction and refunds in the case of Ma-tien-chen were carried 
out by the peasants themselves, organised by the peasants (national 
salvation) association. The Central Committee decision stipulates the 
task of the peasants association as: 
to assist the government in carrying out the laws concerning the 
reductions of rent and interest rates. After the rent and interest 
rates have been reduced, its major task is to assist the government 
in mediating rural disputes and increasing agricultural production. 
It shall not, however, substitute its own decisions for go~ernment 
laws and orders, nor take the place of the administration. 
In spite of this, the goverr,ment and the army in Ma-tien-chen do not 
seem to have done more than promise their support to the peasants 
association in the rent reduction struggle. Apparently, however, the 
Party still assumed leadership within the association, because a member 
of the rent reduction committee was referred to as 'comrade' in the 
Chieh-fang jih-pao. The main 'struggle' by the peasant masses took only 
three days. None of the leaders was concerned to avoid violent struggle, 
and all leaders of mass organisations, the administration and the armed 
forces sought to carry out the struggle by any means possible. The 
case of Ma-tien-chen is worth discussing further, because it illustrates 
many aspects typical of rent reduction struggles in the base areas after 
thctlc . d'' 3 e en ra ornmittee ecision. 
1 
2 
3 
See ibid., pp.282-286. See also the following section on taxation. 
Brandt, et.al., op.cit., p.280. (My emphasis l . 
The description of the struggle below is based on "Ma-tien-chen 
chien-tsu tou-cheng" (Rent Reduction struggle at Ma-tien-chen), CFJP, 
14 December 1942. 
" 
Against a background of bad harvest in 1942 and greater concern 
among the peasants for the new rent reduction law than had been the 
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case in previous years, the peasant association convened a small meeting 
of c.Jdres to discuss the significance of a 25 percent rent reduction 
and a rent of 37. 5 percent of the crop. The women's association also 
hdd a tenant women's meeting, On the day after these meetings, the 
peasants association called a meeting of peasants in and around Ma-tien-
chen to demand a reduction and refund of rent. Eight hundred. peasants 
arrived with empty grain bags to show their resolution to take back the 
excess rent they had paid over the years. The chairman and the district 
chief of the peasants association addressed the meeting in turn, the 
lattei· demanding to know what the government would do to assist in rent 
reduction. The peasants present demanded that the village headman be 
brought to the meeting to answer this question. The headman stated 
chat, since the government had promulgated the rent reduction law, the 
excess rent collected by the landlords should be refunded: "If they won't 
q1ve it back to you, the government will immediately punish them in 
10cordance with law," The representative of troops stationed at Ma-tien-
chen also declared support for the law of the resistance administration. 
The peasants, now confident of victory in the struggle, demanded that 
the landlords be called to the meeting and decided to set up a rent 
reduct10n committee to calculate excess rent and to prevent doception 
by the landlords, When the landlords came to the meeting, they accepted 
all the demands of the peasants, agreed with the rent reduction committee's 
claculation of excess rent, and promised to refund it immediately after 
the 1r.2eting. After the meeting, however, some landlords fled, some 
refused to see the tenants at all and some threatened their tenants. 
ln,, st:ruggle now entered a uew stage. The association decided to con~ 
cc·rd r;1t•2 i cs forces on attacking the most powerful landlord, one called 
-r. - _-.;' !:. ··~ , 
. ··. 
·-: .. ·.:.·: 
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Kuei He-o:heng, in the belief that the other landlords would postpone 
act wn until they saw what Kuei was going to do. About fifty of Kuei' s 
tenants led by the committee went to his house and told him that they 
w0 uld be there till he refunded the excess rent. After a day of stalling 
anc. prevarication, Kuei agreed to the peasants' demands. Having heard 
about Kuei's capitulation, some landlords went immediately to the 
peasants association office to announce that they would refund and reduce 
rent voluntarily, while the peasants, more confident than before and 
rea'1sing the extent of their power and the landlords' impotence, 
were able to complete the rent reduction struggle. In the process of 
c111e movement, the prestige of the peasants association and the govern-
ment 1<as heightened, and the relationship between the army and·the 
peasants was improved. 
The writer of this report, presumably one of the peasants 
association cadres from the district or hsien level, seems to have had 
little concern for the united front with the landlords; nor does he 
report that anyone tried to protect the landlords' interests for the 
sak" of the united front, even though no landlords at Ma-tien-chen 
appears to have been a traitor. The report does not even mention the 
landlords' right to collect rent at reduced rates. The fact that this 
report appeared in the Party's central o~gan means that the Central 
Committee wished to propagate the example of Ma-tien-chen as one which 
embodied the necessary elements for success and which should be taken 
as a model for the rent reduction struggle elsewhere. This emphasis 
on reduction of rent rather than the united front runs throughout the 
articles and reports on rent reduction struggles in the Chieh-fang jih-
pao after the Central Committee decision. The Party was far less 
'.'on-erned with maintaining the united front than it had been before, 
even in the base areas confronting the enemy. 
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rt s~ems, therefore, that the Central Conunittee had determined 
to strengthen class struggle at the basic level, in the knowledge that 
tl:is meant giving up to c. certain extent support of the landlord class. 
several n'asons for this can be deduced. First, this time the KMT 
hostility to the CCP had erupted in numerous armed clashes, including 
the New Fourth Army Incident, and the CCP was forced to stand by itself. 
s~condly, Communist power in the base areas had been consolidated more 
f1rmiy than in the early period of the war. Thirdly, the CCP had·to 
mobilise the peasants to increase production by offering them certain 
economic incentives. Finally, if Liu Shao-ch'i was personally respons~ 
ible for the policy of appeasement towards the richer class, it might 
not be coincidental that in 1941 he was sent to Central China to rebuild 
the New Fourth Army, as a consequence of which Mao's influence was 
strengthened within the North Bureau of the Central Conunittee. 
In other words, the CCP had now established its policy of socio-
econom\c transformation as preeminent, and taking precedence over the 
p:ol u:y of uni ting with the landlord class. The class struggle line was 
now more openly pursued.. As the example of Ma-tien-chen indicates, in 
the process of the struggle the peasants became increasingly radical as 
they faced the recalcitrance of the landlords. By overcoming the 
landlords by violent measures backed by the moral support of the govern-
ment and the army, the peasants became more confident of their power 
and freed themselves from the traditional fear of the landlords. Mass 
str•1ggle, therefore, had been demonstrated as the best means of mass 
educ:at1on and mass involvement in a new way of thinking and a new 
'Jalue system. In November 1945, when the CCP was more explicit about 
the class struggle, Mao wrote in an :Lnner-Party directive: 
Rent reduction must be the result of mass struggle, not a favour 
bestowed by the government. On this depends the success or 
fol1•1re of rent reduction. In the struggle for rent 
.. : .·: · ... • 
"' 
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reduction, excesses can hardly be avoided; as long as it is really 
a conscious struggle of the broad masses, any excesses that have 
occurred can be corrected afterwards. Only then ca~we persuade 
the masses and enable them to understand that it is in the interest 
of the peasants and the people as a whole to allow the landlords 
to make a living so that they will not help the Kuomintang. 
In the SKN Border Region, the situation was somewhat different: 
rent reduction did not necessarily need to take the form of struggle, 
·;specially in those areas where the land revolution had been carried 
out. More landlords were cooperative with the Communists than in other 
base areas where they might expect the Japanese or the KMT army to 
defeat the Communists and protect their interests. In SKN, the main 
problem was not with landlords who resisted the reduction of rent, 
bnt with those who tried. to repossess their land after the reduction. 
In other words, the SKN Border Region was an advanced region in re.spect 
of this land policy. Fewer landlords thought they could resist the 
reduction itself, but some tried to interrupt the process by utilising 
the guarantee of their legal land rights. The editorial in the Chieh-
fang jih-pao for 6 December 1942 emphasised that the peasants could not 
be expected to campaign for a reduction of rent if they feared that 
they might next year lose the land they tilled. 'l'herefore, it argued, 
the guarantee of tenure was the key to thorough implementation of the 
policy. An editorial arguing the same case appeared in the Chieh-fang 
J!h-pao again on 28 December 1942. Both editorials referred only to 
the SKN Border Region. 
The main measures adopted in SKN were meetings and 'persuasion'. 
There were 38 items on rent reduction in SKN in the Chieh-fang jih-pao 
1n November and December 1942, and only a very few, which are reports 
from areas where land redistribution had not taken place, mention 
l 
Mao, IV, p. 72, 
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l 
vwlent struggle. Many of them refer to enlightened landlords who 
offered to refund or reduce rent voluntarily. 2 Some of these enlightened 
landlords joined the rent reduction examination committees. 3 Tenancy 
problems were settled mainly by joint meetings of landlords and tenants 
sfonsored by the peasants associations. 4 It is significant, however, that 
even in the SKN Border Region, radical rent reduction struggles were 
5 
reported from some areas. As Mark Selden states, the emphasis on 'unity 
and stability' during the years from 1937 to 1941 favoured persistence 
of the old power relations, particularly in those relatively new areas 
of SKN where the land revolution had not been carried out. 6 
The Central Committee decision on land policy brought an end to the 
fluctuations in the Party's land policy, and thereafter the CCP retained 
this document as the basis for its land policy, until the 'May Fourth 
directive' on land policy of the Central Committee in 1946. It seems, 
however, that the Party still found it difficult in practice to reduce 
rent 'rigorously and extensively' within a short period. A Communist 
survey reveals, for example, that in 1944 in the First District of P'ing-
shan Hsien in T'aihang Region, in the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yll Border Region, the 
rent on only 13.2 percent of rented land was less than 37.5 percent of 
the crop yield, whereas rent ranging from 40 to 80 percent of the crop 
accounted for 80 percent of rented land, and the remaining 6.8 percent 
1-----
2 
3 
4 
Cf'JP, 2a November, 18, 23, and 27 
For example, 24, 25 and 27 November, 1 and 13 D"'cember, and so on. 
Cl·JP, 25 November 1942. 
A typical meeting is described in the CFJP, 3 December 1942, "Chi Ching-
yang Hsin-pn ch'u i-k~ tsu-tien hui-i" (On a Meeting on Tenancy at 
iis1n-pu District, Ching-yang Hsien). 
s 
Se~ Selden, op.cit., p.234. 
G 
Ibid., pp.234-236. 
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of cented land was rented at more than 80 percent of crop yield. 1 This 
. .,,.s not an exceptional case, at least in the T' aihang Region; in many 
Qther hs1en such as He-shun, Li-ch'eng, She and Ts'an-huang, rent of 
. 2 
about 60 percent was quite common. It should be noted that these hsien 
·.-:ere old Communist base areas whP.re Communist power was supposed to have 
iJeen firmly established since 1938. This suggests that even though the 
CCP adopted a defined land policy and attempted to mobilise the peasants 
for the class struggle, deep rooted fears of the landlords were not 
eosily swept away. Implementation of a radical land policy was one of 
the most difficult tasks faced by the Party, because it required that 
the long-oppressed people should stand up and face directly their still-
p~werful oppressors. 
Nevertheless, after 1942 mass campaigns for rent and interest re-
duct1on were carried out every autumn and winter when rent was paid. 
'Speaking bitterness', 3 which later became one of the most powerful 
weap:ms of the CCP in the prosecution of mass movements, was an increas-
ingly popular device. 4 Persuasion, or 'talking reasonably' (shuo-tao-li 
or shuo-1 i' to the l;;indlords to reduce rent, which had been practised 
<-:ide ly before 1942, was now transformed into persuasion 'struggle' (shuo-
!: 1:ou-cheng) , by which landlords were frightened or forced to accede. 5 
1 
T'aihang tang-wei yen-chiu-shih, "T'aihang ch'ii she-hui ching-chi 
t: 1 ao-c:h' a ti-erh-chi" (Social and Economic Investigation in the T' aihang 
P.egi.onl, rn.p.: 1945), quoted in Ch'i Wu., op.cit., p.122. 
2 
Tb1d. 
? 
'Speaking bitterness' (su-k'u) is a technique by which the people 
talk at meetings about hardships and sufferings, with the purpose of 
c1r1ng personal resentments and stirring up class hatred. This technique 
·.-;'ls used extensively in the Civil War period. Jack Belden notes its 
~sychol.ogical effect on the poor peasants, who had never before expected 
'"''talk at meetings. See Belden, op.cit., pp.162-163. 
Ch'i Wu. op.cit., p.121. 
l bid. 
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f:""t:hermore, an 'examinat:ion of rent: reduction campaign' (ch' a-chien 
,1un-tung J was int:roduced where rent had already been reduced, in order 
ro check on landlords' attempts to raise rent, to repossess rented 
land, to demand secret additional rent, or not to reduce actual rent 
in spite of formal reduction. 1 In effect, rent reduction became a 
mass movement or mass struggle after 1942. This new resolution on 
the part: of the Party seems to have reduced the fear of the landlords 
among the peasants and to have increased their trust in the Communist 
government:. It has been claimed by CCP sources that in roughly two-
thirds of Communist-controlled areas, rent reduction had been im-
plemented thoroughly 2 before the Japanese surrender. 
Although the CCP's land policy did not aim at redistributing land, 
the rent reduction policy, together with progressive taxation and the 
production campaign, helped to change the pattern of land ownership. 
Given below are two examples of shifts in land ownership in the base 
areas, 
l The SKN Border Region carried out ch'a-chien campaign in the winter 
of 1942;43. In the winter of 1944/45, the Chin-Chi-Lu-YU Border 
Region launched a campaign of ch'a-chien, which contributed to trans-
forming land ownership relations in the Region. Ch'i Wu, op.cit., 
PP-126-127. See Table 1 below. 
Meng hs ien-chang, Chung-kuo chin-ta.i ching-chi shih chiao-ch' eng 
'Textbook on Modern Chinese Economic History), (Shanghai: 1951) , 
_ 2G 7. 
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TABLE l ~Jard ''~tnership ~efo~e and af~er H.~nt r.:.e-::uction: 15 Villages :...-:-f t:hec! 12 il.3 i.-:;,~ . t-.:.·:,i+1~~ 
:-:~ 
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in T' aihang Region in the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region l \:3f~1 lit.~~ I I ' I I After May 1942 I I Before May 1942 ' I I 
Percent- Percent- Actual Percent- Percent-
age of age of amount age of age of 
house- land of house- land 
holds owned land holds owned 
owned 
in 
average 
Landlord 2.75 I 23.40 99.64 2.02 8.79 
Working 0.50 1. 59 37.32 0.41 0.91 Landlord 
Rich 7.25 18.68 30.37 6.90 14.53 Peasant 
Middle 37.80 37.02 11.56 46.79 54.87 Peasant 
I 
Poor 48.95 18.98 4.57 42.12 20.05 Peasant 
. 
Hired 
1.88 0.25 1. 57 0.95 0.39 Farmhand 
. 
1 
Ch'i Wu, op.cit., p.125. 
1945 
Actual Percent-
amount of age of 
land house-
owned in holds 
average 
42.28 1.65 
21.82 0.33 
20.74 5.99 
11.54 55.20 
4.69 33.33 
4.26 0.49 
Percent- I Actual 
age of amount 
land of 
owned land 
in 
a"1erage 
3.64 
-
0.58 
-
17.18 
-
60.85 
-
17.01 
-
0.18 
-
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Land Ownersnip before and after Rent: Reduction: 
~ Villages in the Chin-Sui Border Region, 1 
1 Percentage of . Percentage of Actual amount of 
households land owned land per household 
I 
in average 
1940 1945 1940 1945 1940 1945 
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: Landlord 3.8 2.4 30.3 9,0 
, 595 (mou) 350 
I 
I 
1 RJ.cb 
pes.sant 10.8 8.3 24.8 17.5 218 185 
:-:1ddle 
peasant 25.8 44.0 27.5 49.0 102 125 
Poor 
peasant 53,4 42,0 16.3 23.5 29 50.9 
Hired 
farmhand 5-2 2,0 0.85 0,4 16 23.5 
Others LO L3 0.25 0.6 - -
-
The point which emerges strongly from examination of the CCP's 
post-1942 land policy and is confirmed by these figures is that in prac-
t1ce the CCP did intend to change land ownerhsip by its rent reduction 
poi1cy. In practice, the government encouraged peasants to buy land, 
an0 gave the tenants priority if they wished to purchase the land they 
actually tclled- Because tenancy was not now so profitable as before, 
landlords were discouraged from maintaining land ownership2 and the price 
or Land fell, giving the peasants a better chance of purchasing land .. 
The Central Committee decision on land policy contained a stipulation 
on the priority accorded to the tenants: 
When a landowner, at the expiration of rent contract, 
wants to re-rent his land, mortgage, or sell it, the 
' L Ch' eng-Jui, "K' ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch 'i jen-min chi-ke ke-ming ken-
chii-ti ti nung-yeh shui-shou chih-tu yli nung-min fu-tan" (The Agricultur-
al T axat.LOn System and Peasants' Burden in S.ome Revolutionary Base Areas 
0
' •:r1~ People in th<> Anti-Japanes.e War Period), Ching-chi yen-chiu, 
::c :i, 1956, p<l03, 
' TC.cs was reinforced by progressive income-property tax which landlords 
:1ad i:o pay on their income from rent and their land rented out, See 
t~e bilowing section on taxation system. 
.;- ~ . 
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original tenant has the priority, if other 
conditions are equal, in renting, buying, 
0£ taking1the mortgage on the land in question. 
Ir: circumstances where the benefits derived by the peasants from 
communist leadership might be lost if Communist rule was overthrown, 
the peasants naturally saw it in their own interests to prolong 
Communist rule. To the extent that the CCP's policy brought to the 
peasants economic and political benefits which neither of its rivals 
2 provided, the CCP identified itself with the peasants, even though 
its policy may have been ambiguous. 
The policies and campaigns of the CCP must be seen as inter-
related, but generally speaking, the CCP was concerned less with rent 
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reduction itself than with the production campaign, particularly after 
1913. The 1942 Central Committee decision on land policy indicates 
that one of the major purposes of rent reduction was to provide the 
peasants with an incentive for increasing production. The improve-
ment of the peasants' livelihood under the Communist regime depended 
more upon their own efforts in the production drive than on rent 
reduction; the production drive did not require the solution of 
theoretical questions of the national and class struggles. Until 
1946, it seems that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues in the Central 
Comm1tte2 had given little thought to going beyond the 1942 decision. 
Nor were they happy with resort to violent measures to force the 
l 
2 
Brandt et a::., op. cit., p. 283. 
The Japanese did not intend to make any change in thto Chinese social 
or economic system, although their military operations unintention-
ally liquidated what they wanted to preserve. But they were too busy 
with military campaigns and with establishing puppet administrative 
systems to be concerned with the livelihood of the basic people. 
In the areas under the KMT, r<mt was actually raised during the war, 
because of the increased land prices caused by the flight of capital 
from the coastal cities, which was invested in land. Additional 
taxes for the war, imposed on a limited number of people in relatively 
small areas, lowered living standards among the peasants. Above all, 
the KMT did not believe that its social and economic reform programmes 
could be implemented under war conditions . 
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landlords to reduce rent, even though new circumstances after 1944 seemed 
to require such measures. When the war situation turned in favour of the 
CCF in the spring of 1944, the CCP had to face a real problem of vigorous 
class antagonism in the areas newly cavtured from the Japanese. 'Anti-
rra1tor accounts settling' (fan-chien ch'ing-suan) struggles, accompanied 
~\' •; lolence, were often beyond the control of the Communist cadres. 
The landlords themselves were also the victims of war and therefore 
could be allies of the peasants in the anti-Japanese war. As a class, 
however, they were reluctant to give up, without resistance, the economic 
beneftLS they had held for centuries. The class struggle was necessarily 
mere v1s1ble and more acute in the guerrilla areas, where the two politic-
al forces, one of which favoured giving some economic and political bene-
fits to the peasants at the expense of the landlords, and the other which 
favoured preserving the old economic and social relations, were engaged in 
a m1l1tary struggle to defeat each other. It was to be expected, there-
fore, that more radical class antagonisms appeared in the border areas 
and also in newly occupied areas. The CCP was to experience this pheno-
menon over increasingly larger areas in 1945 1 and it was finally pushed to 
introduce more and more radical land policies in 1946 and 1947. The thee-
retccal dilemma between the national and the class struggle was resolved 
in favour of the latter on the basis of the identity of interests between 
1 the CCP and the peasants. 
4, The Taxation System 
In the Yenan period the CCP tried to solve the contradiction between 
tr.e unned front and the class struggle, in the rent reduction policy, 
Z<llQ also lll its fiscal policies 1 particularly in the progressive taxation 
0 YS~ern which was officially based on the KMT principle 'yu-ch'ien ch'u-
-:-----
;,t the end of the war, Mao's recognition of the economic and political 
5ig1uf lcance of i:.he peasants' improved livelihood for the Party's survival 
;:,c'c~rne r lear, even though he wanted to maintain the rent reduction policy 
a.nd t.he ::ollaboration wit.h the KMT, See "On Coalition Government, 11 Mao, 
:!1, •specially pp.299-301. 
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ch' 1 en' I t:hose who have money must con tr ibut money [for the resistance]) . 
. Zilthough progressive taxation was no more than a moderate 'bo•1rgeois 
democratic' system of finance, it was quite revolutionary in rural China. 
But it: was still a compromise. By the progressive taxation system, the 
rarry attempted to ease the heavy financial burden on the peasants as 
well as to appease the landlords by imposing tax on 80 percent of the 
people However, as in the process of the rent reduction 'struggle', 
mass Folitical mobilisation in the process of tax collection allowed the 
Party to go beyond the simple objective of progressive taxation to in-
valve t:he peasants in the political process. 
ThP. CCP's use of taxation illustrates its practice of exploiting 
every opportunity for mass politicisation and transformation of class and 
humai relations at the basic level of society. A feature of the Com-
mun1st: t:axation system, particularly after 1941, is that the argument pre-
sented to the peasant masses to persuade them to accept reasonable tax-
auon were primarily socioeconomic. Chalmers Johnson's argument about 
mass nar.ionalism does not work here. Nationalism does not appear to have 
been a fact:or in t:he peasants' response, nor did the CCP use the 
nationalist cause in taxation programme. 
The CCP started to modernise the taxation system as soon as the base 
areas were established. In the SKN Border Region the Communists abolished 
43 kinds of taxes and levies, and had adopted a unified taxation system by 
1~37. 1 The Border Region government issued a taxation decree every year, 
in which it stipulated the total amount of tax to be collected in grain, 
mainly millet and wheat, twice a year after harvest, which was assessed 
0 . d . 2 n propert:y an income, 
Before 1941, when the CCP could depend on Kuomintang financial 
assistance, and the taxation system in the base areas other than SKN was 
not well established, tax tended to imposed only on the richer 50 percent. 
i:-----
Lin Po-cl1 1 li 1 s report in 
hui-chi, p, 25. 
1939, Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'U ts'an-i-hui wen-
hs1en 
2 
'.'01 the amounts of the grain tax collected in each 
1
'0·iS in the SKN Border Region, see Selden, op. cit., 
.... 
.: . 
.·,: . . · .. ·· .··· 
.· .. · 
year from 
p.182. 
1937 to 
. . . . . •,' : .' : : ._ ~ '• 
This was a reflection of Communist radicalism in the early war period, 
buL the main reason was that the Party could impose a lighter burden on 
the people because of the Central Government subsidy1 and the CCP's 
simple 'guerrilla' type administration, 
In Shansi Province, for example, where in 1935 Yen Hsi-shan had 
un1f1ed taxes into one property-income tax and adopted a policy of he-
11 tu-tan, or 'reasonable burden', the CCP was able to build on this 
system in 1938 when it set up the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region and other 
bases in Shansi. The village office was made responsible for assessing 
the villagers' economic conditions, on the basis of property, income, 
2 the number of family members, daily expenses, etc. In practice, under 
this system a heavy allocation of tax fell on the richer people, in 
accordance with the Kuomintang slogan ;yu-ch'ien ch'u ch'ien' and by 
giving power to the armed mass organisations in the village. Gillin, 
for example, states: 
1 
In areas occupied by the Eighth Route Army, taxes were reduced 
drastically, and frequently were abolished altogether. This 
policy endeared the Communists to the average farmer because in 
an effort to raise capital for his ten-year plan of economic 
development, Yen Hsi-shan had taxed his subjects unmercifully 
and these taxes had been collected, for the most part, from 
the peasants rather than the gentry. Then, the 'mobilisation 
committees' requisitioned from the gentry whateaver was needed 
in the way of supplies for the armed forces or funds to support 
their own operations. This means that the rich were forced to 
bear virtually the entire cost of the war against Japan . 
. . . Gengtry who refused to sacrifice their wealth were demounced 
in public and subjected to intense pressure from mass organisa-
tions.. If they continued to resist, their belongings were 
seized by the armed peasants who made up the 'People's Self-
Defence Corps'. This whole process had profoundly revolutionary 
overtones.3 
For the KMT subsidy to the CCP, and the impact of its cessation in 
1941 on the SKN economy, which was accompanied with other difficulties, 
see Selden, op.cite 1 pp.139 & l.77-181. 
2 
"He-11 fu-tan tsan-hsing t'iao-li" (Tentative Regulations on Reason-
cble Burden), quoted in Tada Corps, op.cit., p.298. Ch'i Wu writes 
that this was no more than a dishonoured cheque. Op.cite, p.147. See 
also Michael Lindsay, "The Taxation System of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei 
Border Region, 1938-1945," China Quarterly, No.42, p.2. 
3 
Gillin, "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," 
[c 283. 
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.~Japanese military source confirms the burden of taxation on the rich, 
citing the example of San-ch' i Village in the Fourth District in He-shun 
a81:e11 in Shansi, where 21 richer families were levied 60 percent of the 
tax for the ••hole village, 96 ordinary peasant families paid about 40 
percent, and 60 poor peasant families were not only exempt from taxation 
l but obtained a subsidy from the government. 
A contemporary article by a Communist economist also confirms that . 
1 n the early years of the war the Communist guerrilla administrations 
tended to impose heavy taxes and levies on the landlords and rich 
peasants. This article gives figures for the Central nopei base; only 
40 to 60 percent of the rural population paid taxe~, and the remaining 
GO to 40 percent of poor people were exempt from taxation. 2 According 
to Gillin, moreover, in Shansi at least 'traitors' often included those 
rich people who refused to pay the heavy taxes and requisitions imposed 
h 3 on t em. 
As Gillin has demonstrated, this radical taxation system was pre-
, 
sumably the main factor in the Communist success in the base areas in 
the early period, assisted by the disciplined and cooperative behaviour 
4 
of the Communist army and despite the failure to implement rent re-
cluct~on policy. 
By 1940, however, faced with the increase.a hostility of the KMT 
and the intensified Japanese campaigns, the CCP had difficulties in 
maintaining t'ie 'guerrilla' type taxation system. A contributing 
factor was increased government expense as new administrative institut-
5 ions were established and expanded. Inf lat ion was serious, and in 
the SKN Border Region the Communist government had to 'borrow' 50,000 
2 
3 
'Eada Corps, op. cit., pp. 298-299. 
11 Ch'eng-jui, op. cit., p. 102. 
Gillin, "'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Communism," p. 286. 
Ibid., pp. 276-277 and 282-286. 
Se~ Selden, op. cit., pp. 181-182, 
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r:::c,,ls of grain from the people in addition to the 90,000 piculs of 
qrain tax collected in 1940, which was already more than double that 
collected in the previous year. 1 
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A~cording to the Border Region Assembly Resolution on the Taxation 
Y.uestion in January 1941, the SKN Border Region government was aware of 
the shortcomings in its taxation system. There were inequalities in 
tiie allocation of tax because of the lack of correct information on 
property and income. Some former landlords were still subject to 
heavier tax in spite of the fact that they were no longer rich after 
land reform. Some taxation officers made private profits from their 
coilection. In some areas, undue burdens were imposed on a small 
2 
number of the people. These shortcomings indicate that in SKN 
3 the same 'leftist' taxation policy was executed before 1940, and also 
that the Party had to contend with the problem of corruption. 
To correct these shortcomings, the same resolution of the Border 
Region Assembly proposed a unified agricultural taxation, on the 
following principles: 
l. Investigation of public and private property and income 
should be carried out in order to lay a rational basis for 
tuxat1on 
2 Itre~pecttve of occupation, at least 80 percent of the 
peo~le should share the burden, on the basis of progressive 
taxation on their property and i.ncome. 
3, The rate of progressive taxation should be suited to 
the actual economic situation of the people of all strata. 
'cun cheng kung-liang kung-ts'ao" (On the collection of Public 
Grain and Public Hay), editorial, CFJP, 15 October 1941. The figures of 
'S<~• ,000 and 200 ,000 piculs for grain tax collected in l.940 and 1941 res-
pectively, given by Li Ch' eng-jui and also Mao Ts-tung, should be read 
l·llJ, 000 and 150, 000 piculs respectively. For the government in practice 
':ollected a total of 140,000 piculs in 1941, and 50,000 piculs out of 
.li.'C' ,000 piculs of grain tax collected in 1941 were repaid to the people. 
:,.,,.Selden, op. cit., p. 182 and Mao, III, p.113. 
:· ~ Fo-ch' li' s government report in 1941, Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch 'u ts 'an-i-
' cien lunen hui-ehi, p. 102 
"~lden, op. cit., pp. 160-161. 
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4. In the village only the village assembly and villagers' 
meeting should have power to impose the tax. 
5. Corrupt public servants should be punished by law. 
6. Without Border Region Assembly approval, there should 
be no increase in tax. 
7. The government should be resporsible for all requisi-
tioning of property and goods. 
The first three points were designed mainly to spread the tax 
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burden to more people and to raise the sliding scale of progressive 
taxation, which ref lec~ed the economic difficulties of the Border 
2 Region. At the same time, this reform of the taxation system 
embodied other objectives, i.e,, unification of tax collection, 
elimination of corruption, consolidation of the united front, and 
above all, carrying administration and mass political mobilisation 
i~to the village, For the first time, the CCP sent work teams to 
each level of local government down to hsiang level. The purpose 
mi?ht have been the collection of drastically increased taxes, but 
it also worked for the penetration of Communist policies into the 
basic level of rural society. 
Reform of the taxation systems occurred in other base areas at 
the same time as in the SKN Border Region, The 'Tentative Measures 
for Unified Progressive Taxation in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region' 
were issued in November 1940. Communist newspapers wrote that since the 
reasonable burden' system was based on the village unit, there were 
l Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'U ts'an-i-hui wen-hsien hui-chi, p.103. 
2 
For the communnist efforts to fill the gap left by the cessation 
c·f the KMT subsidy, see Selden, op.cit., pp.183-184 • 
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inequalities in the amount of tax levied on each village. 1 Michael 
Lindsay, who was in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region from early 1942, 
reports that during 1942 "the exemption limit lowered and the rate on 
lngh incomes [was] reduced'." He reports also that it was at this time 
that the administration gained "a great deal of statistical material 
hitherto unavailable in China" by collecting assessment forms on agri-
2 
cultural land filled out by the taxpayers themselves. 
The principles of the 'Tentative Measures' of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi 
Border Region were direct taxation; taxation in currency, grain or 
flour once a year; exemption of public property, stock animals and 
investment for industry, irrigation and cooperatives; exemption of 
income from manual and intellectual labour; subsidies for soldiers' 
families and the wounded in war; exemption of income of public 
enterprises, property, income of government and other organisations; 
and a 12 grade division of property and income, with a progressive 
rate of 10 percent for grades l to 6 and 20 percent for grades 7 to 12. 
Besides these measures, income from newly reclaimed land was exempt 
from taxation for three years, and the owners of industrial enterprises 
3 
were exempt from taxation on wages and food for workers. 
According to A Leature on the Unified Progressive Taxation by the 
Po-yeh Hsien Inspection Committee for the Unified Progressive Taxation, 
the merits of the new taxation of the Chin-Ch 'a-Chi Border Region were 
the abolition of more than twenty kinds of tax, and the unification 
of the tax collection organs. Apart from the single income-property 
cax, only export-import tax and contract tax remained. Tax was imposed 
once a year and collected twice a year after harvest, and only the 
1 Tada Corps, op. ·cit., p. 299. 
2 Michael Lindsay, North China Front, (London:l944), p.18. On the method 
of statistical material on land, see Lindsay, "The Taxation System of the 
Shar,si-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, 1938-1945," pp. 8-9. 
3 Quoted in Tada Corps, op. cit., pp. 300-303. 
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Border Region government and the village office had responsibility and 
power for collecting tax. 1 In reality, however, this reform had a 
purpose not mentioned in the Communist document cited above; that is, 
as in SKN, the aim was to collect more taxes from an increased number 
of people. The sliding scale starting from 10 percent was the same as 
that in SKN, which was increased from the original one percent in 1941. 
If one recalls that the poorer half of the population had been virtually 
exempt from taxation from 1937 to 1940, the CCP' s intention in collecting 
tax from a broader. section of the people is readily apparent. 
In the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region in April 1940, the Li-ch'eng 
conference of the North Bureau of the CCP adopted a programme of 
tzu-Zi keng-sheng for economic and financial work. Under this programme, 
the conference decided to set up a unified financial system, in which 
taxation should be below 30 percent of the people's income. The con-
ference decided to collect export-import taxes on trade with areas 
outside the Border Region. In· September 1940, P'eng Teh-huai presented 
the unified progressive taxation to the senior cadres conference of the 
North Bureau. 2 This system was implemented in the T'aihang Region 
from 1941 and the guerrilla bases implemented a simple and temporary 
3 
method of progressive taxation. 
The government report of the Central Shantung Region in July 
·L945 describes three undesirable characteristics of the taxation system 
rn the period until 1940: 
l 
3 
Quoted in ibi.d. , pp, 303-304, 
Ch'1 Wu, op.cit,, pp.150-151. 
Ibid., p.154. Although no source material is available for the 
taxation system in the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region, it was presumably 
s1m1lar to that in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, because of in-
tegrated contorol of the North Bureau over these regions. 
; . 
1. 
2. 
1 The troops levied supplies directly from the people. 
The burden on the people was not fixed and finances were 
in chaos. 
3. An unfairly heavy burden was imposed on the rich people. 2 
In 1941-42, the administration system was gradually consolidated and 
taxation was organised first into a temporary 'reasonable burden' system 
and later into a 'unified progressive taxation', while at the same 
time the CCP intended to impose taxes on the great majority of the 
people. 
The process of tax collection in these difficult years presents 
an interesting example of the CCP's practice of turning policy-
implementation into a mass movement. Adequate source materials are 
avaHable only for the SKN Border Region and the desc::iption below is 
drawn mainly from the Chieh-fang jih-pao. 
In SKN, from 1941 the process of tax collection was divided into 
three stages: investigation and propaganda, tax collection and con-
' f . . h 3 centration o grain into store ouses. Normally, the first stage 
took about twenty days while the second and third stages took fifteen 
days each. In the first stage the Border Region government sent work 
teams, consisting of several cadres who were members of financial 
department of the Border Region government or the Party, to the subregion 
and hsien for publicising the taxation decree and helping the hsien 
1 
2 'The troops' here probably mean local non-Communist guerrillas. 
3 Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu, op. cit., p. 36. According to Michael Lindsay, in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, the 
grain was stored iocally and issued to the army supply department or 
government organisation against grain tickets given out by a special 
government department in control of the system. under normal condit-
ions in the base areas the army was supplied its grain through the 
local :mpply department, but in the guerrilla areas or during a 
Japanese offensive each unit carried its own grain tickets and was able 
to get supplies from almost any village. North China Front, p. 18. 
This local storing system seems to have been adopted throughout the 
Communist areas including SKN. 
::·~)7d 
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government in the work of investigation and propaganda. The subregion 
and hsien administration also organised and sent work teams to lower 
levels. 
Investigation supplied the administration with information about 
the people's property and income, while propaganda was meant to convince 
the people of the significance of and justification for taxation. Inves-
tigation had two phases: formal and informal. In the former, the tax-
payers made reports on their own assessment of their property and income, 
which was usually lower than the actual amount. The latter was intended 
to find out how accurate the taxpayer's own assessment was, and to correct 
it when it was not accurate by seeking information from various people. 
A system by which villagers made their reports at the village meeting was 
regarded as the best way of ensuring that their own assessments were 
honest and accurate .. At the meeting, the village gove~nment first 
explained the importance of an honest and accurate assessment and the 
government's taxation policy and decrees. Party members and cadres were 
then supposed to make 'good' reports for use as models by the other 
l 
villagers. 
It was an entirely new experience for the villagers to be consulted 
by the government on the tax they were to pay. The government asked them 
to report their economic situation for purposes of assessing taxation. 
Hore important was that the villagers had to describe their own economic 
conditions in front of the government cadres and their fellow villagers. 
This was significant psychologically. The family still remained the 
basic production unit in the village, and revealing their situation to the 
whole village required, first, that t.he villagers should trust the 
government not to impose an unbearably heavy tax on them or allocate 
inequitable tax, and secondly, that they should trust their fellow 
1 
P 'eng Hsieh-chung, "Tsen-yang tiao-ch 'a ts 'ai-hui cheng-chieh?" 
Can the investigation be Accurate?), CFJP, 12 November 1942. 
.. · 
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villagers. By revealing their economic situation openly to the govern-
ment and the other villagers, the peasants perceived themselves as part 
of the social and political system. This was one of the ways in which 
the cc~ strengthened the peasants' horizontal and vertical ties with 
their fellow peasants and with the Communist authority. If the work team 
could convince the peasants of the need for heavy taxation, the peasants 
would be willing to share their hardships with the government and might 
be more easily available for later mobilisation because of the improved 
relationship between them and the government. 
The village taxation board, which was composed of cadres from the 
village off ice, the Party branch, mass organisations, and some active 
and 'respectable' villagers, 1 inspecLed the assessment reports, and 
decided the amount of tax to be paid by each household in the village. 
According to a Directive Letter of the Finance Department of the Border 
Region Government of the Autumn Tax Collection, the village taxation 
board was supposed to assume power for tax collection, and the work teams 
2 from the higher level administration were supposed only to help thme. 
'rhe board had to publicise the assessment of tax on each household and 
collect the villagers' criticisms and opinions. A new assessment, 
corrected by the board on the basis of criticisms·and opinions, was 
presented to a village mass meeting, when the final assessment was made. 
In the meantime the taxation workers, including the Wtrk teams from 
the higher level administration, collected information about the property 
l 
"::uan-chung fen-ch 'u cheng-liang chin-kuo" (Tax collection J"rocess in 
Kuan-chung Subregion) , CFJP, 26 December 1942. In 1944 the Border Region 
government warned the lower level administration that the members of the 
village board should represent all strata and not be selected simply 
because of the ability to write and calculate. CFJP, 26 November 1944. 
2 
"Ts' ai-cheng t' ing ch' iu-cheng chih-shih hsin," No. 3, c'lated 30 November, 
1942, CFJP, 6 December 1942. 
... · 
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0 r.cl income of every family in the village; this was the informal 
f':1ase of the investigation, Although the process of tax assessment 
illustrates the government's concern to be fair to the taxpayers, 
the government still assumed the possibility of collective deception 
;,,1 the villagers and incorrect reports based on personal grievances. 
:.,_:cording to one report, the most reliable source of informal 
1nfcrmation was native cadres, but other useful sources were farm 
Lands on the subject of their employers, loafers who usually knew the 
r1nanc1al situation of the richer people, shepherds who were simple-
minded, and older villagers who had more time to talk about others. 
The taxation workers collected information by chatting with people they 
e1,, __ ,)untered as they went about the village, and by helping villagers 
:o solve difficulties in their daily lives, for example, by settling 
quarrels among the villagers or by giving medicine to the sick. 1 
There were also inspections of the harvest on the spot, of the daily 
consumption of families, and of haystacks, which indicated the scale 
2 ()f r't1l t:ivat.ion. 
The Chieh-fang jih-pao repeatedly reminded the taxation workers 
that the investigation was for fair taxation, which meant that the 
assessment cf tax resulting from the investigation had to be convincing 
to tr1e villagers. The most preferred method of summing up the 
investigation was a joint conference of the village headmen and the 
-,,;ork team members at the hsien level. The joint conf eren~e studied 
and discussed the investigation, and decided standards and methods for 
tax collection. 3 
The taxation programme was accompanied by special propaganda. The 
'~ii' •2ng Mu, '"riao-ch 'a ti fang-fa fang-shih" (Methods and Manners of the 
cn·1estigation), CFJP, 2 December 1942. 
"·1·s'a1-cheng t'ing ch'iu-cheng chih-shih hsin," No. 3. 
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basic task of this propaganda was to provide the peasants with an 
answer to the question 'why do the people have to pay tax?' The 
answer given by the Northwest Bureau of the CCP was as follows: With-
out taxation neither the war against Japan nor the defence of the 
Border Region against the KMT could be maintained. Once the Border 
Region fell into Japanese or KMT hands, not only would taxation be 
' h ' 1 several times eavier but the people would also suffer under a 
h ' 2 dictators 1p. Propaganda also had to answer specific questions raised, 
for example, about the reasons why tax had doubled from the previous 
3 year and why hay was levied for military and transportation purposes. 
The government sought to convince the people that the Border Region 
ne•2,ied that amount of grain and hay for maintaining the war and for 
defence. It also argued that the tax in the Border Region was still 
not heavy by comparison with the period before the Communists came or 
with !<MT-controlled areas, or in relation to the economic develop-
ment under the Communist government. 4 
l The Chieh-fang jih-pao gives material for comparison of taxation in 
the Border Region and in the KMT area. See Ch'en Hua, "Pien-ch'U jen-
min ti fu-tan chiu-ching chung-pu-chung" (Is the Burden on the People 
in the Border Region Virtually Heavy?), 10 & 11 November 1941. 
2 
"Hsi-pei chu kuan-yii cheng-liang cheng-ts'ao chung ti hsiian-ch'uan 
kung-tso kei k'e-chi tang-wei ti chih-shih hsin" (Northwest Bureau's 
Letter of Directive on Propaganda Work in Tax Collection to the Party 
Committees of All Levels), dated 10 November 1941, CFJP, 11 November 
i941. 
3 
In SKN, the major method of transportation was still vehicles pulled 
by stock animals. Transportation of military supplies and salt, which 
wc.s the most important export commodity from the Border Region, was 
vital, and the government wanted hay for stock animals at every station 
along the highways for rapid transportation. CFJP, 15 October 1942. 
4 
See Ch'ea Hua's article cite1 above. Besides these, the tasks of 
propaganda were to convince the taxpayers of how fair and reasonable 
the taxation was, of how important honest and accurate reports of income 
'.·iere, and of the fact that private human relations should not be re-
fler.ted in the report or allocation of tax, etc. "An-sai ssu-ch' u ssu-
hsiang tiao-ch'a'' (Investigation for Tax Collection in the Fourth Village 
ui the Fourth District in An-sai Hsien), CFJP, 24 December 1943. 
• 
' ' 
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Propaganda methods included convocation of villagers' or block 
residents' meetings, short plays at the village assembly, mass organis-
at1ons, primary and winter schools, and talks by activists and enlight-
ened gentry. According to the Northwest Bureau, it was most important 
1 n propaganda work to select concrete examples for explaining plainly 
end si.ncerely the government's difficulties and demands, and the identity 
Jf interests between the government and the people. The propaganda 
•..iorkers had to convince the peasants that they were being consulted and 
1 
were not being ordered or coerced, 
At this stage of the taxation process, 'democracy' was emphasised. 
The village taxation board, which assumed power and responsibility for 
taxation, was appointed by the village assembly. It first assessed tax 
on its own members and on the village cadres, who were expected to pay 
tax first as an example to other villagers. It had to publicise the 
assessment of tax on every household at least three days before the 
villagers' meeting at which the final assessment was decided. 2 The 
taxation board members could be recalled if they were considered to have 
3 
worked improperly. Moreover, the Border Region government required the 
cadres and the village board to explain 'patiently' to the villagers the 
contents of the taxation decree, and to teach them how to calculate the 
4 progressive rate for themselves. 
l'lLlmerous directive letters of the Border Region government and 
articles in th" Chieh-fang jih-pao indicate the CCP' s desire to con-
vrnce the taxpayers of the necessity for heavier tax than in previous 
"11, i-pei chU kuang-yU cheng-liang cheng-ts 'ao chung ti hslian-ch' uan 
};ung-t.so kei k' e-chi tang-wei chih-shih hsin." 
'- Article 27, Tax Collection Regulations 1942, SKN Border Region Govern-
nent, CFJP, 13 August 1942. 
3 
Article 21, ibid. The village taxation board was required to tell the 
., ll.lagers about this Article, "Ts' ai-cheng t' ing ch' iu-cheng chih-shih 
!:s l n , 11 No~ 3. 
"Ts'ai-cheng t'ing ch'iu-cheng chih-shih hsin," No. 3. 
·.· 
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years. The Party seems to have been particularly anxious to avoid 
giving the peasant masses the impression that the Communists were 
the same as the KMT and warlord rulers in squeezing them as much as 
they could. If the Party successfully convinced the taxpayers, it 
wodd be able not only to achieve its goal of collecting double the 
am~unt of tax but also to involve them in Communist politics and the 
t~ansformation process. The role of propaganda was, therefore, 
critical, and assessment had to be accurate. 
Following the final assessment came stage two, the collection 
and transportation of grain. Even at this stage the assessment could 
be changed by the village assembly. The Border Region government 
requ2red the work team members to check the assessment on all tax-
payers who were reluctant to pay, and to adjust the assessment if it 
was unreasonable; the government asserted that it was bureaucratic 
to consider individual phenomena as unimportant and 'to be afraid to 
l be bothered' . The emphasis in this stage was on collection of good 
grain and collection of the total amount assessed. The taxation 
workers were responsible for intensive propaganda and education among 
the villagers in order to make them pay good quality grain. 'Urging 
grain payment' work teams were organised in the villages to assume 
responsibility for collection. They called the villagers together 
every evening to plan the next day's- collection and transportation, 
and they organised the villagers and their stock animals into trans-
portation teams in order to complete grain collection as soon as 
'b 2 ~oss1 le. 
The whole process of tax collection does not appear to have worken 
l 11 PiE.,-ch'U ts 1 ai-cheng t 1 ing ch'iu-cheng 
~-l December 1942, CFJ P, 18 December 1942. 
lb.td. 
chih-shih hsin'; No. 4, dated 
·~ ----;--·-~-
.. : .. 
•·'' 
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The peasants resisted the government by submitting false 
assess1oent reports, by sabotage or the postponement of sending grain. 
1 Even the Chieh-fang jih-pao admitted to these problems. Not only 
the general peasants but also cac'lres were guilty of failing to carry 
out tax collection work properly. The most common problem was that 
the work teams from higher levels did everything for the local admin-
1stration instead of simply assisting it, ignoring local conditions, 
and assessing tax without proper investigation of the financial 
conditions of individual peasants or listening to the opinions of 
2 
native cadres and local people. 
This phenomenonwas partly the result of the problems of cadres. 
In SKN, 90 percent of the hsiang cadres were virtually illiterate, 
although they had revolutionary experience of land redistribution 
struggle and good knowledge of their native villages. In the 'unity 
and stability' period of 1937-41, to use Mark Selden's terminology, 
their lack of education and administrative skill tended to overshadow 
their other abilities. The efficiency of the cadres from the higher 
levels with their education and over-enthusiasm, tended to result in 
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the work teams taking over all the work of the village administration. 
The Party was alerted to the problem. If the work teams failed to 
mobilise the masses through the local cadres or to respect local 
conditions, they would become tax collectors from above, imposing 
heavier and heavier taxes. 
It seems that the work teams were given broad powers. They were 
able to change the progressive rate and the exemption limit when they 
felt that this was necessary. In 1941, for exemple, the Border Region 
l 
ror example, the two letters of the Finance Department of the Border 
i<egion government, op. cit., CFJP, 6 and 8 December 1942. 
2 
ib1d. 
.· 
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·.-:ark t:eam for tax collection in sui-teh lisien decided that if the Hsien 
,.1ant"'d to complete the collection of assessed grain tax, the progressive 
rate hnd to be l percent higher on each grade and the exemption limit 
had to be one tou lower than stipulated in the decree of that year, 
l because the Hsien was poorer than had been expected. To this con-
clusion, however, the Border Region government responded that the 
exemption limit could be lowered but the progressive rate could not be 
raised because the government wanted most of the people to bear the 
burden of the war in accordance of the principle of the united front. 2 
The taxation system, in which the amount of tax and collecting 
methods were decided year by year, not only caused restlessness among 
the peasants but was also a burden on the administration. Twice a 
year the administration lost the services of large numbers of cadres 
for a total of almost four months. When the CCP was about to launch 
the all-out production drive, the Party recognised that the property-
income tax imposed on actual crop yields in a particular year had det-
d ' 3 r1mental effects on pro uction. In his report to the SKN Senior Party 
4 Cadres Conference at the end of 1942, Mao Tse-tung proposed a fixed 
progressive taxation on land rather than on production, assuming that the 
Corrmunist government had enough statistical materials to classify land 
and that the base areas were sufficiently stable to carry out remeasure-
ment and reclassification of land. Another assumption which if correct 
l Hai Feng, "Cheng-liang kung-tso t 'uan ts 'ai Sui-teh" (Tax Collection 
\·:ork Team in sui-teh Hsien), CFJP, 1 December, 1941. 
2 
"Kuan-yii cheng-liang cheng-ts'ao wen-t'i kei k'@-hsien cheng-liang kung-
tso t' uan he cheng-fu ti hsin" (A Letter to the Hsien Tax Collection 
\·:c;:k Teams and Governments on the Problems of Tax Collection) , CFJP, 
'' Dec ember 1941. 
3 
4 
Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, pp. 196-197. 
For t:his conference and Mao's report, see Section 1 of the following 
-tur. 
· .. ·. 
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.,.;ould have facilitated the attempt to implement a fixed taxation was 
that the peasantry had been trained for proper payment of tax and 
could do so without annual investigation and propaganda. 
In 1943 all base areas commenced re-examination of their financial 
policies. In January, the SKN Border Region government set up a special 
committee for replacing the 'public grain' taxation with a 'unified 
agricultural progressive taxation. •1 Nan Han-ch'en, Head of the 
Finance Department of the SKN Border Region, summarised the important 
fJOints of the new system: 
1. Encouragement of production by a fixed and reduced 
taxation on land, 
2. Protection of tillers by a 10 percent exemption for 
production expenditure, and by decreasing taxation on 
income from side jobs, and 
3. Investigation once in several years to save the time and 
energy of both cadres and people.2 
Tins system was a reflection of the fact that the CCP had basically over-
come its economic difficulties by 1943 and could not afford to talk 
b ' 3 a out tax reduction. 
The SKN Border Region government, however, was slow and cautious 
in changing the taxation system. On 30 August, after a seven month 
study by the special committee for this problem, it decided to implement 
the agricultural progressive taxation only in Yenan, Suiteh and Chingyang 
.'i2:'e;i as an experiment which could also serve for training cadres. It 
was to be expanded later to the whole Border Region. 4 It seems that 
ti·1e Communist leaders found the task more difficult than they had 
anticipated, Land registration, which was to be the basis of the new 
~·:'.; P, 16 January 1943. 
2 
':an Han-ch' en, "Kuan-yli nung-yeh t:'.ung-lei-shui ti shih-hsing" (On 
ExpEr imental Implementation of the Unified Agricultural Progressive 
Taxation), CPJP, 10 October 1943 . 
the 
. ·c1chael Lindsay reports the tax reduction and its reasons in 1943 in 
t'1e Clnn-Ch 'a-Chi Border Region. See "The Taxation System of the Shansi-
(i-.a:1ar-iiopei Border Region, 1938-1945," p. 8. 
-i 
- : ·.'F, 31 August 1943. 
... . ·. · .... ~' . 
.·.· .. 
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systE!"H, v1as not an easy task. In the remeasurement and classification 
0 : land the peasants tried to register their land as smaller or poorer 
l 
ci:an it was. In some areas remeasurement and classification of land 
2 
:·ias successful, but these must have been exceptional cases, because 
::. 1944 only two other hsien were adde:'l to the 'experimental implemen-
' d f th h 1 B d R ' 3 ~Jt1on instea o e w o e or er egion. 
There are some reasons to doubt Michael Lindsay's statement that 
in 1942 the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region government was able "to obtain 
a fairly accurate and complete new survey [on land] for tax purposes 
·.nth minimum of skilled personnel" by delegating the work to the village 
4 
counc.ils on the basis of a sample survey from the centre. He also 
claims that Chin-Ch' a-Chi seems to have been the only base area which 
actually implemented the new 'unified progres'sive tax' system because 
of its 'specially high' standard of administration. 5 Lindsay's 
observations about Chin-Ch'a-Chi may be true, because he was actually 
an eyewitness in this period in Chin-Ch 'a-Chi. It is difficult to 
bd1eve, nowever, that the standard of administration in Chin-Ch' a-Chi, 
which had a population of 25 million and in which there was still 
· ..:ldc~spread fighting, was better, or even as good as, that in the SKN 
corder Region, \·1luch had a population of 1. 5 million, which had exper-
renced a much longer period of Communist control and which had never been 
rnvaded by either the Japanese or the KMT. Yet SKN apparently failed 
For example, see "Yen Hsien Liu-lin ch 'ii shih-hsing nung-lei-shui ti 
ciirn?-yen" (Experience of the Experimental Implementation of the Agri-
cultural Progressive Taxation in Liu-lin District, Yenan Hsien), CF.JP, 
'December 1944. 
''.'i1e two successful cases were reported in detail in the Chieh-fang 
·:1--pao, 27 and 30 December 1943. 
::an Han-ch'en's talk at the Border Region Assembly, CFJP, 10 December,1943. 
Lindsay, "The Taxation System in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, 
iclH-1945," pp. 8-9. 
i_L1J, I pp. 4-5. 
. ... . 
·:. i." ... . , 
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, 0 obtain an accu.rate and complei:e survey on land, nor could ii: 
11nplement the new tax system completely. The Ch1n-Ch'a-Ch1 Border 
Region may have been more advanced than any other base areas behind the 
1 Japanese lines, but not more than SKN. 
In the Central Shantung Region, meetings for financial work were 
held at all levels of government in the spring of 1943 and these estab-
tished a new financial policy. The taxation system was, as in SKN, 
based on newly remeasured and reclassified land, not on the actual crop 
The exemption limit was set at households which had 0.4 mou 
per head_ The highest tax rate was lowered and could not exceed 35 
percent, and hired hands were numbered as members of the employer's 
family to encourage rich peasant production. Rented land was calcu-
lated as half to protect the interests of the landlords and the tenants. 
In guerrilla areas, where there was constant fighting, the burden was 
2 
one-third or on-half that of the base areas. 
In the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region, taxation was assessed only 
on tl·.e basis of land owned, and it was stipulated explicitly in the law 
that movable incomes from labour could not be calculated for taxation. 3 
Land was classified into 11 grades with around grade 6 as the standard 
''.C>. Land owned exceeding l standard mou 4was taxable at the progressive 
5 [ate. 
'rhus, property-income tax became a simple land tax from 1943 on, 
and the economic si tua ti on in the base areas benefited from a good 
harvest in autumn of 1942 and from the 1943 production drive. The CCP 
Lrndsay describes the unified progressive tax system of the Chin-Ch' a-
Ch1 Border Region in detail. see ibid. , pp. 5-10 • 
. , 
Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu, op. cit., p. 38, 
3 
Clnn-chi-Lu-Yu cheng-fu Chi-Lu-Yu hsing-shu, Chien-i h@-Zi fu-tan 
:sa>:-h.s-ing pan-fa (Tentative Simple Method of Reasonable Burden), (n.p.: 
1'~4Si, r.rticle 2. 
Article 7, ibid. 
Article 11, ibid. 
. • ·'. ':: ··!· ,'.. ~:. : •••• ,'· ....• ~-:. • . . • 
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···.: .J t lc>mpted to l 1yhten the tax burden on the people by the 'better 
·_:::.•;:s Md simpler administration' campaign and the production movement 
, J r.he ai:rny and the government, while at the same time attempting to 
,,,-, _-,,urage the peasants to increase productior. by the introduction of 
·.::. ~_,_illi-'-l.t.: land tax. 
:tis significant, however, as Michael Lindsay states, that the CCP 
::•:tempted to use even the new unified progressive tax system as an 
: ns t rument of social policy. Large land-ownership became more of a 
i••rden than a profitable investment. Landlords had to pay property 
on their land and also income tax on land rent, which was now 37.5 
; c·: _ •.cnt or less of the crop yield. Naturally this encouraged landlords 
, sd i their land to their tenants and invest their capital in trade 
" 1ndustry, in which the could gnt much more favourable treatment under 
1 
•'1,e same tax system. 
ln the SKN Border Region, as well as the other regions, financial 
c·~nditions were improved rapidly in 1943 and 1944. Both the army and 
-.;,._ government had fewer financial difficulties and were partly self-
sufr 1c:1 ent in food and some basic goods as a result of the production 
~\1;d si::::Jf-sufficiency campaign . In 1944 less than half of the adm1n-
•. • '.1 nL 1v e and military expenses in SKN came from the taxpayers, the rest 
! e1:\g derived from the production of government staff and armymen. 
-.'cns<0,1uently, the government bPcame Jess concerned with tax collection 
2 9rev1ous years. 
:,:nrJsay, "The Taxation System in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, 
"o·- l':J4 5," pp. 10-11. 
'1: l 'oJcl-1, the Chieh-fang jih-pao did not conduct a tax collection cam-
''"'"'' and no editorial on taxation appeared. This contrasts with prev-
_ J, y~ars, when it carried at least three editorials on taxation each 
··", phis numerous articles, directives and news items; in 1942 
· : · td.ar ly l t gave one whole page out of four every day for the campaign 
·' ··"'.J t!ce tax collection seasons. 
. · .·. 
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The CCP tried to make tax collection a mass movement, and to 
3 cey tain extent it was successful, From 1943, however, when the 
?E.rty launched the production movement, it seems to have believed 
that 'production and self-sufficiency' within the army and the admin-
15 tration would be more effective in improving government finance 
and government-people relations than the more limited tax collection 
ca::ipaigns. The fact that the base areas launched the all-out pro-
duction movement before the completion of the changes in the taxation 
system and achieved 'good results' suggests that Mao's observation 
that prior taxation reform was essential for the production drive was 
~ot !'le<:essarily correct. 
In sum, as with its land policy, the CCP pursued a radical taxation 
policy in the early period of the base areas, imposing heavy taxes and I military requisitions on the richer class, and exempting the broad masses 
A 
.. I 
. 
. · . ~' :. - ~ 
of poorer peasants from taxation. In 1941/42, the CCP had to impose 
a drastically heavier burden on from 80 to 90 percent of the people 
to sup9ort its expanded administration and army. It introduced 
~rogressive property-income taxation system, and tried to make use of 
it for purposes of the united front. From 1943, however, as the 
cconomic Sl. tuation improved, taxation became less important. The 
Party seems to have been reasonably satisfied with the existing pro-
gress1ve taxation system, although it did atter .. pt to reform the system, 
to reduce the people's burden and to create a more stable taxation. 
If one were to regard the official primary objective of the radi-
Col1sation of rent reducbon after 1942 as evidence of the Party's determ-
ination to give the peasants greater incentives for production, the 
Party's attempt to reform the taxation system in 1943 could also be 
e:<l)la1ned in the same terms. •rhe primary concern of the CCP in 1942 
-culd be said to be the economic crisis in the base areas, with all 
!;.JLc1es di.rected primarily to overcoming the crisis. Mass political 
. . . ~ 
. , . · ..... ·_ ... 
. : . ·':. 
' . ~ .. ~·.-;. : .. ,,_ .. :: 
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.. ·-... ,~, ·.: 
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ndnlisation could thus be interpreted as being designed to serve 
,,,, 0 nornic purposes, and social and political transformation could 
ioe ~egard0d as a by-product rather than the aim of the policy. 
Tins point of vi•:w, however, does not take sufficient account 
cf actual policies and their actual implementation. The production 
a,· J ve, discussed in the following chapter, is one clear example of 
a policy aimed at economic development but deliberately utilised by 
t:1e Party to achieve radical sociopoli ti cal transformation at the 
Las1c level. 
·.·. 
· .... 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PRODUCTION MOVEMENT 
ITS POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT 
It is unquestionable that the production drive in the Yenan period 
accelerated social and political transformation in rural China under Corn-
inJnist control. This has been widely recognised by China scholars, and 
tiie organisational basis of the movement and its relation to agricultural 
i·ollectivisation after 1956 has received considerable scholarly attention. 1 
;,i though the economic aspects of the production movement cannot be ignored, 
the concern in this chapter is with the political and organisational 
effects of the movement and not with strictly economic problems. That 
is, for purposes of this study, the interest lies in how the movement was 
exploited by the CCP as another means of mass political mobilisation, and 
1n the extent to which the Party was successful. 
'I'he Japanese occupation meant that the coastal cities of China could 
no longer supply the Chinese people in the hinterland with industrial 
'JOods. The fertile ple.in was also under Japanese control. The CCP had 
co draw its funds from agricultural production, in an area of extremely 
low productivity and primitive technology. 2 
1 
See, for example, Franz Schurrnann, op.cit., pp.416-427; Chalmers John-
son, "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yenan Period 
and the Socialist Education Campaign Period," Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, 
ed., China in CI'isis, (Chicago:l968), Vol.!, Book 1, pp.397-437, especially 
i').J.421-425. Mark Selden approaches the movement from the viewpoint of the 
mass line technique. Op.cit., pp.249-254. 
, 
.. Chao Kuo-chun, AgI'aPian Po Zicy of the Chinese Communist Party, (Bombay: 
1960)' pp. l-3. " ... [Fl arming in modern China, by modern standards, was 
both backward and stagnant. It never broke out of the traditional frarne-
,_.,ork. · ·. !T]he generdl level of agricultural technology in China three 
decades after 1905 remained very low. In farm implements, for example, 
Frofessor Ch' iao Ch' i-ming of Nanking University writing in 1944 described 
the 43 basic farm tools used by the Chinese peasants as 'undeniably prirn-
ltivE.' and remarked that 'the agricultural technology in China has had 
little significant change since the T'ang Dynasty.' ... [I]n the period 
trnrn 1929 to 1933, the average yield of rice in China was only 60 percent 
0
' Italy's, that of wheat 48 percent of Japan's, and that of potatoes 40 
,.,~"''<mt of Great Br i ti an' s. As to the labour efficiency of Chinese cul-
i 
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,:.,e:o after it had established more border regions and guerrilla bases, the 
~·.·F •·:c.s not able to capture industrial cities or the vast fertile plains of 
i!O?\-=' L, .Shant11ng or Honan" In this situation the only way for the Communists 
,., survive was through the development of agricultural productivity and 
;mo! '.-scale industry for the supply of daily essentials within their terri-
tory. In order to mobilise the peasants, it was essential also to raise 
:;0," r standard of living. 
As long as the CCP had to rely solely on manpower for increasing pro-
:i1rt1on, there were only two courses open to it: one was to intensify lab-
l 
:ur and the other was to minimise wastage of manpower. Both depended upon 
,_;,~ leadership of local cadres in the organisation of labout. Under condi-
~ r ·:;c; of primitive agrotechnology, the relative over-population of rural 
Chi01a favoured the CCP; the existence of a landless and half unemployed 
?easa11try offered a source of manpower for military recruitment and coll-
;-;~:t1ve labour-. 
The production movement was designed, first of all, to increase 
,,rodu.:t1on to meet the economic crisis of 1941 and 1942, described by Mao 
as confronting the Party with the question, "Are we going to starve to 
cieach or disband ourselves?" 2 Secondly, however, it was planned that the 
t:roduc:uon movement should serve the political education of both cadres 
and masses. For without political education, full mobilisation in 
F~ot11ote 2 cont'd 
,,.,,tors, it was estimated that in the 1930's one adult male working one 
~oar on a Chinese farm produced an average of 3,080 lbs. of grain, while his 
iimerican counterpart was producing 44,000 pounds, or 14 times as much." 
un the difficulties the CCP faced in the production movement, Johnson 
c;ca•·es: "The basic problem of border-area production was that there were 
"ery few skilled engineers, technicians, or craftsmen. The party had to 
rdy on makeshift methods, discovered and taught to each other by the people 
tiiamselves, and it had to motivate the population to undertake experiments 
ai;d tr\1 new te:::hniques. Many organisational devices were employed, includ-
""' ·.·:·ork-study schools, functions to individual units, using masses of man-
~~·,.;." in place of machinery, and employing the army to do production and 
i:,:;ci reclamation work." Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, ed., op.cit. pp.422-423. 
::"'J used these words in his report to the Senior Cadres Conference of SKN 
'
1
'·' •hi; end of 1942, to describe the situation the Party had been facing 
""':~ c939 The Party had been discussing this problem since 1939. Mao 
"''-' '''fJ du:, Col. 8, p.261. 
~i~~~~~f~~~~;t~?~~F?~:~,1:s?~~~~:J::~li:;Ji;:~:gA~~'t:{i~~~~ll4}~!2:'~'.°f1?~~~;~~ 
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0 , 0 a,1 ction work could not be expected, and at the same time, successful 
full-scale production movement would actually facilitate political 
20ucaL1on and advance the cause of the revolution. The Party was 
~art tcularly concerned with the political education of the cadres, there-
fore, in the rectification campaign which was at its height at the end of 
1942 when the all-out production drive was launched. 
Before discussing the movement itself, it is useful to examine the 
party's perception of the economic and political aspects of the crisis 
which prompted it to launch the production drive. The following section 
is concerned with the important Party conference in the SKN Border Region 
in the winter of 1942/43, especially the lengthy report by Mao to the 
conference on economic and financial problems in the base areas, which 
laid the groundwork for the all-out production movement. 
The Basic Situation and Plan for the l943 Production Movement: 
!Jao 's Repor•t, "Economic and Financial Problems". 
Efforts to improve production, of course, were made throughout the 
Yenan period, and in this sense the production movement cannot be said to 
!1ave started on a particular date, The Party had been in very similar 
circumstances in the Kiangsi period, and had had some experience in carrying 
out a production movement in rural South China. 1 Until th' en6 of 1942, 
aithough it continued its efforts to increase production in the old border 
regions, the CCP concentrated its attention on the military situation, on 
the united front with the KMT and on the establishment of the government 
system in the newly occupied areas. 2 
1 
2 
See Shih Ching-t' ang, ed., Chung-k.uo nung-yeh he-tso-hua yun-tung shih 
Z.iao (Materials on the Agricultural Cooperativisation Movement in China), 
1Peking:l957), Vol. 1, pp. 79-142. 
Hao Tse-tung rarely mentioned the '!conomy or finance until his lengthy 
report to the Senior Cadres Conference at the end of 1942, a 
part of which was included in the Se?,ected ~lorks as "Economic and Financ-
1;il Problems in the Anti-Japanese War." Subsequently, however, five 
articles out of nineteen written before the end of the war were on economic 
C!Uest10ns. '.!.'his contrasts with the period before the conference, when he 
dici not write any articles specifically on economic or financial matters. 
· .. 
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It seems possible that the Party did not even appreciate until 1941 
the possibilities which a full-scale production drive might offer for 
mass political involvement. Even in 1941 and 1942, the Party still 
a9peaYed to consider that a full-scale production drive would be possible 
only after a series of campaigns had laid the basis for mass mobilisation, 
and to discount, or at least underestimate, the fact that the production 
drive itself might generate such mobilisation. 
The Senior Party Cadres Conference of the Sl<N Border Region, which 
lasted eighty-nine days from 19 October 1942 to 14 January 1943, provided 
guidelines for the production movement in all base areas in China. Although 
ti11s was a local Party committee conference for the SKN Border Region, its 
special significance derived from the importance and model role of SKN. 
'.·iao, who held no position in the Border Region Committee or in the North-
west Bureau, not only prepared a lengthy economic and financial report for 
the conference, but also delivered both the opening and closing eddresses, 
as well as two days of lectures on Stalin's Bolshevisation of the Russian 
Communist Party. Other leading Central Committee members who delivered 
lectures at the conference but who held no position in the Border Region 
Committee .l.ncluded L.l.U Shao-ch' i, Chu Teh, Jen J?i-shih, K' ang Sheng, Ch' en 
YUn and P ' eng Chen . 
In addition to the production movement, the conference discussed two 
further problems, the history of the Party in the Border Region and the 
unification of the leadership, both of which were a part of the rectif-
icatwn campaign to replace the urban-intellectual-' leftist' line by the 
:.:ao1st-rural-peasant line at all levels of the Party in local governments, 
a ·m d · . 1 l y an mass organisations. 
The extraordinary length of the conference suggests that the confront-
For t 11e s.l.gnificance of the conference in the history of the Border 
?.eqion Party, see Mark Selden's detailed study. Op.cit., pp.2,00-207. 
J.·.~.' •.',.; ' : .. '-~;r· ··,·'\.~; ... ·:· .,, :;;,:~'0P°~rq~:ie2'1:.,_;_'···.,~:J~~;;1:iJ?'1'J.:is·"''i:l'2l"t'i,Qf P.!?'';~:?:'£:'~!itf .. \!:~~?it.?£:~·,,1;:,·:::-':~1 ;/;•.:' -~~·./:.:.··:.::~~-~~:..::,:_:~~,: 
-·-·-·-··· ··-··-- ;.:.-. •· .·,.:· . --··. 
' ,_ -: (, ~-,, 
. . . . ~: .. : . :: .. .. 
270 
.-,ucn between the 'leftist' and the 'rightist' factions was still sharp 
even after one year of rectification. It indicates, in terms of 
eroduction work, that the cadres were not fully prepared to 'move their own 
'"nos' for production, since the 'leftist' canres prefe>:red more showy 
'revolutionary' work to steady, if more dull and routine, efforts to 
inc.cease production. It was, in fact, one of the major difficulties in 
c3 unclung an all-out production drive, as Mao pointed out, that cadres 
•. ,,,2re reluctant to serve work that was not directly connected with national 
l 
salvation. Many of the Party and government cadres were from elite 
iiackgrounds; they knew nothing about agriculture, and the traditional 
Chinese contempt for manual labour had not been eradicated from their 
. 2 
rhrnKing. As a result, the cadres' attitudes toward the implementation 
of the Party's agrarian policy were more bureaucratic and the economic 
crisis was more serious than it should have been. 3 One explanation for 
the unusual length of the conference may have been the necessity for 
indoctrination of the cadres before the full-scale production campaign 
c:culd begin. 
it is significant also that the Chieh-fang jih-pao did not report 
ci11s conference until 31 January 1943, half a month after it finished. 
Tbe :.'li~eh-fa:ng jih-p.:w does not even give the full schedule of the 
onierence, but, as is usual in such Communist reports, claims that 
e'Jery participant was extremely enthusiastic in the lectures and dis-
l . 
See, for example, "Spread th<o Campaigns to Reduce Rent, Increase 
Production and Support the Government and Cherish the People in 
the Base Areas," Mao, III, pp.133-134. 
Chao Kuo-chun mentions this point as one of the difficulties in 
ti1e programme for rural development. " ... Another important factor 
•.-ids that the programme in modern China which aimed at improving 
rural economy lacked practical leadership. The planners and ex-
ecutives of the projects, being mostly urbanites, often lacked un-
derstanding or experience regarding the specific needs, capacities, 
apprehensions and aspirations of the villagers." Op.cit., p.8. 
:.::cc; Tse-tung ch1:, Vol. 8, pp. 196-198. 
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_-,:,;s cons, and that the conference solved all the important problems and 
: '""d successf11ily. From Kao Kang's report on the history of the Border 
;.egion Party, however, it is obvious that confrontation was serious 
1 
cc1od discussions and criticisms were severe. 
The conference adopted Mao's proposal to make 'production and 
2 
00ucat1on' the primary tasks of the Party from 1943 onwards. 
;d U:ough the conference was convened mainly for settling the dispute 
i;etween the 'rightist' and leftist' lines and for unification 
Dt Party leadership in the rectification campaign, the conference also 
confl,med Mao's principle that 'production was the material foundation 
ior ail work' . The significance of the conference was that it set 
iorth cl early the direction which the full-scale production drive should 
::ake and the specific measures to be implemented in all Communist bases 
rn China. 
The SKN economy seems to have developed remarkably after the Central 
:omm1 ttee settled in north Shensi, particularly after l 939. 3 In that year 
the SKN Border Region GOverr,ment introduced such measures as the election 
c•f labour heroes, agricultural exhibitions, the mobilisation of women 
Eor production, and the drive for self-sufficiency in government organs 
See Kao Kang' s report, "Pi en-ah 'U tang ti li-shih wen-t 'i chien-t 1 ao" 
IAn Examination of the Questions Concerning the Party's History in the 
2 ilorder Region) , (Yenan: 1943) . 
'Ec'•1cat1on' here had a broad meaning which included Party rectification, 
poLLt1cal training or thought reform of the masses and elimination of 
supers ti t1on, as well as school literacy education. 
The SKN Border Region launched the first production movement in 1939. 
L1 Fu-ch' un summarised the movement as 'successful' . See his reports, 
"Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch'u sheng-ch'an yun-tung ti ch'u-pu tsung-chieh" 
\ l\ontat1ve Summary of the Production Movement of the SKN Border 
1;eq1on), Chieh-fang chou-k':m, No. 85, 30 September 1939, pp.7-9; 
"~h-.cng-ch' an yUn-tung tsung~chieh yU hsin ti jen-wu" (Summary of the 
"c:oduction Movement and New Tasks), N0. 106/7. pp.12-15. See also Mau' s 
r,etrnspect of the 1939 production movement in "Ching-chi wen-t' i yli 
'' 'u1-cheng wen-t' i" (Economic and Financial Problems), Mao Tse-tung 
., Vol. 8, pp. 261-262. 
'.~~:'.2 jf~·~?']· .~:_~:,~~}r18~~,s~-!'K'r0?Zfr~W~~~~7:0r~f~0;~1:~~I;;.]~Sj".:~:~~\'t''·'1L~¥~'-: ·~. '::- ~::·:""~· :. '''.. ':··_,::1···· "' ~·;:·?:_"·"·:·~:·~~,~~~' 
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~::·~·)ols and by rear garr1s l troops. These measures later 
;cc:k ~ommon in all Communist bases in the 1943 production drive. 
in this report Mao analysed the factors which helped the Party 
,.·, :i:e development of agricultural production in SKN in 1939-42, 
:c1 tLCUlarly in 1939 and 1940. The Party had corrected its 'leftist' 
c.)nor.11c policy and introduced a policy of 'rest and conservation' 
.-,. - 1 .. ~;;;; she•ig-h.si 1 winch offered the peasants economic incentives 
,;r,d as a result of which the peasants started to invest for the 
'"Jeiopment of production. Secondly, the Party had exploited every 
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c;-.po :t.unity to call on the peasants to develop production. For example, 
o number of meetings in 1939, such as the cadres meeting for mobil-
.s.11;;.on for production convened by the Central Cammi ttee, the Second 
·:1n0ress of l:iorcier Region Party Representatives, the First Border 
P.cgion Assembly and the First Exhibition of Agricultural Production, 
_.,,r2 itll sai.d to have had a favourable effect on the will of the people 
"' d•,velop production. Thirdly, the Party had implemP.nted, apparently 
? 
sc;c-.:co:,;sfully, a migration policy· which was designed to encourage landless 
'"""'•.tnts in densely populated areas to mi.grate to and reclaim areas of 
-"ooLdctnd. The government gave the migrants loans for the purchase of 
.·• .. , l!Hp'c'm'c'nts and draught animals, exempted them from taxation for the 
· "· • 
11····''" yeors. and ew:ouraged the iocal peasants to lend them houses, 
" " rncl '"ash. Mutual a1d t-=ams aad labour cooperatives, both among the 
.·1 • s cdld in c-onJ unc: t ion we th the native people were also encouraged. 
l'h(:: fo1Jrth factor, in Mao's analogy, was the Party 1 s policy of 1 awards' 
-----·~----
'' "·:i-c:h '\J's government report to ':he First Border Region Assembly in 
-i"m-J{a;1-Nlng pi en-ch 'il ts 'an-i-hui wen-hsien hul-chi, p. 32 • 
..... , •h•e c'Xamp le of Ye nan Hsien, whe:·te cultivated land increased from 
• • ,: l!i:J1< :.r1 l'-J"9 to nearly 7llO,OOO mcu in 1942, and where 29, 704 migrants 
'' '"d by l'J42 where the original population in 1937 had been '32,704. 
'<'l;/ ,-i-J,', VD]. 8, pp.190-191 & 2Cl. 
;~~z:\W1~!!'~;.'.~Y£1i~~'.'.Z2:~'.'·~·'(~:':2'.£":~I:;2}'.~~~"'.j3's:1f~E!Z];;!ryl}j;~:7:c.I~'.'.:2&'.;!T:??f:ir~~~~'..~.';:i'ft~:~~·.:~:-~-_-;:._-.:· 
~llii~!~::i . . .· 
' .. 
; . 
. •'. 
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in the first three yGars; incomes from growing cotton were exempt from 
taxation. The election and commendation of labour heroes at the 
eY.hibi tions of agricultural production were part of this 'award' policy. 
Fifthly, the Party's attempts to reduce wastage of manpower, to organise 
labour into mutual aid teams, and mobilise 'loafers' (erh- Ziu-tzu) and 
women to Join production work helped greatly to increase production. 
sixth, and finally, agricultural loans by the government were increased. 
~.pprm(imately one-third of the peasant families lacked oxen, farm 
1 implements and grain, and had to be assisted with loans. 
These policies were all developed further in the 1943 production 
movement. The fourth and fifth were most important in producing radical 
political and organisational changes at the basic level of rural society. 
New social organisations and leadership emerged out of everyday pro-
duct.ion work and these were maintained deliberately, as a means of 
bringing about revolutionary social transforrnation. 2 
In his report, however, Mao presented these policies in terms only 
of production increase, and made no mention of their political. and social 
effects. This was unusual for Mao, who has been generally more con-
cerned with social, political and milit:ary 'spects of revolution. 
Another unusual f "atur" 1'f the report was that it included many figures, 
statistics and tal: les; t.ilis is quite exceptional in the whole body of 
~iao• s \'lritir·:]s. '!'''" . •·son seems to lie i.n the extreme nature of the 
economic crisis. 0:1d it may not mean that Mao ignored the political 
l 
2 
Ibid., pp. 1~2-195. 
Chalmers Johnson appreciates the relevance of the Yenan production move-
ment to the later rural collectivisation and cooperativisation: "One 
measure of the organizational success of Mao's Yenan mass line is to 
be found in the accomplishments of the so-called Great Production 
Movement of the later years of the resistancro war. This movement 
has g>:eat relevance to the second and third five-year plan periods 
because it provided more economic precedents for later years than any 
:other specific campaign of the revolutionary era." Ping-t~ Ho a·nd 
T~ng Tsou, ed., op.cit., p.421. 
':· ' . 
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and social aspects of the production movement, because he later stressed 
these aspects when discussing the progress of the movement. 
With the lessons the CCP had derived from production work up to 
1942, Mao announced that the policies to which he had atcributed success 
before 1942 would be continued. Firstly, he stressed flexibility and 
the use of. different production policies and methods for different places 
and times, and warned cadres who did not know local conditions against 
pursuing uniform policies and methods for production. Secondly, he 
said that a rigorous and extensive implementation of the rent reduction 
policy was an essential foundation for production increase, for the 
peasants would not take an active interest in increasing production if 
the increase was to be taken by the landlords. 
The third lesson the Party had learned f;:om its experience in pro-
duction work was that heavy taxation affected adversely the peasants' 
enthusiasm for production, and taxation according to actual crop yield 
lowered both capacity and investment and willingness to work hard. 
Taxation, therefore, was to be lightened and based on land owned, so 
that the peasants themselves would benefit from any increase in product-
ion. Fourthly, the privilege of tax exemption promised by the govern-
ment was to be applied without exception, for the sake of the government's 
ow'l prestige and to forestall adverse effects on the peasants' activism. 
Finally, the organisation of labour, if carried out properly, was seen as 
a powerful tool to develop ?.gricultural production. The Party had to 
organise the peasants into production organisations, but this should not 
be done simply by bureaucratic directives from above. 1 
Mao's main concern in these five 'lessons' was with providing the 
peasants with economic incentives as a means o.E increasing production. 
1 . ' 
hO.o Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, pp. 195-198. 
....... 
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In other words, he believed that the peasants would make little effort 
co increase production unless they could be convinced that they could 
retain the major part of the increase in production. 
[T]he Party and government personnel at the 
county and district levels should devote nine-
tenth of .their energy to helping the peasants 
increase production, and only one-tenth to 
collecting taxes from them. If pains are ta~en 
with the first task, the second will be easy. 
He wrote in 1943: 
:·1ao did not believe that the peasants wo'.lld be convinced of the necessity 
for 111creased production merely by political indoctrination or education; 
on the contrary, he believed that it was essential first to improve 
their livelihood as a means of establishing a foundation for mass 
poli t1 ccil mobilisation. It is significant that Mao perceived that 
even after a considerable improvement ir, the peasants' livelihood and 
after widespread sociopolitical reform it was still essential to provide 
the peasants with economic incentives. 
In his report, Mao proposed an eight-point policy for developing 
l 1 d . 2 agr icu tura pro uction. With the exception of reclamation of waste-
iand, each of these points is concerned with increasing yields from 
ex1st1ng farms and with the existing manpower. Reclamation of waste-
land was the only availablr; shortcut to increased agricultural pro-
dcct1on, since conditions were such that major technological improve-
men ts could not be expected. 
Since Mao's plans for the development of production all depended 
on manpower, the organisation of labour was the key point. 3 
.·.-.l-=:', Ill, p. 132. 
~ao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 8, p. 209 
3 
Mter one year of the production moveme:1t, Mao confirmed this point: 
"In the present circumstances the organization of labour power is the key 
to increasing production. In each of the base areas, even under present 
<.:ar conditions, it is possible and altogether necessary to organise the 
'<Lour power of tens of thousands of men and women in the Party, the gov-
'co:nm0nt offices and the army ... Communist Party members must attain a full 
'!ias;c of all the principles and methods of organizing labour power." 
."';,,Ill' p. 134. 
.·.· ~:· 
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l:i addition to the fact that north Shensi was sparsely populated, the 
·.·:ar efforr. had diverted labour to the army, and to transportation and 
construction work. Women, therefore, were mobilisP.d for spinning and 
• .. :eaving and also for supplementary work in the fields. Loafers were 
also persuaded or forced to participate in production work. The local 
9,,rrison troops had to help in the peasants' work, especially in the busy 
£:easons. One of Mao's eight points, 'right work in the right season', 
meant that all manpower and livestock should be mobilised for agricultural 
•,.;ark in the busy harvesting and planting seasons. This required well-
organised labour to avoid wastage. 
t·lao did not ignore technological improvement, al though he recognised 
its potential as being extremely limited, and what he actually meant by 
this term \'1as: 
1. Construction and repair of irrigation systems; 
2. Promoting the spread of better strains; 
o. Reclaiming wasteland, and tilling the fields in ~he autumn to 
reduce pest damage, to weather the soil, and to maintain water 
in the so.i.l; 
·! l·leedii1g once or twice more each year; 
5. llolding agricultural exhibitions for the exchange and dissemination 
of better methods, and carrying out a campaign for 'new rich peasants' 
chrough hard work, after the example of Wu Man-yu; 
G. Propaganda by the newspapers for producing many people like Wu Man-
yu; 
Courses on basic agricultural knowledge in primary and secondary 
schools, and the provision of a textbook for the winter schools 
wluch would include practical agricultural information. 1 
These methods are almost too simple to be described as 'technological 
un1orovements' , and some of them are not really concerned with technology. 
TE,cim)logical improvement was, therefor<>, a supplement to production 
ckvelopment, although the low standard of Chinese agrotechnology meant 
·:w l'.';ee-t:ung ci'li, Vol. 8, pp. 216-218 • 
... ·· . 
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chat even these simple improvements could be effective. An inter-
est1ng point is that what Mao called 'technological improvement' 
rested primarily on intensive cultivation, which required either 
1 ~rens1fied labour or more manpower or both. Here again, the 
organisation of labour was of supreme importance. Indeed, organis-
~twn of labour was the key to the success of the production movement, 
iust as it was also the key to impact of the movement on the socio-
<_XJlJ.tical transformation at the basic level. 
At the end of December 1942 the Senior Cadres Conference began 
discussion of the production problem on the basis of Mao's report. 
After about half a month's discussion, the conference apparently 
accpeted his proposals without criticism or amendment, although no 
Conununist document refers to formal approval or adoption of Mao's pro-
l posals. The conference confirmed that the primary work of the Party 
from 1943 on would be in production and education, including rectif-
1cation. since the CCP attempted to develop production without major 
improvements in technology, it had to extract the maximum amount of 
labour from the people. The Party could not use coercion, because this 
would undermine the activism, and consequently the efficiency of the 
people. Indoctrination was thus important for rousing the peasants' and 
workers' act1 vism for the production drive. 
The CCP made the decision to carr.y out a full-scale produr.tion drive 
di't>or one yearof the rectification campaign. The CCP had launched 
the rectification ~arnpaign both to overcome the economic crisis and to 
lay the groundwork for a production drive. The production drive it-
sslf aimed primarily at preventing the recurrence of an economic crisis 
l 
The Chieh-fang jih-pao (31 January 1943) simply tr.eats the report as if 
l~ were an authoritative document of the Party. Most probably, the 
r·eport was approved by the Politburo and leading Central Cornrni ttee 
c<embers before the conference, as the CCP leaders customari.ly did in 
this period. The reporL was regarded in the 1943 production movement 
as a kind of 'sacred text', and the conference itself was acknowled-
<Jed as an event of outstanding importance . 
. · : .. 
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d f . 1 ;,y bu1l ing up reserves o grain. 
It was also a continuation by other means of the rectification 
campaign. As the mayor of Yenan told Gunther Stein in 1944, "We ... get 
much closer to the people we serve; for we know now what manual work 
means and respect it more than we used to .:lo." 2 An~ther significant 
aspect of the production drive as a means of mass political mobilis-
anon was .the constant 'discovery' of activists among the masses, who 
provi.ded fresh political leaders for the masses and for the Party. The 
most important result of the movement, however, was that the life style 
as well as the way of thinking of the masses were transformed through 
organised labour in everyday production work, while at the same time 
labour o:r.ganisation, being managed and led by the new village leaders, 
ultimately undermined landlord-gentry influence in the villages. 
Improved economic conditions also undermj ned the economic basis of land-
lord-gentry power. 
The production movement, the most important mass movement in the 
Yenan period, was carried out along the lines laid down at the conference, 
or rather, on the lines of Mao's report to the conference. The nature 
of t:he production movement after 1943 was quite different from the 
production drive before 1943, particularly in its organisational and 
poll tic al aspects. It was in the course of the production movement that 
che CCP finally established its power firmly among the peasant masses. 
2. Or>ganisation of Labour> 
'rhe production drive meant mobilisation of all available manpower 
••nd equipment in the most efficient way for the development of production 
1. ''.~"G·-san yU-i (surplus grain for four months' 
year's cultivation) , propagated as a target of 
illustrates the Party's intention of using the 
g:ca1n reserves. 
ote1n, op. cit., p. 105. 
.. . 
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1n the base areas. Every participant had to adapt to a planned and 
organised system of production, which was quite new to rural North 
cJuna. The key measure for mobilisation of the masses for production 
was the organisation of labour; other measures were made possible or 
facilitated by collective labour. If the organisation of every 
individual into labour mutual aid teams was achieved, it would be 
possible to introduce measures which would provide for the most rational 
us·= of human and animal power and farm appliances. 1 At the same time, 
organised and planned labour would link the masses with the government 
and the Party in their daily work at the basic level of the society. In 
the production movement, the daily life of the masses could be linked 
with the Party's nationalist and revolutionary causes through organised 
production and the economic benefits it brought. The CCP challenged 
the long-standing rural production structure, consisting of family units 
which the Party had not been able to change in its earlier production 
drive. 
In addition to the Party decision at the Senior Cadres Conference, 
in December 1942 the Third Session of the Government Council of the SKN 
Border Region decided that priority in government work was to be given 
to production, especially agricultural production, and education, par-
ticularly cadre education. 2 According to a Chieh-fang jih-pao editorial, 
rn order to survive the war the CCP had to concentrate manpower and 
capital for developing agricultural production; education of the cadres 
rn which they were to overcome 'leftist' and 'rightist' inclinations, was 
1 
2 
In November 1943, Mao Tse-tung stressed in his talk at the reception for 
labour heroes of the SKN Border Region that the purpose of production 
org~.nisation was to mobilise all labour in the Border Region, and pro-
duction organisation was the only way to develop production and gain 
vi.ctories over the Japanese- "Get Organised," Mao, III, pp. 153-160. 
c;.·,7 P, 23 November 1942. 
··.'· .... 
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essential for the most efficient production. 1 The establishment of 
mutual aid teams was the first and major means of achieving more 
effective use of the existing human and animal power. Traditionally,' 
there had existed small-scale mutual aid systems for agricultural pro-
auction in North China to compensate for the shortage of stock animals 
. l' 2 and large farming app iances. 
'rhe SKN Border Region had had two major forms of mutual aid labour, 
pien-kung (exchange of labour) and oha-kung (collective labour). The 
former was a system of exchange of different labour techniques, different 
proc'iuction measures and different kinds of work. This was organised 
by poor peasants who lacked sufficient draught animals and farm implements, 
and by some middle peasants who had enough draught animals and farm 
appllam.:"'s but lacked sufficient labour and could not afford to hire farm 
hands. Usually the scale of pien-kung was small, varying from two to 
five families who were relatives, friends and/or neighbours. The organ-
isation was also temporary; for example, if A worked with B for spring 
ploughing it did not mean that A would do pien-kung with B again for the 
autumn harvest, although it was comparatively regular in the cases of 
close relatives. 3 
Cha-kung was a system by which labour teams worked mainly on others' 
land. It was most common in areas where the population was less dense 
ani!. more agricultural land was ava:tlable. It did not incl11de draught 
l "K'' f e- u ssu-hsiang chang-ai chi-chung li-liang yii liang-ta jen-wu" 
(Overcome Obstacles in Thought and Concentrate Power on the Two Great 
Tasks) , editorial, CFJP, 23 December 1942. In this context education 
meant political education, as a continuation of the rectification 
campaign. 
2 
On the traditional mutual aid system for agricultural labour in China, 
see Chung-kuo nung-yeh h@-tso-hua yUn-tung shih-Ziao, pp. 3-72, 
, 
"Ecti~orial, CFJP, 25 January 1943; sato shin'ichiro, Chugoku Kyosanto 
•1c :·logyo Shudanka Seisaku (Agricultural Collectivisation Policy of the 
CCP), (Tokyo:l961), pp. 5-9. 
-~.;:.:~?:~(.·, 
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animals or farm appliances. Its scale was of ten much larger than 
~;e12-kung, varying from five to one hundred labourers in a team, 
al though most consisted of about ten people. The members were landless 
and poor peasants who had to sell their labour to support their families, 
1n addition to tilling their own or rented land. Since aha-kung teams 
had to 'sell' collective labour as temporary help to the rich peasants 
or landlords, they had an organiser, a manager and an accountant. As 
;.!ark Selden points out, exploitation of these three people, particularly 
' l 
ci·.2 first two, was obvious. Cha-kung was a much more well-organised 
and stable means of organisation than pien-kung. A certain degree of 
discipline was required in order to maintain the organisation and 
2 
employment. 
Traditional mutual aid labour in rural China was generally unstable, 
short-term, loosely organised, voluntary and lacking leadership and 
planning. It was a product of the polarisation of the peasantry; the 
concentration of land in the hands of a small number of landlords on one 
s1de, and a great number of poor peasants with little or no land on the 
other Another condition which necessitated labour mutual aid was 
dispersed and small-scaJ.e agricultural management, a result of repeated 
equal inheritance and high land rent. Voluntary mutual aid labour in 
che traditional Chinese village existed for the minimum objectives of 
maintaining agricultural production and for the survival of the peasants 
3 
not for expansion of production or raising living standards. 
The conditions which necessitated mutual aid labour were at the 
same time obstacles to development of labour organisation. Extreme 
poverty and dispersed small-scale management of agriculture were 
l 
Selden, op. cit., p. 243. On the functions and privileges of managers 
, and_accountants, see Sato , op. cit., pp. 5-9. 
3 Sato, op. cit., p. 25. 
lbid.' pp. 52-53. 
" 
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Jiff icult to change and impeded the development of large and stable 
r:tutual aid labcur. Traditional voluntary mutual aid labour was essential 
foo: maintaini.ng agricultural production, but to the extent that it was 
'iased on traditional economic and social conditions, it was not able to 
develop into large-scale and highly organised mutual aid labour. That 
, 5 , 1 i: was incapable of bringing about a rearrangement of the land owning 
system, wluch had been the basis of economic and social conditions in 
1 Imperial China. 
The organisation of agricultural labour in the Yenan period was 
based on these traditional forms of labour mutual aid and the Communist 
experience in the Kiangsi soviet period. 2 Although the CCP had recog-
nised the efficacy of collective labour before 1943, it was not until 
January .L943, when the Chieh-fang jih-pao carried an editorial entitled 
"Let's Organise the Labour Force! ", thal the Party started to organise 
as much as possible of the work force in mutual aid for the full-scale 
production drive. It was at the Senior Cadres Conference that the 
0'11cy to develop mutual aid labour was adopted as an 'important lever 
3 for completing the task of production.' 
The CCP recognised that the existing system of mutual aid was 
"suited to the concrete conditions of villages in the border regions." 
"lf they can be effectively utilised and directed, and organised and 
led in a planned way, then they can be transformed into organisations 
l 
lb1d. 
On collective agricultural labour in the Kiangsi period, see ibid,, 
µp. 72-98; Chung-kuo nung-yeh h?J-tso-hua yun-tung shih-liao, pp. 
i'>-144. 
"Chrnh-shao Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch 'u tsu-chih chi-t' i lac-tung ti ching-
yen" tlntroduction to the Experience of Collective Labour Organised 
.Ln the SKN Border Region) , CFJP, 2l. December 1943. The editorial of 
tioe C.'hieh-fang jih-pao, 25 January 1943, was later regarded as the 
first appeal to organise, made by the CCP Central Committee to the 
r:1asses. See l.ntroductory comments on the editorial as printed in 
r 11e c. mpilation, Chimg-kuo nung-yeh h@-tso-hua yiln-tung shih-liao, 
'."!'· 143-144. English translation of this is in Schurmann, op. cit., 
pp. 410-422. 
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l for developing productivity and raising production." 
tins editorial, the merits of collective labour were: 
According to 
lJ 'right work in the right season' (pu-wei nung-shihJ, 2) more 
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economical use of labour, 3) increased work enthusiasm and efficienty, 
.11 education of the masses and an increase in the spirit of mutual aid 
and sol.1darity among the masses. Primarily, the CCP gave attention 
to labour efficiency. "Experience proves: the mutual-aid collective form 
of production organization saves labour power; collective labor is 
betLer than individual labor. Thus: one laborer can plow and sow 
fifteen shang of land each year. But if three laborers work together, 
each year they can plow and sow seventy shang of land and four laborers 
can plow and sow one hundred shang. Two men and one ox can complete 
the task in three days; three men and one ox can complete it in two 
days. Not only this, a mutual-aid and collective form of production 
organization can greatly stimulate work enthusiasm and increase pro-
duction efficiency. Because everyone works together, life is active, 
morale is high, and there is mutual stimulation, mutual competition, and 
no one wants to be behind the others." 2 
The usefulness of labour mutual aid for the CCP was not limited 
to economic benefits. The last virtue of collective labour organis-
at1on stated in the editorial was: "It educates the masses, and in-
3 
creases the spirit of mutual aid and solidarity among thP masses." 
Although political benefits were not stressed in this editorial, collect-
ive labour organisation had the potential to be the basic organisation 
for the political mobilisation of the masses in the Communist cause. 
If the poor peasants who needed mutual aid labour comprised 70 percent 
l 
-, 
1''.l1torial, CFJP, 25 January lg43. Translation Schurmann's, op. cit., 
p /~ 20 
Schurmann, op. cit., 420-421. 
Ilnd., p. 421. 
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of ·:-.he population in rural China, the CCP was in a position to organise 
the maJor part of the rural population by attracting them with promises 
of economic gain. Once organised into mutual aid teams, they could 
provide the basis for Communist power. 
In order to take full advantage of the value of labour mutual aid, 
however, according to the above editorial, the labour force "organis-
ation must be grounded on a basis of voluntarism of the masses, in order 
to prevent formalism, in whatever way they may arise, such as forcibly 
d ' ·1· l' t ,l issuing or ers or compi ing name is s. Another instruction to 
cadres in charge of organising labour mutual aid was that organisations 
"must not be too large ••. Because if organisation is too large, it can 
waste a great deal of labor power and a lot of time. It is best to 
take the natural village as a unit. Where there are villages which 
have more population and need more mutual aid, don't just organise one, 
but organise several (brigades); and don't restrict them just to one 
village, but have them transcend the scope of the natural village, put 
through mutual aid between villages. " 2 
As Franz Schurmann points out, it is significant that the CCP 
realised the importance of the natural village as the basic unit of 
produc~ion organisation. This means that the Party had to penetrate 
the natural village in its own work of labour organisation. This was 
the first time in Chinese history that a government officially recog-
nised the natural village as the basic unit of rural life and set out to 
weave it into the web of the government system, as a result of which the 
CCP ;: inally was able successfully "to create an organization loyal to 
the state which was also solidly imbedded in the natural village. 03 
1 
2 
3 
Ibid.' p. 422. 
lb1d. 
Ib1d .. , p. 416. See also Schurmann' s discussion in p. 423. 
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'l'his was not, ho\'1ever, an easy task for cadres from outside the 
v .•. i.lage. In spite of many reports J.n the Chieh-fang jih-pao of good 
examples of organisation of labour, cadres apparently had to contend with 
a reluctance on the part of the masses to join mutual aid labour. An 
arcicle in the newspaper summarising the experiences in organisation 
or labour in 1943 in the SKN Border Region indicated that many peasants 
doubted that mutual aid was of benefit to them. 1 Even the cadres who 
tried to organise the peasants into mutual aid were not always very 
confident that mutual aid would result in economic benefits for the 
peasants. The article suggested that cadres, Party n.embers and 
activists should themselves be made confident of the benefits of mutual 
aid to those who participated in it before they tried to persuade the 
peasants to take part. 
After having joined mutual aid teams, many members were unhappy 
1-nth mutual aid labour because of their conflicting interests, a problem 
wh1r.h emerged particularly in differences in quality and quantity of 
both labour and land. On this point, the article in Chieh-fang jih-pao 
cited above stated that as nobody wanted to obtain less than others, the 
leaders llad to be very careful to coordinate the interests of the members. 
The peasants' selfishness was an obstacle to the development of organised 
labour, even in such small matters as the different quality of meals 
servec'. by different fami.'.ies or the order in which the members' fields 
'''ere worked. Disputes over these points were to be solved by persuasion. 
The article suggested that those who could afford to serve good meals 
should be made to understand that the financial situation of the poorer 
W>mber s forced them to serve poorer quality meals. On the order of work, 
the leaders were expected to make the team work on their land last, and 
"Clueh-shao Shen-Kan-Ning pien ch 'i.i tsu-chih chi-t' i lao-tung ti 
ch1ng-yen. 11 
"., ... 
. . · 
' .. : . ................. · :· _:· .. 
. ·. 
'· 
'' 
to persuade richer members to work on the poorer members' fields 
1 
first. 
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The Chieh-fang jih-pao reported an example of mutual aid teams in 
3 ·nllage in which trouble had arisen between migrant members and 
native members. 'l'he latter were not interested in reclaiming waste-
land necessary for cultivation by the former. Both groups were 
dissatisfied with distribution of the rewards in 1943 and all the teams 
rn tl.e village were about to be dissolved, even though mut·.Jal aid 
between the two groups was beneficial to the village as a whole. In 
order to settle this problem, the village headman and a cadre helped 
the migrant members privately to solve their material difficulties, and 
on this ground they persuaded both groups to continue the mutual aid 
te2m wh1le at the same time readjusting the organisation and the method 
2 
of calculation of labour days and distribution of the rewards. 
The example indicates that the leaders, who were expected to put 
their own interests last, assumed the key role in organising and main-
tein1ng mutual aid labour. If the village headman and the responsible 
cadres were not able to take proper measures to solve problems among the 
members, the members refused to listen to them and the teams could not be 
maintained. Only by a willingness to help others and ignore their 
private interests could they command respect from the masses and make 
organised production possible. The Pan:y did not demand that the masses 
sacr1£1ce even a small part of their own benefit for the sake of organ-
ised production, but tried to convince them that they could obtain 
greater tangible benefits from mutual aid labour than from individual 
l ibid . 
... , '"' 
· t·1,~, 6 April 1944. 
·' .. •.: 
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1 
labour. 1he Party did not hesitate, however, to demand from its 
okmbers and cadres economic stoicism in mutual aid labour to secure 
respect from and leadership among the ffiasses. The above mentioned 
article in the Chieh-fang jih-pao stressed the importance of obtaining 
suitable persons for leaders of mutual aid labour. It stated that 
"only those who have prestige and are able to help the masses would be 
able to cope with command of a pien-kung brigade." 2 
The process of organisation was usually as follows. Following a 
meeting of Party members, cadres and activists at which the virtues of 
organisation of mutual aid labour were discussed, a meeting of villagers 
was •j)nvened, at which the Party members, cadres and activists tried 
first to convince at least some of th" v1llagers of the merits of the 
system so that they might wish voluntarily to organise a mutual aid team. 
'!illagers who wanted to make up a team were to select people with whom 
they could cooperate. As in all other mass movements, voluntarism was 
emphasised and coercion was strictly prohibited. Once one or a few 
reams were organised, the leaders tried to demonstrate the merits of 
iabour mutual aid to villagers who were still doubtful, and to convince 
. . 3 
rnem to Join tne team. The Party told village cadres to organise 
mutual aid labour 'gradually' , "relying on the spirit of 'shih-shih ch 'iu-
al1c'.h' (due consideration of facts) : careful consideration should be 
given to the realistic situation of development of production, private 
l 
An article in the Chieh-fang jih-pao emphasised that collective labour 
was conditioned by the private property system and manual labour, and 
aimed to develop them; it was a 'leftist' deviation to go beyond these 
cund1tions. Ting Tung-fang, "Lun chi-t' i lao-tung" (On Collective . 
., Labour), CFJP, 9 February 1944. 
" 
"Chi.eh-shao Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch 'ii tsu-chih chi-t' i lao-tung ti ching-
yen." In many cases the leaders of mutual aid teams were Party members. 
Thts article gave an example of Yenan lisien where out of 2,340 members 
of mutual aid labour 803 were Party members and about half of them 
3 assumed leadership of pl.en-kung and cha-kung brigades. 
lbid. 
. . · 
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property and the peasants' political standards. ,,l 
In organising mutual aid labour, political mobilisation of the 
masses was an end which the CCP deliberately sought. Firstly, by 
working together and improving their livelihood by themselves without 
relying on the landlord-gentry class the masses gained confidence 
rn the power of solidarity. This was assisted by changes in class 
composition in the villages. Many poor peasants raised themselves 
to the level of middle peasants, while some middle peasants became rich 
peasants by the government policies of progressive taxation and rent 
reduction, and increases in their production in the production move-
rnent. The traditional village leaders gradually lost their power and 
prestige, which had rested on their economic power, their education, and 
their good relations with the old state or provincial government. 
secondly, the masses became more willing to trust the government 
and the Party . Working with the cadres in mutual aid labour, the 
peasants came increasingly to regard them as having interests identical 
to their own. Agricultural production by cadres helped the masses to 
ldentify with the CCP, making a significant departure from the situation 
in whi1.-h ':JOVernment officials and the peasants made up two different 
worlds which had little communication politically, economically or 
2 
culturally. 
1 
2 
Thirdly, as a result of mutual aid labour the CCP was able to call 
Ting Tung-fang, "Lun chi-t' i lao-tung." 
l"/hen the two worlds had come into contact with each other, it had usually 
meant trouble for the peasants. Richard Solomon quotes P'eng Pai's 
difficulties when he tried to organise peasants in Kwangtung in 1920's, 
when the peasants were suspicious of him, an intellectual - another 
name for a government official, whom they could easily identify as their 
enemy by his face, body, dress, and way of talking and behaving. 
Solomon, "Communica.tion Patterns and Chinese Revolution," p. 85. The 
same difficulties confronted the students from Peking who in 1936 went 
into rural areas to propagate the nationalist cause against Japan and 
to organise the peasants. See John Israel, op. cit., pp. 135-137 . 
. ·. 
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on the peasant masses to defend their economic gains in the production 
arive, while at the same time the production brigade provided an organ-
isational basis for political and military mobilisation. After 1943, 
the CCP often used the slogans 'Pao-wei ahia-hsiang, pao-wei feng-i tsu-
sh:'.i1 ti sheng-huo 1 (Defend your own home, defend your life of abundant 
clothing and sufficient food) for mobilisation of militia and self-
defence corps in the villages. Moreover, the peasants were prepared 
to work systematically in organisations when they had to defend their 
vlllages. This li11ked them effectively with the nationalist cause 
for whicl1 tl·i·:= CCP were fighting~ 
The last and the most important political gain from mutual aid 
labour in the context of the Chinese Communist revolution was what was 
known as its 'educational' value; that is, the peasants allegedly over-
came their selfishness, and became more willing to communicate with 
each other and to help others at some sacrific.o to their own interests. 
Collective labour produced its leaders among the members, who worked 
har<l, created new methods of production, helped other members in their 
daily lives, and most important of all, who were loyal to the Communist 
governmerit. These leaders, newly produced from among the masses were 
re,,arded by the government and the masses with honour and respect, and 
with the fruit of their own hard work. They provided the Party with 
an enormous reservoir of potential cadres with close lj nks with the 
1 
masses. 
Mutual aid labour affected village political organisation by 
transforming leaderdhip structure in the village. Traditional leaders 
were replaced by leaders who hac obtained prestige through their be-
hav1our in collective labour. The new leaders, and organisation, in 
the village shared a common ideal with the Party and the government. 
1 
See the section below on labour heroes. 
'•' 
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Thus, the CCP was able to penetrate the natural village through the 
agency of the new leaders and the production organisation. The every-
day and all-year-round nature of production work helped the Party to 
roa1nta1n its control over the villages. 'l'he Party attempted to maintain 
mutual aid labour permanently, against the more traditional temporary 
mu'cual aid. Once organised for spring ploughing, for example, mutual 
aid was kept going successively for weeding, for the summer harvest, 
summer ploughing, elimination of pest damage and grasshoppers, for the 
autumn harvest, autumn ploughing, irrigation repairs, reclamation, and 
;11nter side jobs such as transportation, charcoal-making and spinning 
and v1nav ing . 
ln collective labour, the peasants gradually acquired the habit of 
cooperating with others, as well as identifying their interests with the 
fate of the Communist government and developing an organised and planned 
pattern of production from the viewpoint of the village as a whole. 
Production planning was an important part of the organisation of labour 
I tor both the peasants themselves and the Party and the government. Production Planning 
The production movement actually began with propaganda on the 
subject of production plans, which were to be drawn up by all production 
units at all levels, right down to the family unit. Production planning 
was designed to have similar effects to labour mutual aid on political 
and organisational transformation of rural society. For the Party, 
production planning provided detailed information on the economic and 
financial situation of the basic units of production. And by helping 
the v"llage government and the peasants to draw up production plans, and 
by controlling the operation of these plans, the Party obtained invalu-
~ble insights into everyday work in the village. For the peasant masses, 
.. 
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un the other nand, planning was a significant step towards psychol-
ogical breakthrough. Firstly, production planning made them realise 
that their production work was inseparably linked with the whole economy 
of the base area. Secondly, through the process of plan-making with 
assistance of cadres, and by publicising their plans, the peasants were 
encouraged to take less account of their own interests and thus belief in 
the family as a self-contained economic unit, as well as to increase 
their trust in the Communist government. Thirdly, planning served the 
organisation of labour by enabling the masses to understand their position 
in the village, and ultimately the border region, economy, and the uses 
of organised production in achieving planned targets. Another 'education-
al' effect of production planning was that it advanced solidarity through 
the process of publicising plans and no~ifying each others' economic and 
financial situation. 
It was not easy, however, to make all rural families draw up detail-
ed production plans, since the major part of the population was illiter-
ate and the peasants were reluctant to disclose their financial situation 
to others. For the spring ploughing in 1943, the government and the 
earty dispatched cadres to organise labour mutual aid to encourage every 
l 
unit of production to draw up production plans. The basic plan was 
made at the hsiang level and was determined by geographical conditions, 
the ~vailability of human and animal power and of capital. The reason 
for making the h:3iang the basic unit for planning seems to havt= been 
administrative convenience and the necessity of coordination between 
natural villages which were the basic units of production and organis-
ation of labour. The hsiang plan was drawn up after discussion among 
the bsrnng administrative cadres, Party branch secretary and activists in 
l 
Kao Kang, "K' e-fu ch' un-keng ylin-tung chung ling-tao shang ti jo-tien" 
!Overcome the Shortcomings in Our Leadership for the Spring 
Ploughing Campaign), CFJP, 17 April 1943. 
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production, led by cadres, from the higher leve~s. The production 
plans for the natural village and virtually every family were made in 
accordance with the hsiang plan. 
Normally, a plan was divided into three parts: the general 
situation of the hsiang, the production plan for the year, and the 
~ethods for achieving the planned target. The first part was simple 
and short, while the second and third parts had to be clear, concrete 
and detailed, and to include every aspect of the production movement. 
Shown below is an excerpt from a typical production plan for a hsiang -
the sixth Hsiang in the Ch' uan-k 'ou District in Yenan Hsien - for 
the year J. 943 : 
Part 2 - Plan 
2 Organisation of labour force: 
For spring ploughing: 5 cha-kung -- 10 people each. 
For weeding: 25 cha-kung -- 10 people each. 
Pien-kung would absorb 200 people. 
500 women, aged people and children were to be organised: 
200 women for supplementary work in the fields, 
60 aged men and children for raising cattle and sheep, 
240 aged men and children for carrying lunch to the fields 
and other miscellaneous work. 
7 Spinning and weaving: 
30 spinning and 5 weaving teams of women were to be organised. 
30 hand spinning machines, 1 large weaving machine and 1 large 
spinning machine were to be supplied by the cooperative. 
Comrades Wu and Yuan would teach spinning and weaving and 
also lead the spinning and weaving teams. 
After the development of spinr.ing and weaving production, 
a cooperative for clothing production and sale would be 
opened by joint ownership and managem<mt of the government 
and the masses. Mr. Yang, Hsiang Head, would be responsible 
fer preparation for the cooperative. 
Part 3 - Methods 
1 Propaganda and mobilisatio1i: 
a. Meetings of the cadres of the Party branch and activists 
fo~ discussing the significance of this year's production 
and production plan of the hsiang were to be called. 
· .. ,. ' 
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b Srx production mobilisation meetings for the whole hsiang 
would be held in order to call on the peasants to develop 
production and to praise the labour heroes Wang, Kao and 
so on, and punish the loafers Hui and sun. 
c. Wu Man-yu campaign would be launched. 
d. The Party members and cadres should talk with the masses 
individually and explain the production movement to them. 
e. Performances should be prepared for production propaganda 
at the Chinese New Year. 
Organisation: 
a Based on the hsiang production plan, the production plan 
of every natural village and household should be drawn 
up. The Party cell chiefs and the natural village 
headmen would be responsible for making the plans 
properly. 
b. Every Party member would lead and urge the peasants to 
achieve the planned targets. 
c. The Party cell would observe its chief and the Hsiang 
Head in their production work. 
d. The number of meetings would be reduced. Mass meetings 
of the whole hsiang should not be called unless a special 
accident occurs. The conference of the natural village 
headmen and the administrative village chairmen should be 
held twice a year in the spring and the autumn. 
i Party members as good examples; 
a. Party members should get up early in the morning. 
b Party members should make sure to achieve the planned 
target in production; accept the masses' criticisms of 
their production work. 
c. All Party members should join pien-kung or cha-kung. The 
Party cell in the natural village should organise a 
cha-kung team. 
d. Party members who would not stop smoking and gambling 
should be strictly punished by the local government 
and the Party. 
e Party members should mobilise all their wives for 
production. 
f. Party members who were middle peasants and above should 
help the irrunigrants by giving them grain, lending them 
houses, getting them jobs and so on . 
. \ Mobilisation of loafers for production: 
a. Loafers were to be persuaded and 'struggled' at mass 
meetings. 
b. "'hey would be given specific pieces of wasteland to 
reclaim. 
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'..·· ·: 
:·: . 
' .. : ~ 
. ;.· 
293 
\: . :·: . . : . " .. 
•• 1 
· ... 
·.:: 
. ,, 
; -f, ·: '·, 
i' 
. - .. ,~ . 
•.•' ~ .. ; '. . - ·. -~---- :~~ .::,;~ _· ... '· :_:· i 
. ......:1 
..•. ~: 
' ~ -~ . 
.. -~---.~-~~-- -~~--_;;~"·,,- ~:·.~~~~ -~ .· .. ~~~:~ ~~~-·:;~~·-._.'."'.·.~·.··!_~ -;~:-::_~:~-~-~-.-~-:: ... -~ •---~~-,:...-~~-:-r..--;n;;,"T.<·,·~~-- --r-;;--;,or, --, •• 
-·' - --· - . .. ---··---- .. ·. ,.~: 
c. All the duties and burdens borne by the villagers should 
be equally put on them. 
d. The whole village should be mobilised not to allow them 
to eat unless they work. 
e. A sign reading 'loafer' would be hung on the gate of 
every loafer's house and removed when he is reformed. 
f. The same measures should be ta~en for magicians, 
fortune tellers, and so forth. 
This example shows clearly how heavily the production movement 
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depended on the organisation of labour and the activism of the masses, 
and also the important role of cadres and Party members in mobilising 
the masses for production. In effect, the CCP depended solely upon its 
members and cadres for the success of the movement. Party members could 
not lag behind the non-Party masses in any aspect of the movement, and 
they had to be willing to give up private benefits and to subject them-
selves to criticism by the masses. The Party expected its members not 
only to lead the masses in production but also to assume model roles 
for them to emulate. The point may seem obvious, but it cannot be over-
emphasised that in this, as in all other mass movements in the Yenan 
period, success depended to a critical extent on the calibre and perform-
2 
ance of the cadres. 
Household plar,s were made, on the basis of the hsia:ng production 
plan. The peasants traditionally had annual plans for agricultural 
production, although they had not been well organised, publicised, or 
detailed. The task of the cadres was to help them to draw up well 
organised and detailed plans, and to encourage them to increase produc-
3 t1on, so that they could use better methods. Because of the limited 
l,.,,_:.' Ip 
.., - ~-· . ., 8 February 1943 • 
2 
3 
i·lao had pointed to the importance of cadr<':s in his speech to the Sixth 
L'lenum of the Party in 1938: "Cadres are a decisive factor, once the 
political line is determined." "Role of the Chinese Communist Party in 
the National War," Mao, II, p. 202. 
:iuang Ching-po, "Tso nung-hu chi-hua ti i-hsieh ching-yen" (An Exper-
ience of Drawing Production Plan of the Agricultural Households) , 
:'."',_; !\ 10 June 1943 . 
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numbRr of literate cadres available for this work, household plan-
making was not carried out extensively in all areas. But in the greater 
part of the base areas one or two districts or hsiang, or several 
households in a hsien, were selected as typical for the purpose of drawing 
up household production plans. The selection of these models was usually 
based on good production results, one purpose being to encourage others 
to emulate their example. 
Before undertaking to make plans for their family production, the 
cadr.es were required to convince the peasants that the purpose of the 
plan-making was to increase their incomes and improve their own living 
standards, and not for future taxation. The peasants tended otherwise 
to understate the amount of land, sotck animals and farm implements they 
owned. 
The method of making household production plans was the same as that 
used for tax collection: the peasants were required to present their 
own plans and the cadres corrected these in accordance with their inves-
t1gac1on of the conditions of the peasants' land, labour and other means 
of product ion. Before a final decision was made on the plans, the 
·:ad res had to obtain the peasants' consent. Coercion was strictly pro-
h1b1ted, and it was argued that to use coercion would be to make the 
1 plans useless. However, the fact that the Central Committee had to tell 
the cadres repeatedly not to use coercion indicates that this must have 
been fairly widespread. 
The Party exploited this opportunity for political education. In 
helping the peasants to draw up production plans, the local government 
was able to discover in detail the circumstances, and the difficulties, 
of ev.,ry family, while at the same time p•tblicising government policies 
l 
"Ch1el.-shao Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch 'ii tso nung-hu chi-hua ti ching-yen" 
!Introduction of Experience of Production Plan-Making for Agricultural 
Households in the SKN Border Region), CFJP, 13 December 1943. 
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among the peasants. It was essential for the cadres to persuade the 
peasants to allow them to examine in detail their financial situation 
and production capacity. An article in the Chieh-fang jih-pao written 
by a hsien Party secretary emphasises that because the plans had to be 
based on such detail, plan-making was also a form of propaganda work 
1 
which penetrated the masses. 
The educational function of planning included giving the peasants 
an idea of the production movement as a whole. The arguments put for-
ward by the cadres were based on the prospects for improvement in the 
pearants' livelihood rather than on nationalism, even though the ultimate 
aim of the production drive was victory over the Japanese. In order to 
develop production and improve their own living standards, the peasants 
were required to publicise their financial conditions and production 
plans, to cooperate with other peasants, to mobilise their wives, 
children and parents, and to help the village loafers to engage in pro-
duct ion. 
Almost inevitably, the Party met with suspicion, and reluctance on 
the part of the peasants to report their financial conditions to the 
cadres and publicise everything in front of the villagers. The above-
mentioned article by a Pa~ty secretary gives an example of a peasant who 
believed that the report on the number of his stock animals and the 
process of production planning were to provide the basis for future 
2 taxation. Rumours to the effect that the production movement itself 
was aimed only at heavier taxation seem to have been widespread among 
the peasants, and tc have become one of the main obstacles to propagation 
of production planning. The emphasis of the propaganda on this point 
indicates the difficulty of the cadres in their planning work among the masses~ 
i 
Li Tsu-ch' uan, "T' an nung-hu chi-hua" (Talking on Planning of Peasant's 
2 Householcl), CPJP, 13 April 1943. 
3 1L1d. 
11uang Ching-po, '"l'su nung-hu chi-hua ti i-hsieh ching 'yen!' 
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This suggests two important factors. One is the depth of the 
9easanLs' suspicion of the aims of government policies. Even after a 
decade of Communist rule under which they had obtained considerable 
gains, both economic and political, the peasants in the SKN Border 
Peg1on retained their distruct of the 'government'; that is, their 
deep-rooted belief that a 'government' could not do anything which was 
ultimately bene.f icial to the people. The second factor suggested by 
the peasants' worries about taxation is that the tax imposed in the 
rirev1ous two years, 1941 and 1942, had been so heavy as to make them 
suspect almost all government policies. 
On the part of the cadres, not all of those who were responsible 
for drawing up household production plans worked as they were instructed. 
The ch:C:h-fang jih-pao reports an example of a village headman who drew 
up the plans for all the households in i1is village, sitting in his 
house and without consulting the villagers, by putting down 'approx-
imate' or estimated figures. Consequently, the figures in the plans 
1 bore no relation to real conditions, and the plans were useless. 
This kind of problem was uncovered in the examination (ahien-ah'a) 
of the actual production work which followed every major task in the 
rnr al calendar. The object of such examinations was to check on 
•.·1hether the work had been done as planned, and if not, to identify the 
problems and to solve them. Two copies of the household production 
plans were made, one to be kept by the household and the other by the 
·.. d f d df h .. 2 
,,3·• 1 1zg or istrict o fice an use or t e examination. This meant 
t'1at the local government could scrutinise the production work of the 
r:eople under i t!i jurisdiction on a continuous basis. The government 
1-1as now involved in the daily life of the peasant masses, and both 
l 
·, 
Chang Pe1, "Chien-ch' a an-hu chi-hua" (Examination of Household Plan-
ning•, CFJ!', 7 April 1944. 
"Ch1eh-shao Shen-Kan-Ning pien-ch 'ii tso nung-hu chi-hua ti ching-yen." 
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01.des shared the same concern with production work. 
In spite of its shortcomings, production planning helped in the 
1mpleme;ntation of the Party's economic and financial policies, involved 
the peasants in organised labour and the political process, and stim-
ulated them to develop production. Together with organised labour, plan-
making helped to impress on the peasants the fact that their production 
1-;ork w.:is a part of the whole Communist state economy. Moreover, the 
psychology of participation made the plan-making an effective means of 
mobilising the individual peasants and other production units for 
1 
competitions for achieving planned targets. Mobilisation, assisted 
by plan-making, was extended to those who had not taken part in production 
before, such as women, aged people, children and 'loafers'. 
'Reform the Loafers' 
The mobilisation of loafers was of special importance because of its 
social and political significance. It is an illustration of the CCP's 
attempt to reform man's thought and transform the individual into a person 
who could participate in the revolution. 
Organisation of labour made it easier for the Party to control the 
general population, including 'loafers'. In the Party's definition 
'loafers' included gamblers, opium smokers, drunkards, magicians, fortune 
tellers and priests. They could be mobilised for production work only 
2 
after the organisation of labour. Mobilisation rf loafers had both an 
economic and a political, or social, purpose; it was part of the Party's 
1 
2 
Mao gives statistics on t>ie mobilisation of loafers in Yenan Hsien in 
the SKN production movement launched from 1939 to 1942 in his report to 
the Senior Cadres Conference, according to which 1,338 loafers out of 
an original 1,700 took part in production work. See.the table in 
:.,'o.c Tse-tung chi, Vol. s, p. 205. 
0 : 0 ''. 
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general design to mobilise all manpower in the base areas, and it rep-
resented an attempt to remove what was an unstable factor in society. 
Loafers could affect the. morale among the masses, and there were the 
social ill-effects of their unhealthy 'occupations'. 
A Chieh-fang jih-pao editorial enumerated the benefits of reform 
of loafers as follows: first, an increase in the labour force, second, 
raising the peasants' morale for production, and third, reform of rural 
1 
customs and habits and preservation of local order. The editorial 
suggested methods to reforrn loafers. Firstly, the village should give 
them land to till, because even if they wanted to work in the fields, most 
of them had neither land nor farm implements. Secondly, the villagers 
were to use patience in 'persuading' and educating them, so that they 
might be brought to a point where they would want sincerely to engage 
in production. Thirdly, if persuasion was not effective, the local 
government was to assign them a certain production task, appoint a proper 
supervisor, and periodically inspect their work. Fourthly, the village 
go·1ernment was to force them publicly to promise the villagers that they 
wauld gi.ve up such habits as opium smoking, gambling and drinking, and do 
a certain amount of productive work. They should be made to swear to 
pay fines if they did not keep these promises. Finally, women and 
children were to be mobilised to 'struggle' against them, as were their 
own parents, brothers, sisters and friends. 2 As suggested by the 
1
"Kai-tsao erh-liu-tzu" (Reform the Loafers), editorial, CFJP, 14 February, 
1943. 
2 
Ibid. A description of a mass meeting for production mobilisation at 
which a loafer was accused, and forced to promise to stop smoking and 
reclaim 6 shang of land is given in Liu Mo-p' ing, "Wuch' i Shih-cheng 
hsiang sheng-ch'an tung-ylian" (Mobilisation for Production at Shihcheng 
Hsiang, Wuch' i Hsien) , CFJP, 11 April 1943. 
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production plan cited above, tremendous social pressure seems 
to have been applied for mobilisation of loafers to a point where they 
could not avoid working. 
The basic _j_dea under lying the CCP' s methods for reform of loafers 
was that they were not born loafers, but had become so because of 
social conditions, and therefore, they could be reformed and made to 
1 
work if social conditions were changed. Thought and behaviour were 
regarded as a reflection of social environment; and if the people's 
ideas and behaviour were changed, this in turn accelerated social 
change. This has been one of the basic ideas underlying the approach 
of Mao and the CCP to the question of man and society, and they have 
always always seized opportunities to educate the masses for further 
2 2ocial change. An important aspect of the 'reform the loafers' 
campaign was the Party's concern with transforming the ways of think-
ing and lives of the peasant masses. The unhealthy life styles of 
loafers had to be eliminated, not by liquidating the loafers physic-
ally, but by winning them over to the new value system, or 'curing their 
disease 1 • The 'reform the loafers' campaign was an essential part of 
the Communist revolutionary transformation of society. 
3. The Labour Heroes 
Organisation of labour in the production movement involved the 
peasant masses iu the revolutionary process in t'1eir daily work all 
nKai-tsao erh-liu-tzu. 11 
ChaJmers Johnson touches on thi.;; point, al though from the following 
quotation it is clear that he regards it as a revolutionary tactic 
and not as part of the essence of Mao's revolutionary thought: "As a 
revolutionary strategist, with this own basic values and goals 
thoroughly compartmentalized, Mao Ts-tung recognised the need to 
exploit opportunistically any poli.tical issue that might bring about 
the desired level of mass organization. Tactical flexibility with 
teqard to matters of Marxist ideology is the most fundamental 
i.lttribute of Mao's theory of people's war." Ping-ti Ho and 
Tang Tsou, eds., op. cit., pp. 407-408. 
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year round. The labour heroes were mass leaders of these production 
organisations, who emerged from the process of the production move-
ment and assumed key roles in the revolutionary process not only for 
production but also in other aspects of sociopolitical transformation. 
In fact, in the whole process of transformation at the village level, 
the CCP relied heavily on the labour heroes. They were the symbol of 
the Party's success in its mass line technique. 
The labour hero system was not a new innovation in 1943, at least 
in the SKN Border Region where in 1942 Wu Man-yu became the first 
labour hero. Wu was elected as an example of hard work, loyalty to 
the government and help with other people's production. 1 A Wu Man-yu 
2 
emulation campaign was launched in May 1942. The campaign stressed 
both his political virtues and his economic achievement in intensive 
. 3 
cultivation. In early 1943, when the CCP was about to start the 
production drive, Wu Man-yu became the model for emulation by all 
production units; the SKN Border Region government and the Northwest 
' I ' I 4 Bureau of the CCP issued directives to carry out a Wu Man-yu campaign 
During the 1943 harvest, when the first year of the production 
movement was nearing completion, all production units were asked to 
select labour heroes (tao-tung ying-hsiung), who had to be active 
producers who had contributed to the production work of the unit as a 
1'1hole, and model production workers (mo-fan sheng-ch 'an kung-tso-che) 
l 
2 
4 
!11u Ai, "Mo-fan 
the Model Hero 
cit., p. 124. 
ying-hsiung Wu Man-yu shih tsen-yang fa-hsien ti" (How 
wu Man-yu Emerged), CFJP, 30 August 1942; Stein, op. 
The Border Region government's 
5 May 1942; Editorials, CFJP, 
Ibid. 
c.;,11 to the peasants for emulation, CFJP, 
30 April & 6 May 1942. 
"K'ai-chan Wu Man-yu yiin-tung" (Launch Wun Man-yu Movement), editorial, CFJP, 
11 January 1943; The directive of the SKN Border Region government to 
all the hsien governments in the Region, CFJP, 14 January 1943; the 
~irective of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, CFJP, 17 March 1943. 
\ 
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,,.,i10 had to be cadres who had worked particularly hard and obtained out-
standi.ng results in leading production work. The local governments 
issued a list of 'standard qualities' for labour heroes. The following 
example gives the standard qualities for the election of labour heroes 
and model workers issued by the Suiteh Subregion Office in SKN. 
Labour Heroes had first of all to be hard working and to have produced 
a large amount of goods of high quality. Secondly, they had to have 
demonstrated that they were adopting and creating new and better pro-
duct ion methods. Thirdly, they had to be willing to pay tax and obey 
the laws; and fourth, they had to be willing to help others and to 
1 influence others, not only in production but also in many other ways. 
For model production workers, the following four qualities were essential. 
2 Firstly, they had to perceive production work 'correctly' and carry 
0111: their tasks of production 'correctly'. Secondly, they had to assume 
a':nve responsibility and to have outstanding work results. Thirdly, 
they had to have planned and creative methods in production work and, 
3 fi.nally, to have close links with the masses. 
What is noteworthy is that two of the four essential conditions 
for labour heroes were political, namely, they should be good citizens, 
willi.ng to pay ta::, to obey laws and help others, in addition to being 
outstanding producers of goods. For the CCP, an isolated petty producer 
•.-1as meaning less, no matter how much he produced; he was not able to 
increase production very far, nor to affect other people's enthusiasm 
for productio:1. In order to mobilise fully all resources for economic 
l 
Directive of the Suiteh Subregion Office, the SKN 
22 October 1943, CFJP, 24 October 1943. 
Border Region, of 
'Correct' perception of production work by cadres means that they have 
realised the importance of production work in the war and the revolut-
ion, and respected it in their daily service as cadres. 
Directive of Suiteh Subregion Office, cited above. 
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development, everything had to be planned and organised for systematic 
use, and everyone had to be indoctrinated to keep morale high, 
It is worth noting some examples of 1943 labour heroes to see the 
qualities which the CCP sought j n them. Wu Man-yu was once more elected 
a labour hero because he had organised his whole village into production 
teams, helped the villagers with financial and technical difficulties 
at his own expense, and also helped the 359th Brigade when it had 
started to reclaim land at Nanniwan, close to his village. Wang Chen, 
the Commander of the 359th Brigade, which by non-CCP accounts achieved 
remarkable success in attaining substantial self-sufficiency in food and 
basic goods in 1943, was elected a first class hero, for his effective 
leadership both in production work in the Brigade and in political work 
such as in the development of oood relations with the villagers around 
Nanniwan. Shen Chang-lin was honoured as a Border Region labour hero 
for his long and successful efforts to give financial and technical aid 
to immigrants and to organise them together with the native villagers 
into mutual aid teams to reclaim wasteland. Liu Chien-chang, the leader 
oi the successful cooperative of the Southern District in Yenan Bsien, 
which had organised 90 percent of the households in the district, and 
expanded its business from commerce to production, transportation and 
credit, as well as making profits for its members, was elected a labour 
hero of the SKN Border Regi:m because of his excellent management and 
leadership of the cooperative. Chang Ch'iu-feng beco.me a first class 
honour labour hero of the Northwest Shanshi Base, -because he had improved 
techniques in the repair and produc·::ion of weapons, saved materials, 
taught young workers his skills and trained them as skilled workers, 
gained prestige among fellow workers, who had elected him union leader, 
and performed leadership functions very well in implementing the 
policies of the Party. 
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It can be seen, then, that labour heroes were both leaders of 
production organisations and at the same time outstanding productive 
workers. But they seem to have been appreciated by the Party more 
for their leadership qualities than for their personal achievements in 
production. Helping others and developing organised production at 
the expense of personal interests were other highly commended qualities. 
In collective work, the CCP tried to eliminate selfishness. A 
concept of 'new citizen' grew out of the organisation of production. 
The concept that 'a good citizen must help others' was entirely new to 
rural China. The labour heroes were, in a sense, new citizens who 
placed 'public' interests above self-interest. What the Party expected 
of the labour heroes was that they should lead their fellows to organise 
labour mutual aid and cooperatives and raise the level of production in 
a village as a whole. Accordingly, the labour heroes who attended the 
F1rst Labour Hero Congress of the SKN Border Region were all leaders of 
production organisations, although the organisations they represented 
1 
varied in size and type. 
It was for this reason that Mao Tse-tung called for further organ-
isation of production at the Labour Hero Congress in November 1943. He 
wrote: 
l 
2 
Labour heroes and model workers in production! 
You are leaders of the people, you have been 
very successful in your work, and I hope you, too, 
will not grow complacent. I hope that when you 
get back to you>. organisations, schools, army 
units or factories, you will lead the people, 
lead the masses and work still better, and first 
of all get the masses organised on a voluntary 
basis into co-operatives, get them even2better 
organised and in ~wen greater numbers. 
l'FJP_, 27 November 1943. 
"r::pt Organised," Man., III, p.160. 
. 
..·, 
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Labour heroes were apparently expected by the CCP to organise and lead 
the masses for mass movements, not only in economic matters but also in 
political, military and educational fields. 1 For example, when the 
sKN Border Region was threatened by the Y.MT army in July 1943, it was 
the labour heroes who organised the villagers into militia corps and 
2 drew up mobilisation plans. In the 'reform the loafers' campaign, labour 
3 heroes assumed model and leading roles. When the government called 
for a 'private school' (min-pan hsUeh-hsiao) movement in 1944~ the 
labour heroes responded promptly by setting up primary schools in 
their villages, by giving financial assistance and persuading the 
villagers to promote the movement. A typical case of leadership by a 
labour hero covering fields other than production is the example of Yuan 
Ch' ien of Pao-ten Hsi en in northwest Shansi, who assumed the head of the 
winter school of his village and made use of the winter school for organ-
isation of tax payment, rent reduction, militia training and assistance 
5 
to the regular army. 
The convocation of labour hero congresses at all levels at the end 
of 1943 was a significant event in the history of mass mobilisation by 
the CCP at the basic level. These congresses honoured the heroes, whose 
ach1e·:ements and methods were praised and reported through all commun-
ica tions media. At the congresses, the labour heroes exchanged experiences 
l 
2 
.J 
ln the Chieh-fang jih-pao it is emphasised how actively the labour 
heroes were assuming responsibility for leading the mass movements. 
The number of articles and news items is so great and the respons-
ibility placed on the labour heroes Wds so large that it seems that 
it miqht well have been a considerable burden to be a labour hero. 
Examples of Yang Chao-ch'en, Wu Man-yu and Shen Chang-lin in the 
~&IP, 17, 17 and 19 July 1943 • 
See Yang Chao-~h'en's example in CFJP, 27 March 1943. 
See "Ken-chii-ti pu-t' ung chio-yii ti kai-ke wen-t' i" (Reform Problem 
of Regular Edu :;a.tion in the Base Areas) , editorial CFJP, 7 Apri 1 
1944. 
:'.'w1g-chan jih-pao, 29 January 1945 . 
~~1;~1~;J;~~~·~~~ 
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on tetter methods and techniques of increasing production and organising 
more people. Usually the labour hero congresses were accompanied by 
production exhibitions (sheng-ah'an ahan-Zan-hui) at the corresponding 
levels, which displayed outstanding achievements in production as well 
as better production methods, including the form and practice of organ-
isation. 
The labour hero congress at the Border Region level was covered 
by the Chieh-fang jih-pao as widely as the National Congress of the CCP. 
This is one clear indication of the significance attached by the CCP to 
the role of the labour heroes and of the congress in the economy and the 
politics of the Communist system. 
In fact, the labour hero congress linked the basic masses politic-
ally to the supreme central organ of state. In a society with poor 
communications, the villagers rarely travelled to the capital city; other 
governments in Chinese history had had little success in controlling 
effectively the basic unit of rural society, the natural village. The 
CCP was the first government to attempt to achieve effect.i<1e control 
over the basic mass of the people through political and economic mass 
1 
movements. The convocation of the labour hero congresses elected by 
the masses was one of the most effective ties between the CCP central 
leadership and the basic levej. of the people. They were notified that 
the labour heroes from their villages went to Yenan, the capital of the 
Communist state, and were received by the supreme leaders of the state, 
and held meetings with labour heroes from other parts of the country, 
and moreover, were coming back with honour and heightened morale to 
bei.r villages to work with them. This seems to have given the masses 
l 
Particularly after 1942, implementation of almost every policy 
of the CCP was designed to be a mass movement-such as an election, 
rent reduction, education, marriage law, tax collection, production, 
and so on . 
i}l(~l~'~'iil[~l;y~~~~J;~~J~:~;r~~l\Z§~~~j,f'l~f'.':%1,C~l ' 
~~~{;JIJ.;,i$'~%.~1~J)¥.' 
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a sense of integrity and solidarity with the whole Communist state and 
1 its leaders. 
The labour heroes were typical cases of the 'activists' whom the 
CCP expected to assume the role of li:-iking the ?arty and the government 
with the masses, to mobilise them by providing the basic leadership in 
the mass movements. The labour hero system was designed to make 
methodical use of the capability and prestige of the 'activists' among 
the masses as mainstays of the Party. 
The labour hero system helped also to transform the value system of 
t!oe society. 'Labour' had never been connected with 'hero' before in 
Chinese history, even though the virtues of hard work, helping people, 
sacrificing one's own benefits and leading people in production had been 
appreciated by people within the vil1.age. Now appreciation of these 
virtues was shared by the villagers and the government. This worked as 
another tie between the masses and the government and encouraged the 
masses to recognise these virtues. 
The labour hero system was so successful, both.politically and 
economically, that from 1944 the CCP extended the 'hero system' to other 
£ ields; to study (hsueh-hs1·. ying-hsiung), fighting ( clian-tou ying-hsiung) 
and m1 ll. ti.a (r.:in-ping ying-hsizmg) . These heroes were elected from the 
basic units up to the border region level, and held heroes' congresses as 
d1 i the labour heroes, al though tr.e Chieh-fang jih-pao reported them 
with less enthusiasm than the labour heroes congresses. The fact that 
the CCP adopted the 'hero system' in other fields indicates that the 
activists in all the mass movements were expected by the Party to assume 
leadership in the movements, and the 'hero system' was one of the most 
l 
Apart from send-offs and welcomes by their own villagers, the labour heroes 
'.·.'he went to Yenan to attend the CongrE·ss were welcomed with respect and 
"Xc1tement by the villagers on their way to and from Yenan. On their way 
back, they gave talks about the Congress and Yenan at the villages they 
passed through. 
-~f~~\f~j~~~;~.,J~llifilill"fil!j~!Jii~~~ff~lt'~~~'ij' 
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effective way to mobilise them as basic leaders. These heroes were 
the people who gave organisation and leadership to the basic units for 
economic, military and political mass mobilisation. For the Party, 
1.he heroes were a source of new cadres of non-intellectual origin which 
the Communist regime badly needed in order to defend its system of 
. t b . t' 1 government agains ureaucratisa ion, and to link it with the mass of 
the people. 
The production movement provided a social foundation for Communist 
power by organising all the peasants under native leaders loyal to the 
new regime. With the improvement in living standards of the masses and 
the social and political change which resulted from the production drive 
2 
'.'1 1943 undermined the landlord-gentry rule in the villages. The 
.cooperatives movement, launched as a part of the production drive, 
accelerated this process by cutting the old dependent ties of the members 
with merchants and usurers. Democratic rule within the cooperative 
helped to give the peasant members political training and a sense of 
participation. 
4. The Cooperatives 
Like the Japanese- and !<MT-controlled cooperative, the coop-
eratives led by the CCP started as consumers' cooperatives. Until 
1941, they were regarded as part of the government, and the 'members' 
regarded their contribution as a form of tax, because the cooperatives 
were organised by local governments and depended mainly on them for 
investment; they managed buying, selling and the production of goods 
l 
2 
Jl.ang--ahan jih-pao, 29 January 1945. 
.Z\ll Communist bases in North China were reported to have achieved 
the target of 'feng-i tsu-shih' through the 1943 production drive, 
although the T'aihang base was still suffering from a locust plague. 
·.che production campsigns in 1944 were launched for another target, 
'k.eng-san yV.-i 1 • 
--~. -.-• ,., __ 
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required by local governments and there was no profit for the share-
1 
holders. It seems that the cooperatives had become a burden to the 
government, at least during the period of economic and financial 
difficulties ~n 1941. In January 1942, the CCP suggested the transfer 
of the cooperatives to non-government management in order to eliminate 
bureaucratism in the cooperative movement. This was intended also to 
make people regard the cooperatives as their own, and to raise their 
enthusiasm for the cooperative movement for development of production 
and commerce. 
This plan for transfer to non-government management followed the 
successful experience of the Southern District Cooperative of Yenan 
i!0·i~n, which had been managed exceptionally well by non-government 
2 
cadres. It had organised over 90 percent of the inhabitants in the 
district as share-holders and expanded its business from commerce to 
production, transportation and the provision of loans. 3 
Although the Chieh-fang jih-pao reported good results from the 
transfer to non-government control in 1942, it seems that the elimin-
2t1on of bureaucratism among the cooperative cadres had not been 
accomplished within this short time. In September 1942 the Chieh-fang 
~<11-pao editorial called on the cooperatives to reform themselves 
in the following ways. Firstly, the cooperatives had to strengthen 
the education of their cadres and make them recognise ~hat cooperatives 
2 
. 0 
See Mao's report, "Economic and Financial Problems," Mao-Tse-tung chi, 
Vol. 8, p. 230; Ch'en Huan, "Pien-ch'ii jen-min ti fu-tan chiu-chin 
chung-pu-chung ," CFJP, 4 November 1941. The latter admits that the 
people regarded the contribution to cooperatives as a burden, because it 
never brought them any profit .. 
'
11 non-government cadre' is not a 'cadre' in the strict sense. But those 
who worked for the mass organisations and cooperatives were also called 
'kan-pu', although they were not employees of the government or the Party . 
Or; development of the Southern District Cooperative, See"Yenan Nan-ch 'ii 
h.e-tso-she ti li-shih" (History of the Southern District Cooperative) , 
'.·int ten by its leader Liu Chien-cha!!g, Mao 1's-tung chi, Vol. 8, 
pp, .234-245. 
· .. :. , .. 
' .· ' ; .·.:. 
·,·· . 
. ' .. 
were an economic organisation of the masses. Secondly, all cooperatives 
which had not yet been transferred to non-government management should 
reform themselves, call general meetings of share-holders and elect a 
board of management. Thirdly, the cooperative cadres should not coerce 
. l 
the masses to join the cooperatives. 
In addition, at the end of 1942 Mao suggested that the Party would 
have to separate the cooperative cadres from the government and pay them 
... ,ages; cultivation of the cooperative cadres' fields by the peasants had 
to be stopped, so that it might be made clear that the cooperatives were 
not part of the government or the Party, both in the eyes of the people 
and in the minds of the cadres themselves. Mao also called for reform 
of the cooperative organisation. The organisation of the cooperatives 
iHd to be simplified and made into a 'business', not a government organ, 
and the number of cooperative workers and the amount of expenditure had 
2 
to be reduced. 
Ccmmunist sources reveal two interesting po;.nts. One is that the 
cooperative movement was started from above, as a government directed 
operation, and around 1942, like other Communist policies and movements 
from above, it became sluggish, mainly because of bureaucratisation. 
The other is that the pur.pose of the Communist cooperative policy was not 
coliect1visation of production, but development of the 'private' sector 
of the border reg ion economy. These two were inter-related. 'Bureau 
er at ism', which had appeared in the form of giving priority to the 
government at the expense of the people, had prevented the cooperatives 
from increasing their members and absorbing small capital. In order to 
.evelop the cooperative movement, cooperatives had to be profitable for 
·, 
•. '"V 
"uan-ch'" he-tso-srie min-pan che.ng-tso" (Rigorously Implement the 
c . 
·.
0 11cy of the People's Management of the Cooperative) , editorial, 
2 
.:····, 8 September 1942. 
.. 
•.Q_; !s8-timg chi, vol. 8, p. 230. 
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the people. As staced anove, the CCP aimed to develop 
the framework of 'capitalism' and 'bourgeois democracy' 
defined by the Party as 'progressive' in rural China, wl 
1 ist' production relations were still nominant. The C< 
believe that the peasants at this stage, with a few exce 
prepared to accept only political or ideological incentJ 
production. 
'Bureaucratism' should be oversome, according to tr 
2 the education of the cooperative cadres, in addition t 
Liu Chien-chang, the leader of the succE 
District Cooperative in Yenan Hsien, wrote that the firs 
mass ownership was the election by the masses of a man c 
management of the cooperative. He should be ideologica 
fair in practice, and understand the significance of the 
he should know that the cooperative should serve the pee 
fore, should be merely an employee of the people without 
The CCP's design was to make the cooperative an org 
and managed by the people and profitable for the people. 
tried to appeal to the masses' self-interest for organis 
ment of the cooperative. In other words, by showing th 
the cooperative could benefit them,. 4 the CCP hoped to d 
1 
See the Central Committee decision on land policy of Ja 
Brandt, et al., ed., op. cit., p. 278. 
2
The period of the cooperative reform policy coincided w 
of the rectification campaign. 
3
,,K .• h" . A 1 Q t" 
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uan-yu e-tso-she ti chi-ke wen-t'i" (Severa _ues io 
Cooperatives), CFJP, 12 June 1943. 
For an example of Communist propaganda on the benefits 
see a news item on the Tzu-chang Hsien Cooperative, in 
j?:h-pao, 17 November 1943. It emphasises that the Coop 
enormous profit for the members, and many people wanted 
because they had come to know the cooperative was profi 
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full the peasants' capital and manpower, for self-sufficiency of the 
border regions. At the same time, the Communists developed the 'pub: 
sector, especially in secondary industry for basic goods. But it wa: 
not able to supply enough basic goods for the demands in the base arei 
and the Party had to depend upon private capital for secondary indust: 
wiuc:h became the main field of the production cooperatives. 
Production of Basic Goods by Cooperatives 
In Liu Chien-chang's article in the Chieh-fang jih-pao quoted ab 
it is shown that the CCP tried by all means at its disposal to colle 
even the smallest amount of capital from the masses. Replying to th 
question of how to recruit members and collect capital for the cooper 
ative, he writes: First, the cooperative had to accept local product 
as capital instead of cash, such as grain, stock animals, timber, fue 
Chinese medical materials, etc. Second, the cadres should not force 
the masses to join cooperatives, but should carry out propaganda on h 
beneficial it was to be a cooperative member. Third, investment in 
cooperative had to be exempt from taxation. Finally, the cooperativ 
should absorb local small merchants' businesses which could not run b 
1 themselves. The CCP mobilised not only small cash savings but also 
manpower which had not so far been used. A typical example was mobi 
isation of women for spinning and weaving cooperatives. By lending 
raw cotton ana equ:.pment, teaching spinning and weaving, and buying t 
finished products, the cooperative tried to mobilise women's labour f 
local self-sufficiency in clothing. 2 
l 
2 
''Kuan-yli hi-tso-she ti chi-kl wen-t'i.'' 
See' for example, Kao Tzu-li, "Hsiang N.;tn-ch 'ii hl-tso-she hsueh-sH 
(Learn from the southern Di.strict Cooperative), CFJP, 20 February 
l943; A report on women's cooperative in the SKN Border Region, 
C'PJP, 8 June 1943; wun Ming, "Wei ch'iin-chung fu-wu ti Yuan-liu-sr 
he-tso-she" (The Yuan-liu-shih Cooperative Serves the Masses) , CFJl 
29 October 1943; CFJP, 17 November 1943. 
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The CCP's ultimate target in economic development in the Yenan period 
che achievement of self-sufficiency within each base area. Even with-
in the base areas the supply of basic goods had to be locally self-
sufficient at the hsien or district level because of lack of modern 
transportation. The cooperative movement was designed to fulfill the 
demands o:E local small industry; industries run by the cooperatives clearly 
shov.1ed this. For example, in 1942 the Liu-lin Hsiang Cooperative, a 
branch d lhe Southern District Cooperative in Yenan Hsien, had a 
Heavin(! factory, a leather mill, a wool weaving factory, an oil mill, 
1 
and a flour mill. In the case of Ling-shu Hsien Cooperative, Peiyao 
Region, the Chin-Ch' a-Chi Border Region, tbere were 6 oil mills, 9 water 
mills, 3 farm appliances factories, 5 dyeing factories, 1 ceramic factory, 
28 sheep meadows, 300 mou of rhubarb fields for Chinese medical material, 
2 200 flour mills, 10 medical factories and 10 mou of vegetable plots. 
In the economically backward Communist bases, the role of the small 
scale cooperative industry was crucial. According to the report of the 
Chcn-Ch.-Lu-Yu Border Region Inspection Group on the cooperatives in the Pai-
yco Region, the cooperative movement in t:-ie Chin-Ch' a-Chi Border Region 
had resulted in the following achievements: 
1. It damaged the puppet currency and strengthened the 
Communist cu~rency, pien-pi,3 by providing abundant 
products. It had systematised exports and imports 
through the organised control of commodities. In 
particular, it had educated the people in the Border 
Pegion and made them use pien-pi for all trade; thus, 
even the people in the guerrilla and Japanese-occupied 
areas had become willing to use pien-pi. Since the 
Japanese had executed a rationing system, the people in 
the Japanese-occupied areas were not able to buy goods 
even if they had money. If they ~ad pien-pi, they were 
~.-~~~~~~~ 
.·.av Tse-tung chi, Vol. B, p. 245. 
2 
3 
!'.'e Chang-lin, "Chin-Ch'a-Chi ti he-tso shih-yeh" (Cooperative Work 
en the C:1in-Ch'a-Chi Border Region), CFJP, 5 January 1943. 
'<e1:-p-i is an abbreviated term for pien-ah 'U ying-hang pi which means 
border rt}ion bank note, issued by each border region bank in the 
h2.se area which was called a border region ba,nk. 
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cible: to buy goods from the Border Region. 
"· It controlled inflation and regulated grain, 
because it organised and controlled local products, 
and, by establishing the central organ of the 
cooperatives, it adjusted maldistribution of grain 
and other goods, and balanced supply and demand. 
3. It greatly developed production. The cooperative 
movement involved a great amount of manpower and 
property for development of production, and made 
every effort to achieve self-reliance. The cooper-
atives helped to develop many side jobs and handi-
crafts. The people's livelihood was raised and 
at least food and clothing were sufficient now. 
4. It was combined with other work. The cooperative 
usually gave gifts and entertairanents in acknow-
ledgment of the service of the anti-Japanese army and 
gave special treatment to soldiers' families. It 
played an important role in recruiting new soldiers; 
for example, the cooperative of a district of the 
Peiyao Region mobilised thirty new soldiers1on an 
entirely voluntary basis to join the army. 
Both the economic and political significance of the cooperatives are 
·ibvious in this report. The first and main achievement of the co-
o~erative movement was economic, i.e., an increase in output; this 
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helped to control inflation and strengthen the position of the Communist 
currency in the monetary war with the Japanese-sponsored currency. For 
the CCP an organised private economy was most desirable. The Party was 
able to plan and control production, and internal and external trade, 
in 1ddition to avoiding waste of capital and manpower, and developing 
industrialisation. This 'guerrilla' way of industrialisation was later 
expanded to the whole of China under the slogan of 'tzu- li keng-sheng '. 2 
~ol 1 t1cal Advantages of the Cooperatives 
Toward the end of 1943, Mao Tse-tung began referring to mutual aid 
labour organisations as cooperatives, quite apart from the normal co-
operatives described above. These two were distinct from each other, 
l 
2 
K'e Cbang-lin, "Chin-Ch'a-Chi ti he-tso shi-yeh," CFJP, 5 January 
] '."•:.]:. 
For a full discussion of the Yenan way of industrialisation, see 
Selden, op. cit., pp. 254-2G2 and 264-267. 
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although they were in some cases superficially similar. For example, 
cransportation work, carried out by the peasants in the slack season, 
was organised both as a form of labour mutual aid and as a part of the 
cooperative; and in practice it was organised both by the cooperatives 
and by the peasants themselves as mutual aid labour. But the cooper-
atives originated from commerce, to supply consumer goods, while mutual 
aid labour was designed to serve production. The former later expanded 
to include transportation and production, but, with a few exceptions, 
never became an organisation for agricultural production until the 
'Socialist High Tide' in 1955. The exceptions were mainly in the 
agricultural work of the army and of cadres who were not natives and did 
not own private land where they worked. Other exception were the 
'cooperative farms' established by landless migrants for reclamation of 
wasteland. 
To the extent that the CCP established its economic policy on the 
basis of private ownership of land, the 'land cooperative' was regarded 
'l f ' d . h . d l 2s a e tist eviation in t e Yenan perio . The exceptional cases 
mentioned above were not referred to as cooperatives by the CCP. The 
only two Communist documents which do ref er to all mutual aid organ-
ioations as cooperatives were Mao's "On the Cooperatives" 2 and "Get 
It is interesting that Mao was the only one to suggest 
the possibility of unifying mutual aid labour and cooperatives into 
'land cooperatives' or collectivisation of land and agricultural work, 
onticipating the socialist stage of economic development when at the 
srune time the Party deliberately avoided mention of this possibility. 
l 
2 
In pr~ctice, howeve~, the CCP stressed the educational function of 
See Section 2 on mutual aid labour. 
article is not included in the SeZeated Works. 
text, see Mao Tse-tung ahi, Vol. 9, pp. 75-78. 
For the 
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t'1e cooperative both for its members and for the cadres. The members 
were entitled to equal participation in the management of the cooper-
at1ve irrespective of the amount of their investment, whereas profit 
was dis:Cributed proportionately to the amount of investment. The 
members were called together for meetings for election of managers and 
staff, for management, for distribution of profit, and so on. At these 
meetings they were encouraged to take an active part in the process of 
'democratic centralism'; that is, the masses were to assume leadership 
. l in the cooperative movement. Participation of the masses in the 
management and work of the cooperative involved them in the political 
process, and the cooperative tried to assist in the implementation of 
t!1e government policies on taxation, school and adult education, self-
defence and security, migration, employment and assistance to the poor. 2 
The members were inculcated with the idea of the identity of interests 
between them, and also between them and the government. In the guerrilla 
bases cooperative work was directly linked with nationalism against the 
3 Japanese; troo· >S and puppet administration. 
The cooperative cadres were expected to work hard and to adopt 
informal procedures. They were paid in proportion to the profit the 
cooperative gained, so that they could identify themselves with the 
4 
cooperative and its members. There were apparently corrupt cadres 
'.·>ho were er iticised by their colleagues and the members, although they 
5 
were rarely mentioned in Communist sources. 
The cooperatives were another organisation through which the CCP 
sought out and brought up activists among the masses, ::md replaced the 
l 
2 
3 
4 
Liu Chien-chang, "Pan he-tso·-she ti chi-k~ ching-yen," CPJP, 4 
Fdiruary 1944. 
Kao Tzu-li, "Hsiang Nan-ch 'ti he-tso-she hsi.ieh-hsi." 
i'ilu \·len, "Wang En-teh 
En-teh and 'Chin-t'ai 
t 'ung-ci1ih yil 'Chin-t' ai-tien"' (Comrade Wang 
Store'), K'ang-ahan jih-pao, 5 February 1945. 
Chien-chang, "Pan he-tso-she ti chi-ke ching-yen." 
C:1u Vien, "Wang En-teh t 'ung-chih yil 'Chin-t 'ai-tien' . " 
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old cadres of intellectual origin from outside. Liu Chien-chang wrote: 
According to our experience, the cooperative cadres at all levels 
should be people who are selected from rural areas and linked 
with the masses. The people who are trained in practical work 
of the cooperatives are better for these cadres know the local 
situation, are conversant with popular feelings, and related to 
the lao-pai-hsing (ordinary peasants) they are relatively 
trusted by the lao-pai-hsing. 1 
rhis also suggests that, as in other fields, there were conflicts and 
Jack of communication between the outside cadres and native villagers 
in the cooperatives. In liu's opinion even though they had some 
educational background and management skills, outside cadres were 
inferior to native ones in developing good relations with the villagers. 
Since the villagers' distrust would ruin the whole work of the cooper-
atives, it was much better to train native cadres. It seems that the 
peasants' distrust and suspicion of outsiders or 'officials' was still 
strongly-ingrained even under the enlightened rule of the CCP. 
The cooperatives were another example of Mao's concept of leadership, 
in which the government machine must be effective in mobilising the masses, 
must be prevented from backsliding into bureaucratisation, and must be 
linked with the local masses. By this kind of leadership, Communist 
policies, the nationalist cause, and social reform, could be carried to 
the basic level of society and could evoke a positive response from the 
organised masses. The fact that the CCP stressed profit-making in the 
cooperatives illustrates its belief in economic advancement as the pre-
requisite for mass mobilisation. It is true that the def eat of Japan was 
propagated as the ultimate goal in organising and reforming the cooper-
at1ves. But by comparison with the publicity given to the economic 
gain which would accrue to the share-holders in the cooperatives, 
propagation of the nationalist cause was almost negligible. 
Liu Chien-chang, "Pan ;,e-tso-she ti chi-ke ching-yen." 
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In other words, the CCP saw the cooperative movement as directed 
nore to sGcial revolution than to advanceMent of the nationalist war. 
Economically, the Party sought to raise even the smallest capital from 
the masses for primitive industrialisation, to supply sufficient 
quantities of basic goods within the base areas and to stabilise the 
p1:enoi, while at the same time, raising the living standards of the 
peasants. Socially, by expanding the 'business' of the cooperatives 
from commerce to production and finance, the movement was designed to 
reduce or eliminate the peasants' dependency on merchants, usurers and 
capitalists, and this undermine the economic dominance of the old ruling 
class. Politically, the cooperative movement again served to link the 
Party to the masses through the economic lift of the peasants. In turn, 
c·rganisation of the cooperatives offered another opportunity for the 
Party to seek out and train activists and cadres from among the local 
masses, who could provide local leaders loyal to the new system of 
government but with close links with the masses. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
The CCP launched a number of campaigns together with the production 
drive. Of special significance was the education reform campaign. It 
was aimed at the spread of primary education at the villagers' own 
The CCP wanted the peasants to set up, run and provide 
curricula for primary schools, so that they would feel that the school 
was their own and ensure that their children went to the school. 
Another purpose was to avoid financial expenditure for primary education. 1 
Apart from regular primary education and adult education, newspaper 
reading teams were organised on the basis of production organisations. 
By informing the peasants what happened at the front, what were the 
policies of the government and the Party, how their fellow peasants 
l 
For a full discussion on this movement, see Seybolt, op. cit., 
Pp. 656-664; Selden,. op.cit., pp.267-274. 
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from other parts of the base areas were engaging in the same mass move-
ments as they were engaging in, the newspaper reading widened their 
horizons, and brought them closer to the whole Communist system of 
qovernment. The CCP claimed that as a result, the peasants were 
stimulated to improve their production methods and to develop further 
. . 1 loyalty to the Communist regime. Wall newspapers in the villages 
were also encouraged and assumed a similar role as did the newspaper 
. 2 
reading teams. 
The anti-superstitution campaign in 1944 was in itself made possible 
by the improved living standards resulting from the 1943 production drive 
and by the medical and hygiene policies of the government, and illus-
trates the change in the source of authority at the basic level of society. 
Throu(Jh the production drive, the CCP had, in fact, succeeded in estab-
11shing its authority among the peasants by 1944. 
The production campaign was the most important and all-embracing 
mass movement in the Yenan period, involving not only the masses but the 
army, the government and the Party. Although its primary purpose was 
to supply enough food and basic goods and to obtain reserves of grain for 
the army and the people in the base areas, the political and educational 
effects of the movem~nt both on cadres and the masses were immense. Mutual 
aid labour brought the government and Party cadres close to the masses, 
while economic mass organisations introduced a new pattern of commun-
icat1on between the leaders and the led, and among the led. 
While deriving immediate and tangible benefits from the production 
movement, the peasants were also indoctrinated by the CCP towards 
acceptance of an entirely new prospect of society and a new concept of 
1 
nation' . Politicisation of the peasants, in turn, gave more discipline 
.·•·,•£', 24 March 1944. 
Chang Chung-shih, "'fang-chia-ling ti ch' iang-pao" (The Wall Newspaper 
Of Yang-chia-ling Village), CFJP, 3 April 1944. 
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and vitality to the Party cadres who worked among the masses, exposing 
them to the masses' criticisms. The success of the mass movement for 
production in 1943 laid the foundation of Communist rule in North China. 
The Communist political strategy of mobilising every individual through 
organisation and striking at individual selfishness, was established in 
this period and is still applied to the mass movements in the stage of 
'socialist construction' . 
. · . 
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CHAPTER VII 
POLITICAL MOBILISATION OR NATIONALISM? 
THE YENAN PERIOD ASSESSED FROM THE PERSEPCTIVE 
OF THE CIVIL WAR 
The preceding chapters have examined the methods by which the 
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Chinese Communist mobilised the masses in the Yenan period and prepared 
the foundation for their accession to power. From this examination, it 
is clear that the critical factors in the Chinese Communist revolution 
both during and after the Yenan period were the mass movements launched 
after the Party rectification campaign, and the 'mass line' technique 
which the CCP finally was able to apply successfully in these mass move-
ments. Mass nationalism provoked by the Japanese invasion was an im-
portant element in Communist mass mobilisation, but should not be over-
estimated. The CCP certainly propagated anti-Japanese nationalism in 
accordance with its united front policy, and the immediate goal of 
Communist policies was the defeat of the Japanese. The united front 
policy, however, should be viewed in a broader context of the Communist 
strategy in the Chinese revolution; it is a strategy for minimising 
hostile elements and maximising friendly elements in a specific situation. 
The experience of the Yenan period should be evaluated as a part 
of the Chinese Communist revolution. Of particular importance in 
assessing the causes of the CCP' s ultimate victory was the Party's 
continuing success in mass mobilisation after the Japanese surrender, 
over much larger areas and to a far higher degree than in the Yenan 
period. This cannot be explained only by mass nationalism. Chalmers 
Johnson has concluded that the key to the question of why the CCP was 
successful in mobilising the masses in the Yenan period when it had not 
.. . 
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been able to do so in the Kiangsi period, is mass nationalism. He 
attempts to explain the CCP's success after the resistance war in 
terms of the Party's 'authority', which he argues was established 
among the masses primarily because of the Party's own nationalism, 
C:2monstrated in the resistance to Japan. Is this sufficient explanation 
for the CCP's remarkab.le success in mass mobilisation in the subsequent 
civil war? Did the masses follow the Party simply because it had 
upheld the banne:: of nationalism in the Yenan period? 
It is instructive to look briefly at mass mobilisation in the 
early Civil War period, and particularly at the CCP's land policy, 
which indicates most clearly the Party's political strategy in the 
revolution. This should help to set the Yenan period in the perspective 
both of the Communist revolution as a whole and of the Communist victory 
in th~ =ontest for power. 
1. Radicalisation of Communist Land Policy in 1945-47 
The period of the civil war from 1945 to 1949 is generally regarded 
as quite dis~inct from the Yenan period. The civil war is, of course, 
a transitional period from 'Yenan' to 'Peking', from the national united 
fcont to socialist revolution. The basic policies of the CCP were 
rapidly radicalised, as the united front with the KMT gradually collapsed. 
This process was symbolised by two notable historical events; one was 
the outbreak of the open and all-out armed struggle between the KMT and 
the CCP in July 1946, and the other was the CCP's official return to 
land revolution in October 1947 after a decade of the rent reduction, 
or non-confiscation, policy. 
In these two respects, the civil war period may seem to present a 
situation which is quite distinct from the Yenan period; but it is 
"!'JJarer;t that in many respects which were fundamental to the Chinese 
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social revolution, it was in fact a continuation of the Yenan period. 
specifically, the CCP continued to develop and apply the mass mobilisa-
tion technique in this period, without any interruption between the 
two periods. Radicalisation within the mass movement forced the CCP 
to adapt its policy, although the mass line techniques were sufficiently 
well-developed to be readily adaptable to such radicalisation. 
Contrary to the Party's assertion that in the newly liberated and 
fringe areas only moderate policies could be implemented, radicalisation 
emanated in fact from these very areas, and the Party was faced with 
difficulties in implementation of more radical policies in the old 
areas where the united front had been firmly established. This problem 
was exemplified in the Party's land policy. In the final stages of the 
anti-Japanese war, the CCP's intention was to continue the united front 
with the KMT in the period of national reconstruction after the war. 
Mao's proposal for a 'coalition government' for postwar China was not 
a temporary manoeuvre to deal with the KMT, still a powerful rival of 
the CCP. In the framework of 'coalition government' and protracted 
collaboration with the KMT, the CCP had no immediate intention of 
radicalising its land policy after the Japanese were defeated. 
The CCP's plan to maintain collaboration with the KMT was not 
un:onditional, nor did the Party trust the Central Government. The KMT 
also had become too suspicious of the CCP's intentions to be able to 
reach an agreement on coalition government. For the KMT, the Communists 
were threatening its 'legitimate' rule with military and political 
strength which had been built up 'illegally 1 during the resistance war. 
1'he CCP, in turn, mindful of the bitter experiences of the Shanghai 
coup in 1927, the extermination campaigns in the early 1930s and the 
lie•.; Fourth Army Incident in 1941, was determined to. maintain its de 
facto rule in the areas where it had established control during the war. 
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At the time of the Japanese surrender, the Communist army was in 
a better position to accept the surrender of, and to disarm, the Japan-
ese troops than was the KMT army, which was concentrated in the south-
western part of the country. The Communists promptly started to disarm 
the Japanese, ignoring instructions from Chiang Kai-shek to refrain from 
doing so. They also overcame resistance offered by Japanese troops on 
the orders of Chiang, and sent their own troops to Manchuria as soon 
as the Japanese surrender was reported. The vast region which had been 
controlled by the Japanese for about eight years thus became newly 
'liberated', and much of it subsequently came under the category of 
'fringe' areas contested by the KMT and the CCP in the civil war. It 
was in these areas that the CCP's radical land policy was revived, and 
from here the policy spread throughout the Conununist territories. 
Why was it in the new areas that radicalisation of the mass move-
ment originated, areas in which there was no experience of social or 
pulitical reform? What made these particular villagers radical, contrary 
to the Party's expectation? Why were they not politically passive as 
before. Johnson argues that the answer lies at least partly in 'nation-
alism', emphasising the use of the slogan 'Fan-chien ch'ing-suan' 
(Settle accounts with the national traitors), which was promoted exten-
1 
sively in the new areas immediately after the Japanese surrender. 
As Johnson has noted, the 'ch' ing-sw;n' was superficially nation-
alist in character. It was 'fan-chien' (a~ti-traitor) struggle, in which 
those who had collaborated with the Japanese were accused, and its 
'nationalist' character in thi& phase is undeniable. Yet there remains 
a critical question of whether compensation was demanded from the 
1 
See ~ohnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, p.198, Note 29 . 
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'traitors' for their collaboration with the invaders or for their 
increased exploitation under Japanese protection. It might be argued 
that this question is irrelevant, since the Japanese simply demanded 
larger taxes and military levies through village administrations than 
the Chinese rulers had done before, and it was customai.ily a right of 
the persons in charge of collecting taxes and levies to add a percentage 
for their own pockets. 
The question is directly relevant, however, to the problem of 
whether the peasants were motivated by nationalism or class struggle. 
If compensation was demanded primarily because the traitors had served 
the Japanese, then it was a manifestation of peasant or mass nationalism. 
lt may be, however, that the peasants felt entitled to compensation 
because they considered the exploitation by the more wealthy classes, 
in the name of the Japanese, was excessive. Since the traditional 
behavioral pattern of the ruling group was that every opportunity for 
making private profit was taken, the higher the taxes and levies imposed 
by the rulers, the more opportunities the village rulers obtained to 
exploit the villagers for their own gain. In other words, irrespective 
of the nature and degree of collaboration by individual 'traitors' 
with the Japanese, the situation in the areas which had been controlled 
by the Japanese was one in which there was heightened class antagonism 
11ithin the rural Chinese population. For this reason, the villagers 
became radical and often violent once mobilised by the Communists. 
Under the slogan of 'fan-chien ch'ing-suan', in fact, a class 
struggle was launched. The peasants demar>ded that the 'traitors', who 
\·1ere often identical with the landlords and richer people, had to pay 
compensation for their exploitation during the Japanese occupation. 
Peasant resentment against the 'traitors' was due not simply to their 
c::o llabora t ion wi. th ·::he enemy, but to their exploiting practices in the 
I 
--""'~ 
-~~~.·:~ :-·~;7·,~ ~->;;-~ ~ ~: .' <; ~;'.J: .! 
. , .... 
.. 
.· 
.. 
.· . 
I 
. · .. 
326 
name of the enemy. In fact, in all the Chieh-fang jih-pao reports on 
the 'accounts settling' movements, no 'traitor' was accused simply for 
collaboration with the Japanese. The 'traitors' were denounced and 
required to pay compensation for their personal exploitation and 'crimes', 
for which they attempted to excuse themselves by pleading the demands 
of the Japanese or the puppei administrations. 
This is not to argue that 'nationalism' had no effect on the 
'accounts settling' campaigns, but to point out that in the militant 
response of the peasants 'nationalism' was secondary to the primary 
motive of class struggle. In other words, the primary concern of the 
masses was with the increased burden imposed on them during the war, 
which often pushed them to the verge of starvation, and with the fact 
that by contrast the village leaders who collaborated with the enemy 
administrations had actually profited from their burden, or at least 
had avoided any share in their burden. The fact that the ultimate 
authority which imposed this heavier burden was non-Chinese does not 
appear to have been of vital importance to the peasant masses; even 
in those areas where it was important, where the villagers had borne 
the direct brunt of the Japanese campaigns, it was still not the vital 
factor. It is quite clearly the case that the 'accounts settling' 
campaign was a class struggle in fact, although one launched under the 
banner of 'nationalism'. 
There is little point, however, in attempting to define the 
'accounts settling' campaign as either 'nationalism' or 'class struggle', 
because the fact that the foreign invaders had tried to maintain the 
old socioeconomic order whereas the nationalist fighters sought to trans-
form it, meant that nationalist struggle was also a manifestation of 
class struggle. The two were woven in the same cloth of the Chinese 
rQvolution at that stage. But in the total perspeci:ive of the Communist 
~C:;T~:;~··"~·,~.: ·.:~p.:ir:· .;,.j'J~r-
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i·evolution, the class struggle, or socioeconomic transformation, was 
far more central than simple nationalism, and was the foundation on 
which mass mobilisation was based. 
The 'accounts settling' was a class struggle, and because of that 
it could spark off more radical class struggle, land reform. The 
method of settling accounts led inevitably to land and property distri-
bution. A su-k•u ta-hui ('speaking bitterness' meeting) at which the 
villagers spoke of what the 'traitors' had done to them and of how they 
had suffered at their hands during the Japanese occupation, was followed 
by a suan-chang ta-hui (mass meeting for settling accounts) at which the 
'crimes' of the traitors were reported both by victims and eye-witnesses, 
and those present made an assessment of the amount which should be paid 
in compensation. Some of the traitors were ordered to pay enormous 
amounts in compensation, which often exceeded the total of their dis-
posable property and meant that they were forced to give their land 
and houses to their 'victims'. 
Thus the first redistribution of land by the CCP in eight years, 
chat is since 1937, was begun without deliberate preparation by the 
f h . 1 d 1" 1 Party or a c ange in an po icy. The CCP gradually became aware of 
the relationship between the anti-traitor struggle and land reform in 
2 the last quarter of 1945. This awareness seems to have been due mainly 
1 Former Japanese-owned land distributed among the landless and land-
short peasants particularly in Manchuria was exceptional. This seems 
to have been commenced immediately after the Japanese surrender, and 
officially directed by the Northeast Bureau of the CCP Central Committee 
in Mi'!nchuria in mid-April 1946. 
2 In the issues of the Chieh-fang jih-pao from 10 August to 19 December 
1945, there are 30 reports and articles on the land problem in the new 
oreas, of which only 8 are dealt with in relation to 'anti-traitor' 
struggles, and in the same period there are 31 reports on the 'anti-
t1·ai tor' struggles, none of which mentions the land problem. These 
figures are r.ct completely accurate because t:here are many missing 
issues and some sections are unreadable, but they do reflect a general 
Lcndency, particularly by comparison with the issues from January to 
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to the Party's perception of the serious financial conditions in the 
new areas in its experience of political work in the few months after 
the Japanese surrender. The Chieh-fang jih-pao often drew the attention 
of the cadres engaged in political work in the new areas to the difference 
in conditions between the new and the old areas. 1 In most cases, the 
economic difficulties of the villagers were too serious for the Party 
to be able to mobilise them immediately for entirely new political 
objectives, such as elections. Yet the 'anti-traitor accounts· settling' 
struggle was launched with the dual purpose of improvement of the peas-
ants' livelihood and political mobilisation. 2 The Party seems to have 
learned from unsuccessful cases of mass mobilisation in the new areas, 
therefore, that the cadres had to try to help the peasants to solve 
their most urg.,,nt problems first, which were usually problems of food 
and production; political mobilisation could oniy come afterwards. 
Clearly, the Party found the peasant masses vengeful against the village 
rulers, and their primary demand was to 'settle accounts' in order to 
3 
obtain both food and the means of production, in particular, land. 
Accounts settling was generally regarded by the CCP as the most 
urgent demand of the peasant masses in the new areas, a demand which 
was both political and economic. It seems, however, that many of the 
cadres were afraid of the peasants' radicalism and tried to keep them 
within the bounds of a non-violent and moderate policy. The Central 
Footrote 2 cont'd 
June 1946 which include 98 reports and articles on the land problem, 
of which 40 icelate to 'accounts settling'. These 40 are also out of 
'.i7 reports and articles on the 'anti-traitor' in the same period. 
l See several examples in CFJP, 17 September 1945. 
" A typical example is given in Fan I, "Lan hsien chieh-fang hou fa-
tung ch' um·chung chung ti chi-ke wen-t' i" (Several Questions in Mass 
;.J'bi lisa ti on After the Liberation of Lan Hsi en) , CFJP, 18 September 1945. 
3 See for example the cases in T'aihang Region, CFJP, 3 Octo~er 1945 . 
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conunittee had to issue directives and circulars calling on the cadres 
in the new areas to mobilise the masses boldly, or fang-shou fa-tung 
1 
ch'Un-chung. This indicates a resolve on the part of the CCP to 
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stand with the masses even at the risk of destroying the united front 
with the KMT. The May Fourth Directive of the Central Committee on 
land policy was issued against this background. 
~'he May Fourth Directive, issued in 1946, 2 was vague in character, 
indicating a certain hesitation concerning policy changes on the land 
problem and the united front. 3 Although the directive declared that the 
Party would resolutely sup~ort and lead land reform movements which 
had been developing in the liberated areas, the concrete methods of 
changing land ownership suggested in the directive, with the exception 
of the land belonging to 'big traitors' (ta-han-chien) , did not include 
unconditional confiscation and distribution of landlords' land. Further-
more, about one half of the directive was devoted to stipulations on 
the protection of middle and small landlords, rich peasants and 'enlight-
ened' landlords. The CCP appears to have been seeking an effective 
9olitical strategy to maintain the multi-class united front, which 
included the landlords, to defeat the KMT in corning civil war. In 
July 1946, for example, when an all-out war with the KMT was considered 
inevitable, Mao Tse-tung stated in an inner-Party directive: 
1 
See the two editorials of the Chieh-fang jih-pao on this subject, 
9 January and 20 February 1946. The slogan 'fang-shou fa-tung ch'Un-
chung' became the first concern of the cadres in charge of mass mobilisa-
tion work from 1946 onwards, especially in the new areas. This slogan 
\·1as revived in the Cultural Revolution. 
2 
'I'his was an inner-Party directive and was kept secret; the full 
text has never been publicised ofiicially by the CCP. For the text, 
see Li Ming-hua, op.cit., pp.208-214. 
3 
On the vague character of the May Fourth Directive, even a Chinese 
Communist source states that it made immediate land reform impossible. 
See Ch'i Wu, op.cit., pp.278-279. 
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In order to smash Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, we must cooperate 
closely with the masses of the people, and win over all who can 
be won over. In the rural areas, on the one hand, we should 
resolutely solve the land problem, rely firmly on the farm 
labourers and poor peasants and unite with the middle peasants; 
on the other hand, when solving the land problem, we should 
distinguish the ordinary rich peasants and middle and small land-
lords from the traitors, bad gentry and local tyrants .... In places 
where the land problem has already been solved, we should change 
to a moderate attitude towards the landlord class, as a whole, 
with the exception of a few reactionaries. In order to reduce the 
number of hostile elements and to consolidate the Liberated Areas, 
we should help all those landlords who have difficulty in making 
a living and induce runaway l~ndlords to return and give them an 
opportunity to earn a living. 
In other words, Mao's view was that the multi-class united front devel-
oped by the CCP during the anti-Japanese war would still be an effective 
political strategy in the civil war with the KMT. Admitting the necess-
ity of land reform for mobilisation of the peasant masses, he attempted 
to avoid antagonising the rich peasant and landlord classes. All pol-
icies in the Communist areas were to concentrate on winning over the 
broadest possible section of the people, minimising the number of 
host L le elements, consolidating the liberated areas and destroying 
Chiang Kai-shek's offensive. This explains the vagueness of the May 
n h D. . 2 rourt irect1ve. 
In the last half of 1946, the land policy of the CCP became more 
raa;.cal and advanced toward the general land reform policy enunciated 
in the Draft Land Law enacted in October 1947. Radicalisation in this 
pe,.-1od again originated in the fringe areas, where the KMT and the CCP 
1·1ere competing. In the May Fourth directive, the Central Committee 
1 
"Smash Chiang Kao-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defence," 
20 Ju1y 1946, Nao, IV, pp.89-90. This was the first official document 
of the CCP that indicated the Party's decision to defend itself against 
the YJ•l'r' s mi 1 i tary actions. 
2 
'ro say tLc't it is vague in character is not to deny the fundamental 
purpose of 'elimination of feu~alist exploitation', that is land 
reform. The directive of the Central China Subbureau of the Central 
Co:nrnittee dated 18 May 1946 states this point more explicitly . 
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asserted that it would be difficult to implement land reform policy 
in the new areas where political or economic reform had not been 
experienced by the inhabitants. The reality was quite the reverse. 
It was in the new and contested areas that radical measures in land 
policy were taken for the first time; the Central Committee ratified 
,nd foliowed the radical practices in these areas instead of suppressing 
them. 
Even after the May Fourth directive, the rent reduction policy 
was not abandoned, but its significance was drastically reduced because 
rent reduction was intended to apply to land which remained the property 
1 
of landlords and rich peasants after the accounts settling struggle. 
After the civil war started, however, rent reduction became virtually 
redundant in the process of radicalisation of the land struggles. It 
was at this time that it became obvious that the peasants in the fringe 
areas were the most radical in the accounts settling and land reform 
struggles. The accounts settling (known now simply as suan-chang) after 
th,, beginning of the civil war had nothing to do with nationalism; it 
1·1as no longer 'anti-traitor'. In the struggle meetings, the assessment 
of the landlords' crimes was not limited to the period of the war or 
Japanese occupation; it often went back through generations to the 
Imperial era. 
In the first year of the civil war the KMT armies pushed the CCP 
back to the rural areas. In the fringe areas now called chieh-ti ti-ch'l.i 
(front areas), the accounts settling struggles had to be completed 
1·1i thin a short time and the peasant masses armed to carry on the 
1 
The SKN Border Region and some old base areas were once again 
exceptional. The land reform was carried out in the form of donation 
Qf land by the landlords to the peasants associations and also of 
government 1•urchase of landlords' land. 
I 
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struggle by thetnselves, since the regular Communist armies were not 
able! to defend them from the landlords' private armed forces, hua11-
J1siang-t 'uan (back-to-the-village corps) 1 or from the KMT troops. 'l'he 
anti-landlord struggles in the front areas thus became directly linked 
with the civil war. To the peasants in these areas, the civil war was 
to all intents and purposes a class war or a nation-wide class struggle 
between the landlords and the peasant masses. 
Towards the end of 1946, the Central Committee was prepared to 
encourage radical class struggle in the front areas, in the realisation 
that only radical land reform could n-.obilise the peasants effectively 
for the civil war. On 1 October 194fi, Mao stated in his inner-Party 
direc:tive: 
rn the comins few months all areas, no matter how they are busy 
with the war, must resolutely lead the peasant masses to solve 
the land problem and, on the basis of the land reform, 1:[ake 
arrangements for large-scale production work next year. 
Account settling struggles on the battlefields do not seem to have• been 
unc·,mmon, and were approved and encouraged by the Central Committee. 
111 a Chieh-fang jih-pao editorial in December 1946 a variety of 
methods 'to take rifle in one hand and redistribute land with the other' 
were praised as representing the 'unity of self-defence war and land 
,,,They (the peasants in the front areas) created such methods 
as fighting guerrilla warfare on th': one 3han~ an~ 'settli~g 
accounts' in the shade of the kao-l1ang; fighting guerrilla 
warfare in the daytime and settling accounts at night; men 
figh':ing and women. settlin~ accounts; and fighting in turn and 
settling accounts in turn. 
-----[ 
iludn-hsiang-t' uan were organised by the landlords who fled the 
villages_ 
' 
"r. 'l'hr·ee Months' Summary," Mao, IV, p.116. 
3 
~Jo-liany is a type of corn, one of the most widespread food grains 
; n Ne rth China, v1hich provided •green curtains 1 for the guerrillas 
•lur1ny the resistar-" The Japanese forbade the peasants to grow it, 
'''" llcularly where tt" J·uerrillas were active. 
4 
"llsiin-su wan-ch' eng t' u-ti kai-k~" (Complete the Land Reform Quickly), 
~ .:.~.·.y·::;1T'!\::;r;:,;.! 
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The same editorial justifies the unity of war and land reform 
by pointing out that it was the masses who joined the army and their 
morale was high wherever land reform had been carried out well. 
similarly, land reform was c~rried out well wherever the war had been 
fought well. It concludes: "'!'he war of self-defence seriously 
demands vigorous revolutionary energy, and it is land reform that is 
l the origin of such revolutionary energy." 
There is no indication here of a desire on the parti of the CCP to 
keep the multi-class united front going; rather, there was a de~ermina-
tion to carry out a rigorous programme of land redistribution in order 
to defeat the KMT. The CCP's new concept of the unity of war and land 
reform represents an admission that the fringe areas had to be more 
advanced in class struggle and social reform if the war effort was to 
be maintained. In other words, mass mobilisation was linked directly 
to the class struggle in the villages; in effect, it was synonymous 
with land redistribution in the new areas in this stage. The fact 
that land reform in the new areas was mostly completed before the 1947 
spring ploughing, 2 during which time the peasants had also been 
fighting the KMT troops, is an indication of how rapidly it proceeded. 
In sum, the CCP's policy change in mass mobilisation in the Civil 
\var period followed the radical practice of the masses in the newly 
liberated or front areas. In the last half of 1946 and the first 
half of 1947, the CCP suffered successive defeats at the hands of the 
Footnote 4 cont'd 
editorial, CFJP, 14 December 1946, reprinted in Ch'un-chung (Masses 
\·leeklyl, Vol. 13, No. 10 (13 December 1946), pp.14-15. 
1 
Ibid. 
2 
Rapid implementation of land reform resulted in malpractices in 
land r~distribution. The mass line was not carried out correctly; 
bureaucratism was still a problem, and cadres often demanded privileges 
in land distribution. The CCP had to launch another mass campaign 
for correcting these 'erroneous' practices. 
I 
1 
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K!·IT and retreated to the rural areas. This war situation created new 
front areas throughout North China, and accelerated radicalisation of 
the land reform policy of the CCP. In the front areas in the Civil 
war, the thesis that the armeJ revolution fights the armed counterrevolu-
tion was put into practice; the class nature of the war was illustrated 
dramatically to the peasant masses. 
It may be argued that the radicalisation of the mass movements in 
the new areas was caused by mass nationalism aroused by the Japanese 
presence during the resistance war. As shown above, however, in the 
anti-traitor mass movement, the 'traitors' were denounced primarily for 
their exploitation and the 'crimes' committed under the Japanese protec-
tion rather than for simple collaboration with the Japanese. The anti-
traitor struggle was essentially a class struggle, reflecting the 
character of the resistance war itself, which was a class war fought 
over the socioeconomic system in rural China. 
This is why the target of the mass struggle was easily extended 
from the 'traitors' to the landlords in general and to the gentry after 
the open armed rift between the CCP and the KMT, with the same mass 
mobilisation techniques such as 'su-k'u' and 'suan-chang'. Radicalisation 
of mass movements 1n the fringe areas in the civil war illustrates the 
class nature of the mass struggle more clearly. The fringe areas, which 
in 1946 and the first half of 1947 were expanded dramatically, to 
include even the old Communist base areas, saw the same radicalisation 
procesF in the mass movements. At this stage the Communists no longer 
hesitated to mobilise the masses for general land reform, since they had 
perceived that nationalism as a symbol did not work for mass mobilisation 
rn the civil war, although they constantly protested about United States 
ass .i stance to the KMT. This nationalist propaganda was directed mainly 
to· .. :c,rd the educated people in the KMT areas. American assistance to the 
.oi;,":'; .:·1f'./, f,;•; :,;r;;·n;·::(#,'; 
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Kl-l'l' aid not in 10Lude the dispatch of field troops, and the American 
;;resence was not so obvious to the peasants as the Japanese presence 
nad been in the resistance war. 
The whole development of mass mobilisation in the civil war suggests 
i:iial the Y6'ne.n mass mobilisation can be explained primarily in socio-
economic terms, even though nationalism may have been one factor. In 
1-i1e following section this point is examined further, from the perspective 
of the Chinese Communist revolution as a whole. 
2 The Chinese-Japanese War in the History of the Chinese 
Revolution 
The evidence of mass mobilisation in the civil war illustrates 
the point that the peasant movements were essentially a manifestation 
of class s•ruggle, even though they were sometimes dressed with the 
slogans of nationalism. It has not been the intention of this study 
w argue that nationalism had no effect on mass mobilisation during 
ond after the war. But there still remains the question posed above: 
ho\'/ can the radical and often violent nature of land reform in the front 
areas in the civil war be explained, if mass mobilisation during the 
resistance was motivated mainly by nationalism? Why did the peasant 
masses so quickly turn the spearhead of their attack from the imperialist 
'rivaders to the class enemies? Chalmers Johnson argues that Communist 
e'o _·rce;ss c,fter the resistance rested on the fact that they had already 
established a legitimate authority during the resistance, through thei.r 
r1wco111promising anti-Japanese nationalism. The peasants, therefore, 
'"'"epted the Communists as the legitimate leaders of Chinese nationalism, 
ar.d tl11s justified and provided popular support for the leadership role 
"s°'"'"d by ':he CCP during and after the war. The peasants cooperated 
'··.-_!: c!i.c CCP because they saw it as the legitimate leader. 1 
---·--
·----
.i.•l:rJSon, op.cit., pp.9-10 . 
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Johnson's argument still does not explain why the peasants in the 
fringe or front areas in the civil war became radical earlier than in 
the old and established Communist areas, or why their radicalism was 
spontaneous rather than inspired by the Communists. This is the fund-
3mental question in the debate on the place of the anti-Japanese war in 
the history of the Chinese revolution. In the context of the development 
of the social revolution in China since the beginning of this century, 
this is not simply a question of a war between the two nations. Japan, 
which had followed the European way of modernisation, began her invasion 
as an ordinary war, in the belief that she could conquer China within 
a shore period because of the superior training and equipment of her 
troops. For the Chinese Communists, however, war had long been a part 
~r their experience, since 1924, and so could the resistance be. A 
•.-1ar, whoever the enemy, could not interrupt the revolution but could 
accelerate it, because a war helped to liquidate the existing social 
system and, because it necessitated rapid mass mobilisation simply for 
sucv1val, served the CCP's fundamental purpose of revolutionary mobfli-
sat:cn. The anti-Japanese war was no exception in working in this way 
simply because it. was on a larger scale, both geographically and socio-
~conomical ly, than previous wars. 
For the CCP, a common feature of all the wars in which it was 
•.nvolved was their class nature; the Party's enemies aimed, therefo:i:e, 
at ann1h1lating it completely, and usually they were better equipped 
an~ numerically superio~. The CCP had to adhere to its socioeconomic 
!J''Jgrammes, because they were the only means by which the Party could 
nope to muster support to survive the wars. All policies, strategies 
ond techniques in the Communist revolution were designed to release mass 
energy from 1:he bounds of the old social, economic and political ties, 
be,-crnse the Party could not otherwise survive. In other words, the Party 
'::: 
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needed socloeconomic reform, as did the suffering majority in China. 
Mass mobilisation by the CCP also aimed, of course, at a more 
arnbltious goal, at what the 1911 revolution and the KMT revolution in 
early 1920s had not been able to achieve, that is, socioeconomic trans-
:•:.·rmation at the basic level. This was the essence of the Communist 
r~volution, and an indispensable part of this was transformation of 
the social values and behaviour of the people. Mass politicisation was 
both a prerequisite for and a result of socioeconomic transformation; 
it was also an important step to the next highest stage of the revolution. 
This is why the Party strove so hard to develop methods and techniques 
of mass mobilisation, and the Yenan period coincided with the completion 
of its conceptualising of these methods and techniques. 
The resistance period in Chinese Communist history has often been 
regarded by China scholars as a distinct or exceptional period, mainly 
because of the KMT-CCP collaboration and the CCP's moderate policies. 
To make such a distinction between the Yenan period and other periods 
of CCP history is to create considerable confusion in understanding 
these other pen.ads, especially the civil war period. It is of the 
greatest importance, therefore, that attention should be focussed on 
policy implementation at the basic level of society, rather than on the 
1 general programmes and policies announced at the top, since the Chinese 
revolution has been a radical social revolution. From the actual 
practice and experience of the CCP at the basic level of society, there 
is more continuity than distinction between the Yenan period and the 
•civil war period. 
l 
'l'he official policy of the CCP was not always identical to the prac-
t t·~e at the level of implementation in the villages. For example, 
iand owned by 'traitors' was first distributed to landless peasants 
and unemployed workers in the last quarter cf 1945, despite the CCP's 
cf he ial land policy, which did not permit redis.tribution of land. 
~· : . 
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In the civil war period, it is clear that the same revolution was 
being carried on as during the Yenan period, if in a different form. 
The Japanese invasion gave the CCP an opportunity to mobilise national-
ism among the educated classes, who were more conscious about their 
nation than the peasants, and, to a much lesser extent, among the 
peasants, especially in the contested areas. But, it would be misleading 
to overstress the nationalist cause. For example, in the CCP's most 
successful mass movement in the Yenan period, the production drive, the 
Chieh-fang jih-pao concentrated its propaganda efforts on appeals to 
material interests rather than to such a vague ideology as nationalism. 
I Nationalism was propagated as an accompaniment to the material, and sometimes political, benefits gained by the peasants in the initial 
mobilisation. Even in the contested areas, the anti-Japanese war was 
waged by the l·:>cal peasants as a defence of their lives and property. 
For this reason, mass mobilisation did not lose momentum after the 
collapse of Japan. The class nature of the resistance war and the mass 
mobilisation carried on during that war, which had been partly obscured 
by anti-Japanese nationalism, was fully revealed in the civil war. The 
CCP was able to continue to develop mass mobilisation in the civil war, 
using the same techniques as in the Yenan period. The basic nature of 
mass mobilisation remained unchanged, but the enemy against which the 
peasants were defending the fruits of mobilisation was no longer the 
same. The nationalist cause could not be so effective as in the anti-
Japanese war, since the new enemy was not a foreign invader even though 
it was helped by another foreign power. In sum, the revolution was a 
social revolution changed at the Japanese surrender. 
Relevant to this point is Mao's concept of the united front; that 
is, the CCP, the vanguard of the Chinese revolution, should unite with 
the secondary enemies of the revolution to isolate and destroy the 
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pr:mary enemy. During the Yenan period the primary enemy was Japan and 
the KMT was one of the secondary enemies which had common cause to 
fight Japan with the CCP. The KMT subsequently became the primary 
enemy, to be isolated and de:stroyed. At the village level during the 
resistance, the primary enemies were the traitors. As the CCP became 
increasingly hostile to the KMT and the civil war biroke out, first the 
big landlords, and then the middle and small landlords gradually became 
the primary enemies of the revolution. 
We should not, of course, overlook another aspect of the Chinese 
Communist revolution, anti-imperialism. The CCP maintained that 
Chinese society was semi-feudal and semi-colonial, and that the character 
of the revolution was anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. The resistance 
to Japan was a typical anti-imperialist revolutionary war. To the CCP, 
however, anti-imperialism was not merely a nationalist demand to free 
China from the economic and political control of the great powers; the 
anti-feudal and anti-imperialist tasks of the revolution were closely 
interrelated. Foreign control over China rested on the feudal social 
system, and the feudal rulers of society had been profiting from foreign 
control. Neither imperialists nor feudalists wanted powerful central 
yo•1ernment supported by the people. Mass mobilisation was the only way 
111 which the two objectives could be pursued at the same time and an 
1nt•:,g1·ated and powerful nation-state of China could be established. 1 
The dual tasks of the revolution were integrated in practice in 
mass mobilisation. Anti-feudal revolution, that is, a drastic change 
w productiot1 relations in rural China, was necessary to mobilise the 
Lo.sic peasant.>, The mass production movement was important in bringing 
1----
l t is matter of coui:se that Mao put "building an independent, free, 
·:cmo.:ratic, united, prospei:ous and powerful new China" in his "On 
· '•Olit1on Government" as the postwar task of reconstruction. 
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about a change in production relations. The anti-imperialist task, 
during the Yenan period, was represented by the defence of the political 
and economic gains obtained by the peasants in the mass movements against 
the Japanese 'imperialists'. The benefits to be defended included the 
Communist government system, in which the peasant masses were now 
involved. 
Psychological involvement was the crux of mass mobilisation. The 
series of mass movements launched in the last three years of the war 
was designed to involve everyone in the rural population in the Communist 
areas. Although all the mass movements were not usually 'class' in 
nature, mass participation itself represented the class interests of 
the basic peasants. As a means of sustaining in the peasants a sense 
of participation, the production campaign and the organisation of pro-
duction were ideal; they were continued all-ye&r-round and involved the 
daily life of the people, as distinct from short-lived movements such as 
election campaigns. 
Although the CCP generally avoided propaganda on the class struggle, 
mass mobilisation in the Yenan period was essentially of a class nature. 
l''Jr example, the most immediate purpose of the production drive was not 
to change social relations, but to raise living standards in the 
Communist areas. Nobody mentioned its class nature. But in practice, 
the basic peasants, who were deeply involved in the network of produc-
t1on organisations, became closer to the government and the Party, as 
well as active both in production and politics. Organisation and 
economic activities gave the peasants enormous confidence in their own 
)?ower and in the Communist government. The economic and political power 
of the basic peasants undermined the landlord-gentry rule in the villages. 
l-sy•:ho logical revolution, or transformation of the peasants' value 
s:•stem, inev 1 tably fallowed. We should not overlook an important 
·····.· 
:•. :_. -· , .. : ., ..... 
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aspect of the production drive, the tangible economic benefit to the 
peasants. In other words, they obtained something to defend in the 
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war, and the CCP used this fact, symbolised by the slogan 'Pao-wei chia-
hsiang, pao-wei feng-i tsu-shi ti sheng-huo' (Defend your home, defend 
your life of abundant cloth and sufficient food), for military mobilisa-
tion after the: commencer .. ent of. the production drive. 
Although the Communists maintained that the national contradiction 
between China and Japan was great and urgent and the class contradiction 
within China was subordinate, the national contradiction did not elimin-
ate, nor did it even reduce, the class contradiction. Nor did the 
Conununists ignore the class basis in mobilising the peasants; mass 
mob1l1sation would not have been possible if they had ignored class 
contradictions. It is important not to misinterpret the role of the 
Japanese invasion, or the CCP's vocal promotion of nationalism and the 
united front, since this may result in underestimating the class nature 
of the resistance and of the CCP's mass mobilisation. 
The legitimacy of Communist authority was established in the 
resistance, as Chalmers Johnson has argued, but it Nas not merely 
because of the CCP's uncompromising nationalism. For urban intellectuals, 
CCP nationalism may have been crucial in persuading them to transfer 
cheir support from the KMT to the CCP. Among the basic peasants on 
whose energy the CCP finally came to power, however, the primary reason 
for supporting the Party was its line of social revolution or class 
struggle. This is why mass mobilisation continued to be successful 
in the civil war, and also why the Yenan spirit was deliberately revived 
and propagated even after 1949. 
.,, 
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